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Foreword
Access to land remains central to the livelihoods of Melanesians. 
I welcome this important volume and the contribution that it makes to 
the discussion of land issues in the Melanesian region.
The movement for independence in various Melanesian countries was 
galvanised by the demand to return alienated land to the indigenous 
populations. The constitutions of Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and 
Solomon Islands reflect this aspiration by retaining customary control 
over most land. In Vanuatu, for example, the Constitution has specifically 
maintained the jurisdiction of customary institutions over land. Since 
Independence, however, customary land has again been parcelled, 
commodified and leased. The recent land rush in Papua New Guinea 
and in Vanuatu demonstrate the potential impacts of land leasing on the 
customary system. These land transformations are discussed at length in 
this publication, and as such the volume offers important insights into 
understanding land issues in Melanesia.
A number of chapters in this volume deal with the implications of 
increasing urbanisation across Melanesia. While the problems associated 
with urbanisation look different across the region, all countries have faced 
challenges in trying to provide suitable land for the expanding populations 
around urban centres. These are difficult issues, but Melanesian policy 
makers must recognise that not everyone living in urban areas has an island 
or village to which they can return. The state has an obligation to try and 
provide its population with access to urban services, and necessarily this 
will involve the creation of new state land through the acquisition of new 
areas of customary land, which often requires substantial funds.
In discussing urbanisation in the Melanesian region, I think we need to 
challenge the idea of ‘squatter’ settlements on customary land. In my 
experience in Vanuatu, very few people are ‘squatters’ on customary land; 
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almost everyone has an agreement that they have entered into that allows 
them to live on the land. When people with customary agreements are 
evicted, I believe there is a role for the state in trying to relocate people 
and find them alternative areas of land to live on.
The research in this book contributes greatly to our understanding of 
how  people are living on land in Melanesia in urban, peri-urban and 
rural areas. Many of the chapters in this book describe the various forms 
of transactions that take place over land, from customary agreements to 
formal leasing.
Policy makers from the Melanesian region need to learn from applied case 
studies of land issues in their own countries, and more broadly from across 
the region. Research findings must always be condensed into a form that 
policy makers can read and learn from. As such, I am pleased that this is 
an open-access digital publication, which should make it widely available 
throughout Melanesia.
I am delighted to see the large number of Melanesian women represented 
in this volume, and of Melanesian voices more broadly. It is essential that 
people from the region write about land issues in their own countries. It is 
important to see our own academics and practitioners writing about land 
issues that are so central to our Melanesian identity.
I commend the essays in this volume to anyone interested in the future 
of people living in the Melanesian region. Access to land is central to 
sustainable development. Maintaining adequate land access is a major 
social justice issue. Land is essential to the maintenance of kastom, kinship 
structures and language. The title of this book encapsulates the way in 
which people across Melanesia today find themselves at a crossroads, 
caught between the idea of land as property and the concept of land 







Powers of Exclusion in Melanesia
Colin Filer, Siobhan McDonnell and Matthew G . Allen
Introduction
In the recent explosion of academic literature devoted to the study 
of what has been described as a new global ‘land rush’ or ‘land grab’, 
reference is often made to the process that Karl Marx called ‘primitive 
accumulation’, and especially to his observation that ‘[t]the expropriation 
of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil is the basis of 
the whole process’ (Marx 1976: 876). That is because the new ‘land rush’ 
or ‘land grab’ is sometimes understood as a process that has resulted from 
a massive increase in the amount of transnational investment in large-scale 
agricultural projects, especially in ‘developing’ countries where peasant 
farmers constitute a large part of the rural population (Cotula et al. 2009; 
Borras and Franco 2010; Deininger and Byerlee 2010; Zoomers 2010; 
Alden Wily 2011; Oxfam 2011). This can be construed as the agrarian 
aspect of a global process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 
2003), since it entails the foreign acquisition of land rights previously held 
by local or indigenous communities. However, many scholars have argued 
that the idea of a generic ‘global land grab’ conceals a wide variety of more 
specific types of social, political and economic change in the distribution 
of landed property (Peluso and Lund 2011; Borras and Franco 2013; 
Hall 2013; Wolford et al. 2013). In this respect, they echo the point that 
Marx himself made when he said that the process of separating peasants 
from land ‘assumes different aspects in different countries, and runs through 
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its phases in different orders of succession, and at different historical 
epochs’ (Marx 1976: 876). But beyond this, many scholars also argue that 
the ideas of ‘expropriation’ and ‘dispossession’ do not suffice to describe 
or explain the changes that are actually taking place in the distribution of 
landed property in different parts of the contemporary world.
In their book, Powers of Exclusion, Derek Hall, Philip Hirsch and Tania 
Murray Li argue that the concept of ‘exclusion’ is rather more useful as 
a point of entry to understanding the variety of such transformations in 
the countries of Southeast Asia. They define exclusion as a generic form of 
social process that has the effect of transforming landed property relations 
at various geographical scales or levels of political organisation. However, 
they do not define it as the opposite of a social process of inclusion, but as 
a process that consists of a denial of access to previous, current or potential 
users of the land in question (Hall et al. 2011: 7). In this respect, they 
regard it as an essential condition of any form of landed property or 
productive land use in any part of the world at any moment in history. 
But while this process may take a variety of specific forms in certain 
places at certain times, it is always a process that is ‘structured by power 
relations’ (ibid.: 4) that are understood to be broader than property rights 
(ibid.:  8). Specific forms of exclusion are therefore related to different 
forms of power.
The aim of the present volume is to test the application of their conceptual 
framework, which we shall henceforth call the Exclusion Framework, 
to the neighbouring region of Melanesia. The countries with which we 
are mainly concerned in this volume are the four Melanesian Spearhead 
states—Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and 
Fiji. Given our interest in the relationship between state formation and 
transformations of landed property, we have excluded consideration 
of New Caledonia (still a French territory), Papua and West Papua 
(two provinces of Indonesia) and the islands of the Torres Strait (in the 
Australian state of Queensland). The combined population of the four 
Spearhead states is less than 10 million, which is very much smaller than 
the total population of the Southeast Asian nations in which Hall, Hirsch 
and Li situate their argument. It is not clear whether this difference in 
scale makes any difference to the suitability of any conceptual framework 
for finding answers to the ‘land question’, but there is no doubting the 
political and economic significance of this question in the Melanesian 
regional context.
3
1 . POWERS OF ExCLUSION IN MELANESIA
The chapters in this volume derive from a collection of papers presented 
at a workshop designed to consider land transformations in Melanesia 
in light of the Exclusion Framework. The workshop was held during the 
biennial conference of the Australian Association for the Advancement 
of Pacific Studies in April 2014. It was chaired by Vanuatu’s Minister 
for Lands, Ralph Regenvanu, and was also addressed by PNG’s High 
Commissioner to Australia, Charles Lepani. The workshop was attended 
by academics, policy makers, advocates and activists, and functioned as 
an engaged space for policy discussion around land issues in Melanesia. 
During the workshop, Minister Regenvanu and High Commissioner 
Lepani challenged scholars to present their research on important land 
issues in a way that would be accessible to policy makers in Melanesia. 
This volume constitutes a response to that challenge.
The authors of papers presented at the workshop were asked to deal with 
one or more of a range of questions derived from our reading of the 
Exclusion Framework:
1. Who are the actors promoting or opposing key changes in landed 
property relations?
2. Who wins and who loses as a result of the changes that actually take 
place?
3. How are specific types of change informed by particular political 
or historical contexts?
4. Is it possible to identify processes of inclusion, as well as exclusion, 
in a broader process of transformation?
5. Does the transformation of landed property look different at different 
levels of political or social organisation?
6. What is the role of the state in changing the relationship between 
people and landscapes?
7. How is the transformation of landed property related to the process 
of state formation?
In the remainder of this introduction, we elaborate on the ways in which 
such questions may be addressed in the Melanesian context. The nature 
of the Exclusion Framework itself entails that we divide this discussion 
into two main parts. The first has to do with the way in which property 
relations are conceived as social relations, and, therefore, the way in which 
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the transformation of property relations is conceived as a type of social 
process. The second has to do with the way that power is exercised in this 
type of social process.
Land, Property and Society
Hall, Hirsch and Li name seven different types of exclusion by reference 
to the types of people involved and the types of things they do:
1. ‘Licensed exclusion’ is a process by which governments award legal 
land titles to some people but not others (Hall et al. 2011: 27).
2. ‘Ambient exclusion’ is a process by which people are denied access to 
land that is reserved for the ‘common good’ or ‘public interest’ (most 
notably in the form of protected areas) (ibid.: 60).
3. ‘Self-exclusion’ is a process by which ‘local communities’ are persuaded 
to limit the use of the land that they already occupy (as in various 
forms of ‘community-based natural resource management’) (ibid.: 71).
4. ‘Volatile exclusion’ is a process by which small farmers lose access to 
large areas of land that are converted to a single land use to meet the 
market demand for specific agricultural commodities (ibid.: 111).
5. ‘Post-agrarian exclusion’ is a process by which small farmers lose 
access to agricultural land that is converted to non-agricultural use 
(ibid.: 118).
6. ‘Intimate exclusion’ is a process by which villagers exclude relatives or 
neighbours from land to which they formerly had access (ibid.: 145).
7. ‘Counter-exclusion’ is a process by which poor people (or indigenous 
people) resist their own dispossession or repossess land from which 
they have previously been excluded (ibid.: 172).
They do not claim that this is an exhaustive list of all the specific forms 
of exclusion that can be found in the countries of Southeast Asia. There 
seems to be a fairly obvious bias towards the forms of exclusion that can 
be found in rural areas. All of these processes have been documented in 
Melanesia, and some are documented in this volume. The question we ask 
is whether this sort of typology is the best way to understand the current 
transformation of landed property relations as a universal phenomenon. 
Although we pose this as a question about Melanesia, we do not assume or 
propose that Melanesia has some unique social or cultural characteristics 
5
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that entail a special answer to this question. Whatever the relationship 
between land, property and society in the recent history of this particular 
region, some aspects of this relationship are likely to be found in other 
regions as well. What we aim to do here is to unpack some of the concepts 
conventionally applied to an understanding of this relationship and see 
whether the Melanesian evidence makes more sense if we add the concept 
of exclusion to the mix.
Property Relations
Property is conventionally understood as a bundle of rights in resources 
that are necessarily embedded in the social relations through which some 
people do or do not recognise the rights of other people (Blomley 2003; 
von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006). All property relations, including 
landed property relations, are therefore social relations, although many 
social relations are not property relations. At the same time, it can be 
argued that the very concept of property conceals social relations 
(between people) by representing them as rights that people can exercise 
independently of each other (Rose 1994). In the four Spearhead states 
of Melanesia, this concealment is accomplished by the Western legal 
principle known as Torrens Title, whereby the act of registration creates 
an ‘indefeasible’ private property right that trumps all customary rights of 
access to a circumscribed area of land, and thus constitutes the legal basis 
for the use of state power as a power of exclusion (see Chapters 3 and 9, 
this volume). This is an instance of what Hall, Hirsch and Li call ‘licensed 
exclusion’.
In his analysis of commodity fetishism, Marx elaborated on this idea 
of concealment by proposing that social relations between people in 
a market (or capitalist) economy are completely disguised as economic 
relations between commodities. Following this line of argument, many 
anthropologists would argue that there was no (abstract) concept of 
property in traditional Melanesian societies, even if there were all sorts 
of  economic transactions between people, some of which (like barter) 
were quite impersonal, and some of which could involve the alienation 
of what might be described as ‘land rights’ (Carrier 1998).
We have no quarrel with the idea that property relations should be 
conceived as a set of social processes rather than a set of ‘things’ that 
are either present or absent in a certain type of economy or society. 
This remains the case when a traditional society is somehow combined 
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with a capitalist economy. The question is whether the generic concept 
of exclusion, rather than some alternative concept like alienation, throws 
more light on the place of landed property relations in this combination.
Hall, Hirsch and Li try to avoid the reduction of social relations to what 
Marx or Weber would recognise as class relations, even though they are 
dealing with transformations of landed property. That is because social 
classes have traditionally been distinguished as the parties to an economic 
relationship that only has two sides to it. An example would be the 
distinction between landlords and tenants as two sides to the economic 
relationship represented by the payment of rent, or the distinction between 
capital and labour as two sides to the economic relationship represented 
by the payment of wages.
Marx defined the social relations of production as a combination of 
property relations and labour relations. Hall, Hirsch and Li are less 
concerned with the combination of these two types of social relation, and 
more concerned to show that the transformation of property relations 
may involve more than two classes of people (or social actors) in a single 
social process, especially when that process is analysed at more than 
one geographical scale or political level. They are trying to get beyond 
the traditional Marxist analysis of agrarian class formation or social 
differentiation at the level of the village, involving landlords and tenants, 
merchants and moneylenders, or rich and poor peasants.
Nineteenth-century social theorists were much impressed by the seeming 
impersonality of market forces in a capitalist economy. Marx himself 
distinguished between social relations—by which he meant relations 
between social classes—and what he called ‘personal and local’ relations. 
This was similar to the distinction that other social scientists have made 
between society and community, where local communities are built out of 
personal (or ‘face-to-face’) relations such as friendship, kinship or patron–
client relations. While Marx might have seen the distinction between 
economy and society as a product of capitalist (or liberal) ideology, 
this second distinction has been institutionalised in the separation of 
economics from sociology as two distinct branches of social science. 
Polanyi (2001) reacted against this second distinction by insisting that all 
economies are ‘embedded’ in societies, by which he meant that economic 
processes are a subset of social processes, while social relations include 
both economic and personal relations.
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If economic relations are regarded as a subset of social relations, then it 
is hard to maintain the argument that all social relations are also class 
relations. In a broader definition of social relations, it can instead be argued 
that social relations are the relations constructed between the different 
characters who participate in specific social (or economic) processes. 
In  a  Melanesian social context, the separation of social and economic 
relations from personal relations is nowhere near as complete as it is in 
the idealised model of a capitalist economy. What some scholars describe 
as a  ‘moral economy’ (Gregory 1982; Ballard 1997) or a ‘relational 
economy’ (Curry and Koczberski 2009) could otherwise be described as 
a type of society (or community) in which economic relations are also 
personal relations.
Anthropologists have come to use the word ‘transaction’ as a broad label 
for traditional or pre-capitalist social relations that perform economic 
functions—or what Maurice Godelier (1986) would call the functions 
of relations of production—without having any obvious counterpart in 
a modern capitalist economy. The various forms of ‘gift exchange’ would 
constitute an obvious example in the Melanesian context (Strathern 
1996, 1999). These could be described as economic relations if it were 
not for the argument that there was no separation of economy from 
society (or  economic from social relations) in pre-capitalist societies, 
and it is certainly not possible to see any such separation in traditional 
Melanesian societies.
How then should we describe the relationship between different types of 
transaction in land and the different types of social process designated by 
words like exclusion, dispossession or expropriation? In our view, this is 
essentially a question of spatial and temporal scale. It may take weeks or 
months (or even years) for different actors to negotiate the sale or lease of 
a particular block of land. This is a social (and economic) process, but still 
one that has fairly narrow spatial and temporal limits, and therefore one 
that is likely to involve ‘personal and local’ relations. In the bigger scheme 
of things, it is just one instance of a social (and economic) relation that 
may be more or less common across a wider region or a  longer period. 
For  example, when we write about the ‘transition from feudalism to 
capitalism’, we refer to a process that may last for decades or centuries, 
in which a society (and economy) based on the relationship between 
landlords and tenants is replaced by one based on the relationship 
between capital and labour. The problem then is to determine the spatial 
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and temporal scale at which it makes sense to make general statements 
about a general process called ‘exclusion’ or a number of more specific 
forms of this same process.
Land-Based Livelihoods
The majority of the people or households in each of our four Melanesian 
countries are smallholders united by their dependence on what we shall 
here call ‘land-based livelihoods’. There has been much debate about the 
best way to designate this social class. The word ‘smallholder’ is far from 
perfect, but it is preferable to the word ‘peasant’, which is hardly ever 
used in Melanesian political discourse, and even preferable to words like 
‘villager’ or ‘farmer’ (MacWilliam 1988). The critical feature of a land-
based livelihood is that the land on which it is based is not just the space 
occupied by a house or a workshop or a trade store, but an area, however 
small, from which natural resources are extracted. These resources include 
the nutrients in the soil cultivated by a farmer or gardener, but they also 
include the timber harvested from a native forest, or the metal derived 
from an underground ore body.
Smallholders do not necessarily derive their livelihoods from the land 
through the application of their own labour. They might also make a living 
from the collection of compensation or royalty payments from a mining 
company or a logging company that operates on their land. To obtain 
this sort of income, they must normally be able to assert their status as 
‘customary landowners’ (Filer 1997; Holzknecht 1999).1 The owners of 
customary land, or holders of customary land rights, may also rent land 
to an agribusiness company, or more frequently to other smallholders who 
cultivate it for a living (Ward 1981; Curry and Koczberski 2009). Although 
many smallholders aspire to be petty landlords, the number of households 
that actually collect some sort of resource rent is relatively small. For most 
of these households, a resource rent is only one component of their land-
based livelihood, and in some cases—as with logging royalties—it may 
not last too long.
1  ‘Customary landowners’ may be thought of as customary groups, or as groups holding customary 
rights, or as individuals holding customary claims to membership of such groups. The ambiguities 
of this phrase are an inherent property of what Filer (2006) calls the ‘ideology of landownership’. 
In  Vanuatu, such people are generally called ‘custom landowners’—a phrase that connotes an 
additional element of reification.
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Although these petty landlords constitute a minority within the larger 
class of smallholders, their number could be comparable to the number 
of people who are formally and directly employed by mining companies, 
logging companies, or other companies that extract natural resources from 
the land. These wage-earners also have land-based livelihoods, but they do 
not count as smallholders. When the companies involved in this type of 
business are extracting resources from customary land, they occasionally 
try to employ the customary owners of that land to do this kind of work, 
but they are not always successful because the customary owners may 
regard such work as an affront to their own status as petty landlords.
There is another subclass of smallholders who do not count as ‘villagers’ 
because their labour is applied to land-based livelihoods in urban or 
peri-urban areas. Most of them are engaged in the production of food 
crops for sale in urban markets or cash crops for export to overseas 
markets. Furthermore, most of them do not have customary rights to 
the land from which their livelihoods are derived. This group includes 
the so-called block-holders who cultivate oil palm on allotments of state 
land in state-sponsored resettlement schemes in PNG and sell their crops 
to the operators of a nearby nucleus estate, but it also includes migrants 
who have made arrangements with customary landowners to access some 
of their land for the same purpose (Ploeg 1999; Koczberski et al. 2009).
There are numerous instances of this kind of informal tenancy 
arrangement between petty landlords and migrants or ‘settlers’ who have 
been separated from their own customary land for periods of time that 
may be long enough to entail a complete loss of customary land rights in 
their places of origin (see Chapter 5, this volume). Whether or not the 
tenants have land-based livelihoods, their numbers have almost certainly 
grown in step with the growth of the urban and peri-urban population as 
a whole, but it is hard to determine the prevalence of such arrangements 
from official census and survey data because information on household 
economic activities is not normally accompanied by information on land 
rights. Nevertheless, the number of households involved in this type 
of arrangement seems to be larger than the number involved in the type of 
informal labour contract by which customary landowners employ other 
people to work their land. This second type of arrangement is generally 
confined to areas in which customary landowners can obtain a reasonable 
cash income from other sources while still living on their own land.
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As a general rule, the dependence of smallholders on the value of resources 
extracted from their own customary land can be expected to increase with 
the distance of their normal place of residence from an urban centre or 
a decent road that leads to one. The more remote a rural settlement, the 
larger the proportion of households with land-based livelihoods, the more 
likely that these will depend entirely on the exercise of customary rights, 
and the smaller the opportunity for landowners to supplement their 
subsistence by selling some of the fruits of their labour (Hanson et al. 
2001; Gibson et al. 2005; Bourke and Harwood 2009). At the other end 
of the spectrum, in urban and peri-urban areas, households with land-
based livelihoods may only account for a minority of the total population, 
and some of them are likely to contain members who derive a livelihood 
from something other than the use of land—as wage-earners, shopkeepers, 
artisans, criminals, and so forth. The transformation of landed property 
relations should therefore take different forms at different points along 
a line of accessibility that leads from the most remote rural villages to the 
biggest urban centres. The exchange value or ‘price’ of a given quantity of 
land should vary along the same continuum, but so should the capacity 
to realise that value in some sort of monetary transaction such as rent 
collection. Exceptions to this rule normally arise with the discovery of 
a natural resource in a ‘remote’ area which has a higher market value than 
the land with which it is associated—oil, gold, timber, and so forth—
which makes for the creation of a new resource frontier (Tsing  2005; 
Li 2014).
Hall, Hirsch and Li clearly think that people who qualify as smallholders 
are the principal victims of different forms of exclusion, even if they can 
also be perpetrators in the process of ‘intimate’ exclusion. They do not 
try to calculate the number of households or people whose land-based 
livelihoods are disrupted or destroyed by different forms of exclusion, 
and  that is not surprising, given the size of the national populations 
in Southeast Asia and the uninformative nature of national census 
data. The  statistical issue is no less problematic in Melanesia, but the 
populations are much smaller, so anecdotal evidence or subnational 
survey data can tell us more about the rate of absolute or relative decline 
in the size of the smallholding population and the different reasons for 
this type of social change.
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The Urban Question
Hall, Hirsch and Li have little to say about the transformation of landed 
property relations in urban areas, mainly because their central concern 
is with various types of ‘agrarian transition’. In the Melanesian political 
context, it is not possible to separate the land question from the problem 
of urbanisation, because struggles over access to land are generally more 
intense in urban and peri-urban areas than they are in rural areas. This is 
not simply a function of population growth or population density, 
but is  also due to the fact that some of the land in urban areas is still 
customary land or is subject to customary claims. As a result, urban spaces 
are rather like patchwork quilts, with some parts covered by formal land 
titles, some parts occupied by their customary owners, and some parts 
whose legal status is quite uncertain. From this point of view, urban spaces 
are condensed versions of the rural spaces in which the patches tend to be 
much larger, with much lower population densities.
It is difficult to measure the rate of urbanisation, or the growth of the urban 
population relative to the rural population, mainly because census data 
continue to divide the two populations on the basis of town boundaries 
established during the colonial period. Some of the areas now defined as 
‘peri-urban’ areas result from the expansion of a single urban space beyond 
the limits of these boundaries (Storey 2003), but these new urban areas 
are still officially designated as parts of a surrounding rural area. This does 
not mean that urban or peri-urban areas can be defined in material terms 
by the exclusion of land-based livelihoods. As we have seen, there is a class 
of smallholders in these areas who make some sort of a living out of the 
practice commonly known as ‘urban gardening’ (Thaman 1977, 1995), 
even if they form a small minority of the total urban population.
It is currently estimated that the urban and peri-urban population of 
PNG accounts for roughly 20 per cent of the total national population. 
The  proportion is more than 25  per cent in Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu, and as much as 50  per cent in Fiji (see Chapter 2, this 
volume). Between 30  and 50  per cent of the people who live in such 
areas are housed in so-called squatter settlements (Connell 2011), and so 
‘squatters’ are represented in the national political discourse as a distinctive 
(and problematic) social class.
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One of the main reasons for the growth of informal settlements in 
urban areas has been the inability of national or local governments to 
acquire, secure, subdivide and service additional land for residential 
development. This has entailed an increase in the cost of accommodation 
in the private housing market, well beyond the general rate of inflation 
reflected in the consumer price index, and a corresponding decline in 
the proportion of the urban population who can afford to pay rent to 
a private landlord or pay off a mortgage obtained from a bank. While 
some employers (including government agencies) subsidise the housing 
costs of their employees, a growing number of full-time wage-earners in 
the formal economy have joined the population of the settlements. It is 
not the source of people’s livelihoods that distinguishes the settlements 
from other residential areas, or distinguishes one settlement from another. 
Instead, the residents of each settlement are more likely to share common 
origins in a particular province or district or ‘tribal group’ (Oram 1976; 
Jackson 1977; Foukona 2015; Moore 2015; also Chapter 4, this volume).
In theory, a general distinction can be drawn between settlements located 
on government land that has been alienated from its customary owners, 
but not yet leased out to other users, and those located on customary 
land, where the settlers have entered into an informal purchase or tenancy 
arrangement with the customary owners (Numbasa and Koczberski 2012). 
In practice, the distinction is blurred by legal uncertainties surrounding 
the original process of alienation, or by the resurrection of customary 
claims over land left ‘waste and vacant’ by the state. In both cases, settlers 
have good reason to escape their identity as ‘squatters’ by constructing 
personal and local relations with the customary owners or their 
descendants  (Chand and Yala 2008). Alternatively, those in occupation 
of vacant public land may seek to establish a quasi-customary right of 
adverse possession to protect themselves against the threat of eviction 
(Chapter 3, this volume), or even claim an entirely new kind of  right 
on the basis of their economic contribution to national development 
(Chapter 2, this volume).
Despite these efforts, the threat of eviction is a very real one, and the 
practice has grown more common with the rise in the real market value 
of urban land and the intensity of competition for new leasehold titles 
(Koczberski et al. 2001; Connell 2003). In some cases, evictions have 
only been temporary demonstrations of state power, and settlers have 
been allowed to reoccupy the land from which they have been removed 
(Goddard 2001). In other cases, they have been ‘compensated’ with an 
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allocation of land, and even the promise of formal land titles, in another 
part of the same town. But because of the way that settlements have been 
socially constructed, the process of eviction can easily take on the character 
of an ‘ethnic cleansing’ exercise, in which squatters are demonised as 
alien intruders who should be forced to return to the province or district 
from which they originated (Allen 2012). In this version of ‘intimate 
exclusion’, the ‘customary owners’ of an urban or peri-urban space may 
well repudiate their social connections with settlers from other parts of the 
country or reprimand each other for selling or renting the land on which 
the outsiders have settled (Monson 2015).
Dispossession and Expropriation
One of the main reasons that Hall, Hirsch and Li have opted to portray 
the transformation of landed property in Southeast Asia as a mixture of 
different forms of exclusion is their desire to question the idea that there is 
just one form of dispossession or expropriation that is a necessary condition 
of capitalist development. They recognise that the process known as 
enclosure in British and European history is indeed a specific form of 
dispossession or expropriation, and one that may well have supported 
the accumulation of agricultural and industrial capital, but this does not 
entail that dispossession or expropriation is invariably part of a process 
of (primitive) capital accumulation, nor does it necessarily involve the 
privatisation of communally owned land (Hall et al. 2011: 13–14).
When people say that ‘possession is nine-tenths of the law’, they imply 
a  contrast between possession (in practice) and ownership (in law). 
The  same contrast appears in the distinction often made between land 
use and land tenure. The contrast sometimes disappears when people talk 
or write about dispossession and expropriation, as if these were just two 
different words for the same sort of social process, but the distinction 
is significant. When ‘squatters’ have been evicted from an informal 
settlement, they have been dispossessed. They might also believe that 
they have been expropriated, if they think that their occupation and 
improvement of the land has created a legal entitlement to it. But the 
people who evict them will commonly justify the act of dispossession 
by saying that they had no such entitlement, and so they have not been 
expropriated. Dispossession is a physical process whose occurrence can be 
observed ‘on the ground’. Expropriation is a change in the distribution 
of property rights that can be, and often is, contested in law. In some 
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circumstances, a process of expropriation may constitute the legal basis for 
a subsequent process of dispossession that often involves the application of 
physical force. However, dispossession can occur without a prior process 
of expropriation, and expropriation does not necessarily lead to a process 
of dispossession (Borras and Franco 2013). Numerous examples exist in 
Melanesia of land titles being created without any subsequent material 
possession of the land.
A distinction between the possession and appropriation of land, and hence 
between the dispossession and expropriation of people, does not make 
much sense in a stateless society. In the pre-colonial societies of Melanesia, 
the possession or appropriation of land was intimately linked to the 
practice of shifting cultivation (Rimoldi 1966; Lea 1969; Panoff 1970; 
Brown and Podolefsky 1976; Mitchell 1976; Healey 1985). The members 
of a single ‘tribe’ or political community had various ways of deciding 
which households would clear which plots of (normally forested) land 
to make new gardens in any particular year. The act of cultivation was 
generally an act of exclusive possession during the brief period in which 
most of the crops were harvested and planted, but in the longer term, it did 
not enable the household to appropriate the land itself. Personal property 
rights were normally confined to the products of people’s own labour. 
This explains why the ownership of planted trees was typically vested 
in the individuals who planted them, while the ownership of the land 
on which they grew was vested in a larger social group. In this property 
regime, acts of dispossession within a political community were a threat 
to its existence as a community, and when they did occur, they were often 
acts of expulsion. The dispossession of people in other communities was 
commonplace, but ‘tribal warfare’ did not necessarily entail a change in 
the territorial boundaries of these communities (Reay 1967); it could just 
involve the appropriation of other people’s heads or bodies.
It is a moot point whether (and where) the ‘alienation’ of customary 
land during the colonial period counted as an act of dispossession or 
expropriation. Each of the four colonial regimes in our region—British, 
French, German and Australian—had its own way of recognising or not 
recognising ‘native land rights’ (Mair 1948; Rowley 1958; Brookfield 1972; 
Crocombe 1972; Firth 1983; Bennett 1987; Van Trease 1987; Ward and 
Kingdon 1995). There were also considerable differences in the way that 
British colonial authorities dealt with this issue in their four Melanesian 
possessions in the late nineteenth century. In the early years of colonial 
rule, when land was supposedly ‘purchased’ from its native owners with 
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the proverbial beads and trinkets, it barely makes sense to ask whether 
the ‘sellers’ knew what they were doing, or whether they had a customary 
‘right’ to engage in such transactions. On the other hand, the idea of 
a ‘colonial land grab’ obscures the fact that colonial annexation of these 
territories was partly justified by the need to regulate the appropriation of 
native land by European planters, miners and missionaries (Harris 1981; 
Quinn 1981). The colonial authorities constructed a legal concept of native 
land rights through the very same process by which they constructed the 
capacity of individual native leaders (often designated as ‘chiefs’) to act 
as group representatives in the alienation of native land. This process was 
accomplished far more rapidly in Fiji than it was in the other colonial 
territories (France 1969), but in all cases it led to the creation of specific 
institutions, policies and procedures for the investigation of native 
land rights as a precondition for the purchase of native land (Holmes 
1953; McGrath 1964). White anthropologists were more or less active 
participants in this legal and political process (Mair 1948; Bell 1953; 
Rimoldi 1966; Lawrence and Hogbin 1967; Panoff 1970).
This process was markedly different from what happened in the white 
settlement of Australia, where the legal doctrine of Terra Nullius deprived 
the Aboriginal population of any form of landed property rights. 
In Melanesia, the colonial authorities generally accepted the evidence of 
shifting cultivation as evidence of appropriation, as well as possession, 
although it took them some time to appreciate the extent to which 
the landscape had been modified by this practice, and even longer to 
appreciate that it was not wasteful and destructive (Allen and Filer 2015). 
The  recognition of native land rights did not prevent the colonial 
authorities from appropriating large areas of land that were declared to be 
‘waste and vacant’, and some of these areas may well have qualified as a sort 
of ‘no man’s land’ for one reason or another. However, these declarations 
were generally invalidated at the end of the colonial period, as the political 
leaders of the newly independent states insisted that any land that had not 
been purchased from its customary owners must still belong to the realm 
of customary tenure (Sack 1974).2 In Vanuatu, they went even further, 
by insisting that all alienated land must still be customary land in some 
sense, because the very nature of customary tenure did not allow for the 
permanent alienation of communal ownership, only for the temporary 
2  This complete rejection of the principle of Terra Nullius had obvious links to the simultaneous 
demands being made for the recognition of native title in Australia.
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grant of use rights (Larmour 1984). This idea has since gained ground in 
all four Spearhead states, creating a version of Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ 
in which the principle of Torrens Title is continually challenged by the 
reassertion of customary rights (Filer 2014; also Chapter 12, this volume). 
This has come to resemble the process that Hall, Hirsch and Li call 
‘counter-exclusion’ when the descendants of customary landowners whose 
land was alienated during the colonial period actually repossess the land 
from which their ancestors were excluded (Filer and Lowe 2011).
This does not mean that the rate of expropriation has diminished, or that 
it has not taken a variety of new forms. In urban areas, ‘land grabbing’ 
may involve the expropriation of persons holding leasehold titles over 
public (state) land through the fraudulent grant of new leasehold titles 
over the same land—an activity that often leads to lengthy legal battles. 
In cases where the fraudulent grant of titles does not affect the rights of an 
existing title holder, it may still be deemed an act of expropriation, rather 
than misappropriation, if people with customary claims over the land 
are able to maintain that they were not consulted about the transaction, 
or if the new title holders proceed to evict the current occupants of the 
land, whether or not they have customary claims over it. These types of 
‘licensed exclusion’ have flourished with the ‘corruption’ of government 
agencies responsible for land administration in response to the boom in 
urban land values (see Chapter 9, this volume).
The same types of fraudulent activity have also been recorded in rural 
areas, especially in places where the economic value of the land has 
suddenly risen with the prospect of some form of large-scale ‘resource 
development’, but in rural areas, they are more likely to involve 
the expropriation of customary landowners, and less likely to lead to the 
dispossession of the current occupants. A notable example is the abuse 
of the so-called lease-leaseback scheme in PNG, whereby huge areas 
of customary land have ended up in the hands of foreign ‘developers’ 
operating in partnership with landowner company directors (Filer 2011a, 
2011b, 2012; also Chapter 7, this volume). In this case, all customary 
rights to the land in question have been legally abrogated for the period 
of the lease, which is normally 99 years, without the knowledge of the 
customary landowners who have supposedly consented to the transaction 
(see Chapter 6, this volume). This would count as an example of what 
Hall, Hirsch and Li call ‘volatile exclusion’ if the customary owners were 
to be dispossessed, as well as expropriated, since most of the leases have 
been granted for agricultural purposes, even if many of the leaseholders are 
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more interested in harvesting logs than in planting cash crops. A similar 
form of expropriation has flourished in some rural areas of Vanuatu, albeit 
with a different collection of investors and local collaborators, and with a 
much greater risk of dispossession for the customary owners (Van Trease 
1987; Scott et al. 2012; McDonnell 2013). This would count as an 
example of what Hall, Hirsch and Li call ‘post-agrarian exclusion’, since 
most of the leases have been granted for the construction of tourist resorts 
or residential property.
There are other forms of expropriation and dispossession that take place 
in rural areas, even when customary land is not legally alienated through 
the creation of new leasehold titles. That is because customary landowners 
or their representatives can alienate specific types of use right, such as 
timber harvesting rights, or can consent to the grant of mining rights 
by governments that claim ownership of subsurface mineral resources. 
The four Spearhead states have different policy regimes in place to regulate 
different types of extractive industry, and these contain different provisions 
for the establishment of what is nowadays called ‘free, prior and informed 
consent’. But even when serious efforts are made to establish the consent 
of customary landowners to the logging or mining of their land, they can 
still be expropriated through the misappropriation of the compensation 
and rental payments to which they are entitled by the development 
agreements signed on their behalf (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1997; Koyama 
2005; Golub 2007; Lattas 2011; Hviding 2015).3 Large-scale mining 
operations are liable to involve a distinctive form of dispossession, 
when the customary owners and occupants of land covered by mining 
leases are subjected to the process of ‘involuntary resettlement’, but the 
compensation they receive for their loss is not so easily stolen from them.
Alienation and Incorporation
Hall, Hirsch and Li make hardly any use of the word ‘alienation’, either 
because they think that their concept of exclusion is a better way to 
think about the transformation of landed property relations, or because 
the concept of alienation is open to many different definitions and 
interpretations. The distinction commonly made between alienated 
and customary land rests on a narrow legal definition by which the owners 
3  Hviding describes this as an instance of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, but he recognises that 
the misappropriation of logging royalties in Solomon Islands does not involve what we would call the 
dispossession of customary landowners.
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of land rights can either choose to alienate them to other people by various 
means, or else these rights can be alienated by other people without the 
knowledge or consent of their rightful owners, in which case the owners 
are expropriated. However, there is a much broader philosophical or 
sociological interpretation of the concept that is concerned with the 
way that ideas about the relationship between people and property have 
developed in different types of society.
The vernacular languages of Melanesia rarely contain a word that is used 
in the same way as the word ‘land’ is used in English, let alone a phrase 
equivalent to ‘land rights’. This does not exactly mean that they had no 
such ideas; it just means that the arrangements by which people gained 
access to specific places or resources could not be spoken of in isolation 
from a larger bundle of local and personal relations that were represented, 
or embedded, in the biophysical landscape (Weiner 1991; Leach 2003). 
In recent decades, the advocates of indigenous land rights in all corners of 
the world have come to encapsulate this form of attachment in a variety 
of slogans with the common theme that ‘land is life’.4 The construction 
of land as an alienable form of property is thus conceived as a universal 
social process that destroys the special attachment of indigenous people 
to something that is much more than this. From this point of view, the 
alienation of land from people is not a process of expropriation but 
a  process of reification. Land is separated from human labour, local 
livelihoods and personal relationships, and made into a substance that 
can be mapped and surveyed, quantified and measured, divided and 
subdivided, without any necessary reference to its cultural and natural 
attributes (see Chapter 12, this volume). As we have seen, the process 
by which land was turned into a new kind of legal object was the same 
as the process by which the ‘native’ was turned into a new kind of legal 
subject—the ‘customary landowner’ whose rights could be recorded and, 
perhaps, eventually registered. However, the fixed idea that native land 
rights must, by definition, be collective or communal land rights meant 
that the subdivision of native territory had to be matched by a parallel 
subdivision of native society. This was a regional variant of the process 
that some scholars call territorialisation (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995).
4  The original version of the slogan was probably coined in the Philippines around 1970. It made 
its first known appearance in PNG in a book published in 1974 (Dove et al. 1974: 182). The preferred 
version of this mantra in contemporary Vanuatu is ‘my land, my life’.
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The suppression of tribal warfare often entailed the demarcation 
of territorial boundaries between neighbouring tribes, especially in areas 
of  high population density (Brookfield and Brown 1963; Allen and 
Giddings 1982; Gordon 1985; Curry 1997). Once this task had been 
accomplished, the colonial authorities could envisage the subdivision of 
each tribal territory between the constituent elements of each territorial 
community. In doing so, they were inclined to regard each tribe as 
a combination of ‘clans’, and each clan as a combination of smaller social 
units, such as ‘lineages’. Each of the entities in this social and spatial 
hierarchy was conceived as a group of people with exclusive rights to its 
own territorial domain, and each group would ideally be represented by 
a greater or lesser ‘chief ’ whose status allowed him (or very occasionally 
her) to deal in the rights of the whole group (see Chapter 11, this 
volume). Most of the vernacular languages of the region contained a set 
of proper nouns that could be read as the names of such groups,5 and 
many contained words that could be read as the titles of their leaders. 
The key point about such acts of translation is that they took away the 
significance of proper nouns that were not the names of groups that could 
dispose of land, but were the names of the roles played by different groups 
in some other kind of social activity, like the practice of marriage or the 
conduct of mortuary ceremonies. At the same time, they took away the 
significance of words that referred to positions of leadership in any kind of 
social activity that could not be construed as an allocation of rights to the 
use of land. It is in this sense that the process of territorialisation was also a 
process of alienation, even when customary land was not legally alienated 
from its customary owners.
As we have seen, the process of territorialisation was a form of uneven 
development. In Fiji, tribal territories were subdivided into the properties 
of clans and lineages in the 1880s, and a corresponding hierarchy of 
chiefly titles was established at the same time (France 1969). In PNG, the 
colonial authorities made no serious attempt to demarcate the boundaries 
of ‘landowning groups’ until the 1960s, and even then they failed to get 
the job done (Hide 1973). Nevertheless, the idea that clans and lineages 
are corporate groups of landowners, in which the rules of membership are 
also the rules that govern access to customary land, was firmly entrenched 
5  In some areas, the names were derived from words that represented different species of animals 
or plants, and were thus part of a system of totemic classification. In other areas, the names were 
derived from the names of founding ancestors, or the names of places where those people once lived, 
and therefore sounded more like the names of descent groups.
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in the colonial legacies of all four Spearhead states. As a result, post-
colonial laws and policies that have aimed to protect or enhance the 
powers and rights of customary landowners have generally made these 
corporate groups take on more and more of the characteristics of a private 
company. By this means, the ‘chief ’ of such a group is liable to be recast as 
the chairman or managing director of a board whose other directors have 
a lesser claim to chiefly status.6
The incorporation of customary groups and the formalisation of their 
customary rights count as separate moments in the alienation of land from 
people because most of the people who notionally belong to such groups 
or hold such rights progressively lose control over the pieces of paper that 
represent their membership or ownership. Certificates of incorporation are 
not used to accomplish anything like a traditional economic transaction; 
they are more like a form of paper currency that can be used as evidence 
of the right of an individual office-holder—say a chairman or secretary—
to act on behalf of a group that may only exist on paper. When survey 
plans and title deeds are added to this currency, the process of alienation 
is taken to another stage, as individuals are then able to accomplish the 
transfer of legally recognised ‘customary rights’ to third parties that bear 
no resemblance to any sort of customary group, and in so doing, strip 
away their customary quality (Cooter 1989, 1991; also Chapter 6, this 
volume). In this respect, the formalisation of customary land rights is not 
just a process of ‘licensed exclusion’ in which governments award legal 
titles to some people in preference to other people. It can also be a process 
of ‘intimate exclusion’ in which the possession of titles and offices is used 
by powerful men to exclude other members of the customary group 
from decisions about the use of customary land (see Chapters 10, 11 and 
13, this volume). This is one of the main reasons why the advocates of 
indigenous land rights in Melanesia have been opposed to the registration 
of customary land titles, even under laws that prohibit the outright sale 
of customary land.
Even when customary land rights have somehow been converted into this 
peculiar form of ‘private collective property’, their privacy is no guarantee 
that the owner is internally coherent or clearly distinguished from others 
6  This process of incorporation has been taken much further in PNG than it has in Solomon 
Islands or Vanuatu. In Solomon Islands, the corporate group is legally conceived as a collection of 
trustees and beneficiaries, rather than a collection of directors and shareholders. In Vanuatu, the 
creation of land trusts after Independence resulted in legal conflict that led to most of the trusts being 
disbanded.
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of its kind, whether they be households or clans, incorporated land groups 
or private companies. People who argue that this type of property is an 
obstacle to economic development are not making a point about the 
privacy of the property right, but about the governance of the corporate 
body that owns it (Gosarevski et al. 2004; Hughes 2004; Lea and Curtin 
2011). By representing the transformation of landed property as a set of 
gains and losses made by the parties to an unequal or asymmetrical relation 
of alienation or exclusion, we may be led to overlook the multiple forms 
of agency that exist on both sides of the fence. If the fence is construed as 
a denial of access, the social process by which it is built does not have to 
be construed as one that only contains two types of actor, the winners and 
the losers. Just as people now disown the right of some distant ancestor 
to sell customary land to white settlers or government officers, so they 
can contest the right of today’s title holders and office holders to dispose 
of customary land in an un-customary manner. In this sense, a process of 
counter-exclusion is built into the process of incorporation that alienates 
some customary landowners from their customary rights, since the 
alienation is always incomplete.
The Gender of Tenure
It is easy enough to argue that land cannot be completely alienated from 
people or by people so long as the people in question are unable or unwilling 
to exclude themselves from customary social institutions. However, this 
does not entail that all such institutions are equally capable of sticking to 
the land that now constitutes the basis for land-based livelihoods or has 
acquired some kind of exchange value in a market economy. If we take the 
view that land as such had no market value in the pre-colonial economy, 
or that there was no pre-colonial ‘economy’ distinct from pre-colonial 
society, it is not even clear how any customary social institutions could 
retain their influence over economic transactions in land without being 
changed beyond recognition.
When transactions in land are embedded in the local and personal 
relations of kinship and marriage, the transformation of landed 
property relations becomes a transformation of gender relations and 
intergenerational relations. The social reconstruction of clans and lineages 
as corporate groups of customary landowners was often accompanied by 
an expectation (on the part of colonial authorities) that these should be 
what anthropologists call unilineal descent groups. In ‘patrilineal societies’, 
KASTOM, PROPERTy AND IDEOLOGy
22
people inherit membership of such groups from their fathers; in ‘matrilineal 
societies’, from their mothers. While the process of territorialisation was 
accompanied by a distinction between areas occupied by patrilineal and 
matrilineal ‘tribes’, and this distinction has since become part of the 
common sense of public discourse in the Spearhead states, the contrast 
between these two types of society makes more sense under Western laws 
of inheritance than it does in customary social practice (Goddard 2011).
To be sure, it was commonly the case that most people inherited 
membership of named social groups or categories from either their fathers 
or their mothers. Even in these cases, it was common practice for people 
to be adopted or incorporated into groups to which they had no ‘right of 
membership’ by birth. But there were many other cases in which the 
transmission of membership between generations did not follow such 
simple rules, or in which there were no such rules at all because ‘descent 
groups’ had no social or economic function (Ogan 1971; Wagner 1974; 
Guddemi 1997; Jorgensen 1997; Ernst 1999; Filer and Lowe 2011). 
And  even where they did have a social or economic function, there is 
no reason to assume that this function was primarily defined by their 
collective ownership of exclusive property rights, rather than by the 
substance of the transactions that took place between the members of 
these groups. In all Melanesian societies, this was a thoroughly gendered 
substance, in the sense that all the people and things involved in such 
transactions had masculine or feminine properties (Strathern 1988).
If seen through the lens of ‘property rights’, this means that men and 
women had different types of rights in land and other types of property. 
But it does not necessarily mean that women in matrilineal societies 
had more rights in land than women in any other type of society. From 
a gender perspective, the difference between one society and another lay 
primarily in the means by which male and female rights and powers, like 
other male and female things, were transacted between people. And that 
included the means by which they were transmitted from one generation 
to the next. In the majority of communities where descent groups did 
perform some social or economic function, marriage was the customary 
social institution through which the groups ‘leased’ male or female bodies 
to each other for reproductive purposes. At the end of the day, when the 
bodies were no longer living, they were normally buried in the ground 
of their own group. On the other hand, insofar as these groups were the 
collective owners of both male and female land rights, funeral or mortuary 
ceremonies were the primary social institution through which such rights 
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could be transferred from one group to another (Rodman 1987; Damon 
and Wagner 1989; Foster 1995). No sense can be made of customary 
rules of descent and inheritance in abstraction from the transactions in 
reproductive capacities—the social relations of reproduction—that take 
shape through the human life cycle (Strathern 1972, 1988; Leach 2003; 
Hirsch and Strathern 2004).
These considerations help to explain why two things that used to 
puzzle anthropologists no longer seem to be so puzzling. The first is the 
puzzle posed by the construction of women in matrilineal societies as the 
‘landowners’ who could not convert their property rights into political 
power (Maetala 2008; Naupa and Simo 2008). The second is the puzzle 
posed by the failure of men to dispense with the custom of matrilineal 
inheritance in a legal and economic system suffused with the values of 
possessive individualism (Nash 1974, 1987; Lomas 1979; Sykes 2007; 
Bainton 2008; Eves 2011; Martin 2013). When there is a contest between 
the property rights of individuals and those of customary groups, there is 
no reason to suppose that a difference in the rules that govern membership 
of the customary groups—matrilineal, patrilineal, or otherwise—should 
make a difference to the outcome of the contest. On the other hand, the 
difference between the collective property rights exercised in ‘matrilineal’ 
and ‘patrilineal’ societies, if they are now to be conceived as ‘rights’ in 
the modern legal sense, cannot simply be taken to reflect the customary 
balance of power between women and men.
Regardless of the rules that determine membership of customary social 
groups, the incorporation of such groups as the legally recognised owners 
of customary land does seem to be a process in which the balance of 
rights and powers has been tipped in favour of the male members—or at 
least some of them. Melanesia seems to be fertile ground for the sort of 
triangular process in which male leaders seek to demonstrate their own 
personal authority over other group members by alienating collective land 
rights to outsiders (see Chapter 13, this volume). This propensity may 
well have been encouraged by the patriarchal bias of European outsiders 
who sought to acquire such rights during the colonial era, but it has not 
disappeared when other aspects of the colonial legacy have been rejected. 
If anything, it is more likely to be represented as a continuation of pre-
colonial customary practice, even when the transactions in question have 
no traditional counterpart.
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The right of male leaders to engage in this particular form of ‘intimate 
exclusion’ is commonly conflated with their right to make public speeches 
on those traditional social occasions, such as mortuary ceremonies, when 
people or things are transferred from one group to another (see Chapter 11, 
this volume). And yet there is a world of difference between the social 
process that encompasses this type of event and the one that is involved in 
a decision to dispose of rights to the use of customary land in return for 
some form of ‘development’. Women are routinely excluded from this type 
of decision-making process, even in those matrilineal societies where they 
are acknowledged as the ‘true landowners’, because they are not allowed to 
speak for the land (Naupa and Simo 2008; also Chapter 10, this volume). 
And what often follows is their further exclusion from the process in 
which the benefits of ‘development’—in the form of compensation, rental 
or royalty payments—are distributed by the decision makers (McDonnell 
2013). Given that this is not a customary social process, governments can 
only use the power of the law to create a right for women to participate.
Power, Politics and Ideology
Hall, Hirsch and Li suggest that there are four ‘powers of exclusion’, which 
they call regulation, force, the market and legitimation (Hall et al. 2011: 4). 
They say that the separation of these four powers is an analytical device, 
but in practice they tend to be combined in one way or another in a range 
of more specific social processes (ibid.: 197). Their seven different types 
of exclusion may therefore be distinguished from each other, not only by 
reference to the types of people involved and the types of things they do, 
but also by reference to the types of power that are exercised in each case. 
What is not entirely clear is whether each of the four powers that they 
identify is understood to be a power that some people exercise over other 
people, or something more abstract and impersonal.
When someone is forcibly dispossessed or evicted from a piece of land, 
it  is normally possible to identify someone else who is responsible for 
this use of force. It might be a landlord who has hired a group of thugs 
to evict a tenant whose rental payments have fallen in arrears, or it might 
be a  judge who has ruled that the current occupant of the land has no 
right to be there and should therefore be removed by the police. In the 
first case, the power of the market may also be at work, since the tenant’s 
inability to pay the rent could result from his or her loss of income from 
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the sale of some commodity. In the second case, the power of regulation 
would seem to be at work, since there will normally be some law that 
justifies the ruling made by the judge. But the landlord does not exactly 
use the power of the market to evict the tenant, unless we say that his 
capacity to pay the thugs is itself a manifestation of this power, or unless 
it turns out that he was responsible for cutting off the tenant’s income in 
the first place. In the same way, the judge does not exactly use the power 
of regulation to dispossess the illegal occupant, unless perhaps we assume 
that he or his associates have some personal interest in the achievement of 
this outcome. But if we say that the power of the market or the power of 
the law is something more abstract and impersonal, does it make sense to 
say that the ‘power of force’ is something of the same sort?
Consider this question from the point of view of a (male) person who 
wishes to exclude someone else from a piece of land. If he uses force, 
and is successful, then he will have exercised the sort of interpersonal 
power that political philosophers recognise when they say that person A 
has exercised power over person B if and when A has got B to do what 
A wants B to do (Lukes 2005). It is not force that has the power; it is the 
person who has used it. There may be several ways in which force can be 
applied in the exercise of power. In the present case, person A could hire 
a bunch of thugs to do the job, or he could take person B to court in 
the hope of securing a judgement that would lead the police to exercise 
force on his behalf. Or he could pay the police to be his bunch of thugs, 
or bribe the judge to make a ruling in his favour. But force might not 
need to be used at all. If a court instructs person B to vacate the property, 
the order itself may have the desired result. Or the money that person A 
might otherwise use to pay the police or bribe the judge could just as well 
be offered to person B as the price of compliance.
These might seem like fairly trivial examples in the wider scheme of things, 
but regardless of scale, any social process that involves the transformation 
of landed property relations is likely to be a political and legal process as 
well as an economic process. Interpersonal power is not only exercised in 
the context of local and personal relations; it is also exercised on a broader 
social stage, where groups or classes of people exhibit their power by 
making laws or policies or rules that serve to advance their own interests 
at the expense of other members of society. Hall, Hirsch and Li attribute a 
specific power of regulation to the set of (formal and informal) rules that 
govern access to land or exclusion from land, and thus create different 
forms of landed property or types of land use (Hall et al. 2011:  15). 
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They connect the power of regulation to the ‘power of force’ by pointing 
out that regulations generally entail sanctions, one of which may be the 
use (or threat) of force, usually state force (ibid.: 16).
They recognise that force is not always used in the service of regulation, 
and might even be used to oppose it, but it is also important to recognise 
that regulations are not always enforced, even by the people who are 
responsible for their production. If regulation is conceived as a process 
comparable to the one that Peluso and Lund (2011) call ‘legalisation’ or 
‘institutionalisation’, then it is easier to see that the power to make laws 
or policies or rules that relate to the ownership and use of land may be 
matched or countered by the power to ignore such things and find another 
way to deny access. In very simple terms, the power to break the rules may 
be no less important than the power to make them. Indeed, the powers to 
make, enforce, bend, break or contest a body of rules may all be applied 
quite differently, either in the process of excluding people from land or in 
the alternative process that Hall, Hirsch and Li call ‘counter-exclusion’. 
The exercise of such powers may or may not involve the use of force, and 
it is hard to see why they should be represented as examples of one type 
of political and legal process that deserves the name of ‘regulation’.
So what about the power of the market? When Hall, Hirsch and Li describe 
the market as a ‘power of exclusion’, they are not only talking about the 
market in land or land rights, but also the market in other things like 
agricultural outputs or inputs. The operation of these markets can easily 
lead to the loss of land rights on the part of smallholders who can no 
longer afford to keep hold of them, while the accumulation of capital in 
the form of landed property can proceed on the basis of multiple forms of 
unequal exchange. However, land markets do not emerge spontaneously 
in societies where other things already have an exchange value; they 
must first be established and maintained through the application of state 
power. That is why Marx (1976: 871) described the ‘so-called primitive 
accumulation’ as a myth. Marx developed a complex theory of ‘ground 
rent’ in what proved to be an unsuccessful attempt to show that his labour 
theory of value could be applied to the price of commodities like land and 
other natural resources that are not the products of human labour. Polanyi 
(2001) called such things ‘fictitious commodities’ because they are not 
produced for the purpose of exchange, and argued that the markets in 
such things are more unstable than normal commodity markets, even 
when they are central to the operation of a capitalist economy. From his 
point of view, land markets are not simply created by acts of ‘so-called 
primitive accumulation’, but remain the sites of an enduring contest 
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between people who use the power of the state to keep them in operation 
and other people who use the same power to limit the negative effect of 
their operation on social relations and the natural environment (Kelly and 
Peluso 2015: 474). The commodification of land or land rights is therefore 
subject to what Polanyi called a ‘double movement’, in which different 
actors are continually attempting to remove or reassert political limits on 
market transactions (Cotula 2013).
This type of contest is all the more likely to take place in states where the 
majority of people have what we call land-based livelihoods, and have 
not yet been subject to a process of accumulation by dispossession. In 
these circumstances, other kinds of power get applied to the operation of 
a land market, and if one of these is to be defined as the power of ‘market 
forces’, it is best understood as the use of money or other commodities 
(aside from land) to secure some change in the distribution of landed 
property. Rather than talk about the ‘power of the market’ as an abstract 
and impersonal force, we might instead consider the ways in which some 
political actors use their existing wealth to secure the transformation of 
landed property relations, whether or not they use it in combination with 
the use of force.
And where does this leave our fourth and final ‘power of exclusion’? 
Hall,  Hirsch and Li define the power of legitimation as the power 
of arguments about what is right or wrong (or fair or reasonable) in 
the distribution (or denial) of access to land. Legitimation can also 
be understood as the social or political process through which the 
transformation of landed property relations is justified. But if it is conceived 
as an instrument in the exercise of interpersonal power, comparable to the 
use of force or money, then words like ‘authority’ or ‘persuasion’ could 
be adopted to describe it. And if it is conceived as the articulation of 
ideas that confuse the current state of affairs with moral judgements about 
the way that land or land rights ought to be transacted or distributed, 
then we could equate it with the power of ideology. Hall, Hirsch and 
Li do not have a great deal to say about ideology. Their book is notable 
for the absence of terms like nationalism, populism, socialism, or other 
‘isms’ that are the conventional labels for such things. However, they do 
make several references to neoliberalism, which they clearly regard as the 
dominant ideology in the countries of Southeast Asia. Maybe six of their 
seven specific forms of exclusion are justified by reference to neoliberal 
principles, but the process of ‘counter-exclusion’ must surely be justified 
in some other way.
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In his account of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, Polanyi 
recognised that the landed aristocracy had sometimes used its political 
power to defend the interests of the emergent working class against the 
capitalists who exploited them. This observation formed the basis of his 
argument that markets in ‘fictitious commodities’, including the land 
market and the labour market, are subject to an ongoing political and 
ideological contest between free market principles and what he called the 
principle of ‘social protection’ in all capitalist economies and societies. 
Liberal and neoliberal ideologies have largely retained the argument of 
classical political economy that landowners are little more than parasites 
if their incomes are largely derived from the rental value of a natural 
resource, whether it be undeveloped land or native forests or subsurface 
mineral resources. The removal of political constraints on the market 
in such things is therefore justified by the profits and wages that can 
be earned when ‘developers’ are free to invest capital and labour in the 
transformation of natural spaces or resources into genuine commodities, 
and in so doing, reduce the economic significance of ‘unearned’ rental 
incomes and the political influence of the rent collectors, whether they be 
private landlords or government agencies.
Nowadays, the defence of such political constraints is justified in two 
different ways. First, there is the long-standing argument against the 
alienation of land from people, or labour from land, that now tends to 
be framed by the discourse of human rights. Second, there is a more 
recent argument against the logic of ‘resource development’ that relies 
on environmental values, like the protection of biological diversity or 
the sustainability of ecosystem services. To update Polanyi’s terminology, 
we could therefore say that the other side of the double movement is 
represented by a combination of social and environmental protectionism. 
The relative importance of these two aspects of the counter-movement is 
then likely to depend on the relative significance of land-based livelihoods 
in each national economy. As the alienation of land from people proceeds 
apace, the alienation of land from nature, or natural resources from the 
natural environment, becomes a bigger political issue.
Let us now consider how these reflections on the relationship between 
power, politics and ideology apply to current arguments about land rights 
in Melanesia.
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The Dominant Ideology Thesis
The world of Melanesian politics is sometimes described as a world 
without ideology because it is hard to distinguish between the policies and 
programs of different political parties (Rich et al. 2006). This could be 
taken to mean that all elected politicians subscribe to a single (dominant) 
ideology, or that ideologies are not distinguished from each other in a way 
that makes it possible for politicians in parliament to align themselves 
with one side or the other, or that assemblies of elected politicians do 
not constitute the sort of space where major political choices are made. 
We  can certainly allow for the existence of multiple ideologies in one 
political space without having to treat each of them as the exclusive 
property of one political party or one social class. Indeed, we might 
even allow that different ideologies can be espoused by one individual in 
different political contexts.
There is a neoliberal argument which states that economic growth in 
Melanesia has been obstructed by the prevalence of customary land rights 
(Gosarevski et al. 2004; Hughes 2004; Curtin and Lea 2006; Lea and 
Curtin 2011). Elements of neoliberalism can also be detected in the 
policy prescriptions of international financial institutions and bilateral aid 
agencies, but their interest in the privatisation of state-owned enterprises 
has not been matched by a comparable level of interest in the privatisation 
of landed property. That is partly because the aid industry has a parallel 
interest in the protection of human rights and the natural environment, 
and partly because neoliberal economic policies are not popular with 
regional politicians or members of the general public (Kavanamur 1998; 
Fingleton 2005).
What seems rather more popular is an ‘ideology of development’ that 
supposedly takes inspiration from the experience of the Asian ‘tiger’ 
economies, since it is partly concerned to favour the interests of a national 
business elite in their dealings with foreign investors, and partly concerned 
to protect small business owners from foreign competition. While 
foreign investors dominate some sectors of each national economy, they 
do not share a common interest in the privatisation of landed property. 
Property developers may seek to secure the permanent expropriation 
and dispossession of customary landowners in order to turn a profit, 
but mining and logging companies only need to gain specific use rights 
for the time it takes to conduct the business of resource extraction. 
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Different  groups of foreign investors also have quite different levels of 
public commitment to the principles of social and environmental justice, 
or what some companies now describe as their ‘social licence to operate’.
Many national politicians might seem to have a common interest in the 
‘mobilisation’ of customary land for so-called ‘impact projects’ in rural 
areas (see Chapter 8, this volume), but most of the people who vote 
them into (and out of ) office have land-based livelihoods that depend 
on the maintenance of customary rights. If these people also subscribe 
to an ‘ideology of development’, it is not because they favour the 
accumulation of capital at their own expense, but because they believe 
(rightly or wrongly) that ‘developers’ will provide them with rental 
incomes, business opportunities, or even some of the public goods and 
services, from roads to scholarships, that cannot be obtained from their 
governments (see Chapter 7, this volume). Their aspirations should not 
be confused with those of the smaller class of people with wage-based 
livelihoods, mostly living in urban and peri-urban areas, who want the 
price of land to be reduced to the point at which they can afford to buy 
their own homes. When regional politicians talk about ‘land reform’, it is 
this second constituency to which they often seem to be appealing.
Hall, Hirsch and Li use the phrase ‘land reform’ to describe a social 
and political process in which land is taken away from its current legal 
owners and granted to people who previously owned little or no land. 
The  redistribution of land rights through such a process is virtually 
unknown in Melanesia. Instead, the phrase is generally used to refer to a 
policy process that is either concerned with the formalisation or registration 
of customary land rights, or else with the adoption of legal measures to 
prevent the misappropriation of customary land or public land, or to 
restore such land to its rightful owners.7 Both of these activities can be 
represented as forms of counter-exclusion that are meant to challenge the 
abuse of political or bureaucratic power to bend or break the formal or 
informal rules that already apply to the allocation of landed property. 
Both can therefore be justified by reference to the principles of human 
rights and good governance, and both are therefore likely to win support 
from the donor community and some of the more enlightened members 
of the business community. However, both need broad public support in 
7  It is the second of these aims that has dominated the recent land reform agenda in Vanuatu, 
where it has been pursued by the Graon mo Jastis (Land and Justice) party led by Ralph Regenvanu.
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order to overcome the symbiotic relationships formed between politicians 
and less scrupulous investors with an interest in land speculation or other 
forms of resource extraction (see Chapter 9, this volume).
If neoliberalism does not exactly count as the dominant ideology in this 
region, it might still be counted as one of the several variants of a capitalist 
or ‘pro-business’ ideology that dominates the land policy domain. Other 
variants include the economic nationalism or economic populism that 
both seek to exclude foreigners from the ownership of some types of 
property or the conduct of certain types of business. They also include 
the sort of possessive individualism that is espoused by wage-earners or 
small business owners who wish to secure their own possession of the 
small areas of land on which they live or work. There are even forms of 
social and environmental protectionism that operate in partnership with 
the ‘right’ sort of business against the ‘wrong’ sort of business. However, 
those forms of social and environmental protectionism that are actively 
supported by the donor community and some members of the business 
community do not constitute the strongest form of opposition to the 
neoliberal agenda. That honour could be reserved for Christianity, which 
has a pervasive influence on all aspects of social life in Melanesia, but 
few of its many denominations have a distinctive outlook on the land 
question. The strongest form of counter-movement is a form of cultural 
conservatism that defends all customary institutions, including customary 
land rights, as components of what we propose to call a ‘neo-traditional 
social order’ that is partly accommodated by the institutions of the nation-
state but partly opposed to them.
The Neo-Traditional Social Order
There has been a long debate about the extent to which Melanesian 
‘custom’ or ‘tradition’ has been modified by the introduction of new 
concepts, institutions and practices by the colonial authorities and the 
agents of post-colonial ‘development’ (Keesing and Tonkinson 1982; 
Keesing 1989; Jolly 1992; Otto and Pedersen 2005; Filer 2006). Much of 
this debate fails to take account of the full range of meanings ascribed to 
‘custom’ (kastom or kastam) or the variety of institutions or practices that 
are said to be ‘customary’. These things are defined in various ways in the 
national legislation of different Melanesian countries, but legal definitions 
of ‘custom’ do not exhaust the range of meanings found in public debate. 
We do not propose that there is a single ‘ideology of custom’ at work in 
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Melanesia, nor do we propose that every form of cultural conservatism has 
been exclusively concerned with the promotion or defence of customary 
land rights, even if that is our main concern in the current context. Some 
links might be drawn between the growing prominence of this issue in 
Melanesian politics and the growth of international concern with the 
rights of indigenous peoples, but these links still seem quite tenuous 
in regional political debates because of a widespread perception that 
‘customary landowners’ have a higher social status and greater political 
power than people who are merely ‘indigenous’.8
In our view, the neo-traditional social order is a set of social institutions 
whose justification lies in the combination of the twin ideologies of 
landownership and chieftainship. These are not exactly two sides of the 
same coin, since their mutual relationship varies between Spearhead states 
in ways that reflect the distinctive features of their economic and political 
trajectories. But both have their roots in a segmentary mental model of 
traditional social organisation derived from the process of territorialisation 
we have already described. The veracity of this model is not the point at 
issue here. What matters is the process by which these twin ideologies have 
been legalised or institutionalised as part of the process of state formation, 
and the manner in which they have been applied to the transformation of 
landed property relations.
The fundamental tenet of the ideology of landownership is that every 
automatic (or indigenous) citizen counts as a ‘customary landowner’ by 
virtue of his or her membership in one of the multitude of customary 
social groups (tribes or clans or lineages) that supposedly have exclusive 
customary rights over land. Even land that was alienated during the 
colonial period can still be represented as the subject of these customary 
claims, and no land anywhere is wholly free of them (Filer 2014). In this 
conception of the world, it is these customary groups that constitute the 
‘real’ units of social and political organisation within the nation-state, 
and not those ‘modern’ groups whose members have the right to vote 
for individuals to represent them in a national parliament, provincial 
assembly, local council, or civil association (Anderson and Lee 2010).
8  In New Caledonia, Kanak political parties have been wary of the idea that Kanaks belong to 
separate ‘indigenous communities’ in case this weakens the political case for independence from 
France.
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The fundamental tenet of the ideology of chieftainship is that ‘politics’ 
(or political conflict) reflects the corruption by alien values and institutions 
of a traditional social system in which the authority of chiefs is the only 
legitimate form of personal power. In the post-colonial era, the institution 
of chieftainship has been granted various forms of legal recognition, but 
this has necessarily created some tension in the distribution of power 
between elected politicians and unelected chiefs (White 1992; White and 
Lindstrom 1997). This tension cannot be resolved unless these two classes 
of people can somehow be merged into one, which has not been the case in 
any part of Melanesia, even if some individuals have managed to perform 
both roles at once. If chiefs are understood to be the representatives 
of  groups of customary landowners, and hence to have a specific form 
of traditional authority over the allocation of customary land rights, it is 
then a moot point whether bodies of elected politicians can interfere with 
this allocation without recognising that authority.
Both ideologies may be understood as forms of nationalism insofar as 
they construct the idea of ‘the nation’ in specific ways (as a nation of 
customary landowners or a nation represented by traditional chiefs), but 
they do not resemble the nationalisms of European history because they 
do not treat state institutions (including modern legal codes) as legitimate 
expressions of this cultural identity. Both can be used to legitimate or 
justify the exclusion of outsiders at any level of political organisation—
not just at the level of the nation-state but at various levels below it—and 
can therefore be expressed in forms which some observers have described 
as ‘micro-nationalism’ (May 1982). Both can therefore be mobilised 
to make what Hall, Hirsch and Li call ‘ethno-territorial claims’ within 
the boundaries of any jurisdiction, and hence to justify the exclusion 
of outsiders, including other indigenous citizens, from specific areas 
of customary land.
The neo-traditional social order was an integral component of British 
colonial rule in Fiji (Macnaught 1982). However, the government of 
Frank Bainimarama has distinguished itself from all previous regimes by 
dismantling these customary institutions on the grounds that they are 
obstacles to national unity and economic development (Lawson 2012). 
Bainimarama’s version of economic nationalism is shared by some of the 
political leaders in other Spearhead states, but there is less enthusiasm for 
his attack on the ideologies of landownership and chieftainship since these 
have not been so deeply entrenched in their political systems for such 
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a long period of time, nor have they been used to counter the economic 
interests of such a large population of citizens as the Fijian population of 
Indian descent.
In Vanuatu, the ideology of chieftainship has acquired a problematic 
relationship with the ideology of landownership. This is partly because 
of the extent to which the native population was both decimated and 
dispossessed during the colonial era, and partly because of the way that 
some ‘chiefs’, acting as if they were individual ‘landowners’, have more 
recently been involved in acts of ‘intimate exclusion’ that have alienated 
the land of the customary social groups they are supposed to represent. 
McDonnell (2013) calls these men ‘masters of modernity’, rather than 
‘masters of tradition’ (Rodman 1987), because of the way that they have 
used the power of the state, as well as their claims to customary authority, 
to authorise their own dealings with foreign or non-indigenous real estate 
developers. Claims to chiefly status have thus defied the ideology of 
landownership and the ‘power of custom’ because they have been used 
to justify the alienation of customary land. However, these activities have 
given rise to a form of ‘counter-exclusion’, and a process of land reform, 
in which the ideology of landownership and some of the institutions of 
the neo-traditional social order, including the National Council of Chiefs, 
have been mobilised against this process of alienation.
In PNG and Solomon Islands, by contrast, the ideologies of landownership 
and chieftainship have both acquired most of their contemporary force 
from the extent of foreign investment in the extraction of natural resources 
from customary land. In PNG, the legal incorporation of more than 
13,000 ‘landowning clans’ over the past 25 years has clearly been tied to 
specific legal and political processes through which customary land rights 
have been partially alienated to the government in return for the prospect 
of some kind of ‘resource development’ (Filer 2007). In those parts of 
the countryside where the social relations of ‘resource compensation’ 
have come to the fore, either in reality or in local people’s expectations, 
land group chairmen, landowner company directors and political office 
holders have struggled to establish themselves as ‘chiefs’ who can claim 
some traditional right to control the distribution (or misappropriation) 
of ‘landowner benefits’ (May 1997). This is even true of areas where 
anthropologists could only identify ‘big men’ or ‘great men’, not ‘chiefs’, 
as traditional figures of political authority (Keesing 1968; Golub 2007; 
Martin 2013).
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Landed Property and State Formation
The ideological forces that have already been discussed may be sufficient to 
account for the specific nature of the legal and political processes involved 
in the transformation of landed property relations in the four Spearhead 
states. Yet we still need to consider the extent to which the ‘power of 
the state’ is (or is not) applied to these processes, or the extent to which 
the exercise of interpersonal power by ‘state actors’ and other actors in the 
transformation of landed property relations is also part of the broader 
process of state formation. That broader process appears to be constrained 
by the existence of a neo-traditional social order whose inhabitants regard 
the state as a large but illegitimate tenant from which everyone is entitled 
to extract as much rent as they can, by whatever means are available to 
them. Indeed, the wealth owned by the state is the magnetic force that 
impels so many citizens to compete for election to public offices from 
which they can dispose of it. Those who succeed can make the institutions 
of the state look weak when they either break existing rules or make up 
new ones that enable them to consolidate their own personal power 
through the allocation of public wealth, including public land. But the 
state looks even weaker when their interpersonal rivalries prevent them 
from consolidating their collective power as a political class from which 
new members are excluded. And in countries where the institutions of the 
modern democratic state can still be cast as foreign impositions, this form 
of exclusion is not easily achieved.
In some respects, the Melanesian countries are comparable to the Asian 
‘frontier regions’ that Hall, Hirsch and Li characterise as areas of traditionally 
low population density, occupied by ethnic minority or indigenous groups 
of shifting cultivators (or even hunter-gatherers), which have been subject 
to colonisation by migrants from densely settled areas of permanent rice 
cultivation over the course of the last 60 years (Hall et al. 2011: 28–9). 
The whole of West Papua (or what the Indonesian government now calls 
the provinces of Papua and West Papua) would count as a frontier in 
this sense. The Spearhead states have not been subject to colonisation 
by migrants from densely settled areas of permanent rice cultivation, but 
their largely uncharted rural areas are still occupied by indigenous groups 
of shifting cultivators with population densities that are still low by Asian 
standards. And even if the ideology of landownership resists the very idea 
that anyone has a right to colonise anyone else’s customary land, it is still 
the case that foreign investors have obtained the right to exploit much of 
KASTOM, PROPERTy AND IDEOLOGy
36
this land in one way or another. In these circumstances, we should not 
be surprised if the application of state power to the business of rural or 
resource development has distinctive limitations.
Three of the four Spearhead states possess a severely truncated form of 
territoriality in which the distribution of customary land rights between 
customary social groups was only partially documented by the colonial 
authorities and remains a bone of deep contention whenever anyone 
proposes to formalise or legalise such rights for the purpose of public or 
private investment. As we have seen, the colonial authorities made some 
efforts to demarcate the physical boundaries between tribal territories in 
order to limit the incidence of territorial disputes, but the delineation of 
land boundaries by means of cadastral surveys was mostly confined to 
those areas of land that were alienated from customary tenure. What the 
colonial authorities bequeathed to their successors was a set of procedures 
to be followed by government officers in the acquisition of rights to 
customary land that had not already been alienated. These typically 
involved the physical inspection of land boundaries in the company of 
leading men from neighbouring customary groups and the negotiation 
of a price or compensation package that would persuade the owners to 
part with their rights. This aspect of the colonial legacy was transformed 
in somewhat different ways in each of the newly independent states of 
the region. However, the institution of legal procedures for the alienation 
of customary land rights has generally not been matched by any effective 
capacity to regulate the subsequent distribution of ‘landowner benefits’ 
between the people who purport to represent the original owners.
The truncated form of territoriality in these three countries could either 
be taken as evidence of popular resistance to the exercise of state power 
or as evidence of a fundamental lack of capacity on the part of relevant 
government agencies. On one hand, the ‘illegibility’ of national and 
subnational landscapes has created more opportunities for people to engage 
in illegal or fraudulent land transactions and protracted legal disputes. 
On the other hand, it has motivated foreign aid agencies to try and fill 
the capacity gap by funding the production of new policies and laws that 
aim to limit such opportunities. The efforts of the World Bank and other 
aid agencies to strengthen the administration of the forestry, mining and 
petroleum sectors in PNG would be a case in point. Yet these efforts to 
enhance the ‘power of regulation’ commonly fail because they are based 
on an assumption of ‘national ownership’ that proves to be false. That is 
one reason why the architects of the recent land reform process in PNG, 
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which resulted in the legislation that now allows incorporated land groups 
to register titles to their own land, insisted on keeping foreign aid agencies 
and consultants at arm’s length (see Chapter 6, this volume). What is not 
so clear is whether such assertions of national sovereignty can serve to 
prevent the sort of irregular behaviour that has come to be associated with 
the alienation of customary land rights in all three countries.
In these three countries, the ‘rule of law’ seems to be seriously 
compromised because of widespread ignorance of what the law says, 
wilful misinterpretation of the law by politicians and public servants 
engaged in a ‘culture of complicity’ (see Chapter 9, this volume), and 
a basic lack of enforcement capacity on the part of the courts and the 
police. When big companies end up behaving like proxy states in their 
dealings with representatives of the neo-traditional social order, this is 
not because of any great desire to assume such responsibilities, nor 
because governments have been persuaded to adopt a neoliberal policy 
agenda, but rather because politicians themselves have a habit of turning 
into ‘chiefs’ or ‘landowners’ when making their own demands on these 
companies, while public servants sit in their offices, read the newspapers, 
and possibly dream of their own election. In these circumstances, the 
‘power of regulation’ will always be problematic. When the production 
of new laws seems almost like a way of compensating for the inability to 
make them work in practice, there is no reason to suppose that a change 
in the rules will effect a change in the balance of power between different 
groups of political actors. But if legal reform can only be one part of 
the solution to a political problem, there may be no solution without it. 
Whatever the means by which actors evade or subvert the rules at different 
levels of political organisation, a change in their legal identities can still 
effect some change in the ways that land is transacted.
Two Points about Scale
If Weber’s ideal type of bureaucratic authority makes little sense in these 
circumstances, we need to ask what other qualities—apart from the 
occupation of neo-traditional leadership roles or the possession of personal 
charisma—enable individual actors or characters to exercise authority 
in land matters. Rebecca Monson (Chapter 13, this volume) echoes 
Sikor and Lund (2009) in arguing that (landed) property and (political) 
authority are ‘mutually constitutive’, by which she means that people 
who can demonstrate a capacity to transform landed property relations, 
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often to their own personal advantage, acquire additional authority by 
doing so. On the other hand, Michelle Rooney (Chapter 4, this volume) 
suggests that ‘big people’ (men or women) may gain additional authority 
over land matters because of their level of education or the nature of their 
employment in the formal economy, and may use this authority to resist 
the expropriation or dispossession of other, ‘smaller’ people. But all the 
stories told by the contributors to this volume should serve as a reminder 
that any analysis of the exercise of authority over the distribution of land 
rights is liable to vary with the geographical and political scale at which 
the analysis is undertaken, regardless of differences in the laws and policies 
that belong to specific jurisdictions. One of our reasons to question 
what is meant by the ‘powers of exclusion’ in a Melanesian context is 
that Melanesian jurisdictions are so small by comparison to those of 
Southeast Asia, however large they might appear in a Pacific Island 
context. The smaller the jurisdiction, the harder it is to distinguish social 
and economic relations from interpersonal relations, and the greater the 
scope for individual actors to exercise or modify the ‘powers of regulation’. 
This may be one reason why the Lands Minister in Vanuatu seems to have 
more political power and personal authority than his counterpart in PNG 
(see Chapter 9, this volume).
Hall, Hirsch and Li allow that individuals or organisations or even 
‘social movements’ may be actors in the transformation of landed property 
relations, depending on the scale at which the process is analysed. Since 
they are mainly concerned with large groups or classes of social actors, they 
do not make the conventional distinction between actors and the roles they 
perform or the characters they play in a social process. Yet this distinction 
can be helpful in the analysis of social processes in which actors are able to 
represent themselves in different ways. Thus, for example, a (male) public 
servant involved in approving some process of exclusion or expropriation 
may subsequently get elected to parliament and then use his position 
as a politician to try and reverse the process that he formerly endorsed. 
To say that he is simply continuing to operate as a ‘state actor’ does not 
encapsulate such a change of character. In Melanesian countries, it is also 
quite common for actors to swap roles or characters without the need for 
any change in their material circumstances, as when politicians (or public 
servants) represent themselves as customary landowners (or  landowner 
representatives) even while they act in the interests of foreign investors 
who are seeking to exclude customary landowners from their land. That is 
why people sometimes say that ‘conflict of interest’ is a concept unknown 
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in Melanesian politics. But perhaps it also counts as evidence that the 
political process in Melanesia has elements of flexibility or instability that 
are less prominent in other countries.
While Hall, Hirsch and Li are clearly aware of the possibility that 
different ‘powers of exclusion’ can be exercised in different ways at 
different geographical scales or levels of political organisation, they do 
not seem to entertain the alternative understanding of scale as a social and 
political construct in its own right (Leitner et al. 2008). The emergence 
of the ‘landowning group’ as the fundamental unit of social and political 
organisation within the nation-state, and the changing balance of power 
between ‘customary landowners’ and government bodies in the negotiation 
of benefit-sharing agreements, are examples of the scale-making powers of 
extractive industry projects in resource frontiers or resource-dependent 
economies (Tsing 2005). While the flow of revenues from such projects 
has not induced the same degree of political fragmentation in PNG and 
Solomon Islands as has been documented in Nigeria (Watts 2004), it has 
still induced an escalation of ethno-territorial claims by representatives 
of the neo-traditional social order (Allen 2013).
The instances of violent conflict that erupted on the island of Bougainville 
in 1988, and on the island of Guadalcanal 10 years later, both serve to 
illustrate the way in which struggles over the distribution of the benefits 
and costs of large-scale resource development become struggles over 
the scale at which ethno-territorial claims should be made, customary 
property rights should be recognised, and new political settlements 
should be forged. From these examples, it would seem to be the scale 
of customary land rights that is most productive of violent conflict in 
Melanesia, and hence responsible for the realignment or ‘re-scaling’ of 
political boundaries, as the ideology of landownership insinuates itself 
into the national imagination as a shifting bundle of claims to exclude 
other citizens from the benefits of large-scale resource development. 
The question we can then pose, but not so readily answer, is whether the 
relationship between this type of scale-making activity and the process 
of state formation (or deformation) varies between the four Spearhead 
states as a function of their relative dependency on large-scale resource 
development, or as a function of some other factor, like the relative size 
of their national populations.
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Exclusion Reviewed
The concept of exclusion, as expounded by Hall, Hirsch and Li, 
is undoubtedly a useful addition to the vocabulary that is required for an 
understanding of all the social processes entailed in the transformation of 
landed property relations, and this is just as true of Melanesia as it is of 
Southeast Asia. That is mainly because the loss or denial of access to land 
is not invariably coupled with a process of dispossession or expropriation, 
but has sometimes been accomplished by means of another kind of 
social process, like the process of territorialisation in which Melanesian 
‘clans’ have been reconstituted as the collective and exclusive owners 
of customary land rights. Yet this example suggests that we should not 
simply abandon the idea that a process of exclusion may be countered 
by a process of inclusion, rather than the process that Hall, Hirsch and 
Li call ‘counter-exclusion’, since clans are still capable of including or 
incorporating people who do not have an automatic right of membership 
by virtue of descent from some founding ancestor.
We do not believe that the concept of exclusion is sufficiently powerful or 
comprehensive to displace the concepts of dispossession and expropriation 
from the vocabulary that is needed. Indeed, we find that the concept of 
exclusion tends to elide the distinction between the physical and legal forms 
of social process that is entailed in the distinction we have drawn between 
acts of possession, dispossession and repossession on the one hand, and 
acts of appropriation, expropriation and reappropriation on the other. 
Furthermore, the opposition of a generic process of ‘counter-exclusion’ to 
several specific types of exclusion does not appear to us to encompass the 
full range of possibilities encompassed in Polanyi’s concept of a ‘double 
movement’, once this is conceived as an oscillation or alternation in both 
physical and legal transformations of landed property relations, and not 
just as a contest between opposing ideologies. We would certainly argue 
that the reassertion of customary land rights has been a more powerful 
and diverse social (and political) process in Melanesia than it has been in 
Southeast Asia. On the other hand, there are some aspects of the long-
term, large-scale process of alienation and territorialisation that do not 
seem to be reversible, but constitute aspects of a process of state formation 
and capital accumulation that constitutes the stage on which different 
actors perform their double movements.
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When we come to consider the six different types of exclusion (excluding 
counter-exclusion) that Hall, Hirsch and Li have chosen to highlight in 
their own discussion of the agrarian transition, we find that such highlights 
are liable to vary from one region to another, as they themselves concede. 
For example, this volume contains no discussion of the process they call 
‘self-exclusion’, and very little discussion of the process they call ‘ambient 
exclusion’, because these forms of exclusion are relatively insignificant in 
Melanesia. Although there have been a number of donor-funded nature 
conservation projects whose proponents have tried to change customary 
land use practices, they have not had much success because the creation 
of new protected areas has not been taken as a valid pretext for the 
alienation of customary land rights (Filer 2012). National governments 
have sometimes used their legal powers to alienate customary land for the 
construction of public infrastructure, but have rarely been able to do so 
without protracted arguments about the identity of the customary owners 
and the contents of their compensation package (Manning and Hughes 
2008). On the other hand, the chapters in this volume illustrate a variety 
of different forms of ‘intimate exclusion’ on the part of men posing as 
the representatives of customary land groups, and it is not clear that their 
actions are coherent enough to warrant the adoption of a single label for 
what they do.
Finally, we find that the four ‘powers’ distinguished by Hall, Hirsch 
and Li are not really things of the same general type, and this becomes 
apparent when we ask how individual actors exercise power in settings 
where it is not only the actions of ordinary people that can be subject 
to detailed scrutiny at a purely local scale, but also the actions of foreign 
investors, government ministers, public servants, and so forth. In the 
Melanesian context, we find that the distinction that Hall, Hirsch and 
Li make between the powers of ‘regulation’ and ‘legitimation’ fails to take 
account of the importance of the sort of ideological contest that Polanyi 
highlighted in his own version of the double movement. In this context, 
we do not find it helpful to assume that ‘neoliberalism’ is the dominant 
ideology, or the dominant form of political economy, but find it more 
helpful to think of power through the lens of legal pluralism (Merry 
1988). Instead of opposing the power of ‘the market’ to that of ‘the state’, 
we find that it makes more sense to see how the power of ‘custom’ has 
entered into a complex and dynamic relationship with the power of 
‘the law’ in the regulation of a variety of economic transactions in this 
fictitious commodity.
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Urban Melanesia: The Challenges 
of Managing Land, Modernity 
and Tradition
Sarah Mecartney and John Connell
Introduction
All Melanesian countries exhibit rapid urbanisation, and yet, in 
development, policy, and academic discussions, they are often regarded 
as simply rural, since a large proportion of the population lives in rural 
areas and there is a strong cultural affiliation to the land. However, 
half of the Fijian population, more than a quarter of that in Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu, and substantial numbers of Papua New Guineans 
are urban residents. Growing numbers, often now extending beyond 
formal urban boundaries, emphasise the need to recognise urbanisation 
and urbanism, and its permanency, and understand these new urban 
contexts, the processes utilised by different communities to access land 
and services, and  how this influences and requires urban development 
and management.
Modernisation and globalisation have brought fundamental changes to 
Pacific societies, affecting values, goals and social norms. In 2008, the 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, through its Land Management and 
Conflict Minimisation Project, recognised:
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a shift taking place from communal lifestyles, to lifestyles where there is 
a greater emphasis on individual economic wealth accumulation, leading 
to increasing pressures to derive economic benefits from customary land. 
Basic human follies of greed and personal power influence people who are 
in positions of power, so that their decisions are at times being made for 
their own personal gains, and not in the interest of the landowning group 
as a whole (PIFS 2008: 19).
It did not, however, address the question of how non-customary owners 
and nationals access land, the varying notions of property rights in 
urban environments and their hinterlands, and how and why urban 
land issues have otherwise rarely been at the forefront of development 
planning. Although Melanesian towns and cities house increasingly larger 
proportions of national populations, they have become ‘the elephants 
in the room—ignored in policy and practice, perhaps an aberration, 
a circumstance in transit—hopefully not really there and surely not the 
“real Pacific”’ (Connell 2011: 121; see also Wittersheim and Dussy 2013). 
Policy, practice and perception largely ignore urban growth, despite its 
obvious centrality and underwhelming visibility.
It is scarcely surprising that policy makers have struggled with urban 
land. Land issues have made urban development particularly difficult, 
notably where land is mainly owned by local indigenous groups, as it 
is throughout Melanesia. Like other states, the current Solomon Islands 
government maintains land acquisition as a priority area for the broader 
development of the country and seeks ‘to continue to pursue customary 
land mobilization and reform by looking at ways to bring customary 
land into productive usage as land remains fundamental in the country’ 
(GoSI 2014: 6). That is a major challenge since access to land is zealously 
guarded as a critical, unique and enduring source of wealth, especially in 
towns and near urban boundaries where it seems most under threat, and 
problems have confronted external efforts to encourage land registration 
and privatisation, and thus an ‘orderly, regulated and planned’ urban 
development. Consequently, a distinctive form of urbanisation has 
developed, associated with the rights, or lack of rights, of residents to 
land in urban areas. Urban centres are increasingly characterised by a core 
‘modern city’ and rapidly growing uncontrolled fringes of peri-urban 
customary land, settlements on marginal lands, and pockets of traditional 
villages swallowed up in the expanding modern town. This chapter 
examines these issues and the questions they raise about how rapidly 
changing cities can be managed, how they can contribute to national 
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development, who have ‘rights to the city’, and what public policies might 
most effectively enable a more managed urban growth that can create 
space for the inclusion of multiple, diverse urban communities.
Urbanisation in Melanesia
Melanesia is rapidly urbanising at a pace that has increased significantly 
in this century, with accelerating social, economic and environmental 
changes placing pressure on access to urban land. Part of this urbanisation 
consists of suburbs and tower blocks (increasingly in gated communities) 
with formal tenure, that would not be out of place anywhere in the 
world; part consists of settlements largely constructed by the residents 
with diverse forms of formal and informal tenure; and part is composed 
of ‘urban villages’, where established villages—famously at Hanuabada 
in Port Moresby—have become surrounded and engulfed by expanding 
cities. The three parts symbolise the juxtaposition of modern and 
traditional, formal and informal, homogeneous and heterogeneous, 
whether of culture, housing or employment (Jones 2011a). Each part is 
composed of people and communities with social networks, governance 
structures, and various ways of life. Urban residents, short-term and 
long-term, are born there or come from all islands and provinces; they 
include professionals, unskilled people, migrants, customary landowners 
and squatters, all with different formal and informal tenure arrangements, 
on state-owned or custom-owned land, and with different reasons for 
being in the city.
All Melanesian towns and cities have informal and squatter 
settlements, with each of the four independent Melanesian states having 
30–50 per cent of their urban populations living in these communities 
in 2010 (Connell 2011). Informal settlements are growing particularly 
quickly as the supply of land and formal housing is inadequate to meet 
needs. Informality occurs where incomes are low and irregular, public 
housing policies fail to meet demand for low-cost housing, and urban 
planning and management are weak. It is unsurprising that settlements 
are  thus widely perceived as social, economic and environmental 
problems, and that there is opposition to rural–urban migration. Vanuatu 
and Solomon  Islands have the highest current rates of urban growth 
in the Pacific at 2.8 per  cent and 3.7 per cent per annum respectively. 
Such  growth  rates mean a  doubling of population size in less than 
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20 years. In Honiara, this means about 1,500 additional residents looking 
for housing and land every year. In Port Vila, the minimum official area of 
residential plots is 600 square metres, and an additional 10,000 residential 
plots will be required in the next 16 years. Pressures on land are already 
obvious, in terms of demands on government authorities, extension of 
housing into more distant areas, inadequate infrastructure and service 
delivery, pollution and problematic environmental management. 
The geographical spread and spatial pattern to the distribution of changes 
in land use highlight a rapid rate of lease ‘sales’ in and around towns and 
cities, which is matched by increased struggles over land and growing 
political opposition to land sales. Pressure on land for commercial, 
agricultural and residential purposes produces a highly competitive 
environment, accompanied by increasing inequality, rising informality 
and, in some communities, a lower quality of life, especially where 
informal settlements are built on marginal, hazard-prone land, as land 
shortages necessitate, so contributing to a ‘coastal squeeze’ and intense 
pressures on land and housing in such areas (Jones 2011b; Connell 2013; 
Bryant-Tokalau 2014).
Over time, urbanisation has become more permanent, especially where 
urban residents or their ancestors have come from small and remote 
islands (Connell 2011). It is a tired romanticism that everyone has land 
to ‘go back to’ or, indeed, wishes to return to traditional villages. Many 
urban households have effectively severed connections with rural areas 
(or their distant rural kin have severed connections with them), have 
come from places where little land is available (even were they to seek 
to ‘return’), or have children who have grown up without the language, 
aptitude and social connections for rural life, and who have relatively 
permanent urban employment. Urban residents may contemplate return 
but remain in town for their children’s sake (Mecartney 2001). In some 
places an urban middle class has emerged with only tenuous connections 
to rural areas (Gewertz and Errington 1999). The importance of towns 
and cities for the future of Pacific Island states is inescapable, whether as 
drivers of economic growth, centres of social conflict, or simply centres of 
modernity. Yet national political leadership and urban bureaucracies are 
often still unwilling to accept the reality that urban populations will not 
only stay, but will continue to increase. Without that acceptance and more 
effective management, conflict may become more evident than economic 
growth. Resolving underlying land issues is thus crucial.
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Contemporary Customary Complexities 
and the Right to the City
Within most Melanesian towns and cities, and especially the largest ones, 
multiple forms of land tenure exist, accompanied by even more ways of 
thinking about and owning urban and peri-urban land. Claims to land 
may come from colonial or post-colonial law, possession, purchase, 
customary ownership, or recognition by customary owners. That diversity, 
and the entanglements of ideologies, raise basic and severe challenges for 
governments for effective planning and controlling urban development 
and management. Government ownership is common in urban areas, 
dating from colonial era acquisition, with smaller but significant areas 
under customary tenure or individual freehold. On the fringes of towns, 
where expansion has become significant, customary tenure is much 
more important, and poses problems for the conversion of rural land to 
urban uses. A general problem exists in ‘adapting tenures which derive 
from combined customary and colonial precedents, to serve the needs 
of non-customary, post-colonial societies’ whilst ‘traditional precedents 
are not relevant to modern urban living’ (Crocombe 1987: 386, 390). 
The unresolved task of bringing customary land into a modern realm has 
resulted in substantial areas of capital cities especially being quarantined 
from urban development, whether for housing, garbage dumps, or other 
modern uses.
Melanesian countries place great store on the continuing role of customary 
land in support of national values. After Independence, Vanuatu went 
further than any other country in abolishing all freehold land tenure 
and returning land to traditional owners; in urban areas land titles were 
converted to automatic leases on the assumption that land rents would 
pass to customary owners (Rodman 1995). Customary landowners fear 
the loss of ownership of their land, and seek to protect it from alienation, 
yet feel they have little control over urban migrants who have settled 
on their land, even though, in most cases, permissions and some form 
of agreement have been made. Simultaneously, many feel threatened by 
overcrowding, lack of employment, and the rise of facets of contemporary 
life that are seen as problematic, such as excessive drinking, drugs, new 
diseases and brash youth, that challenge perceptions of tradition and the 
good life. Some traditional owners, such as the Motu-Koitabu in Port 
Moresby, have thus fought strenuously to prevent further settlement 
and gain more adequate compensation for land alienation (Connell and 
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Lea 2002:  131–2). However, over time, migrant groups have grown 
in number, size and authority, by dint of their growing power and status in 
urban society. Conversely, despite the growing semblance of permanency 
attached to the gradual acquisition of services and improvement to 
housing, settlers often have no security of tenure. Acquisition of secure 
land title is the most basic and greatest single need for most residents 
(Kiddle 2010), in itself also an indication of the extent of intended urban 
permanency. Uncertainty has resulted in their unwillingness to invest in 
housing and infrastructure, and so improve their quality of life.
Land issues are further complicated both by uncertainties about 
the nature of group ownership of particular tracts of land, and by 
indecision, uncertainty and division between landowners concerning the 
future of the land. In urban areas, local ‘communities’ are increasingly 
dispersed, leadership is fragmented, putative ‘real owners’ multiply and, 
via  marriage and migration, once unknown ‘others’ may claim some 
form of ownership. The fact that there are multiple classes of claimants 
to a particular parcel of land, no strong tradition of delegated authority, 
and no statute of limitations with regard to customary claims, means that 
it is extremely difficult to come up with schemes by which landowners can 
pool resources to convert customary land into modern, alienable property 
(Fukuyama 2008: 21).
Such complexities can seem insuperable and have posed severe problems 
for urban development. At Blacksands settlement (Port Vila), some 
landowners lived in the settlement while others were quite distant; more 
distant landowners wished to legally subdivide the land to lease to possible 
investors, others sought to increase the number of settlers paying rent, 
some preferred the removal of settlers, and still others had no desire for 
any change (Mecartney 2001). Some customary landowners acknowledge 
the mutual benefits of opening up land for development on one side of 
the scale (for example, the Ifira Land Trust in Vanuatu), while others 
aggressively curtail any consideration of urban expansion or use of custom 
land for residential purposes. All were conscious that their need for land 
was likely to grow in the future, but there was no organisation, formal or 
informal, for them to articulate sentiments, fears and plans. Insecurity 
of tenure poses problems for landowners, settlers and urban managers.
That is further complicated where footholds in the city are tenuous, for 
example, where landowners who have negotiated leases with urban settlers 
die and new arrangements are negotiated. This has sometimes resulted in 
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landowners attaching more stringent regulations on land, for example, 
banning some economic strategies such as fishing, using mangrove 
swamps for collecting crabs, shells and wood, and restricting gardening, 
numbers of houses (and ethnic groups), and the establishment of trade 
stores (Numbasa and Koczberski 2012). Such changing practices attest 
to increased competition for land (for housing and agriculture), marine 
access, and other urban resources. Many urban residents survive rather 
than prosper in the city, sometimes by holding several jobs, a situation 
of ‘occupational multiplicity’, or holding none at all, and merely ‘killing 
time’ (Mitchell 2013). Claims on the city vary substantially, urban dreams 
can remain elusive, and the city can seem a threatening place of strangers.
Since land is much more than an economic asset, were that not enough, 
and society is ‘written on the ground’, landownership is complex, 
embedded in cultural and personal relations, and not easily amenable to 
translation into Western codes and conventions. Even claiming exclusive 
rights to land for oneself or one’s group can negate long-standing elements 
of reciprocity. Clarification of land tenure, however necessary for the 
working of a capitalist economy, can threaten the tenuous achievement 
of community and unity where land tenure remains cloudy and thus 
flexible, and even subject to competing claims, rather than be finalised 
and fossilised and a source of overt contention (McDougall 2005). 
That is, however, incompatible with most forms and processes of urban 
development.
Much attention on land in Melanesia is focused on the protection and 
benefits of land dealings for in situ landowners, and ignores how this may 
impact on national citizens who live and work on land with which they 
are not culturally associated. Customary landowners (and their relatives), 
governments (with access to public land) and smaller numbers of people 
who have been able to purchase land usually have superior urban status 
in terms of permanence and stability. By contrast, those who are relatively 
recent migrants, with temporary tenure (either negotiated or claimed 
by squatting), and who are usually relatively poor and without good 
access to employment, have weaker prospects for stability or access to 
services. That is accentuated where they are of different ethnicity, or with 
distinctive cultural characteristics, from the dominant urban population 
group. One consequence has been opposition to urban newcomers.
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In many of the larger Melanesian cities especially, deliberate efforts 
have been made by established urban residents, and urban and national 
governments, to exclude more recent migrants from urban permanency 
or simply refuse to grant access to such services as electricity and water 
supplies. In some sense this is a legacy of colonial ‘apartheid’ policies that 
sought to exclude ‘inappropriate’ natives from urban residence, and that 
were not overturned until the eve of Independence. The rise of urban 
populations, poverty and the informal sector (sometimes perceived as 
the ‘infernal sector’), has been marked by new repressions of the poor 
and marginalised in anti-urban policies, where residents are forced 
out of urban areas, most dramatically by evictions and the bulldozing 
of settlements, and by attempts to devolve responsibilities from the 
state, for example to churches, rather than efforts to devise welfare and 
employment policies to reduce urban problems (Koczberski et al. 2001; 
Connell 2003, 2011; Russell 2009; Mitchell 2011). Even urban markets 
(especially for betel nuts) and market vendors have been opposed by 
urban and national governments, despite their ability to provide food and 
substantial employment, and thus livelihoods, albeit insecure, for youths 
and women. For two decades, Port Moresby food vendors have been 
harassed rather than provision made for them (Connell and Lea 2002). 
In Honiara, governments were bulldozing markets at the same time as 
formal reports were recognising them as invaluable for employment 
generation (Maebuta and Maebuta 2009; Russell 2009). Such opposition 
has occurred even while urban residents experienced reduced access to 
garden land and coastal fishing (Wittersheim 2011). Anti-urbanism is 
not, however, matched by pro-ruralism.
In a form of wishful thinking, residents of informal settlements are 
often perceived as temporary and/or not really belonging to the city, and 
thus unworthy of rights and services. Beyond this conceptualisation, 
quintessentially in Port Moresby, settlers are seen by the wider public, and 
by such agencies as the police, as ‘violent and volatile’ people, responsible 
for most urban crime, and a security threat who should therefore be 
repatriated to their rural villages (Mawuli and Guy 2007:  109–11). 
Ideally, they should be out of sight and out of mind—rather than 
becoming beneficiaries of positive policy formation. Such a pervasive and 
long-standing moral panic has taken various forms in the past. In some 
cases, this sense of ‘not truly belonging’ has resulted in conflict and forced 
removal of urban communities. As early as 1977, opposition to settlers 
in Bougainville resulted in several groups of squatters being repatriated 
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to the New Guinea mainland (Connell and Lea 2002: 64–5). Attitudes 
have not fundamentally changed since then. Migrants in Port Vila, 
whether from Ambrym, Tanna or smaller islands, are seen as problematic 
and disruptive (Widmer 2013). In Honiara, violence erupted partly 
because of competition between different ethnic groups for scarce 
urban land (and equally scarce livelihoods) (Allen 2012). A correlation 
between urban crime levels and migration has been frequently voiced but 
lacks any demonstrable proof, whereas it is not implausible that social 
disorganisation and crime are a function of substantial inequalities in 
access to land, housing and other services. Practices opposing settlers 
have remained in the guise of achieving order and cleanliness, reducing 
crime and unemployment, freeing land for business development, and 
demonstrating that the state was not weak. No practices have contributed 
to developing a more inclusive city, or recognising the contribution 
of these residents through the provision of informal goods and services.
Opposition to settlers, and the lack of rights for customary owners, 
emphasise that cities are places of both inclusion and exclusion. 
The  gradual emergence of post-colonial Melanesian ‘revanchist cities’ 
(Smith 1996) is characterised by discourses and actions directed at 
minorities, squatters, informal workers and recent migrants, creating an 
exclusionary version of civil society, nominally directed towards control 
and safety but designed to remove symptoms of poverty and difference 
from sight. In so doing, revanchist urban practices have displaced already 
marginalised people into more difficult circumstances, evaded the 
possibility of creating a more inclusive urbanism, and effectively denied 
the right to the city to a substantial proportion of the urban population. 
In other parallel contexts, this has resulted in calls for more substantive 
forms of participation and urban citizenship (Holston 2009; Stead 2015). 
Certain present and potential residents, and national citizens, have thus 
been more or less excluded from the city and its services and from the 
potential benefits of urban life, emphasising issues of contention, conflict 
and uneven power relations (Hall et al. 2011). Moreover, intensified 
competition over land and shifts in governance affect land use in ways 
that introduce new injustices (Sikor et al. 2013), while the sensitivity of 
land issues is a powerful political and economic tool—maximising the 
paradox of cultural protection and integrity against responsibility for 
fair land dealings for all. Modernisation has introduced new concepts 
and new dimensions to the use and management of customary land 
and the distribution of benefits derived from it. For example, resource 
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extraction and infrastructure investment projects, such as those in Papua 
New Guinea (PNG) and Solomon Islands, offer compensation payments 
for alienated land that have often given rise to community conflict over 
compensation and a recent escalation in demands, even where that land 
has been used for the benefit of the local community (Banks 1998). 
The combination of disputes over landownership, increased claims for 
compensation by those who often perceive this to be their most valuable 
asset, the individualisation of property rights previously held in common 
(Gilberthorpe 2007) and mismanagement have all slowed the process of 
urban development.
Intensified competition and struggles over land ‘coupled with shifts 
towards flow-centred governance has generated land uses involving new 
forms of social exclusion, inequity and ecological simplification’ (Sikor 
et al. 2013: 522). Increased demands for land that surrounds towns have 
created a parallel increase in land ‘ownership’ claimants (just as around 
mine sites). Such land has high value due to demand, and is also the site 
of blurred civic responsibilities. Little clarity on the roles and rights of 
involved actors exists in the absence of clear national or cultural guidance 
in this growth space, so that, as in Southeast Asia, ‘claims to land on the 
basis of indigenous or ethno-territorial basis in which one group asserts 
precedence and the right to exclude on the grounds of historical and 
affective claims to place, raise especially troubling dilemmas’ (Hall et al. 
2011: 11). The resultant urban fracture zones are evident, as in Vanuatu, 
with the creation of the Vete Indigenous Land Association, a ‘registered’ 
group of individual and group claimants primarily from the island of 
Tongoa and the Shepherd Islands, who state that they have been excluded 
from land decision processes on Efate, which they assert is their traditional 
land (Wilson 2011). Once again an increased number of claimants, using 
different strategies for claiming landownership, in urban sites where land 
is obviously becoming more valuable and in demand, does nothing to ease 
the task of urban management and development.
The Trouble with Land
Balancing the rights and needs of customary owners and migrant citizens 
represents a critical challenge for urban management, and, other than 
in Fiji, there has been a marked reluctance of government to intervene 
in customary land matters. Politicians deliver promises rather than plans. 
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Urban land has, to date, been conscientiously placed in the ‘too hard 
basket’ due to a lack of recognition of its contribution to development 
finance, and because cultural politics threaten future plans and vested 
interests oppose change. Nonetheless, throughout Melanesia, land 
mobilisation strategies have been pursued that would secure land for urban 
development, and in PNG finance has been secured for land development 
through the state becoming the lessee of customary land enabling lease-
leaseback schemes for customary land mobilisation, bringing land into 
use without it becoming alienated (see Chapter 6, this volume). However, 
if land policies are piecemeal, exclude the role of the resource ‘owner’ 
and ‘user’, and fail to deal with the underlying systems for land rights 
allocation, land use planning and the land market, inefficiency and 
discontent may prevail.
Larger cities, greater urban permanency and environmental concerns raise 
new challenges, but especially the need for appropriate and accessible 
land for residential purposes and the management of growth (planning, 
infrastructure investment). There is a widespread and growing perception 
that institutions—whether state, customary or hybrid—are ineffective in 
managing land issues, and fail to deliver equitable or durable outcomes, 
hence their legitimacy is increasingly questioned. This imposes multiple 
stresses and costs on three critical fronts:
• restricted business development, whether small or large, local or 
foreign, through inadequate guarantees of security, making this less 
profitable, less durable and more uncertain;
• inefficient delivery of public assets—roads, schools, clinics, water 
and electricity—where disputes over rights, compensation and lease 
payments result in higher costs and delays; and
• decreased social cohesion, with intra-community and intergenerational 
tensions as a consequence of unresolved contests over benefit-sharing 
arrangements.
Thomas Sikor and colleagues (2013) note a discernible trend in land 
governance away from the classic territorial forms that had become 
dominant with the rise of the modern nation state, such as land use 
regulations made by central governments, land use planning conducted 
by local governments, and land management undertaken by local 
communities to guide access to and development of land. In Melanesian 
towns and cities, communities do not have a strong role in land 
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management, nor is there clear action or an articulated role for customary 
landowners in contributing substantially to land management or use in 
peri-urban environments, the contemporary zones of crisis (Storey 2003).
Many urban land managers—land use and physical planners, housing 
and environmental officers—in Melanesia are confronted with multiple 
land challenges when seeking to address sustainable urban development 
issues. Land issues offer problems of:
• ambiguous and inadequately defined rights;
• frequent and unrecorded land use changes;
• land conflicts;
• land grabbing by powerful elites (access to urban land being a prime 
area of corruption);
• a lack of information (sometimes none at all or simply not in digital 
form);
• ambiguous and/or outdated, and poorly monitored and implemented 
land use plans;
• outdated legislation;
• over-regulation (with rules that are unknown and unenforceable with 
current staff capacity or without the technical ability to assess non-
compliance);
• a lack of effective development control;
• fraudulent valuations; and
• a weak private land sector and market.
Whereas urban land management needs to be systemic to produce 
sustainable development, urban land managers are constantly forced 
to make instant, non-sustainable decisions about fundamental issues 
such as environmental concerns, climate change, and the occupation of 
vulnerable and disaster-prone locations. Beyond such problems there are 
few enough land managers or supportive institutions.
Tim Anderson (2011) and others downplay the need for land reform, 
promoting the productivity of customary land, its social value and the 
livelihood opportunities it supports. While this remains crucial in rural 
areas—especially in the face of land grabs (Filer 2011)—it is less valid 
in densely populated, fast growing, heterogeneous urban communities. 
Virtues exist in recognising flexibility, but what works in rural areas 
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among largely homogeneous cultural groups is impossible to implement 
in cities. Here ‘fuzzy boundaries have the virtue of enabling flexible 
accommodations’, yet lack of clarity enables officials at various levels to ‘act 
as tyrants, using the power invested in them erratically to evict, intimidate 
[and] make a grab for resources’ (Hall et al. 2011: 12). Such ‘regulatory 
fuzziness’ poses greater problems at the peri-urban interface. Regulating 
access to land and exclusion from it are carried out by both state actors 
and customary groups, involving at least four areas of regulation that 
determine boundaries between pieces of land, prescribe the types of land 
use that are acceptable, determine the kinds of ownership and usufruct 
claims made with respect to different areas of land, and make claims 
about which groups have rule-based claims to any particular piece of land. 
Unsurprisingly, in such circumstances, regulation is not always effective, 
as reflected in the lack of compliance with land use plans, zoning strategies 
and local planning schemes that exists in both Port Vila and Honiara. 
Typically, therefore, in Honiara, although the Town and Country 
Planning Act allowed for stakeholders to take part in the development 
of a local planning scheme, the city council planners were not effectively 
implementing this provision (Hou and Kudu 2012: 25).
The two key actors promoting (and also opposing) changes in land 
relations are currently limited to national governments and customary 
landowners—the latter being dominated by male representatives (both 
individuals and as collective groups). The blurred administrative lines 
and boundaries of urban centres and their peripheries result in fuzzy 
responsibilities that allow state actors and customary owners to exclude 
urban settlements and their communities from access to services and fair 
land dealings. There is a need to address current urban boundaries and 
how any potential redefinition impacts on the rural edge, with its stronger 
traditional governance structures and norms, like the large settlement 
of Blacksands near Port Vila, which is largely ignored by all levels of 
government in Vanuatu. In recent years, there has been investment in 
institutional strengthening of state and subnational agencies to improve 
delivery for development planning, but customary landowners have not 
benefited from this, despite their relevant knowledge, being excluded from 
the more intimate but formal interactions of urban contexts. However, at 
a rather different scale from capital cities, a unique arrangement has been 
gazetted for the small urban centre of Lenakel (Tanna, Vanuatu), where 
the town’s administrative area has been declared a ‘physical planning area’, 
and thus subject to national planning and zoning regulations, whilst the 
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ownership of the land remains with the 12 customary land claimants. 
The management of the town is overseen by 13 councillors comprising 
representatives of the landowners, youth, women, churches and business 
houses. Its success remains to be seen, and what is possible in a town of no 
more than 4,000 people may not be easy to transfer elsewhere.
Remarkably, neither urban nor state land has expanded spatially since 
independence was gained, but few significant changes followed, beyond 
exceptional cases such as the gazetting of Nasinu as a new township in Fiji 
(within the Suva-Nausori corridor), and also Rakiraki. With rapid growth, 
there have been increasing calls to expand city and municipal boundaries 
(as in the case of Port Vila). The Solomon Islands government has listed, 
among its top 10 priorities, a desire ‘to see the Honiara Boundary issue 
resolved so that sensible discussions can begin to occur about developments 
outside the original Honiara Boundary’ (GoSI 2014: 6). This has been 
identified as a priority in recognition of the need for urban equity, social 
stability and economic growth, but will not be easy to implement in a 
contested area. Generally, there have been reactions rather than positive 
responses to expansion statements (emanating largely from government 
and private sector sources that seek economies of scale and social protection 
views). Local communities have demonstrated concern over land use, 
access and affordability, whilst landowners fear a minimisation of their 
roles as resource custodians, and a perceived loss of both cultural identity 
and a source of revenue. However, dialogue has often been maintained 
‘offline’, outside formal meetings and often on an individual basis, and 
while many officials agree on the nature of the problems associated with 
land use, needs and management, few evince any real confidence that they 
can be overcome. A lack of enterprise, initiative and domestic leadership 
is difficult to ignore, and bodes ill for improving urban land governance 
and for development in a broader sense.
Towards Strategic and Inclusive 
Urban Planning
In Melanesia, public policy has largely been formally directed at rural 
development, transport and service provision. Policy or action for urban 
spaces is often absent, and the social ramifications of this are not well 
understood by national decision makers or citizens. Attempts at urban 
planning are scarcely new, and even flourished on the eve of decolonisation, 
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and yet, half a century later, in rapidly changing cities with no tradition 
of  planning and management, there are no demonstrable Melanesian 
success stories.
Urban planning—even land use planning—is rare in Melanesia, and 
unregulated urban expansion has increased the costs of urbanisation, 
especially for infrastructure provision. Public space and recreational space 
are scarce. Many settlements are entirely unregulated, and governments 
simply cannot keep pace with service provision, producing anarchic, 
dysfunctional and partial housing and land markets. Policies that once 
had some ephemeral success have been overwhelmed by rapid changes, 
especially urban population increases, bureaucratic inefficiency and, again, 
land shortages (Jones and Lea 2007). Management has worsened rather 
than improved. Few effective housing policies exist, and state housing is 
undeveloped and beyond the reach of the poor, so that people have had 
little option but to provide for themselves. Even ‘site and service’ schemes 
have become rare. In PNG, the National Capital District Commission’s 
Settlements Strategic Plan, 2007–2011 focused on upgrading settlement 
areas and developing site-specific plans related to distinctive land tenure 
situations, but it made little progress (Jones 2012). Basic infrastructure 
is rarely the result of public initiatives. Governments have demolished 
as much as constructed, so that many people are in effect urbanising 
the towns themselves, in the face of formal intransigence and neglect. 
Even then, urban communities find it increasingly difficult to access land 
for housing and other individual purposes. Five key challenges are the 
lack of access to land, acute competition for land, variable knowledge of 
land tenure, affordability, and the availability of adequate housing. These 
are most prevalent in the peri-urban interface where land markets are 
subject to competitive pressure as urban centres expand and speculation 
is frequent. Fiji’s National Housing Policy (GoF 2011) therefore adopted 
a fundamental shift in the role of government, from provider to enabler of 
both affordable housing and improved access to land through innovative 
partnerships.
Recognition of the considerable challenges and the disappointments 
of  urban planning and management brought belated external 
intervention to coordinate and exchange ideas, strategies and plans for 
urban development that culminated in the Pacific Urban Agenda (PUA). 
The PUA was developed in 2003, endorsed by the Pacific Islands Forum 
Leaders in 2005, and further accepted by the Pacific Urban Forum in 
2007 (and again in 2011), as an effective mechanism for raising awareness 
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and improving understanding of urban matters at country and regional 
levels, and one that could be used as a basis for the inclusion of urban 
issues in national development plans. The PUA was never formalised as 
a document, but was buried within the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat’s 
Pacific Plan (PIFS 2007), and without any regional agency tasked with 
putting it into place. Nonetheless, the PUA provided moral and practical 
support for effective urban policies and enshrined a set of themes and 
guidelines for establishing institutional frameworks, building technical 
capacity, and raising political awareness. In a region devoid of institutional 
support for urban management, it was a necessary development.
A set of interventions centred on four thematic areas:
• institutional framework: strengthening capacities (particularly local 
government);
• urban environment: integrating environmental and disaster 
management issues into urban development decision making;
• access to serviced shelter: strengthening provision of serviced land for 
urban development; and
• urban quality of life: recognising community and traditional decision-
making structures where appropriate; engaging with vulnerable groups; 
addressing livelihood and employment; community-based safety nets.
The PUA did not directly advocate improved access to land for all, instead 
taking a less confrontational approach within the goal of improving 
institutional structures for better management of urban growth and the 
provision of infrastructure for basic services for urban communities. 
Land  and housing were identified as priority areas in the PUA and 
reinforced at various meetings, such as a national urban forum in 
Vanuatu (2010), national housing policy consultations in Fiji (2011), the 
Papua New Guinea National Urban Forum (2012), the Pacific Housing 
Workshop (2012), and the Rights to Housing in Melanesia Workshop 
(2013). However, conspicuous in their absence at such meetings, or with 
limited representation, have been traditional landowners and leaders, the 
private sector and the community (in numerous possible versions of civil 
society)—three critical groups of actors who have significant influence in 
shaping their space and managing its use, and with their own rights to the 
city, but who have not always been organised or recognised. A key challenge 
within the PUA has been that of government agencies not proactively 
seeking dialogue with the identified customary landowners and the local 
community. Dual challenges of workload and regulatory responsibilities, 
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along with uncertainty over how to actually engage with landowners 
and community alike, have frequently resulted in a lack of action or 
dialogue. Different ministerial portfolios do not support effective urban 
management or forward planning, such as city development strategies, 
and fragmentation of responsibilities is not conducive to effective and 
cohesive responses, especially where managerial expertise is scarce. Urban 
management requires a multisectoral coordination with governance, 
land, planning, investment, environment and community components, 
which allows interactions with people and politics.
Despite obvious constraints, the PUA has enjoyed some success as an 
advocacy platform, but its implementation at the regional level has suffered 
from limited technical and human capacity, a lack of (multipartner) 
commitment, and inadequate resources to implement priorities such as 
access to land and housing in the wider Pacific Plan. The difficulty of 
mobilising land for urban development deterred widespread embrace of 
the PUA, and enabled only limited efforts at participatory governance 
and the application of innovative skills and approaches required for 
unlocking customary land for urban growth. This reflected caution by 
both governments and politicians in evaluating the social, economic, 
environmental and political implications of urban change, rather than 
a conscious decision not to address urban issues. The weighing up of 
the implications of urban change (including evaluating financial costs), 
assessing the ramifications of urban improvements versus deferred 
expenditure in rural areas, the costs of the conditions and caveats attached 
to development loans and grants (more difficult to access for those not 
in the finance sector) and their impacts on local landowners, were all 
paramount considerations. Urban development was constantly deferred.
Some selected lessons learned through the application of the PUA are 
that Pacific Island countries require committed and active leadership 
(and champions), along with well-articulated, resourced and integrated 
plans for (urban) development. Such plans and strategies need to be 
developed through effective community consultations and then strong 
partnerships between national and local governments, public corporations 
(service providers), traditional leaders and landowners, community-
based organisations, the private sector and development partners. 
These partnerships are critically important in addressing potential threats 
that undermine living standards, sustainability and economic growth, and 
in creating healthy and safe living environments across urban and peri-
urban areas. That is no small challenge.
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Management, Public Policy and Dialogue
The limited impact of the PUA has emphasised how urban plans and 
policies have been piecemeal and largely ineffective in managing rapid 
expansion at the urban fringe. Throughout Melanesia, national frameworks 
to guide urban growth and promote a more equitable share of the benefits 
of development are required. Partial land use and urban policies have 
been formulated in Vanuatu, Fiji and PNG, but with varying degrees 
of participation and sectoral integration affecting their impact. PNG 
has recently endorsed an Urbanisation Policy (GoPNG 2010), which 
clearly sets out the benefits and advantages of planned and managed 
urbanisation, but may be destined to become another moral statement 
rather than an effective practical plan. Nonetheless, settlement assessment 
and upgrading is being undertaken, and is supported by political leaders, 
while communities are organising themselves into collective associations 
to dialogue with state actors and better understand what their rights are 
within regulated and political urban environments.
Since 2007, several Pacific Island countries have commenced actions to 
manage urban growth. These have included the establishment of Planning 
and Urban Management Agencies (in Samoa, Tonga and Kiribati) with 
integrated work plans with land agencies, several policy dialogues, and 
policy formulation in consultation with other national government 
agencies, but these initiatives are yet to be effectively extended to the 
larger Melanesian states. Solomon Islands has continued to regularise 
temporary occupation licences in Honiara, thus giving settlers more 
security of tenure. Many such efforts have been conducted with little 
support from other sectors, thus highlighting the critical need to extend 
participation, since a key lesson is that exclusion of interest groups results 
in slow progress and a lack of a holistic ownership for improved urban 
management.
Fiji, by contrast, has a more active program (in partnership with 
land trusts, local governments, non-governmental organisations and 
communities) aimed towards eradicating poverty by the provision of 
housing and land opportunities for all. Fiji has recently clarified the role 
and responsibilities of the state in urban environments, settlements and 
accessing iTaukei (customary) land in a manner that strives for equitable 
benefits. However, the cost of management is high, both financially and 
politically, for the state, and the implementation of actions for improved 
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access to land for all has commenced cautiously on a small scale, primarily 
directed at vulnerable communities in the Greater Suva Area. In 2014, 
the Ministry of Local Government, Urban Development, Housing 
and the Environment launched its Town-Wide Settlement Upgrading 
Programme, which targets settlements on iTaukei land within urban 
areas. The implementation strategy has been established by:
• facilitating the provision of basic infrastructure services and affordable 
and decent housing opportunities;
• providing some form of security of tenure (communal leases and 
regulated subdivisions as two options); and
• improving compliance with the Urban Policy Action Plan (2004), 
Urban Growth Management Plan (2006), and National Housing 
Policy (2011).
As this clearly demonstrates, numerous agencies and institutions must 
work together in urban areas.
The role of urban and peri-urban formal and informal settlements in 
policy dialogue has been marginalised, affecting well-intentioned but ill-
formed policy goals and implementation. For ‘fuzzy governance’ at the 
peri-urban interface, hybrid systems—legal or perceived—are likely to 
be required, like those set up in the small town of Lenakel. Some states 
are moving in this direction. Thus the Constitution of Vanuatu (1980) 
recognises custom, and a range of statutory and regulatory instruments 
prescribe governance roles for several organisations rooted in custom, 
such as the National Council of Chiefs (Malvatumauri), the Vanuatu 
Cultural Centre, and Customary Land Tribunals. These arrangements 
have so far enabled Ni-Vanuatu to reaffirm local identity and kastom 
while pursuing economic and political liberalisation in ways that have 
eluded other Melanesian nations. Necessarily, though, this hybridity is 
incomplete, leaving gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies in the framework as 
the rapid pace of transformation from pre-market customary institutions 
to global institutions throws up unresolved policy contests, and also 
challenges the capability of existing institutions to effectively regulate 
and mediate transactions and ensure the affordability of both land and 
housing. Continuing globalisation of the economy, and the expected 
acceleration of investment and development affecting customary land, 
will pose additional challenges. The institutions responsible for managing 
these stresses—governmental, commercial and traditional—are coming 
under increased pressure (see Chapter 6, this volume).
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Little can be achieved without advocacy and champions, and the 
involvement of landowners and settlers in more robust processes. 
Advocacy, public policy and dialogue are all being used to varying 
degrees to address improved access to land, property and services, and 
to resolve land conflicts. The experience of attempts at Pacific urban 
management over the last decade clearly indicates that there is a need 
to develop pragmatic and culturally acceptable solutions to packaging 
native and customary land for urban development, as little formal land 
supply has been provided. The task of developing relevant and robust 
planning responses to these challenges rests not with urban experts, but 
with the ability of central, provincial and local government to work 
with rather than for landowners and urban communities and respond to 
their needs rather than define their needs on their behalf. Recognising 
local community needs on the one hand, whilst integrating regional and 
international concerns on the other, calls for good communicators. Public 
policy can provide guidance when well formulated and inclusive dialogue 
contributes to developing practical goals and the sustainability of policy 
actions. However, such effective integrated activity is rare in any country, 
let alone in Melanesia.
Political urban champions are emerging but require more technical 
and financial support to implement the socially inclusive development 
they advocate. Without collective action to elevate urban and land 
challenges on development agendas, resource commitment will remain 
low. The additional challenges posed by natural disasters, and the adverse 
impacts of climate change that affect settlements and residential patterns, 
also demand the recognition of a continuum of land rights and action. 
For  example, following the 2007 tsunami in Gizo, Solomon Islands, 
many did not want to return to their previous places of residence due to 
the perceived risks they would face if there were repeated natural disasters. 
However, due to land disputes and lack of clarity over land tenure, 
permanent places for resettlement were not identified. The government 
appeared unable or unwilling to take an active role in settling the disputes, 
and three years later security of tenure remained an issue, since the land 
disputes had not been formally settled and many of the affected population 
had rebuilt on Crown land with no legal permission. Such problems of 
resettlement are familiar throughout Melanesia and the wider Pacific 
(Connell 2012) and, yet again, indicate the land constraints to modern 
development.
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Capacity constraints within both national and municipal governments 
affect the ability to get policy ‘right’, and its implementation remains 
a significant challenge. Despite genuine and considerable efforts in 
Melanesia, no single entity exists that can deliver on targeted and effective 
urban policy on its own. Greater integration and coordination need to 
be recognised across government agencies alongside genuine engagement 
with non-government actors, supported by greater political commitment 
and stronger administration, since these cannot be sustained by external 
partner support or on the moral basis of the PUA. More home-grown 
options must examine the role of the private sector and how it engages 
with the city and customary landowners. The voices of many people—
notably the youth, women and urban residents (including non-customary 
landowners)—are muted in public consultation, where that exists. 
Community participation in urban discourse has been piecemeal and 
limited. While some urban communities are not as socially cohesive as 
rural and outer island communities, though these too lack cohesion, 
greater efforts need to be made in engaging affected urban communities 
in the planning, design and development of their locales.
The invisibility of communities is most marked in fringe squatter 
communities, such as Burns Creek on the edge of Honiara, where 
thousands are without the most simple access to water and sanitation 
facilities, living in conditions of poverty but not demanding improved 
access and opportunities either from the state (national and subnational) 
or from landowners for fear of violence or eviction. On the other hand, 
recent (February 2014) land reforms in Vanuatu insist on the inclusion of 
women and youth in decision dialogue with an Ombudsman for Land as 
a mediator should the case arise. A hybrid system, where modernity meets 
kastom, offers promising ways forward, but this too requires courageous 
champions and leaders. Customary landowners and indigenous structures 
will have a greater means of influence than they have exercised in the past 
and over a larger area. This requires governments to be sensitive to this 
scenario and less reliant on their own prerogatives. The cost of avoiding 
‘sensitive’ land issues is too high a price to pay.
In this century, land summits and similar meetings have tended to focus 
on customary landowners, providing little space for the local population 
residing on or wishing to access non-state lands for residential/family 
purposes. Indeed, urban residents are caught between a place-of-living 
versus a place of traditional identity, in many ways disempowering their 
contribution to decision making. They may elect local councillors and 
KASTOM, PROPERTy AND IDEOLOGy
78
national members of parliament, yet their engagement as ‘non-customary’ 
landowners in policy and other decision-making processes is currently 
limited. Greater efforts are needed to nurture the inclusion of urban 
residents in national land dialogues if a more equitable and people-
centred development is to be achieved. Provision for dialogue has not been 
adequately provided in urban settings that at best operate symbolically, 
with chiefly representatives to mediate social situations that do not include 
access to ‘foreign’ land. People in the Pacific, regardless of where they 
live, have cultural knowledge of successful ways of resolving land-related 
conflict. This knowledge needs to be recognised, respected, supported and 
extended. Extra care needs to be taken to protect the interests of local 
people and to establish open dialogue and capacity building so that all 
involved parties understand the full consequences of development and 
investment and can make informed decisions.
Future Challenges
Land is a ubiquitous and problematic feature of development throughout 
the Pacific, and land management is unusually challenging in Melanesia, 
yet  it is at the core of sustainable urban and increasingly national 
development. Limited understanding exists of the roles that towns and 
cities play in national development, and whether there is sufficient 
engagement of landowners, the private sector and the community in the 
management of this growth. Immediate urban problems may stem from 
land issues, absent policies and management limitations, but underpinning 
these are circumstances of limited economic growth, political instability 
and diverse development priorities. Customary land has tended to be 
a nation divider rather than a foundation for state building—ironic given 
that land tenure was a unifier in paths to independence in Melanesian 
countries. In PNG, where urbanisation was relatively late, towns were 
anticipated, on the eve of Independence, to become centres of national 
social, economic and political development—nothing less than ‘crucibles 
of nationhood’ (Ward 1970, cited in Connell 2011: 121). That optimistic 
era has long gone. Identity remains inseparable from land and, in 
revanchist cities, crucibles boil over. Over time, attitudes to urbanisation 
have hardened, through prejudice against squatter settlements rather than 
any idealist vision of rural development policy. There is no going back to 
taem bifo. People have moved and will continue to move, and genuine 
efforts between customary landowners, the state and community must 
recognise changed ways of living, and broader rights to the city.
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The Pacific future is decidedly urban. Recognising this reality will help 
focus  the efforts of governments and traditional leaders, and ordinary 
citizens, on practical measures to manage this growth, as well as 
address the critical discussions and decisions in relation to land. Yet for 
several decades, antipathy to migrants and settlers has been pervasive, 
emphasising how:
The identity of the modern city is created by what it keeps out … In order 
to determine itself as the place of order, reason, propriety, cleanliness, 
civilisation and power, it must represent outside itself what is irrational, 
disordered, dirty, libidinous, barbarian and cowed (Mitchell 1988: 165).
Melanesians are rarely easily cowed, but such pervasive representations 
emphasise exclusion and denial of agency and minimise the possibility 
of comprehensive and strategic urban planning and management. 
There is an urgent need for practical discourse on the mutual benefits 
of accessing and developing customary land whilst respecting customary 
tenure systems. Just as urbanisation evolves and changes over time, 
so does custom, requiring modalities that recognise cultural protection 
and the need to provide basic services for all citizens while also taking 
into account equitable access to land. Critically, Pacific cities and their 
management demonstrate and require elements of hybridity that offer 
solutions in other realms of development and change (Connell 2013). 
The modern city must be built, grounded and inspired by traditional 
foundations. This is particularly significant where the physical boundaries 
of urban areas do not coincide with their administrative boundaries, and 
peri-urban areas play an important role in the provision of food, water 
resources and land. This peri-urban interface is also where processes of 
urbanisation are most intense, and where some of the most obvious social 
and environmental impacts are located. If well managed, the interactions 
between town and village provide the basis for a balanced regional and 
sustainable development. Yet, despite a greater engagement with the 
broader community for management approaches that are grounded in the 
principles of equity, justice and human rights, and the right to the city, 
inevitable problems exist in seeking to embrace competing philosophies of 
land tenure, under pressure and in contexts of rapid change and mobility, 
respecting different groups with varied interests, knowledge, wisdom and 
objectives, but among whom consultation and collaboration are required.
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Committed political and traditional leadership is needed to accept the 
reality that urban populations will continue to increase and urbanisation 
will intensify. Urban solutions depend on economic growth, slower 
population growth, more effective service provision and management, 
and innovative approaches to land provision. The level of protection and 
respect of human rights will be tested as countries continue to urbanise. 
Advocacy for the recognition of increasing urban permanency, public 
policy for managing urban growth, and creating space for the inclusion 
of urban communities in land discussions are crucial. Champions, plans, 
and skilled, competent and neutral managers, and considerable general 
goodwill and political will, are all required. Actions must work for both 
short and long-term periods. There needs to be genuine collaboration 
across multiple stakeholder groups for meaningful actions in managing 
urban growth whilst ensuring fair land dealings for all and not just for 
a selected few. That is no gentle challenge or easy agenda where economic 
prospects are constantly changing. But the consequences of continued 
inaction and an imbalanced discourse may result in conflict and increased 
poverty in both urban and rural environments.
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Urban Land in Solomon Islands: 
Powers of Exclusion and 
Counter-Exclusion
Joseph D . Foukona and Matthew G . Allen
Introduction
Donovan Storey has observed that urban growth in Melanesia ‘has 
created an unabated demand on services, shelter, infrastructure and 
land—all of which are in limited supply’ (Storey 2003: 259). There can 
be no doubt that the supply of, and demand for, land as a commodity 
is a salient driver of exclusion from land in urban Honiara, the capital 
of Solomon Islands. In keeping with this volume’s mandate to engage 
with the Powers of Exclusion framework developed by Derek Hall, Philip 
Hirsch and Tania Murray Li (2011), we apply it, first, to an analysis of the 
processes by which people—both settlers and those ‘indigenous’ to the 
island of Guadalcanal, which hosts Honiara—are being prevented from 
accessing urban land; and second, to an analysis of the strategies that the 
subjects of this exclusion are employing to claim, or claim back, access 
to land within the city boundaries. In other words, we are interested in 
examining powers of both exclusion and counter-exclusion as they apply 
to contemporary Honiara. In doing so, we suggest that the powers of 
exclusion and counter-exclusion at play in Honiara can only be fully 
understood against the backdrop of an encompassing political economy 
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characterised by patronage networks and personalised forms of political 
and administrative governance; and with reference to the particular 
histories and social relations of Solomon Islands.
That said, we find much of heuristic value in Hall, Hirsch and Li’s 
framework. Of the four powers of exclusion they identify—regulation, 
force, the market and legitimation—regulation and the market (and, to 
a  much lesser extent, force) provide useful lenses on the processes 
of  exclusion that are playing out in Honiara. In the case of powers of 
counter-exclusion (Hall et al. 2011: 170–91), we find that legitimation 
plays a central role, as evidenced by collective mobilisations around 
discourses such as indigeneity, customary landownership, nation-building 
and citizenship. While force has not, to date, emerged as a salient power 
of counter-exclusion in urban Honiara, contemporary urban land 
struggles are set against the backdrop of the so-called ‘Ethnic Tension’ 
of 1998–2003, which saw the violent eviction of settlers from rural 
and peri-urban areas immediately adjacent to Honiara at the hands of 
Guadalcanal militants whose agenda could be broadly characterised as 
‘ethno-territorial’ (Hall et al. 2011: 175–80). In the contemporary post-
conflict setting, lingering tensions and grievances, including in relation to 
the original alienation of the land that now hosts Honiara, cast a spectre 
of violence over the city. Moreover, the increasingly violent character of 
Honiara’s settlements, most of which are organised along ethnic lines, and 
previous incidents involving the mobilisation of settlement youth in overt 
acts of collective political violence, raise the possibility that force could yet 
become more salient as a power of counter-exclusion in urban Honiara.
In applying the Powers of Exclusion framework to our examination 
of processes of exclusion in urban Honiara, and in particular to the 
interaction  between regulation and the market, we arrive at a broadly 
similar set of conclusions to those reached by Hall, Hirsch and Li, 
namely that the formal rules often bear little resemblance to on-the-
ground realities (Hall et al. 2011:  16), that public officials frequently 
‘act as tyrants’ in the administration of land (ibid.:  14), and that the 
market for land is not a product of ‘some abstract space of supply and 
demand’ (ibid.:  18). We demonstrate how the abuse of discretionary 
powers vested in the Commissioner of Lands has seen property rights in 
urban land allocated in ways that distort the market and abrogate formal 
legal procedures. Once such allocations have been made, the courts have 
tended to rule in favour of registered titleholders, and, on occasion, 
these rulings have been enforced by the state’s security apparatus. It is 
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within this realm—the  ‘fuzzy zone of compromise, accommodation 
and bribery’ (ibid.:  16)—that Solomon Islands’ distinctive political 
economy, characterised by patronage networks and highly personalised 
forms of political and administrative governance, becomes paramount in 
understanding how exclusion plays out in urban Honiara.
Moreover, this political economy is also evident in some of the powers 
of counter-exclusion. We shall elucidate cases in which settlers have been 
able to successfully mobilise political and patronage networks in order 
to secure their access to urban land. Counter-exclusion has also seen 
the deployment of discursive strategies that are familiar from Southeast 
Asia, for example in competing narratives of settlers as citizens and 
nation-builders, on the one hand, and the rights of indigenous people 
on the other (Allen 2012). But  again, these discourses are inflected 
by the particular histories and social relations of Solomon Islands. 
For  example, the discourse of customary landownership (Filer 1997), 
which we conceptualise as sitting at a scale below indigeneity (which, 
in the case of Solomon Islands, is often nested at the scale of the island or 
province), has become a powerful ideology of both exclusion and counter-
exclusion; while settler narratives, especially those of the nation’s largest 
group of migrant-settlers—Malaitans—are firmly rooted in histories of 
labour migration and workers’ struggle. We also demonstrate how settler 
narratives of counter-exclusion have recently begun to invoke the colonial 
construct of ‘waste lands’, with its obvious connections to the overarching 
discursive themes of citizenship and nation-building.
We begin by discussing the historical context of Honiara, and the rapid 
expansion of the city and its settlements that has occurred over the past 
several decades. We then examine the processes by which people have 
been excluded from accessing land in urban Honiara, focusing on the 
role of the Commissioner of Lands in both abrogating legal processes and 
distorting the urban land market. We then move to an analysis of the ways 
in which groups and individuals, including both settlers and indigenous 
landowners, have sought to counter their exclusion from the urban space. 
We conclude by reflecting upon the utility of the Powers of Exclusion 
framework in the case of urban Honiara and by discussing a recent change 
to the law designed to curb the discretionary powers of the Commissioner 
of Lands.
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Historical Context of Honiara
The Honiara landscape once upon time was under customary land tenure. 
The tenure arrangements were in accordance with the rules of custom. 
The rights to customary land were exercised by individuals, a  family 
or group who belong to a clan or tribe (Allan 1957). How a person 
accessed customary land was through membership of a line, tribe or clan. 
Access and use of customary land could also be allowed based on special 
arrangements such as compensation, marriage, warfare or gifts (Zoleveke 
1979). However, in the case of Honiara, the customary landscape changed 
over time into an urban space as a consequence of land alienation prior to 
and during the colonial period.
The site of the present city of Honiara was ‘partly occupied by the village 
of Mataniko which consisted of a group of leaf houses’ (BSIP 1968: 5). 
The  alienation of this core landscape originates from three land 
transactions  negotiated between traders and people categorised as 
landowners prior to the establishment of Solomon Islands as a British 
Protectorate in 1893 (Moore 2013). The core area from Lunga to Point 
Cruz, referred to as Mataniko, was alienated through sale by Woothia 
(or Uvothea), Chief of Lunga, Allea, Chief of Nanago, and the latter’s 
son, Manungo, to Thomas Gervin Kelly, John Williams and Thomas 
Woodhouse (who were trading partners) for £60 of trade goods in 
November 1886 (Moore 2013; WPHC n.d.). The other area to the west, 
bordering on Point Cruz, referred to as Ta-wtu (or Mamara plantation), 
was alienated to Karl Oscar Svensen and his partner Rabuth. The third land 
transaction was the alienation of the ‘area to the east, named “Tenavatu”’ 
to William Dumply, an employee of Svensen (Moore 2013).
These land areas were further alienated by the traders to other 
commercial  actors, such the Levers plantation company, following the 
introduction of a leasing system by the colonial government soon after 
1893. This process of alienation resulted in the exclusion of the original 
landowners from their land because of the new owners asserting their 
property rights. These land alienation processes have been sources of 
contestation since the 1920s, which resonates with Colin Filer’s concept 
of a ‘double movement’ of property rights in the context of Papua New 
Guinea. He argues that ‘steps taken towards the partial or complete 
alienation of customary rights are continually compensated or counter-
balanced by steps taken in the opposite direction, towards the reassertion 
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of such rights’ (Filer 2014: 78). The double movement provides a useful 
framing for the ongoing assertion and reassertion of claims to land in and 
around Honiara.
The Kukum or Mataniko land, the core land area where Honiara is 
situated, was contested by landowners as an unfair purchase, and this was 
investigated by Gilchrist Gibbs Alexander, who was appointed in 1919 
as Lands Commissioner to investigate previous land alienations in the 
Protectorate.1 The Lands Commission recommended that the land claim 
be settled as follows:
(a) A survey should be made at the expense of Levers Pacific Plantation 
Ltd of all land to the east of the Matanikau River, all such land to be 
included in the title of the company, the Matanikau river to be the western 
boundary and the line run south west from Ilu to the back boundary of 
the Matanikau river; (b) the land to the west of the Matanikau River 
including all coconut trees planted by Levers Pacific Plantation Ltd to 
revert to native custom owners and to be excluded from the title of the 
[company]; (c) the natives to move the village of Matanikau to the west of 
the Matanikau river but to have the produce of the native gardens on the 
east side of the river so long as the present crops are bearing; (d) Levers to 
pay 50 pounds to the natives; (e) on completion of the survey a validating 
Regulation should be passed confirming the freehold title of Levers in 
the land shown on the survey plans as finally approved by the Resident 
Commissioner (WPHC 1922).
The Secretary of State confirmed this recommendation by publishing it 
in  the Pacific High Commission Gazette in 1924, which gave it a force 
of law. This state-sanctioned process legitimated the property rights of 
Levers Pacific Plantation Ltd. It also authorised the return of land to the 
west of the Mataniko River to landowners.
Honiara did not exist prior to 1942. The decision by the colonial 
administration to relocate the capital from Tulagi to Honiara appeared 
to be influenced by a number of factors. One was the existence of 
critical infrastructure left behind by the departing United States forces 
in 1945, such as the airfield at Henderson. Another was the ‘anticipated 
agriculture potential of the Guadalcanal Plains and the dry healthy nature 
of the climate’ (Bellam 1970: 70). During this period, Honiara was an 
1  Alexander resigned towards the end of 1920 after investigating 29 out of 55 land claims. He was 
replaced by Frederick Beaumont Philips to complete the work of the Land Commission, which then 
came to be known as the Philips Commission.
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‘underpopulated and largely alienated hinterland’ (ibid.). The  land area 
on the east side of the Mataniko River, which was alienated by Levers 
Pacific Plantation Ltd and held as a freehold estate title known as 
Kukum, was acquired by the colonial administration in 1947 through a 
land acquisition process prescribed by law. The colonial administration 
acquired the land to the west of the Mataniko River through a process 
of negotiation with landowners who occupied it. Consequently, the 
landowners relocated to the fringes of the Honiara town boundary and 
the state assumed a ‘monopoly of ownership of land in Honiara. On this 
clean new tenurial slate the capital was built’ (ibid.: 70).
However, in 1964, Baranamba Hoai of Mataniko village disputed the 
state’s title to land comprising the Honiara town. He made a claim on 
behalf of himself and the Kakau and Hebata lines of Mataniko village, 
reasserting ownership rights over a part of the Honiara town land. Hoai 
and four others gave evidence to substantiate their land claim. But the 
Registrar of Titles rejected the claims on the basis of a lack of prima facie 
evidence and forwarded the case for decision by the Western Pacific High 
Court. In his ruling, Chief Justice G.G. Briggs also rejected Hoai’s claim 
due to lack of reliable evidence. The High Court further held that Hoai’s 
claim was the same claim that was settled in 1924, and remained binding 
on the parties concerned (Anon. 1964; Moore 2013). To this day, this 
remains the key court decision that legitimises the state’s property rights 
to land in Honiara.
Post-War Migration and the Growth 
of Honiara’s Settlements
Due to Honiara’s status as a city situated on alienated land over which 
the state has proprietary rights, it has attracted migrants from other 
islands to be part of this state landscape. The pattern of internal 
migration was influenced by the uneven distribution of ‘development’ 
and social and economic opportunities. The concentration of education, 
medical and employment opportunities in Honiara and the surrounding 
areas of north Guadalcanal was a major factor in attracting people to the 
island of Guadalcanal.
91
3 . URBAN LAND IN SOLOMON ISLANDS
Although people from various islands have migrated and 
settled in Honiara,  the largest number have come from Malaita 
(Gagahe 2000: 53, 63–5). This is because it was Malaitan labour that was 
exploited in the development projects that took place on Guadalcanal, 
in the Western Solomons, and in other parts of the country. Part of 
the reason was that Malaita had a bigger population that could supply 
labour to the colonial plantations, and, later, to the industries in Honiara. 
John Connell, in a study commissioned by the former South Pacific 
Commission (now the Secretariat of the Pacific Community), pointed 
out that migration to Guadalcanal and the Western Solomons was high in 
the period from 1978 to 1981 because of the employment opportunities 
available in these two provinces (Connell 1983). Nicholas Gagahe also 
noted that, according to the 1970, 1976 and 1986 national censuses, 
Malaita had a large number of out-migrants to Honiara, Guadalcanal, 
Western and Central Provinces (Gagahe 2000: 53, 63–5).
This has resulted in an increasing number of informal Malaitan settlements 
located in every corner of Honiara. Most of these settlements evolved 
from the temporary housing schemes that were introduced in the 1960s, 
and their names reflect their ethnic composition based on either dialect or 
regions of Malaita. For instance, settlements in Honiara having Malaita 
dialect names are Ada’liua, Aekafo, Fera’ladoa, Matariu, Koa Hill, Lau 
Valley, Kwaio Valley, Fulisango and Tolo. Other settlements that comprise 
a mixture of people from various regions of Malaita include Burns Creek, 
Sun Valley, Borderline, New Mala, Kobito (1, 2 and 3), Green Valley, 
Gilbert Camp, Kaibia and Mamulele. While these settlements lack 
a guarantee of tenure security, with their residents therefore susceptible 
to processes of exclusion, some residents have built permanent houses 
and have subsequently successfully applied to the Commissioner of Lands 
to transfer the fixed-term estate title to them. We discuss this further in 
a later section of the chapter.
In 1960, the state introduced ‘temporary housing area’ (THA) schemes 
on public or state land within the Honiara town boundary to cater for 
the influx of people to the town and to address the emergence of squatter 
settlements (Storey 2003). People were allowed to settle on public land 
and build temporary housing for a nominal fee of SB$5 or SB$10 
per annum for a ‘temporary occupation licence’ (TOL) (Tozaka and 
Nage 1981: 115–8; Storey 2003). The system was intended to provide 
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people some form of legal security in relation to urban land use while 
simultaneously discouraging ‘large scale illegal settlement on other urban 
lands’ (Storey 2003: 269).
By the mid-1980s, ‘THAs accommodated 23  per cent of Honiara’s 
population  …  those THAs outside the town’s boundaries numbered 
around 15, with an estimated population of 1,308 persons’ (Storey 
2003: 269). Over the years, however, the THA system has broken down, 
due in part to the significant increase in rural–urban migration. Other 
factors that have contributed to its decline include inadequate town 
planning, unaffordable housing and the maladministration of urban land. 
A household survey in 2006, funded by AusAID through the Solomon 
Islands Institutional Strengthening Lands and Administration Project, 
reported that only 10 of the 3,000 households surveyed had a valid TOL.
During the Ethnic Tension, which was mainly restricted to the island 
of Guadalcanal, some 30,000 settlers, most of whom were of Malaitan 
origin, were violently evicted from their places of residence in the rural 
and peri-urban areas west and especially east of Honiara. These displaced 
people either returned to Malaita or sought refuge in Honiara, where the 
city boundaries were secured by police and Malaitan militias. In the wake 
of the Ethnic Tension, Malaitan settlers have been unwilling to return to 
their former homes in rural and peri-urban Guadalcanal, even in the case 
of those who had obtained legal titles to land (Allen 2012). Honiara, on 
the other hand, continues to be seen as a safe and legitimate space to take 
up residence—a factor that has contributed to the rapid growth of both 
the city and its settlements since the restoration of peace and law and 
order in mid-2003.
Occupying an area of only 22.73  square kilometres, Honiara is easily 
the largest urban centre in Solomon Islands, accounting for around 
78  per cent of the total urban population. The 2009 census recorded 
the city’s population as 64,606, which increases to around 80,000 when 
its peri-urban fringes are included (Allen and Dinnen 2015:  391). 
Honiara’s population has increased fivefold since Independence in 1978 
(Moore 2015), and there are now around 30 informal settlements within 
the town boundary, six of which have encroached on customary land 
(Hou  and Kudu 2012). Most of the residents in these settlements are 
considered as ‘squatters’ in the eyes of the state and city authorities because 
they ‘lack legal title to the city land they occupy’ (Englund 2002: 141).
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Powers of Exclusion in Contemporary 
Honiara
Drawing upon the Powers of Exclusion framework, we see regulation, 
the market and, to a lesser extent, force as the key drivers of exclusion 
in contemporary Honiara. However, as we shall demonstrate below, 
the two main powers of exclusion considered here—regulation and the 
market—can only be understood with reference to a political economy 
characterised by patronage relations and the personalised nature of 
political and administrative practices. Exclusion from land in Honiara 
is produced through a dynamic interaction between regulation, the 
market and social and power relations that resonates strongly with the 
observation that the formal rules governing land and property rights 
often bear little resemblance to on-the-ground realities (Hall et al. 2011). 
We  now consider each of the powers of exclusion in turn, but within 
a cross-cutting context of political economy.
Regulation
Title to Honiara city land is vested in the state as perpetual estate regulated 
by the Land and Titles Act. Following the definition of regulation in the 
Powers of Exclusion framework, this legislation governs which ‘individuals, 
groups or state agencies have rule-backed claims to any particular piece 
of land’ (Hall et al. 2011: 16). Under this legislation, the state has exclusive 
property right claims to Honiara city land by vesting perpetual estate titles 
in the Commissioner of Lands, who holds them in trust for the state.
This means that the Commissioner of Lands, as an agent of the state, has 
exclusive legal right to determine Honiara city land use, to benefit from 
the services of this land, and to transfer portions of the property rights 
at mutually agreeable terms. He has the legal right to dispossess people, 
or turn individual claimants without legal titles into squatters.
Private property in land, other than customary land, is created by the 
Commissioner making a grant out of a perpetual estate over public 
land … [and the] derivate interests, technically terms of years, are called 
Fixed Term Estates. The Commissioner of Lands is also responsible for 
approving all transfers of Fixed Term Estates and for approving long 
subleases (Williams 2011: 2).
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This process of allocating private property rights depends entirely on the 
Commissioner of Lands’ discretionary powers. These discretionary powers 
have been interpreted as giving him the authority to transfer or allocate 
plots of Honiara city land to private individuals, politicians or investors, 
regardless of the merits of such allocations. There have been numerous 
instances of the Commissioner of Lands exercising his discretionary 
powers in ways that appear to be beyond the textual legal meaning of 
how such powers should be exercised as prescribed by the Land and Titles 
Act. For example, the Honiara City Mayor, Andrew Mua, was reported 
on 7 June 2013 as complaining that the Commissioner of Lands had sold 
plots of land that were part of the Honiara dumpsite to Asian investors 
and other individuals (Namosuaia 2013).
The print media also reported that a small park in the centre of Point 
Cruz was allocated for transfer to a businessman. The Solo Environment 
Beautification Group claimed that they had started making a garden in 
the park after receiving assurance from the Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Survey that the land would not be 
sold because drainage and sewerage lines lay under the area (Namosuaia 
2013). Officers from the ministry, however, advised the group to stop 
any gardening work because the land had been sold for a commercial 
purpose. In August 2013, the media reported that a plot of land next 
to the Mataniko bridge, which had been set aside for possible future 
expansion of this urban transport infrastructure, was transferred by the 
Commissioner of Lands to an Asian businessman (Dawea 2013).
These examples show how the Commissioner of Lands’ exercise of 
discretion, as provided by law, can easily be manipulated by ‘uncodified 
and informal socio-political forces’ (Pelto 2013). While the exercise 
of discretion by the Commissioner of Lands over urban land is often 
alleged to be an abuse of discretionary powers, there have been few court 
challenges or prosecutions. What is certain, however, is that the abuse of 
these discretionary powers has meant that a majority of Solomon Islanders 
find it challenging to acquire property rights in Honiara. This has seen the 
emergence over time of a range of strategies to acquire property rights 
in Honiara, which we discuss in the second part of this chapter as an 
instance of the powers of ‘counter-exclusion’.
The continual media reports and public complaints to the effect that the 
Commissioner of Lands has repeatedly abused his discretionary powers by 
leasing Honiara city land to politicians and investors for his own benefit 
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has resulted in a recent amendment of the Land and Titles Act as part 
of the government’s land reform program. This legislative amendment 
abolished the discretionary powers of the Commissioner of Lands and 
provides the Land Board with the ‘powers and functions relating to the 
allocation of interest in land, the development of land and to ensure the 
administration of land is carried out in a fair, transparent and equitable 
manner’.2 We return to this recent development in the conclusion.
The Market
The market as a process of exclusion establishes land as a commodity 
that can be bought and sold. The market depends on regulation to define 
the process of ownership and legal title to the city land that residents 
occupy. The land in Honiara has been accessed, controlled and leased 
for government and commercial offices, private homes, stores, hotels 
and small-scale business. With the rapid increase in rural–urban migration 
and population growth, land supply as a marketable commodity in 
Honiara has become a limited resource. As a result, within and around 
Honiara, people coming from other parts of the country continue to 
struggle to acquire private property.
One reason is that the government insiders, or those associated with the 
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Survey, have secured patches of land 
within the Honiara town boundary, and are transferring their property 
rights to these lands at very high market values that are only affordable 
to the highest income earners and investors. There have been constant 
allegations from the public that numerous officers in the Ministry of 
Lands, including the office cleaner, have more than one fixed-term estate 
title to land in Honiara. This suggests that these lands officers know the 
system well and are heavily involved in land deals by inflating land market 
prices. The consequence of this is the exclusion of many low or middle-
class Solomon Islanders—who make up the majority of the Honiara 
population—from acquiring property rights because they cannot afford 
the increasing price of urban land.
Individual market transactions in land are occurring in Honiara at 
price levels that many Solomon Islanders cannot afford. For example, 
in 2010, the Premier of Guadalcanal, when commenting on the sale of 
2  Section 8A, Land and Titles (Amendment) Act 2014.
KASTOM, PROPERTy AND IDEOLOGy
96
plots of land in the Lunga area, stated: ‘We learn that there are parcels 
of land sub-divided and registered and are ready for sale [that] are very 
expensive for potential individuals and business investors’ (Palmer 2010). 
He recommended that Levers Solomon Limited, which holds the fixed-
term estate title to the land in the Lunga area, ‘reduce the current value of 
land sales at reasonable and affordable prices for individuals and businesses 
who would want to invest in Guadalcanal Province’ (Palmer 2013). These 
land transactions are unregulated, so individuals or groups could easily 
be excluded by those with fixed-term estate titles due to unregulated 
market competition.
Force
Force, as a process of exclusion, concerns acts or threats of violence such 
as forceful eviction (Hall et al. 2011:  4–5; see also McDonnell 2013). 
The Commissioner of Lands, as an agent of the state, and the Honiara 
Town Planning Board are the main actors who play an important role 
in determining people’s access to, and development of, Honiara city 
land, including when to decide on the application of force as a process 
of exclusion.
Section 5 of the Town and Country Planning Act provides that there 
‘shall  be a Town and County Planning Board in each Province and in 
Honiara’. The Honiara Board has jurisdiction to establish a planning 
scheme and to regulate any development within the Honiara town 
boundary, including any material change of use of any building or land. 
The legislation prescribes that the Board must consider the planning 
scheme apart from any other material consideration when considering 
applications for building permits or any development within the Honiara 
town boundary (Foukona and Paterson 2013). However, ‘the enforcement 
of planning requirements is, in practice, not very strong’ (ibid.: 75). 
This has given many people the impression that, as citizens, it is legitimate 
to first construct buildings on any vacant plot of land or any Honiara city 
land they have acquired, and later apply for building permits if they are 
required by the Board to do so.
Due to the increase in informal settlements and the construction of 
houses without proper building permits, the Honiara City Council has 
recently started issuing notices to demolish such buildings as a measure 
to enforce its regulations (Namosuaia 2014). For example, an Asian 
businessman continued to build on a patch of land on the western side 
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of the Mataniko bridge, despite the Honiara Board turning down his 
proposed development application (Piringi 2013a). However, a Honiara 
city councillor challenged the decision of the Board, claiming that 
it was legitimate for the Asian businessman to develop the site because it 
was ‘given by the Minister of Lands, Housing and Survey, Joseph Onika, 
who was one of the joint owners of that fixed term estate’ (Piringi 2013b). 
The strategy used by the private businessman was to use the Honiara city 
councillor to challenge the decision of the Board, and to highlight that 
the Minister of Lands, Housing and Survey was involved by leasing this 
land to the businessman, and thus it was legitimate. However, the Board 
stood its ground, and issued an order for the private business investor to 
demolish his building.
The decision of the Board concerned the demolition of the private 
business investor’s building rather than the title to the land. Once the 
Commissioner of Lands exercises his power in leasing urban land and 
a registered title is created, the property rights of the owner of registered 
title are indefeasible,3 or ‘not liable to be defeated except as provided by 
the Land and Titles Act’ (Levers Solomon Ltd v Attorney General 2013).4 
As highlighted by the Solomon Islands High Court:5
once a person becomes registered owner of an interest under the Act, he 
has absolute liberty to deal with that interest according to the title which 
attaches to it under the Act. An innocent party … is not bound to look 
beyond the register.
Although the discretionary power of the Commissioner of Lands to create 
property rights has been questionable, and in some instances aggrieved 
settlers have challenged it, in most instances the courts in Solomon Islands 
have upheld the proprietary rights of the registered owner of land within 
the Honiara town boundary.
One example is the case of Kee v Matefaka,6 in which the defendants in 
this case were five families who had occupied and built semi-permanent 
houses on land the Commissioner of Lands had allocated to two Asian 
investors, Sia Kee Ching and Lau Khing Hung (Theonomi 2014). 
3  The principle of indefeasibility and the conclusiveness of the Register are covered under Parts 
VIII and IX of the Land and Titles Act.
4  Lever Solomon Ltd v Attorney General [2013] SBCA 11. Note that all court judgements cited in 
this volume are available from www.paclii.org.
5  Manepora’a v Aonima [2011] SBHC 79.
6  Kee v Matefaka [2014] SBHC 112.
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These two investors applied to the Solomon Islands High Court in order 
to evict the defendants from the land. The High Court upheld their 
application and a notice was issued to the families to voluntarily vacate 
the land, but they failed to do so. An enforcement order was subsequently 
issued, which the Sheriff of the High Court, with the assistance of the 
police, acted on to demolish the houses of the defendants and order them 
to vacate the land.
The defendants applied to the High Court seeking a stay of the 
enforcement orders due to ‘maladministration by the Commissioner of 
Lands, no payment of stamp duty, and the issue of right of occupation’. 
The defendants claimed that they ‘were not given sufficient time to 
prepare before vacation, and the manner in which the eviction orders 
were carried out was contrary to their rights and freedom from forced 
eviction’ (Kee v Matefaka 2014). Edward Matefaka, a spokesperson 
for the families, claimed that they had ‘submitted applications to the 
Commissioner of Lands’ but while their ‘applications are still pending 
before the Commissioner of Lands … two foreigners’ have come in and 
‘out rightly acquired the land’ (Theonomi 2014). Matefaka questioned 
‘whether Solomon Islanders are entitled to apply for state land and why 
the two foreigners—is it because of money?’ The actions of the agents 
of the state can easily translate into a conflict between the settlers and 
the state, particularly when the police are involved and perceived to be 
protecting the property interests of foreigners.
Despite the circumstances surrounding the way in which the land was 
acquired, the implicit force sanctioned by the court, as a process of 
exclusion, which was used by the agents of the state to evict the settlers, 
indicate that the Commissioner of Lands’ land dealings are legal unless 
challenged otherwise on the basis of fraud or mistake.7 The High Court 
upheld the property rights of the two investors, since they were the 
titleholders of the registered interest in the land, and ordered the eviction 
of the settlers.
Administration and management of Crown land is a function vested in 
the Commissioner of Lands and the Registrar of Titles. That function 
includes the allocation and grant of titles, and can only be questioned 
through the Court challenging the validity of a title. Whoever is occupying 
Crown land without going through the formal processes, and without 
7  See Section 229, Land and Titles Act.
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the consent and approval of the Commissioner of Lands, occupies that 
land illegally, and can be forced to vacate it in the event of resistance or 
unwillingness to do so.
Powers of Counter-Exclusion in 
Contemporary Honiara
Legitimation
Hall, Hirsch and Li describe legitimation as ‘establishing the moral basis 
for exclusive claims’ (Hall et al. 2011: 5). They see legitimation playing 
a central role in counter-exclusions, which they define as ‘collective 
mobilisation by groups of people seeking to counter their exclusion from 
land as territory or productive resource, and to assert their own powers to 
exclude’ (ibid.: 170). Attempts to counter the powers of exclusion that we 
have already elucidated, including the historical alienation of the land on 
which Honiara now sits, have seen the deployment of two overarching—
and competing—discursive narratives, each of which seeks to establish 
a morally legitimate claim to property rights in Honiara. On one hand, 
Malaitan settlers cast themselves as ‘workers and builders of the nation, 
thereby linking themselves to the legitimacy of the state and its broader 
modernising project’ (Allen 2012:  172), while on the other, ‘a Guale 
“landowner” narrative invokes indigeneity as the paramount fount of 
legitimacy in the spheres of land and resource development’ (ibid.: 164). 
While Allen describes these competing discourses of legitimation in the 
context of the Ethnic Tension, with a particular focus on rural areas east 
and west of Honiara, we suggest that they are also discernible in the 
context of Honiara itself. Moreover, the strategies that are being deployed 
to counteract urban exclusion are inflected by Solomon Islands’ political 
economy, as well as by local histories and social relations.
We have already seen that historical patterns of rural–urban migration 
explain why a significant proportion of settlers who have occupied 
land in Honiara are from Malaita. Allen (2012, 2013) describes how 
Malaitan identity narratives are embedded in the history of labour 
relations. Due to historical patterns of uneven development, and the lack 
of economic opportunities on Malaita, Malaitans have a long history 
of labour migration that stretches back to the international labour trade 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is with some legitimacy, 
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then, that Malaitans portray themselves as the workers and builders of 
Solomon Islands. In the wake of the Ethnic Tension, Malaitans have 
been reluctant to return to rural Guadalcanal. However, as Allen argues, 
their identity narrative nevertheless remains tied to the legitimacy of 
the state: ‘The state underpins the rights of Malaitans to live within the 
Honiara town boundary—where they continue to comprise a significant 
proportion both of the urbanised elite and the town’s overall population’ 
(Allen 2012: 175).
A recent development that fits neatly into this nation-building and 
modernising narrative is the appeal by settlers in Honiara to the colonial 
concept of ‘waste land’. This concept was introduced as part of the early 
colonial government’s land policy, both to regulate land speculation 
and to make land available to investors. Section 10 of the Solomons 
(Land) Regulation No.  4 of 1896 defined waste land as ‘land being 
vacant by reason of the extinction of the original native owners and their 
descendants’. Following the enactment of the Waste Land Regulation of 
1900, as amended by Queen’s Regulation No. 1 of 1901, repealed and 
consolidated by Queen’s Regulation No.  2 of 1904, the definition of 
waste land was amended to mean land that was not owned, cultivated or 
occupied by any native (see Bennett 1987: 131; see also Foukona 2007). 
The legal implication of this was that more land in the Protectorate 
became available for acquisition and alienation. This process contributed 
to the transformation of customary land into state land in Honiara.
Today the term ‘waste land’ is no longer recognised in law, but some 
settlers, mainly from Malaita, are still using the concept to assert their 
claim to vacant spaces in Honiara.8 To some of these settlers, ‘waste land’ 
is perceived as land that is not needed by Guadalcanal landowners or land 
in and around Honiara that is underdeveloped. In other words, some 
settlers justify their claims by asserting that, since the land is ‘waste land’, 
it is all right to occupy and build on it because it is not useful for any 
other development purpose. The fact that people continue to consider 
areas such as swampy places, valleys, river banks or steep gullies as waste 
land to legitimise their land claims is a basis for future land exclusion and 
contestation (Chand and Yala 2008).
8  This view is often expressed by settlers from Malaita who have recently built informal houses on 
undeveloped urban land situated in valleys and swampy areas, such as behind the King George and 
Panatina Ridge east of Honiara.
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In many instances, the Commissioner of Lands has knowledge of these 
occupiers, who are usually defined in law as squatters, but the fact that they 
have remained on the land for a long period could constitute a possessory 
title.9 Some of these occupiers have applied to the Commissioner of Lands 
for a grant of fixed-term estate title to the land. Others believe that, if 
they are ordered to vacate the land they have occupied for a long period 
of time, the Commissioner of Lands, as an agent of the state, and the 
Honiara Town Council would come up with a scheme to relocate them.10
In the post-conflict context, some settlers are also attempting to justify their 
claims to urban land over which they do not hold registered titles on the 
basis of being displaced by the Ethnic Tension: to evict them, they claim, 
would cause another displacement.11 Such a strategy is reinforced by the 
fact that most informal settlements in Honiara are based on provincial or 
island affiliations, which creates a strong sense of group identity, security 
and protection.12 Therefore, anyone who holds a legal title to a plot of 
land in Honiara that is occupied by settlers may find it difficult to assert 
their claim, either through legal means or by extra-judicial force. While 
going through the courts to obtain an eviction order is possible, as we 
have already seen, enforcing such an order in practice, and getting people 
to recognise it, is a difficult process that can create additional tensions.
The proposal by the Solomon Islands National Sports Council (NSC) to 
build a national sports stadium in the Burns Creek area is a case in point. 
The NSC acquired the perpetual estate title to land in this area that was 
occupied by settlers three years ago. The Solomon Star newspaper reported 
that in 2012 the settlers were ‘given some time to leave their homes since 
the NSC took title over the proposed land but have not done so since 
then’ (Anon. 2012). The settlers continued to reside on the land, and 
recently, with the financial help of their member of parliament (MP), they 
built a clinic right in the middle of the land that the NSC had earmarked 
for a  playing field. This seemingly reinforced the settlers’ perception 
that, if an MP can fund the building of a clinic on the land, then it 
is legitimate for them to continue occupying it. The NSC criticised the 
MP for failing to consult the Honiara City Council to ascertain the legal 
status of the land before funding the construction of the clinic building 
9  Section 225 of the Land and Titles Act deals with the principles of adverse possession.
10  See, for example, Onika v Sevesi [2007] SBHC 57.
11  This was the view by some settlers who moved from the Guadalcanal Plains to Malaita during 
the Ethnic Tension and then relocated to the Burns Creek area, east of Honiara.
12  Connell and Curtain (1982: 119–36, 127) made similar observations in Port Moresby and Lae.
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(Aruwafu  2012). In  October 2013, the NSC revealed that the  sport 
stadium’s ‘actual ground work could not eventuate as proposed, due to 
settlers refusing to leave the land earmarked for the stadium despite the 
call to relocate’ (Anon. 2013).
Another example of an MP assisting settlers to assert their property 
rights concerned a block of public land opposite the White River betel 
nut market in 2013. Reef islanders from Temotu Province have occupied 
the land in question for the past 20  years and have named it Karaina 
settlement (Palmer 2013). The settlers were aware that they did not have 
tenure security and could be excluded from the land by any private person 
or company who acquires the legal title to it. The MP claimed that the 
settlers had asked him to register the land during his campaign in 2010, 
and he promised them that he would attempt to do so if he became an MP. 
The Commissioner of Lands made a grant out of a perpetual estate over the 
land by vesting a fixed-term estate title held in trust by three prominent 
members of the Karaina settlement: the ward councillor, the Honiara City 
Mayor and the West Honiara MP (Palmer 2013). This land transaction 
was fast-tracked and enabled by the fact that an MP was engaged in the 
process, which suggests that the behaviour of the Commissioner of Lands 
is influenced by patronage politics.
Those people who do not have the requisite patronage networks to 
secure access to urban land have also adopted the strategy of building as 
fast as they can on any vacant plot of land that they identify in Honiara, 
even in the absence of any building permit approval from the Town and 
Country Planning Board (Diisango 2016). These vacant plots of land 
are public or alienated land for which the Commissioner of Lands holds 
perpetual estate titles from which fixed-term estates can be created.13 
Not many people who have built on these vacant plots of land have been 
able to acquire fixed-term estates due to a highly bureaucratic land transfer 
process and high land lease prices (see Keen and Kiddle 2016). Some 
settlers who can afford such high costs have paid brokers or middlemen, 
often referred to as ‘land consultants’, who are familiar with the system 
of transferring land or have connections with officers in the Ministry of 
Lands, Housing and Survey to fast-track the process of land transfer.
13  The Commissioner’s power to deal with estates has now been transferred to a Land Board under 
the Land and Titles (Amendment) Act 2014.
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Turning now to the strategies of counter-exclusion employed by indigenous 
people on Guadalcanal in relation to the land that hosts Honiara, we have 
already seen that the colonial-era land alienations that ultimately enabled 
the establishment of the city have been contested since the 1920s. In the 
post-colonial period, the return of, or compensation or rent for the use 
of, these lands—especially the area from Lunga to Tenaru—have featured 
prominently in a succession of formal demands that have been put to the 
national government by the Guadalcanal Provincial Government, most 
recently in the form of the ‘demands by the bona fide and indigenous 
people of Guadalcanal’ that were issued in January 1999 (see Fraenkel 
2004: 197–203; also Sasako 2003). These demands, and the discourses 
of indigeneity that have framed them, operate at the scale of the island of 
Guadalcanal. They can be interpreted as part of a broader ethno-territorial 
agenda that seeks to exclude the rights of outsiders, including the state, 
in matters of resource access and control on Guadalcanal (Allen 2012). 
This  agenda was one of the key underlying causes of the violent land 
evictions that occurred during the Ethnic Tension.
However, this island-scale ethno-territorial project is deeply problematised 
by territorial ambitions and agendas that operate at lower scales of 
socio-political organisation, specifically at the scale of customary 
landownership. Originally postulated by Filer (1997), the ‘ideology of 
customary landownership’ has become an increasingly pervasive and 
powerful strategy of territorialisation and exclusion throughout post-
colonial Melanesia. In the case of Honiara, there have been claims and 
counter-claims among Guadalcanal landowners, and there have also been 
tensions between the Guadalcanal Provincial Government and individual 
landowner claimants.
For example, a chief called Andrew Kuvu, representing Guadalcanal 
indigenous tribal groups, asserted their ownership of land from Lunga 
to Tenaru (Anon. 2011), but another local man, Andrew Orea, alleged 
that Kuvu was illegally harvesting cocoa and coconut from this land, and 
that another landowner, Jemuel Guwas, was selling plots of land from 
within this contested area (Orea 2009). Another landowner, George 
Vari, who was chairman of the Lunga-Tenaru Trust Board, challenged 
the claim by Guadalcanal provincial leaders that Lunga land belongs to 
the province and its people, and asserted that it belongs to the Malango 
people (Vari  2012). These claims and counter-claims demonstrate that 
Guadalcanal people, despite drawing on the ‘ideology of customary 
landownership’, are not one entity, and in any case, their ownership claims 
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are without any legal basis. The property rights to the Lunga-Tenaru land, 
which is part of the Tenavatu estate, is vested in Levers Solomon Limited. 
With the consent of the state, Levers can sell the rights to this fixed-term 
estate to any private individual or investor, which entails the exclusion 
of Guadalcanal landowners.
Force
As previously discussed, there exist, both historically and in the 
contemporary context, multi-scalar ethno-territorialising agendas in 
relation to Honiara. While there is no immediate evidence that these 
agendas will be pursued through some form of collective violence, the 
grievances that underscore them continue to be voiced by the Guadalcanal 
Provincial Government, by prominent Guadalcanal landowners, and by 
a wider network of leaders throughout the province (see Babasia 2014; 
Leni 2014). Given the persistence of these grievances, and in the wake of 
the violent evictions that occurred on north Guadalcanal during the Ethnic 
Tension, a spectre of ethno-territorial violence hangs over all of Honiara. 
However unlikely a return to widespread violence may be, the possibility 
that these long-standing agendas may lead to collective violence aimed at 
reclaiming Honiara cannot be entirely discounted (Anon. 2014a, 2014b).
Moreover, within Honiara itself, settlements are widely perceived as 
violent spaces in which alcohol and drug abuse are widespread and acts 
of interpersonal and group violence are commonplace.14 As mentioned 
previously, the threat of force is ever-present and may act as a deterrent 
to those seeking to enforce property rights in settlement areas, including 
the state’s security apparatus. In this sense, settlers’ claims to rights 
of occupation or possession are backed by a spectre of violence. This threat 
of force is given greater weight, as well as an explicitly political dimension, 
by a number of well-documented cases of settlement youth being 
mobilised in overt acts of collective violence on the streets of Honiara. 
During the riots of April 2006, this collective violence effectively brought 
down the government of the day (see Dinnen 2007; Moore 2007). In this 
sense, Honiara’s settlements are politically powerful spaces, at least for 
those political elites who are able to harness the energy and frustration of 
their younger residents.
14  One example would be the conflict between two ethnic groups in the Karaina settlement, 
situated in the White River area in western Honiara (Inifiri 2014).
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have applied the Powers of Exclusion framework to an 
analysis of the processes by which both settlers and those ‘indigenous’ to 
the island of Guadalcanal have been prevented from accessing urban land, 
and to the strategies that the subjects of this exclusion have been employing 
to claim, or claim back, access to land within the city boundaries. We have 
found that the framework is broadly useful in explaining these dual 
processes, and we arrive at a broadly similar set of conclusions as Hall, 
Hirsch and Li. With regard to the powers of exclusion: the formal rules 
have tended to bear little resemblance to on-the-ground realities; public 
officials have frequently acted as ‘tyrants’ in the administration of land; 
and the market for land is not a product of some abstract space of supply 
and demand. In regard to the powers of counter-exclusion, legitimation 
has played a central role, as evidenced by collective mobilisations around 
discourses such as indigeneity, customary landownership, nation-building 
and citizenship. We have also argued, against the backdrop of the Ethnic 
Tension and the increasingly violent character of Honiara’s settlements, 
that force, in the form of collective violence or the threat thereof, may yet 
become more salient as a power of counter-exclusion in this urban space.
However, just as the Powers of Exclusion framework is tailored to the 
particular political economy and social contexts of Southeast Asia, diverse 
as they are, so too, we have suggested, the powers of exclusion and counter-
exclusion at play in contemporary Honiara can only be fully understood 
in the context of an encompassing political economy characterised by 
patronage networks and personalised forms of political and administrative 
governance, and with reference to the particular histories and social 
relations of Solomon Islands. Perhaps the most salient example of this 
political economy has been the abuse of discretionary powers vested in 
the Commissioner of Lands, which has seen property rights in urban 
land allocated in ways that distort the market and abrogate formal legal 
procedures. In many instances, the abuse of these powers has seen urban 
property rights granted to individuals on the basis of political patronage 
or to foreign investors for personal economic gain.
The circumstances surrounding the way that these land transactions are 
made are often perceived as dubious by members of the public and contrary 
to the expectations of occupiers. With the recent (2014) amendment to 
the Land and Titles Act, which abolishes the Commissioner’s powers and 
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establishes a Land Board to administer and lease land, it is anticipated 
that a more transparent leasing process will be introduced. It is hoped 
that questionable land dealings will be minimised since the discretionary 
power to create property rights vests in a board rather an individual who 
can easily be manipulated or bribed. The Board came into operation in 
December 2014, and produced an annual report for 2015 that was tabled 
in parliament in May 2016 and has recently been made accessible to 
the public. The report provides a list of land allocations and the names 
of successful applicants (GoSI 2016). This demonstrates a degree of 
transparency in the Board’s deliberations. However, there are no records 
of minutes concerning how the Board has dealt with the applications, 
including in relation to the criteria used to assess them. Furthermore, the 
issue of the high cost of land transactions has remained, which means 
that in most cases only those with money can afford to successfully apply 
for urban land in Honiara. Some of the applicants to whom the Board 
has allocated land, as shown in the annual report, have revealed that they 
have not been able access the land. This is because boundary markers have 
been moved, the land is already occupied by someone else, or officers in 
the Ministry of Lands have been unhelpful in showing where the land 
is located and facilitating its transfer.
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1  In order to assist with the clarity of the argument of this chapter, I have edited, summarised and 
translated interview transcripts while maintaining the meaning of the interviews and context. Where 
a particular word or phrase is important for the argument, I have kept these in their original form.
‘There’s Nothing Better than Land’: 
A Migrant Group’s Strategies for 
Accessing Informal Settlement 
Land in Port Moresby
Michelle Nayahamui Rooney
The land belongs to the customary landowners before the colonial time in 
Papua New Guinea. But since the colonial time the land was given to the 
state. The land has portion numbers. We are applying for the portions. 
We have the documents and we’ve written a letter to the lands department 
and the former governor of NCD. We expected something from the 
government but nothing has been done. It is for the improvement of 
this community that we secure land to settle (resident of ATS settlement, 
January 2013).1
In the year 2000, the United Nations General Assembly with all the world 
governments’ representatives agreed that by the year 2015 poverty levels 
must be decreased to the lowest levels. How do you achieve that with 
people who cannot afford to make their own living? To equip them to 
achieve this goal, there is nothing better than land itself. Once you get 
land and the title, they can mortgage it to get loans from the bank and 
do something to start building their level up (resident of ATS settlement, 
January 2013).
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Introduction
These statements were made by two leaders of local institutions in the 
Air Transport Squadron (ATS) settlement in Port Moresby, the capital of 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) (see Figure 4.1).2 They reflect the myriad actors, 
value systems and processes that migrant settlers residing in ‘informal’ 
or ‘illegal’ settlements in Port Moresby must engage with to secure and 
legitimise their ‘informal’ occupancy over land. They also reflect the 
intersections between customary and neoliberal state ideologies of land 
and property. Many residents of the ATS settlement moved there after 
being excluded from the expensive housing and property market in Port 
Moresby. Many cannot afford to return home or prefer to remain in the 
city closer to services. This chapter examines their collective strategies to 
secure land as actors who occupy a place at the centre of the political 
economy of land in the city. As the ‘illegal’ or ‘informal’ occupants of 
land, their tenure is challenged by customary landowners, the state and 
private holders of state leases.
The chapter aims to contribute to an understanding of two growing 
areas of concern for Melanesia, namely (1) the urbanisation process, and 
(2) emerging land dynamics arising from increasing internal migration and 
population mobility. It will contribute to an emerging body of literature 
that explores urban land dynamics arising from internal migration by 
examining the ways in which residents of urban settlements collectively 
act in relation to both customary landowners and the state in an urban 
Melanesian context.
Urbanisation in the Pacific is a challenge for development in the region. 
It  is  estimated that around 26  per cent of the region’s population live 
in urban areas (Numbasa and Koczberski 2012; see also Chapter 2, 
this volume). PNG’s urban population is around 13  per cent of its 
total population (GoPNG 2010; Jones 2011). It is estimated that up 
to 50 per cent of PNG’s urban population lives in informal settlements 
(Connell 2011; Jones 2011; Numbasa and Koczberski 2012). Central to 
challenges of urbanisation in Melanesia is the shortage of available land 
for development and housing (Kidu 2002; Connell 2011; Chand and Yala 
2012; Numbasa and Koczberski 2012). Housing problems faced by city 
2  The Air Transport Squadron compound of the PNG Defence Force is adjacent to the settlement. 
The settlement is referred to interchangeably as the ‘Oro ATS’, ‘ATS’, ‘Oro’, or ‘Popondetta’ (the urban 
centre of Oro Province) settlement.
113
4 . ‘THERE’S NOTHING BETTER THAN LAND’
dwellers are often the result of a prohibitive combination of inadequate 
supply of formal housing, financial incapacity, and difficult legal and 
regulatory processes, leading many to take up residence in settlements. 
Pre-existing claims on settlement land mean that the threat of eviction is a 
major risk to settlers’ livelihoods and well-being.
Figure 4.1 Map of Port Moresby, 2013, showing location of ATS 
settlement.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
Historical factors that shaped Port Moresby’s contemporary housing 
problems involved the spatial stratification of houses and residential 
areas around expatriate administrators, their national employees, low-
cost housing, self-help housing for national workers, and settlement 
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schemes for incoming migrants. In this context, housing was usually 
provided by employers at a highly subsidised rate. The market price of 
existing formal residential housing was most often beyond the financial 
capacity of migrants (Langmore and Oram 1970; Oram 1976; Stretton 
1979; Goddard 2005: 21–32; Numbasa and Koczberski 2012; Webster 
et al. 2016). Between 1985 and 2010, the increasing commercial value 
of land has meant that formal housing allocation has evolved into a high-
priced market stimulated by broader economic activity in the extractive 
industry sector (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Private companies and higher-
level government positions continue to offer housing as an incentive to 
attract the most skilled Papua New Guineans, but for most Port Moresby 
residents, this situation means that housing is unaffordable. Moreover, the 
increased land value and high property prices have also attracted property 
developers interested in investing capital in the city, and this is seen in 
the increase in investment-style properties being advertised in the city 
(Rooney 2015) (Table 4.3).
Table 4.1 Weekly rental costs for two- and three-bedroom houses in 
different suburbs of Port Moresby (in PNG kina, at constant 2010 prices), 
1985–2010.
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Boroko, Korobosea, Gordons, Gordons 5    
Maximum 3,346 2,796 2,603 1,785 950 4,000
Minimum 797 1,048 651 470 380 650
Average 1,779 1,934 1,281 906 691 2,297
Hohola, Gerehu, Waigani, Tokarara, June Valley, Ensisi, Morata, Rainbow Estate
Maximum 1,977 1,747 2,765 2,442 506 1,200
Minimum 608 517 325 282 380 550
Average 1,151 1,011 857 677 443 802
Downtown Port Moresby
Maximum n .a . 4,310 4,554 2,630 2,532 7,500
Minimum n .a . 643 813 650 570 1,500
Average n .a . 2,224 1,914 1,634 1,354 3,579
Source: Rooney 2015, based on Post-Courier newspaper advertisements published 
in June each year .
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Table 4.2 Sale prices for two- and three-bedroom houses in different 
suburbs of Port Moresby (in PNG kina, at constant 2010 prices), 
1985–2010.
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Boroko, Korobosea, Gordons, Gordons 5    
Maximum 760,393 671,023 487,976 657,511 443,166 2,500,000
Minimum 425,820 326,192 146,393 65,751 341,871 380,000
Average 554,001 450,501 366,999 358,479 389,353 1,147,692
Hohola, Gerehu, Waigani, Tokarara, June Valley, Ensisi, Morata, Rainbow Estate
Maximum 547,483 121,157 211,456 356,934 443,166 750,000
Minimum 91,247 116,497 32,532 56,358 291,223 175,000
Average 268,875 118,827 94,003 138,051 367,194 424,654
Downtown Port Moresby
Maximum 669,146 1,048,473 1,138,612 1,221,092 1,202,879 4,000,000
Minimum 669,146 838,778 422,913 469,651 1,076,260 2,800,000
Average 669,146 996,049 817,941 653,989 1,139,569 3,100,000
Source: Rooney 2015, based on Post-Courier newspaper advertisements published 
in June each year .
Note: 2005 figures for Downtown Port Moresby derived from advertisements published 
in August 2005 .
Table 4.3 Sale prices of investment-style properties (in PNG kina, 
at constant 2010 prices), 1985–2010.
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Maximum 1,520,786 2,562,933 341,583 4,320,786 1,899,282 7,500,000
Minimum 316,324 279,593 123,621 216,039 215,252 230,000
Average 809,927 1,149,437 214,710 1,129,823 700,360 1,825,654
Source: Rooney 2015, based on Post-Courier newspaper advertisements published 
in June each year .
Note: 2005 figures are derived from advertisements published in August 2005.
By opting to reside in informal and low-cost land tenure and housing 
arrangements, evoking their shared history and engaging with their 
intimate network of kinship relations, residents of informal settlements 
are able to reposition themselves from a point of being excluded from the 
prohibitively expensive land and housing market into one of inclusion—
albeit contested—in a settlement context. This contested inclusion 
provides an illustration of Hall, Hirsch and Li’s (2011) framing of 
exclusion that focuses on access—rather than inclusion—as the opposite 
of exclusion. They argue that the exclusionary powers of force, regulation, 
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legitimation and markets work to exclude some while enabling others to 
have access to land. Thus, exclusion from expensive formal housing leads 
to people seeking inclusion in informal settlements, but this inclusion also 
comes at the expense of excluding others. In the face of threats by prior 
claimants to dispossess them of the land they currently possess, migrants 
residing in Port Moresby’s informal settlements need to legitimate their 
occupancy of the land or counter these threats by excluding others’ claims 
on, and access to, the same land. The collective strategies of residents of 
Port Moresby’s settlements demonstrate an inherent capacity to negotiate 
and create systems of land tenure and access that meet their needs 
(Hall et al. 2011: 8).
This contested inclusion also provides new insights into the discourse on 
urban land in Melanesia, which tends to focus on juxtaposing customary 
landowners with an array of ‘other’ actors whose counter-claims are the 
result of pre-colonial and colonial history, urbanisation, population growth 
and commercial interests. These actors include customary landowners, 
the state, property developers and migrants. A key challenge for policy 
makers, then, is negotiating with customary landowners to allow more 
of their land to be made available for urban development, while ensuring 
that their traditional rights are protected and that they benefit equitably 
from the use of their land (Barter 2002; Kidu 2002; Koczberski 2002; 
Nolan and Abani 2002; Pai and Sinne 2002; Chand and Yala 2008, 2012; 
GoPNG 2010; Jones 2011: 94; Numbasa and Koczberski 2012).
There is a growing body of Pacific literature that examines how migrant 
settlers engage with customary landowners in relation to accessing and 
maintaining tenure. In the context of Port Moresby, Chand and Yala 
(2008, 2012) have undertaken a study looking at informal arrangements 
for land access in settlements. Others have examined this issue in the 
oil palm growing regions of PNG and Solomon Islands, looking at the 
ways in which migrant settlers and customary landowners use adaptive 
strategies to create avenues for mutually beneficial land transactions 
(Koczberski and Curry 2004, 2005, 2009; Koczberski et al. 2009, 2012; 
Allen 2012; see also Chapter 5, this volume). Koczberski and Numbasa 
(2012) have looked at migrant access and maintenance of tenure in the 
urban setting of Wewak (PNG) (see also Chapter 5, this volume). Martin 
(2013) describes the shifting ways in which people in East New Britain 
(PNG) apply, in varying degrees, both custom and Western notions of 
exchange and reciprocity to land transactions. Thornton and colleagues 
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(2013) examine social change and increasing urban landlessness in Samoa. 
Much of this literature focuses on relationships between migrant settlers 
and customary landowners, with less attention being paid to the ways 
in which migrant settlers engage with both customary landowners and 
state and legal processes. Through a gendered lens, and in the context of 
Solomon Islands, Monson (2010, 2012) explores the role of customary 
normative processes and legal and state systems of negotiating land 
and property in delimiting the ‘voices’ of important stakeholders, such 
as women, in land discourses relating to disputes between customary 
landowners and migrant settlers (see also Chapter 13, this volume).
In the introduction to this volume, the authors adopt a broader definition 
of alienation that situates customary landowners in both the Melanesian 
ideology of landownership as well as in formal legal contexts. This definition 
provides a frame for this chapter to discuss how migrants residing in Port 
Moresby’s informal settlements engage with both customary landowners 
and the state in Melanesian relational terms and formal legalised ways.
After describing the fieldwork and data, the chapter presents the nature 
of the contestation over the land that the ATS settlement. It then briefly 
maps the historical geography of the land area in this settlement to 
illustrate the multiple claims on it. It then examines various strategies that 
residents of this settlement deploy to secure their collective access to land. 
The conclusion discusses the key findings and policy implications.
Fieldwork and Data
The fieldwork for this research was conducted in the ATS settlement 
over the period from December 2012 to June 2013. The settlement 
is primarily made up of people who come from PNG’s Oro Province. 
During the fieldwork, over 50 formal interviews were conducted with 
members of the ATS community, key informants and representatives of 
local institutions. Interviews were also conducted with representatives 
of other institutions in Port Moresby such as international agencies, 
non-governmental organisations, the Governor of the National Capital 
District (NCD), and other residents of Port Moresby. Further data was 
obtained from the Department of Lands, the National Mapping Bureau, 
and media reports. A household socio-economic and demographic survey 
was conducted with 32 households from one particular ethnic group. 
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The interviewees were members of the household who knew detailed 
information about the household. The interviews were loosely structured 
and conducted as conversations lasting anywhere from 45  minutes to 
two hours. They focused on six themes: (1) household demographic data; 
(2) household characteristics; (3) incomes, employment and livelihoods; 
(4) accessing land in the settlement; (5) main risks or threats to livelihoods 
affecting the community; and (6) social relations within the settlement, 
in Port Moresby, in people’s village of origin and beyond. Apart from 
the formal interviews, I interacted socially and often, both with people 
I interviewed and with others, over the fieldwork period. I also draw on 
my experiences and observations as a long-term resident of Port Moresby 
to inform my insights and analysis.
Contested Urban Land
In January 2015, more than 18  months since I had completed my 
fieldwork in the settlement, the land there had escalated to become the 
subject of a national parliamentary debate. While this issue has attracted 
media attention for many years, recent developments in Port Moresby 
have intensified land debates. Developments include a rapidly increasing 
population, soaring property prices, increased traffic, and a multimillion 
dollar schedule of road and building construction to host the 2015 
South Pacific Games and the 2018 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
meeting. In 2014, NCD Governor Powes Parkop announced in the 
media that the evictions of settlers would increase to make way for new 
roads (Martin 2014). In this context, in October 2014, and in response 
to questions about the status of land in the ATS area, the Minster for 
Lands is  reported to have made the following statement on the floor 
of Parliament:
‘Let me give the status of land at ATS … The portions … 693 up to 698, 
all of them have titles to them. Leases have been given from 1964 up to 
2008,’ Mr Allan said.
‘And our people out there are illegally living on these portions however, 
looking at time and some of these titles. Some title holders have 
taken time  to develop and we will look at the issuance of these titles.’ 
(Anon. 2014a)
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In November 2014, a Member of the Opposition, Sam Basil, posted 
a message to his Facebook page to say that he had presented a petition on 
the floor of Parliament on behalf of the residents of the ATS settlement. 
The petition asked the government to reconsider granting titles over the 
land portions in the area to a private company, and instead to consider 
granting the land to the residents for legal settlement (Basil 2014).
Around this time, customary landowners, who had long been raising the 
matter in the media, also challenged the residents of the ATS settlement:
not to mislead the State on the initial arrangement for their permanent 
settlement.
Clan chairman and spokesman William Tokana said the State, especially 
Lands and Physical Planning Minister Benny Allan and Moresby 
Northeast MP Labi Amaiu should be properly briefed on the history of 
ATS and land portion 698.
He said this portion was handed over by the customary landowners to 
Oro settlers as a goodwill gesture through intervention by then prime 
minister Bill Skate and then NCD governor Philip Taku (Anon. 2014b).
In this statement, the clan spokesman clarified that the original 
arrangement by which land was allocated to Oro settlers involved only 
Portion 698. However, over time the settlement has extended well 
beyond the boundary of Portion 698 (see Figure 4.2), and the recent land 
contestation involves other parcels of land as well.
It is evident that the residents of the ATS settlement are situated at 
the frontier of Port Moresby’s expanding sprawl. Given their physical 
possession of the land, they are also at the centre of the contestation 
between the state, private leaseholders, and customary landowners. 
The escalation of the matter to the level of a parliamentary petition and 
debate, and the associated public discussion through the media, illustrates 
the highly contested commercial and moral values at stake. The rest of this 
chapter examines the multiple ways that residents of the settlement have 
gone about securing their tenure over the land.
KASTOM, PROPERTy AND IDEOLOGy
120
Figure 4.2 Google Earth image of ATS settlement, 2013, 
with cadastral overlay.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University, based on Google Earth imagery 
and survey data from the PNG Department of Lands and Physical Planning .
History of Port Moresby Land
Customary Landowners
When I asked research participants the question, ‘Who are the customary 
landowners of this area?’, the general response was, ‘the  Dubara clan 
(of Hanuabada)’. Understanding the contemporary issues that residents 
of the ATS settlement face thus requires situating them in the historical 
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context of land in Port Moresby. When the area was first visited by 
Europeans  in 1873, the largest indigenous settlement was called 
Hanuabada  (literally ‘Big Village’), which was actually made up of five 
villages and two distinct ethnic groups—the Motu and the Koita (or 
Koitapu [sic]) people (Belshaw 1957:  11–12; Oram 1976:  11; Groves 
2011:  3–9). The villages were Hohodae (Koita), Poreporena (Motu), 
Tanobada (Motu), Guriu (Koita) and Elevala (Motu) (Belshaw 1957; 
Gregory 1980, 1982). While there are variations in the history of these 
two groups of people, there is general consensus that the Motuans were 
the original coastal people, while the Koita came from the hills inland, 
but  they have live together along the coastline of what is now Port 
Moresby for generations. Reflecting this long and shared history, the Motu 
and Koita people together are now known as the Motu Koitabu people 
and live within and beyond the boundary of the city as it is known today.
Though culturally distinct, the two groups have similar forms of social 
organisation (Belshaw 1957: 12; Oram 1976: 4). Each of the villages was 
divided into named iduhu, which were the basic residential and social 
units based on common descent. Each iduhu had several lines of houses 
built over the sea. Houses on the left (or eastern) side were called laurina 
and houses on the right (or western) side were called idibana (Belshaw 
1957: 13). In Hohodae village, the main iduhu were known as Taurama, 
Geakone and Dubara (ibid.: 13). The ‘Dubara clan’ that the ATS settlers 
refer to consists of the descendants of the Dubara iduhu of Hohodae 
village. Of importance for understanding the contemporary dynamics 
of  land in Port Moresby is the fact that iduhu may split for a number 
of reasons, such as conflict or marriage, and an affected person or group 
may move and reside elsewhere (Belshaw 1957:  13; Bramell 1960; 
Groves 2011: 24–5). This means that ‘clans’ may have several branches 
residing in different areas, but with land claims similar to those held by 
their Hanuabada-based kin (Belshaw 1957; Oram 1976; Goddard 2005; 
Groves 2011). Furthermore, although the inheritance of land in Motu 
Koitabu tradition is theoretically patrilineal, land may be transferred to 
or through women in certain circumstances and within local customs and 
practices (Belshaw 1957: 27–30; Bramell 1960).
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Commoditisation of Land
Europeans started buying land from indigenous people in 1884, when 
the southern part of the island of New Guinea was declared a Protectorate 
of the British government (Oram 1976: 22). The Administration began 
buying land for Crown purposes, and by 1889, as part of planning the 
town of Port Moresby, land was being bought, surveyed and divided 
into quarter-acre blocks, then subdivided into sections and allotments 
(ibid.: 1976: 25–6). Over the period from 1883 to 1974, increasing tracts 
of Motu and Koita land were bought. The legal framework evolved to 
accommodate the Administration’s increasing need for land. The initial 
policy was that Europeans were only allowed to buy ‘waste and vacant’ 
land, provided this did not impede the access rights of the indigenous 
population (ibid.: 24). By 1906, the Land Ordinance was enacted, giving 
the Administration powers to compulsorily buy land for public purposes 
(ibid.:  25). In 1956, a proposal that all Port Moresby land should be 
purchased did not succeed, although the Administration insisted that 
indigenous landholders had a ‘moral obligation to make their land available 
for development’ (ibid.: 175). By 1974, only one fifth of the land within 
the Port Moresby town boundaries remained under customary tenure.
Indigenous landowners increasingly showed signs of resentment and 
reluctance to sell their land, and by the 1960s, land shortage was evident. 
The threat to their subsistence livelihoods as a result of loss of land 
remains a key issue for indigenous people. As time progressed, there was 
increasing awareness of the long-term value of land as a means of earning 
cash returns (Oram 1976: 177). However, by the 1960s, the area where 
the ATS settlement is located was all Crown land (ibid.: 178), and by the 
1980s, all the land portions in the area had been purchased by private 
leaseholders (see Figure 4.2).
Land Groups Incorporation Act
While this history shows that land in Port Moresby has been gradually 
subsumed into a commoditised market and transacted under conveyancing 
laws for over 100 years, increasingly marginalised customary landowners 
continue to assert their claims through legal instruments such as 
the  Land Groups Incorporation Act (LGIA). The LGIA was enacted 
at the time of Independence in order to legalise notions of indigenous 
land management (Filer 2007). However, despite the noble intention to 
incorporate customary groups into formal land tenure regimes in order 
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for them to realise the economic benefits of their land, the LGIA has been 
problematic in its application (Filer 1997, 2006, 2007; Jorgensen 2007). 
Such attempts to use formal legal frameworks to integrate customary land 
into modern economic and legal systems are discussed by McDonnell 
(2013), in the broader Pacific context, as instances of the ‘cultural power 
of law’ in redefining cultural and customary identities. In 2009, the 
LGIA was amended to enable more stringent requirements to be imposed 
on group membership, land boundaries, areas of dispute, management 
committees, annual general meetings (with 60 per cent quorums), bank 
accounts, registers of members and codes of conduct (Tararia and Ogle 
2010: 22–3).
In the next sections, I explore how this historical and legal context, in 
which the ATS settlement was established in the mid-1990s, continues to 
have a bearing on the way that the resident navigate the land challenges 
that confront them.
Collective Strategies for Securing 
Urban Land
Engaging with Customary Landowners
Many urban settlements are formed around ethnic, provincial or regional 
groups (Gewertz and Errington 1999; Koczberski and Curry 2004; see 
also Chapters 2 and 3, this volume), involving people who have a shared 
history that acts as a glue for identifying criteria for inclusion in the 
settlement (Langmore and Oram 1970; Gewertz and Errington 1999; 
Barber 2003, 2010; Goddard 2005; Chand and Yala 2008; Numbasa 
and Koczberski 2012; Sharp et al. 2015). Similarly, the narratives of 
residents of the ATS settlement whom I interviewed indicate a collective 
effort to secure land, by people who originated from Oro Province, with 
both customary landowners and the state. In the mid-1990s, leaders of 
the Oro Province community living in Port Moresby started to look for 
land to form a settlement. As discussed by Koczberski and Curry (2004) 
and Bashkow (2006), the Oro Province ‘identity’ has been in the making 
for some time, and this would have helped to enable collective action 
(Rooney forthcoming).
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It is not only the dichotomy between customary and state claims 
on the land that settlers face; they must also navigate the dynamics 
of  customary landowners who are increasingly demanding their share 
of the developments on their land. Given the current contestation over 
the land,  the prior claims of customary landowners, and the fact that, 
during my research, it was very difficult to obtain any written documents 
pertaining to the original agreement reached to establish the settlement, 
it  is hard to reconstruct some parts of its history. This section of the 
chapter  relies on data from interviews, incorporated land group (ILG) 
records, other Lands Department records, media reports, court documents 
and consultations with a number of key informants. The main purpose 
here is to demonstrate the deployment of an Oro Province identity as 
a  collective strategy to secure urban land, and how this strategy has 
changed over time from an emphasis on provincial identity towards 
positioning themselves as citizens.
Prominent in people’s recollections of how the settlement land was 
accessed was the story of friendships between several Oro men living in 
the city and members of the Dubara clan. In 1995, negotiations between 
these men and the Dubara clan members culminated in an agreement for 
Oro people to settle on Portion 698 (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Oro leaders 
also liaised with the then NCD Governor, Bill Skate, and Member for 
Moresby North-East, Philip Taku, to allow them to settle on this same 
land.3 In order to facilitate this process and to manage the movement 
of Oro people into the new settlement, the Oro leaders formed the 
Oro Community Development Association (OCDA). Its inaugural 
executive members included Jerry Asina and Joel Sanata, who still feature 
prominently in people’s recollections of the early days of the settlement 
and in media reports.
A key figure in this history is the late Maso Henao, who was a prominent 
female member of the Dubara clan and the mother of William Tokana, 
the current clan chairman and spokesman who features in most of 
the recent media reports. Many people I spoke with recounted that it 
was Maso Henao who granted the Oro leaders permission to settle on 
Portion 698. However, in the land group records for the Dubara clan 
3  Given the focus of this chapter on the importance of social relationships in the strategies of 
settlers, I have decided to use the real names of the key actors involved in the history of the ATS 
settlement, as they are already used in the public domain due to media coverage of issues in the 
settlement for a number of years.
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of Hohodae, Hanuabada, members of the clan question Maso Henao’s 
role in decisions over land. This is despite the same records also 
indicating that she had been granted customary rights over the land at 
the ATS settlement because of her  commitment to pursuing the rights 
of landowners. This occurred even though the land had been state land 
for many years. To underscore customary landowners’ connection with 
the land in question, Portion 698 contains the burial site of a number of 
the members of the Dubara clan (see Figure 4.3). Indeed, many residents 
of the settlement recall Henao in their stories of the history of the 
settlement, and several recalled attending her funeral in the settlement at 
Portion 698. People also recollected engaging with customary landowners 
by contributing funds towards, and participating in, customary events 
in practices similar to those described by a number of other authors 
(Koczberski and Curry 2004, 2005, 2009; Chand and Yala 2008, 2012, 
Koczberski et al. 2009, 2012; Monson 2010; Allen 2012; Numbasa and 
Koczberski 2012).
Figure 4.3 Cemetery of customary landowners on Portion 698, 
with Maso Henao’s grave in the centre of the picture.
Source: Photograph by author .
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On the other hand, reflecting the complexity of customary landowner 
identification in PNG, a few people I interviewed expressed uncertainty 
on this score. For example, when I asked another person if he was still in 
touch with the Dubara clan, he responded that the customary landowners 
used to:
come up here and pick up some collection [for customary events]. 
But not these days. We knew that they were illegally collecting fees for 
their problems (Luke, ATS settlement, April 2013).
The statement that customary landowners were ‘illegally collecting fees’ 
suggests uncertainty about their claims to the land. As the history of 
land in Port Moresby illustrates, fissions in the customary landowning 
clan over the years, as well as gradual appropriation of land by colonial 
administrators, have contributed to this uncertainty about who are the 
rightful owners of the land.
This is also evident in the ILG records for Port Moresby. A search of 
the ILG register in the Lands Department showed that the ‘Dubara clan’ 
had two registered ILGs. The land mediation records in the files indicate 
that there was a split in the Dubara iduhu that resulted in one group 
relocating from Hanuabada village to Kirakira village. The latter group 
is registered as ‘Dubara of Kirakira’, while the former is registered as 
‘Dubara of Hohodae, Hanuabada’. This situation explains some of the 
uncertainty among residents of the settlement. For example, in a 2005 
meeting, the chairman of the Dubara of Kirakira ILG noted that:
[W]ith regard to the land issue with the settlers of ATS settlement. 
He informed the members [of the ILG] that the settlers have raised a total 
of (K25,000.00) Twenty-Five Thousand Kina as requested …  As  the 
settlers are unsure as to who is the real owner of the land on which the 
settlement is located, they have withheld the money and have contacted 
[representatives of the ILG] to discuss the landownership matter with the 
Dubara Idibana Clan of Kira Kira.
The ILG records reveal that there was a long-standing dispute between 
these two groups over land around the ATS area, and land mediation 
was ongoing. In addition, there is a long-standing and public attempt 
by both groups to reclaim land or claim compensation from the state for 
the use of their land. The land area at the centre of this dispute includes 
Jacksons International Airport, which is located near the ATS settlement 
(see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). More recently, the media reported that another 
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clan—the Iarogaha clan of Korobosea—was claiming ownership of the 
airport land (Anon. 2015), but it is not clear from the report if this clan 
was also claiming land in the ATS settlement area.
This historical narrative has been complicated by demographic changes, 
population growth and the increased land value around the settlement. 
Over the years, the population of the ATS settlement has grown 
substantially. In 2013 it was estimated that there were between 7,000 
and 10,000 people now living in this area (Rooney forthcoming). 
The  settlement is still known as ATS but now extends well beyond 
Portion 698 (Figure 4.2).
Patrilineal Ideologies and Inclusion
While the ATS settlement has a strong Oro Province identity and history, 
things are far more complicated. The social relationships that underpin 
the settlement’s Oro identity draw on the common provincial background 
of its residents, and include shared histories of education, church, kinship 
and employment networks. As many of the settlement’s residents moved 
there from formal zones, and still have close kin living in other areas of 
Port Moresby, this shared Oro Province identity predates the establishment 
of the settlement, and is mutually constituted by those living outside and 
inside the settlement.
Within the settlement, it is very clear that the population is mixed in both 
ethnic and socio-economic terms. Interspersed throughout the settlement, 
and intermarrying with people from Oro Province, are people from all 
over the country. There are large subsets of the population who could 
easily be regarded as having their own distinct settlements. For example, 
there is a large ‘Samarai’ (Milne Bay Province) block and a ‘Goroka’ 
(Eastern Highlands Province) block.
Those who primarily identified with the OCDA explained the principles 
by which land is allocated as being based on an Oro identity. As a general 
rule, originally, newcomers to the settlement arrived under the rubric 
of the OCDA. The OCDA charged an application fee and annual 
membership fee. In theory, the application fee was stratified, with men 
from Oro Province paying the lowest fee regardless of where their spouse 
came from. Higher fees were charged to non-Oro Province people, or 
outsiders, including Oro Province women married to outsider men. 
Upon establishing residency in the settlement, an annual membership fee 
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of K30 was charged. This ‘theoretical’ emphasis on patrilineal principles of 
allocating land resonates with the ‘patrilineal ideology’ of different ethnic 
groups in the province, such as the Orokaiva (Schwimmer 1973: 95–110, 
193–7) and the Korafe (Gnecchi-Ruscone 1991).
In practice, however, accessing land in the settlement diverges from 
this patrilineal narrative, and people who have a long association and 
social standing in the settlement were also evidently accepted as part 
of the community. Thus the moral and political basis for inclusion in 
the settlement is the need for accommodation and identification as 
a member of a patrilineal group, as well as ongoing participation in the 
social, economic and political sphere of the settlement. This divergence 
between a patrilineal ideology of land access and actual social practices, 
in which inclusion is based on shared lives and contiguous relationships, 
also resonates with traditional practices in Oro Province and other parts 
of PNG (Crocombe 1971:  301; Schwimmer 1973; Gnecchi-Ruscone 
1991: 26; Bashkow 2006: 41).
In the actual practices of accessing land, people generally described a process 
whereby a relative would facilitate communication between themselves 
and the OCDA or other leaders in the settlement. By facilitating this 
process, and sometimes allowing newcomers to build a temporary shelter 
on their land, an existing resident implicitly vetted the arrival of a new 
applicant. Many people admitted that, once they had accessed land in 
the settlement and paid an ‘application fee’, they did not usually pay the 
annual fees. Reasons for non-payment included citing misuse of money 
by previous executives or, for many people, not being able to afford the 
K30 per annum. Another challenge for the OCDA was the influx of new 
settlers, including ‘outsiders’ who entered the settlement directly through 
friends without joining the association. One such category of newcomers 
are those referred to as ‘big people’, who offered amounts far in excess 
of the established fees, which has led to many settlers taking it upon 
themselves to facilitate land access in order to make money.
The term ‘big people’ variously refers to people in a network of kin, 
wantoks, friends, or colleagues, who live and work in formal areas of Port 
Moresby, and who settlers view as wealthy, educated and elite professionals 
with powerful networks of their own. It reflects the ways in which settlers 
position themselves in relation to ‘others’ who live and work in the formal 
areas of Port Moresby. ‘Big people’ may form a network of resources 
on which to draw, or potential powerful actors who can use their own 
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networks to gain from their relationships with settlers. As far as possible, 
residents of the settlement try to engage with ‘big people’ in mutually 
beneficial ways, as we shall see later in this chapter.
Engaging as Citizens
Like others residents of Port Moresby, residents of the ATS settlement 
talked about being citizens. They are voters, clients of politicians, 
taxpayers, part of the labour force, beneficiaries of projects, and important 
development partners in the international development arena of poverty 
reduction. They know that, as citizens, they must be accorded equal status 
as their compatriots who live in formal areas of the city. This narrative of 
citizenship speaks to the narrative of the land being legally owned by the 
state. As citizens, residents of settlements throughout Port Moresby are 
increasingly becoming a major political interest group, and many of them 
maintain and nurture social and political relationships in all spheres of 
life. People would often tell me about how candidates made promises of 
services and utilities, such as water, during election periods, but did not 
follow through.
Reflecting the double narrative of the customary and legal status 
of the land, there appears to have been a shift in settlers’ understanding 
of the status of the land they occupy. As this informant explains:
We were told that it was customary land so we all went in blind thinking 
it’s a customary land. Eventually I did my own investigation and I started 
seeing cement markers. It was telling me that this cannot be a customary 
land. These cement markers mean something else—that the land has been 
surveyed. So I started going around investigating and I discovered that all 
this was state land (resident, ATS settlement, January 2013).
Given the general lack of access to formal land records, it is understandable 
that settlers would not have known the actual legal status of the land at 
the time when the settlement was established. This change in knowledge, 
and the difficulties of dealing with fragmented landowners, as apparent in 
the ILG records, shape the ways that residents of the settlement legitimate 
their occupancy in relation to the state. It also places more emphasis 
on commoditised land tenure systems in which land is surveyed and 
parcelled into blocks. This was also evident during fieldwork, as people 
talked about surveyors surveying the land so that blocks of land could be 
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allocated, bought and sold. A common sentiment was that, without land 
titles (collective or individual), they cannot make claims on the state for 
public services.
These intersecting narratives, between customary land tenure arrangements 
based on social relations on the one hand, and commoditised land tenure 
systems based on citizenship on the other hand, are woven with the 
narrative of collective Oro Province and ethnic identity on the one hand 
and citizenship on the other. With respect to securing land based on the 
notion of citizenship, people tended to foreground issues such as the need 
to ‘secure the title’ as a way of securing ‘loans from the bank’ and ‘city 
services’, such as water, instead of being treated ‘as just a squatter’. Herein 
we see settlers nestled between, and negotiating with, two land tenure 
ideologies (relating to customary and commoditised land), and two social 
and political value systems (relating to provincial cultural identity and 
national state citizenship).
The emphasis on the rights of citizens to land has gained more 
prominence in recent years, as more evictions are taking place at the 
hands of property developers attracted to the increasing value of land in 
the city. For example, in response to a major eviction exercise in 2013, 
the NCD Governor Powes Parkop noted that ‘it was not acceptable for 
a corporate company to evict PNG citizens’ (Anon. 2013a). He went 
on to explain that, under such circumstances, city residents living in 
informal settlements who had been evicted or threatened with eviction 
tended to approach the NCD Commission, and himself as Governor, for 
assistance. The assistance in the particular instance involved supporting 
people with the costs of transporting their personal belongings to other 
areas, providing new tarpaulins for shelter as well ‘considering assisting 
the people with their legal fees to take out a court injunction against the 
developers’ (Anon. 2013a).
Threats of Eviction: Portion 695
Within the ATS settlement, residents also draw on their status as citizens 
in order to address challenges to their land tenure. Reflecting this nestling 
between two land tenure ideologies and social and political value systems 
is the case of Portion 695 (see Figure 4.2). Another reason for collective 
mobilisation is the common goal of residents who are directly affected by 
a threat of eviction, as in this case. This case also highlights the point that, 
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even within the relatively small geographical spaces of settlements, risks 
to land tenure may be localised, and the nature of risk is related to the 
history and geography of the area. In this case, the cadastral boundaries 
creating Portion 695 rendered the settlers residing within it the subjects 
of an eviction notice. This case was in the courts, and is one in which 
I was able to directly observe and, to a limited extent, participate during 
my fieldwork.4
I was in the settlement one morning, approaching the home of a prominent 
settlement leader living on Portion 695, when my research assistant and 
I noticed a police vehicle parked beside his home. We soon found out 
that the police were issuing a notice of an eviction to be applied to people 
living on this portion. The atmosphere at the small betel nut stand where 
we usually congregated was sombre, as we contemplated that, just the 
previous day, one of the daily newspapers had reported that another Port 
Moresby settlement located near the Moresby Arts Theatre had been 
demolished by bulldozers (Sayama and Wapar 2013).
Soon after the eviction notice was issued at the ATS settlement, a number 
of reports appeared in the local media. One newspaper reported that:
The policemen turned up with an eviction order from Dunlavin Limited, 
a Chinese company, ordering the settlers to vacate portion 1695 at 
8-Mile.5 The settlers were never informed of what was happening. The 
community leaders were now taking the matter to court. According to 
sources at the Department of Lands, the land title was given to Dunlavin 
Limited under suspicious circumstances in 2008. Settlers moved into this 
location in 1994 under a pilot resettlement project carried out by then 
Moresby East MP Philip Taku and the late Sir William Skate who was 
then the NCD Governor. The resettlement of the people was a political 
decision and the leaders of the settlement have documents to prove this 
claim (Ovasuru 2013).
4  I was rather taken aback at witnessing this interaction with the police first-hand, and so made 
contact with a local newspaper to alert them of another potential settlement demolition. As I had 
recently interviewed the NCD Governor, I had his contact details, so I also let him know what was 
happening. I also contacted the editor of one of the national newspapers to alert him of the same in 
the hope that journalists would cover the matter. The incident prompted me to write a blog article 
(Rooney 2013).
5  The reference to Portion 1695 in the newspaper is presumably a typographical error, as the 
cadastral maps show it as Portion 695.
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Another newspaper article reported that customary landowners were
demanding K20 million from the national government before any new 
development starts. The landowners were noted to state that the national 
government did not properly acquire parts of our customary land where 
we have ultimate customary rights over them including portions of 
land around the airport areas which extends from the ATS settlement 
towards the public cemetery land at 9-Mile. It is also very disheartening 
to see foreign companies, multi-national corporations, politicians and 
big businesses engage in land-grab using their financial powers while we, 
the customary landowners, have simply been ignored by state agents. 
The Dubara clan rejected that the Oro settlement at ATS was given as 
a pilot project by former NCD politicians Philip Taku and Sir William 
Skate. They said it was traditional owners Ova Boge, Ruma Varona and 
Maso Henao who signed the initial agreement and gave their consent 
to the late Jerry Asina in 1995 to use the land. According to the clan 
members, the settlers had not complied with the conditions of the 
agreement and after 16 years they wanted their land back (Anon. 2013b).
To underscore their claims as the original claimants of ATS land customary 
landowners also assert that their:
evidence that [they] are the true traditional landowners of the land at ATS 
area is the fact that [their] parents Maso Henao and Ova Boge lie in their 
graves with other family members buried at Portion 698 (Anon. 2013c).
The references to the breach of the arrangement between customary 
landowners and Oro Province settlers is confirmed in statements from 
some settlers who told me that the original arrangement was for them to 
settle on Portion 698.
Although the issue of the eviction relates to the specific location of Portion 
695, its coverage in the media enabled both customary landowners and 
settlers to reassert their claims to the land in a public domain. They both 
note the ‘dubious’ and ‘suspicious’ nature of the transfer of the title of 
Portion 695. Both groups of claimants situate themselves within the 
broader contemporary discourse on land grabs (see Filer 2011), and turn 
the public gaze, and questions regarding ‘legality’, back onto the state and 
the Department of Lands, which is renowned for corrupt land deals (see 
Chapter 8, this volume).
The immediate problem of a ‘threat of eviction’ is placed in the legal 
framework as a dispute between settlers and the private leaseholder. 
In the Latin American context, van Gelder (2013) describes interactions 
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between settlers’ ‘illegality’ and the legal domain in which settlers use the 
formal court processes to delay or prevent eviction. The legal framework 
of universal human rights, where natural laws take precedence over other 
forms of law, such as civil or commercial law, is often the strength of 
arguments against eviction. In the case of Portion 695, the legal process 
has so far delayed the eviction. However, the same cannot be said of other 
eviction exercises. For example, in 2012 a significant section of the Paga 
Hill settlement was demolished while settlers were in the process of seeking 
legal recourse to stay the eviction orders (Lasslett 2012; Wilson 2012).
The threat of eviction from Portion 695 has had the effect of uniting 
people of different backgrounds and ethnicity. Thus Oro Province 
collective identity is backgrounded in order to pragmatically address the 
immediate issue of eviction. Residents of Portion 695 have a common 
purpose of fighting a counter-claimant or face losing their homes. While 
their Oro identity matters for harnessing important social and political 
influence in their court battle, they know that the outcome in the courts 
will depend on legal technicalities related to their claims as citizens. 
Out of the households that I interviewed, 13 lived in Portion 695. One 
of my interviewees, Lance, who lives in a cluster of households including 
those of his brothers and nephew, told me that one of his brothers lives 
several metres from him but is located inside the Portion 695 boundary, 
while he lives in the adjacent Portion 697 (see Figure 4.2). Lance’s brother 
is therefore impacted by the eviction notice, while Lance and his family are 
safe from eviction for the time being. The case of Portion 695 and Lance’s 
story show that, while settlement household patterns are usually described 
in terms of clusters of kin living together (see Chand and Yala 2012), the 
risk to tenure can be highly localised in ways that render these kinship 
clusters temporarily irrelevant, while foregrounding relationships between 
those living on the same legal portions of land. In this example, Lance’s 
brother is requested, and is obliged, to make a contribution towards the 
legal fees to pay for the court case to save Portion 695. Lance sympathised 
with his brother but, as he was unemployed, he was unable to assist.
Legal Fees to Fight Eviction from Portion 695
The leaders of the residents of Portion 695 have managed the eviction 
process by taking the matter to court. This has a direct impact on 
livelihoods, as one resident pointed out when I asked about what big 
issues affected the community:
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Another thing with this land is that we don’t have the title and sometimes 
they tell us we have to move from this block. This affects our well-being. 
The leaders call for meetings and ask the community to contribute money 
to address land issues in order to pay lawyers to take the case to court. 
Only last week we met here and each household was told to contribute 
K100 to meeting legal fees. This is for everyone who is affected by this 
eviction notice (Mick, resident of ATS settlement, 2013).
Considering the relatively low incomes and their unequal distribution, 
this financial contribution to secure land is a significant financial burden 
for most families.6 Given the long-term process and immediate impact 
on housing and livelihoods, the contributions are most likely an ongoing, 
albeit variable, cost faced by households.
Throughout my fieldwork, the residents of Portion 695 also raised funds 
through barbecues and dances. Through this common goal, the eviction 
notice has forged a shared interest for the residents of Portion 695 whose 
lives are now dependent on their joint efforts. Given their low incomes, 
however, settlers will have to look for other means to secure legal and 
financial support, including their social and political networks. The long-
term nature of legal battles, their impact on settlers’ meagre resources, 
and the need to tap into social and political networks, is also noted by 
Lasslett (2012) in the Paga Hill settlement case. The residents of ATS 
settlement also told me that the Governor had agreed to assist them with 
their legal fees.
‘Big People’ as Stakeholders in Land
In asserting their rights as citizens, settlers also position themselves as equal 
to other PNG citizens and ‘big people’. From their own life experiences as 
former residents of formal housing, and as former or current employees, 
they know that the social gap between them and other citizens living in 
formal areas is nominal, negotiable and subject to change. Land in Port 
Moresby is scarce, and already others, including elites and professionals, 
in the city are seeking land as their own tenure of employment comes to 
an end, or as they seek to broaden their livelihood and housing options. 
As one resident noted:
6  Of the 32 households I interviewed, 13 of whom lived on Portion 695, 65 per cent reported 
household incomes of less than K100 per person per fortnight, so a K100 contribution per household 
towards legal fees is a very large amount and often an ongoing cost to families.
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Out there in the city there’s no land. You go and apply [but] you won’t 
get it because all the land is taken up. For this reason many ‘big people’ 
are now seeing that they will one day walk out of their jobs, so they come 
and help the settlement associations because in this way they may one 
day access land in ATS and will eventually end up owning something for 
ourselves (resident, ATS Settlement, 2013).
That ‘big people’ such as lawyers, engineers, public servants and wealthier 
kin and friends, who ‘will one day walk out of their jobs’, are interested 
in the settlement is also an opportunity for residents of the settlement. 
These relationships give settlers access to otherwise inaccessible 
institutions and people. ‘Big people’ provide legal services, surveying 
skills, computing support for document preparation, printing, political 
influence or other services to gain entry into the settlement. At the same 
time, the relationships are not one-way relationships, and by virtue of 
their ‘settlement’ identity, settlers know that they are in a position to 
reciprocate by offering support, such as introducing people to influence 
decision makers inside the settlement, or people who can provide housing 
when needed. In many ways, I myself could be considered to belong to the 
category of ‘big people’. My research was welcomed, and people explicitly 
asked me to convey their stories so that others would know about life in 
settlements. In addition to helping raise awareness on the Portion 695 
eviction, I would occasionally be asked to pass a message back to someone 
or other. On the other hand, I may have been viewed as an intermediary 
by other outsiders like myself. For example, when I mentioned that I was 
conducting fieldwork in the ATS settlement to an acquaintance who is 
a public servant, he responded that he had heard of land being sold there, 
and that he might accompany me during one of my visits to ascertain his 
own prospects of buying land. Among elites and professionals, the topic 
of buying land is commonly discussed.
Another settler expressed puzzlement at a professional who had approached 
her for land in the settlement.
They are big people. They get land but they don’t come again for ten years. 
Why would they want land if they don’t want to settle? (Summarised from 
interview notes, 2014)
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I have met professionals in the city who mention that they have a block in 
the settlement and visit it periodically. Two of the participants I interviewed, 
who now live in the settlement, previously held senior positions in the 
public service while their brothers held land in the settlement. When they 
stopped working they relocated to the settlement.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sought to illustrate the multiple claims on land 
in Port Moresby, and the complex ways that these claims are entangled 
with each other. I have examined these issues from the perspective of 
migrants residing in a Port Moresby settlement. Much of the discourse 
on urban land in Melanesia juxtaposes customary landowners with an 
array of ‘other’ actors who include other customary landowners, the state, 
property developers and migrants.
The historical and legal framework presented in this chapter shows the 
multiple and competing claims on urban land and the overlapping forms 
of property rights. Within this context the present-day reality is that the 
settlers occupy the land. Efforts to assert counter-claims to the land or 
alter the status quo, including any policy-induced changes, will either 
involve an eviction process or a revision of the ways that settlers’ claims, 
obligations and responsibilities are defined and exercised. As this will have 
a direct bearing on their livelihoods, settlers will also be at the forefront 
of dialogue, mediation and negotiations, and therefore their responses are 
important for understanding urban land discourse.
Residents of informal settlements legitimise their claims to land by 
invoking both traditional notions of access to land for subsistence and 
the formal international human rights framework that includes notions 
of citizenship and the right to shelter. Both customary and modern forms 
of access and maintenance of tenure through exchange and reciprocity 
are utilised and adapted to allow settlers to negotiate with different 
actors at different times. By mapping the historical processes that shape 
contemporary claims on land, and by a grounded examination of the ways 
in which settlers collectively mobilise and adapt to respond to counter-
claims on land, this chapter draws out several important considerations 
for urban land discourse in Melanesia. Claimants to urban land—the 
customary landowners, the settlers, the state or the private leaseholders—
are dynamic and fragmented groups. Within them disputes occur, 
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new factions emerge and new institutions are created. This means that 
distinctions between them often disguise complexities that are important 
in shaping the challenges that settlers face—and also their responses. 
Another category of actors emerging in these dynamics are the ‘big people’ 
whose money and status in the city create opportunities for the residents 
of settlements, as well as opportunities for themselves to buy land from 
existing residents.
The pressure from customary landowners for fees to be paid for the use 
of the land led ATS residents to raise substantial fees through financial 
contributions. However, these were withheld when settlers realised that 
there was a dispute among customary landowners, and requested clarity 
about which customary landowning group the fees should be paid to. 
The realisation that the land was alienated created an opening to assert an 
alternative claim as citizens. The common threat of eviction created a sense 
of unity among residents of Portion 695 regardless of their ethnicity.
Migrants living in informal urban settlements will continue to negotiate 
in ways that harness the best of a myriad of strategies involving different 
actors, values and systems. Urban land policy needs to be cognisant that 
any change in the status quo, no matter how well intended, will exclude 
some people, and this will lead to ‘counter-exclusive’ responses (Hall et al. 
2011). At the very least, policies or proposed developments must include 
provisions to identify those who will be affected and options for their 
resettlement. Residents of the ATS settlement evoked their shared history 
and identity to collectively secure land, but in the face of threats by other 
claimants to dispossess them of the land they occupy, their strategies to 
legitimate their occupancy of the land involved, by necessity, excluding 
other claims on, and access to, the same land.
None of this relieves the hardship that settlers face, and the ongoing 
difficulties and challenges of maintaining tenure, but the fact that settlers 
will remain a prominent part of the urban social, political, physical and 
economic landscape, and have sustained their efforts for so long, show 
that they have developed ways to do so that can inform urban land policy 
processes. This paper offers some partial but important insights into how 
settlers respond collectively to land tenure challenges.
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Informal Land Markets 
in Papua New Guinea
Gina Koczberski, Georgina Numbasa, 
Emmanuel Germis and George N . Curry
Introduction
Customary land in Papua New Guinea (PNG) remains a critical livelihood 
asset. With less than 5 per cent of the land under freehold title or state 
leases, the management of present and future demands for customary 
land for housing, services and livelihoods in the rapidly expanding urban 
and rural growth centres is a critical development challenge. As elsewhere 
in the Pacific, Papua New Guineans are leading more mobile lives as they 
seek new livelihood opportunities and improved access to services in urban 
and select rural locations. All Pacific Island states are rapidly urbanising, 
with urban growth outstripping national growth rates in some Pacific 
nations (see Chapter 2, this volume). A large proportion of migrants, 
especially from remote parts of PNG, are also moving to rural agricultural 
and resource frontier zones to access employment, education and health 
services. The high rate of migration to urban and select rural locations in 
PNG is placing great pressure on customary land as migrants seek access 
to land for housing and to develop livelihoods, including subsistence food 
and cash crop production. The demand and willingness of migrants to 
pay cash for short- and long-term access to land is fuelling a dynamic land 
market comprising ‘informal’ land transactions and rental arrangements.
KASTOM, PROPERTy AND IDEOLOGy
146
This chapter examines informal transactions of customary land between 
customary landowners (hereafter referred to as landowners) and outsiders 
without birthrights to the land. It identifies key principles underpinning 
a range of informal land transactions that could be used to inform policies 
of land reform. We argue that landowners are not seeking a transformation 
of customary tenure principles to enable them to capitalise on the rising 
demand for land by migrants; rather, they are seeking to retain ‘ownership’ 
and control of their land within a framework that stresses the relational 
dimensions of their transactions with ‘outsiders’. By examining the 
adaptations and modifications of customary tenure that are taking place 
on customary land outside government structures, new approaches to 
land reform can be found that meet the changing demands on customary 
land  and that move away from previous failed land reform attempts 
based on the notion that secure individual property rights through titling 
of land are a prerequisite to building a modern economy.
Background
Most people in PNG, as in other parts of the Pacific, hold an intense 
attachment to land. Land is at the heart of economic life, cultural and 
spiritual beliefs, and an individual and group’s sense of social identity 
and belonging (Sillitoe 1999). This link to social and cultural identity 
underpins the common view among landowners that land is inalienable. 
Even customary land that has been acquired by the state or converted 
to freehold title is rarely seen as being alienated permanently from 
customary ownership (Chand and Yala 2006; Filer and Lowe 2011; 
Curry et al. 2012).
Customary land tenure arrangements vary across the country, but 
generally, under customary tenure, rights to land are based on a mixture 
of  descent, residence and participation in communal activities 
(Cooter  1991; Larmour 1991; Curry 1997; Koczberski et al. 2009). 
Exclusive individual landownership and inheritance was limited because, 
in the largely horticultural societies of PNG, an individual’s rights to land 
for the cultivation of food crops waned as the garden reverted to fallow. 
As the fallow period lengthened there was a gradual return of rights back 
to the group (Ward and Kingdon 1995; Curry et al. 2012). This system 
of land tenure prevented individuals from acquiring exclusive control over 
large tracts of land.
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Another characteristic of customary land tenure was its flexibility, which 
permitted land rights to be modified to accommodate changing socio-
political, demographic and environmental situations. The pragmatic 
nature of customary land tenure meant that the relative importance in 
land rights of descent, residency and participation in social and political 
activities varied, so that no single criterion, such as descent, was sufficient 
in itself to provide unconditional rights to land (Crocombe 1971). 
This flexible system ensured that most villagers had sufficient land to meet 
their daily livelihood requirements, and allowed temporary land rights to 
be transferred to individuals and lineages without birthrights to the land 
(Crocombe and Hide 1971; Mandeville 1979; Curry 1997; Ward 1997). 
Thus, members of a clan short of land were often given access rights to 
gardening land that belonged to another clan in the village.
Although traditional principles of land tenure are still followed throughout 
the country, the way in which customary land is governed by landowning 
groups is being modified in response to new demands and pressures related 
to rapid demographic and socio-economic changes. In contemporary 
PNG the key drivers of these changes include:
• Large-scale resource development, such as mining and plantations 
(Lea 1997; Gilberthorpe 2007; Weiner 2007; Banks 2008; Bainton 
2010; Imbun 2013).
• Smallholder production of cash crops, particularly perennial crops 
like coffee and cocoa, and large-scale food production for urban 
markets. There is a trend in areas where perennial cash crops have 
been incorporated into village farming systems for customary tenure 
to gradually become more individualised and for land to be ‘sold’ 
to other clan members (Epstein 1969; Standish 1984; Foster 1995; 
MacWilliam 1988; Curry et al. 2007; Martin 2007; Koczberski et al. 
2009).
• Population and land pressures. Mounting demand for land in 
villages and the increasing need for cash are leading to many internal 
adjustments to land tenure arrangements. In some cases such pressures 
are eroding the flexibility of customary land tenure practices, resulting 
in a tightening up of access rights and increasing individual/family 
control over land (Carrier and Carrier 1989; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 
1997; Martin 2013).
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• Internal migration. In PNG large numbers of people, usually from 
remote and poorly serviced areas of the country, are migrating to urban 
areas and rural resource frontier regions. These migrants are entering 
into informal agreements with landowners to gain access to customary 
land for housing and to generate livelihoods.
• Rapid urbanisation and the growth of informal settlements. Most of 
the recent residential growth occurring on customary land in peri-
urban areas is due largely to the limited supply of state and freehold 
land. The demand for land by migrants is sustaining an active land 
market in informal land ‘sales’ and rental arrangements (Goddard 
2005; Chand and Yala 2012; Numbasa and Koczberski 2012).
• Growing notions of individualism and changing aspirations. As PNG 
undergoes social and economic change, people’s attitudes to land are also 
changing. In some parts of the country, especially where engagement 
with the market economy is strong and growing, social relations and 
values are becoming more market-orientated, with a  corresponding 
trend towards possessive individualism (Martin 2013). This is leading 
some clan members to view land as a commodity that can be ‘sold’ to 
people outside the landholding group.
The adaptations and modifications to customary land tenure by landowners 
in response to these key drivers offer lessons to inform land reform policies. 
Whilst customary land tenure is recognised in PNG’s Constitution, it has 
largely been considered problematic in discussions of land reform. Land 
reform in PNG and elsewhere in the Pacific has been dominated by the 
assertion that customary tenure is incapable of providing secure property 
rights necessary for facilitating investment and the commercial use of 
land (Lea 2002; Gosarevski et al. 2004). With communal ownership and 
no formal title to land, customary tenure is viewed as a major obstacle to 
economic development. Thus, attempts at land reform in PNG have been 
based on the notion that secure individual property rights through land 
titling and tenure conversion are a prerequisite for building a favourable 
investment climate and fostering economic development. This private 
property approach to land emerged in Africa in the 1970s when the 
World Bank launched its policy on land reform for developing countries, 
and it has since dominated land reform programs in PNG and elsewhere 
in the Pacific (Peters 2007; Fingleton 2008).
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However, land reform is ‘easier said than done’ (GoPNG 2007), and the 
three major land reform programs that have been attempted in PNG 
since the 1960s have failed (Larmour 1991; Fingleton 2004; Yala and 
Lyons 2012). One reason for their failure was their incompatibility with 
people’s concepts of the moral basis of land rights and the strongly held 
view that customary land is inalienable. The failure of past land reform 
programs, and the growing interest by some landowning groups to 
mobilise their land for development, have influenced the most recent land 
reform discussions that started in 2005 and have since continued under 
the National Land Development Program (see Chapter 6, this volume). 
There is now greater acknowledgment that landowners must feel a sense 
of ownership of the land reform agenda (GoPNG 2007; Fingleton 2008). 
This has led to nationwide consultations with landowning groups to 
obtain their views and support for proposed policies. The central goal of 
the reforms is to identify ways to facilitate access to customary land for 
economic development while providing tenure security for investors and 
ensuring land remains under customary ownership (individual user rights 
but ownership at the group level). This represents a significant shift from 
earlier land reform programs that sought to replace customary tenure.
A significant challenge for policy makers in PNG will be how to deal 
with the proliferation of informal (and sometimes illegal) land transfers 
taking place, as landowners develop their own arrangements for land 
mobilisation outside government structures, and as they seek to capitalise 
on the demand for urban and rural land by land-poor migrants. 
How policy makers can develop an effective reform program and land 
administration system to accommodate the range of informal and semi-
formal arrangements already well established will be one of the principal 
challenges for land reform in PNG.
In the remaining part of this chapter, two case studies are presented to 
illustrate how customary land tenure has been modified to accommodate 
‘outsiders’ without birthrights to the land. The first case study is from 
Wewak, the provincial capital of East Sepik Province, and focuses on 
migrant settlers living in informal settlements. The second is in the oil 
palm-growing areas around Hoskins in West New Britain Province, where 
migrants from other provinces are acquiring land for oil palm production 
(Figure 5.1). Each case study examines the informal land transactions 
between landowners and land-poor migrants, and in particular how settlers 
first obtained and continue to maintain access to the customary land of 
others. The key principles underpinning successful land transactions in 
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both case studies are discussed, together with the factors contributing 
to disputes between migrants and their landowner hosts. Whilst 
anthropologists as early as the 1950s reported on individuals and lineages 
without birthrights being given access rights to land (Meggitt 1965, 
1971; Reay 1971; Forge 1972; Mandeville 1979), few recent studies have 
examined how migrants into urban centres and rural and resource frontier 
zones maintain long-term access rights to customary land to establish new 
livelihoods in their adopted homes.
Figure 5.1 Location of study sites.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University, based on PNG national census data .
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Home Making in Wewak’s Informal 
Settlements
Wewak has a population of almost 25,000, and is made up of state, 
freehold (largely owned by the Catholic Church) and customary land. 
Most of Wewak, including peri-urban areas, is on customary land. Wewak 
grew considerably after the Second World War through to the 1980s, 
as it became the administrative and commercial centre for the province. 
In the 1950s, several informal settlements began appearing on customary 
land as people from other parts of the province came to Wewak seeking 
employment and access to government and church services (Numbasa 
and Koczberski 2012). By the mid-1970s almost half of urban housing 
in Wewak was in informal settlements (Jackson 1977). These informal 
settlements on customary land have continued to expand, so that Wewak, 
like other towns and cities in PNG, has become a town of migrants, with 
over 55 per cent of the population born elsewhere (GoPNG 2001).
To examine how migrants accessed land for housing, interviews and 
household surveys were conducted with residents at seven informal 
settlements that were founded between 1950 and 1970 (Figure 5.1). Levels 
of services in the settlements were poor, and most do not have electricity, 
reticulated water or garbage collection. Each settlement was dominated by 
one or two cultural or ethnic groups, and while some residents were in paid 
employment, most made a livelihood in the informal sector selling store 
goods, cooked food, fish, handicrafts and wood carvings at local markets.
Table 5.1 lists the key characteristics of each settlement, including 
the dominant source area of migrants, the average residency period of 
household heads in the settlement, the type of land tenure, how settlers 
initially accessed the land, how they have maintained access rights to 
the land through time, and the range of restrictions imposed on settlers 
by the landowners. All the settlements are located on customary land, 
although some were formerly established on what was then Catholic 
mission-owned land. Many landowning groups who supported the 
establishment of the Catholic Church in Wewak donated land to 
the church, and some of this land was used by the church to house their 
workers. Over time these compounds have grown as village relatives 
joined family members residing in Wewak. The mission land has since 
been returned to the landowners, which has involved settlers entering new 
informal agreements and relationships with their new ‘landlords’.
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Most settlements on customary land, such as Boram Beach, Koil Island 
Camp and Kaindi Ward 5 Settlement, were established initially by 
a person or a group of people who had some marital, friendship or long-
standing traditional trading relationships with the landowning group. 
For example, in the 1950s, people from Wewak’s offshore islands and 
distant coastal villages began visiting Wewak more regularly for business, 
to see their relatives, and to seek medical and education services (which 
were very limited outside the provincial capital). With the consent of 
landowners, the migrants established small camps on the beach, such as 
Boram Beach Front and Koil Island Camp at Kreer Beach. Originally, the 
camps were used by the visitors as places to secure their canoes during 
trading expeditions or when visiting the mainland to access the new 
services that were becoming available in the towns. Whilst the initial 
negotiations were between elders from the migrant source villages and 
members of the landowning group, later agreements tended to be between 
individual migrants and landowners. Over time, as residency became more 
long-term, the camps evolved into established permanent settlements. 
The traditional trading relationships that facilitated the initial residential 
arrangements were important for assisting later migrants to access land 
for more permanent settlement in Wewak, as were the initial settlers who 
provided a base and personal contacts within the host communities.
Since the settlements were established over four decades ago, migrants 
have continued to maintain their tenure rights largely through personal 
exchange relationships with their landowning hosts and increasingly 
through intermarriage (Table 5.1). Migrants maintain their access rights 
to the land through regular contributions in cash, food or labour to 
landowners’ customary activities and expenses, especially funerals and 
brideprice payments. Three quarters of respondents reported making 
regular in-kind or cash contributions to landowners’ customary expenses. 
These contributions to customary exchange are central to building 
and strengthening settlers’ relationships with landowners, as is settlers’ 
attendance at marriage ceremonies, funerals and other customary events 
in the landowning village. Socially and politically, these acts are public 
demonstrations by settlers of their close relationship ties with their hosts 
and their ongoing respect for landowners and their customs. It is through 
meeting their ongoing customary obligations to the landowners and 
maintaining good relationships with them that access rights are upheld.
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In addition to maintaining ongoing customary relationships with the 
landowners, settlers must observe landowner-imposed land use restrictions 
to maintain ongoing access to land and housing (Table 5.1). Landowner 
regulations governing land use varied among settlements. Often 
restrictions included defining the types of livelihood activities migrants 
could and could not pursue, prohibiting the utilisation of mangrove or 
forest resources adjacent to settlements, and controlling house building 
and the numbers and demographic composition of the settler population. 
The most common type of landowner-imposed restriction on settlements 
was on who could reside in the settlement. Potential new residents had to 
gain approval from the landowners prior to moving into the settlement 
and, generally, only those closely related to existing residents were granted 
permission. When settlers neglected to observe these restrictions, conflicts 
with landowners could emerge leading to the eviction of settlers.
By engaging in exchange relationships with their landowner hosts and 
observing the restrictions placed on their activities, settlers were more 
likely to sustain stable tenure rights. Landowners engaged in a regular 
process of evaluating and assessing the status of their relationships with 
settlers, and in so doing, made judgements of the moral basis of migrants’ 
occupancy rights. Thus, how settlers managed their relationships with 
landowners was critical to determining tenure status.
However, despite the relatively stable relationships between landowners 
and settlers, the tenure security of migrants in some settlements was being 
undermined. This situation was arising largely because of the changing 
social relationships between younger members of the landowning group 
and the children born in the settlement. In certain settlements, some 
second- and third-generation settlers resented complying with the endless 
requests to contribute cash and food to the customary exchanges of 
their landowner hosts, especially given their own household cash needs 
and their continuing customary obligations to relatives in their ‘home’ 
villages. Similarly, some younger members of the landowner community 
were reluctant to recognise the informal agreements or long-established 
relationship ties made by their elders with the settlers’ fathers and 
grandfathers. From their perspective, the informal agreements established 
with the migrants were of the past and belonged to an older generation 
for whom customary obligations and practices were more strongly valued 
(Numbasa and Koczberski 2012). Moreover, some younger landowners 
viewed the new generation of settlers as the source of law and order 
problems, and their continued residence in the settlement was seen as 
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an obstacle to formally leasing the land to developers. At the time of 
fieldwork, at least three landowning groups were holding discussions with 
developers about leasing their land (Numbasa and Koczberski 2012). 
The lure of higher returns by leasing their land to developers was stronger 
when the quality of the relationship between landowners and migrants 
was perceived to be poor. Thus the tenure security of second-generation 
migrants was changing as their social and exchange relationships with 
their landowner hosts were also undergoing reassessment.
Oil Palm and the Desire for Land
The oil palm belt along the coastal plain of Kimbe Bay in West New 
Britain has one of the fastest population growth rates in the country. 
Much of this population growth is attributable to high immigration 
to the province from mainland PNG. Approximately 38  per cent 
of the residents were born in other provinces (GoPNG 2001), many of 
them being concentrated around the Hoskins and Bialla oil palm land 
settlement schemes and plantation estates, and in the urban centres of 
Kimbe and Bialla.
For the past 25  years, and especially over the last decade, land-poor 
settlers living in the oil palm belt have been seeking customary land on 
which to plant oil palm. Whilst there has been a history of landowners 
gifting land to village non-clan members to plant oil palm, the informal 
‘sale’ or ‘renting’ of land to migrants from other provinces is more recent. 
The ‘sale’ of land to settlers first emerged in the 1980s at Hoskins and in 
the early 1990s at Bialla. Most of those buying customary land are the 
children or relatives of settlers who acquired state agricultural leases on the 
government oil palm land settlement schemes at Hoskins and Bialla, or 
have been in long-term employment in the province where they also raised 
their children. Figure 5.1 shows the major locations where customary land 
is being ‘sold’ to outsiders. The initial land transactions between migrants 
and clan leaders in the Hoskins area were typically based on friendship or 
a marital link, similar to the close relationships associated with the early 
land transactions with ‘outsiders’ in Wewak. Also, as in Wewak, access 
rights were maintained through contributing to customary exchange and 
participating in village activities.
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More recently, as the demand for customary land has grown, land 
dealings have increasingly been with settlers where there has been no pre-
existing relationship with the landowners. Virtually all land transactions 
with ‘outsiders’ now involve payments for the land. Although there is 
great variation in the types of informal land sale agreements, which is 
partly explained by the different relationships between landowners and 
outsiders, typically an initial cash deposit is paid to the landowner(s), with 
the outstanding balance paid in cash instalments over several years after 
the palms come into production.
In most cases, land sales tend to be informal verbal agreements between 
the transacting parties, with an individual’s access and use rights to the 
land loosely defined. Seldom are there written records of the agreed 
‘purchase’ price and the amount and timing of payment instalments; 
nor are the specific rights and obligations of the migrant or landowner 
documented. Rarely is the size and boundary of the ‘purchased’ land 
surveyed. Members of the broader landowner group are sometimes not 
aware that land has been ‘sold’ to an ‘outsider’, and this can become 
a major source of discontent within the landowner group.
Disputes over ‘purchased’ customary land (and even over land initially 
gifted to migrants) have been increasing over the past 10 years. These 
disputes arise not so much because migrants and landowners have different 
understandings of land use rights—the right to plant oil palm—but rather 
because they have different concepts of land ‘ownership’, which means 
that their respective interpretations of the obligations and expectations 
associated with land transactions can be very different.
There are three major points of contention in migrants’ and landowners’ 
interpretations of land transactions. First, some migrants believe that the 
cash payments made to landowners confer on them outright ownership 
of the land, not unlike freehold title. These migrants therefore argue that 
their children should be able to inherit the land and they should have the 
unencumbered right to sell the land to a third party without consulting 
the landowners (Koczberski et al. 2009). This is rarely the view of the 
landowners, and nor is it the case in law as the land remains customary 
land with the potential to be reclaimed by the landowners on the death 
of the ‘purchaser’. Second, those migrants who discursively construct 
the land transaction as a commodity transaction are of the view that, in 
addition to cultivating oil palm, they can establish small businesses or 
other income-generating activities on the land. Landowners contest this 
right and remind migrants that they have purchased only the use rights 
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for oil palm cultivation, not other livelihood activities. If other income-
generating activities were to be established on the land, landowners often 
insist on some additional payments; after all, the migrants are earning this 
additional income on the land of the landowners, and this wealth should 
be shared. Third, while many settlers do contribute cash to the customary 
exchange activities of the landowners, some settlers resist or reject these 
demands as they believe there should not be an obligation on them to 
maintain a social relationship with their ‘hosts’ through gifts of labour and 
wealth. These settlers strive to limit their relationships with landowners, 
but in doing so they undermine their moral claim to the land in the eyes 
of landowners.
From the landowners’ perspective, land transactions must accord with 
customary principles concerning the inalienability of land. From this 
point of view, exclusive and permanent property rights are not guaranteed 
by full payment of the agreed ‘purchase’ price. Rather, migrants’ land 
rights are less exclusive and are conditional on settlers’ fulfilment of 
specific obligations and maintenance of good social relationships with 
their landowner hosts. For example, there is an expectation among 
landowners that they should share in the wealth generated on their land by 
‘outsiders’, even though no landowner labour contributed to that wealth. 
This is most strikingly observed when oil palm prices rise and landowners 
expect they should also share some of income accruing from the higher 
prices. Thus, migrants are expected to act like clan members, share the 
wealth from the land, and contribute to village brideprice and mortuary 
payments, other forms of customary exchange, and village fundraising 
activities.
These demands on ‘purchasers’ accord more with the widespread view of 
landownership in PNG being grounded in relational identities. Robert 
Cooter’s (1991) conceptual framework is relevant to an understanding 
of the differing interpretations of land transactions by migrants and 
landowners (see Table 5.2). Cooter described freehold transactions as 
those that occur between strangers whose only relationship with each 
other is commercial, where the obligations and commitments between 
the parties are minimal. While buyers and sellers have some obligations 
to each other, the transaction choices they make are not constrained by 
mutual social obligations. Both buyers and sellers can act to their own best 
advantage, and the relationship between them is short-term and concludes 
with completion of the sale (Koczberski et al. 2009). Cooter (1991: 41) 
described freehold tenure as ‘property law for stranger relations’.
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In contrast, land transactions occurring under customary land tenure 
regimes are between relatives and are based on long-term relationships 
of reciprocal obligations, cooperation and commitment to the kinship 
group. Such reciprocal obligations determine customary rights to land 
and constrain people’s freedom to act to their own best advantage in land 
transactions. Under customary land tenure regimes, relational concepts 
of land tenure are therefore dominant. Customary land laws are thus 
described by Cooter (1991: 41) as ‘property law for kin relations’. Migrants 
who construct the land transactions as being in the realm of commodity 
transactions, and therefore anchored in the principles of freehold title 
(stranger relations), are likely to see their access rights challenged as they 
allow their relationship with landowners to wane. Settlers accepting land 
access rights as being grounded in social relationships, and dependent 
on meeting certain exchange obligations, are better able to integrate 
themselves into their host communities and develop long-term stable 
relationships with them, with ongoing access to land.
Table 5.2 Cooter’s concept of property law in PNG.
Freehold Principles
(property law for stranger relations)
Customary Principles
(property law for kin relations)
Relationships between people are 
commercial: obligations and commitments 
are thin
Relationships between relatives: kin 
networks bind people together in a web 
of mutual obligations and commitments
Short‑term relationships between people Long‑term relationships between relatives
Concept of absolute unitary ownership Concept of relational property and land 
as an inalienable resource
Source: Cooter 1991: 41 .
Discussion
Informal land markets provide an important function in contemporary 
PNG. As highlighted above, there is a large demand for customary land 
by migrants desiring to secure a future in urban and rural areas of PNG 
where livelihood opportunities and access to services are relatively good. 
While there has been a long history of landowners gifting land to non-clan 
members, informal land agreements and the ‘renting’ or ‘sale’ of land to 
land-poor migrants from other provinces or districts is more recent, and 
presently undergoing reassessment as relationships between landowners 
and migrants change. The new and rapidly changing rules of access for 
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‘outsiders’ illustrate both an expanding and evolving informal land market 
in PNG and the profound shifts in value systems as the country becomes 
increasingly tied into the global economy.
A common feature across both case studies was the broad range of land 
transactions enabling migrants to gain access to land. Monetary land sales, 
rentals and ‘gifted’ access rights were common, with most transactions 
being informal verbal agreements, grounded in local forms of sociability, 
while some were more formal, with written documentation. In many 
situations there was a level of ambiguity regarding migrants’ long-term 
tenure security, although land use rights were clearly defined and tightly 
circumscribed, with very specific use rights and restrictions on who can 
reside in the community. For example, migrants may have residence 
rights, but not the right to establish small businesses or harvest forest 
or marine products belonging to their hosts. Typically, these rights were 
negotiated separately from the land transaction, and sometimes incurred 
additional payments if they were permitted at all.
In both case studies, despite the inclusion of cash to facilitate access rights 
to land, ongoing tenure security was largely dependent on the creation 
and maintenance of social relationships. Indeed, initial settlement rights 
were typically granted to settlers with whom the landowners had a pre-
existing relationship. In the Wewak case, this was sometimes built on 
long-standing trading relationships in which the leaders of the host 
and migrant communities arranged settlement. In West New Britain, 
friendships forged between migrants and landowners, sometimes while 
working together on plantations or in town or as neighbours, were 
the basis of their relationship and subsequent land transactions. More 
recently, as demand for land has increased, access rights to customary 
land have been granted to settlers with no pre-existing relationship with 
the landowners. This represents a deepening degree of commodification 
of land transactions with migrants.
However, despite the absence of pre-existing relationships with landowners, 
and the appearance of there being market transactions in land, recent 
settlers are still expected to develop relational identities with their hosts to 
validate access rights. These relationships are initiated and then fostered 
through indigenous exchange transactions in which migrants make 
cash, food and labour contributions to the customary and community 
activities of their hosts. There is also an expectation that landowners will 
share in the wealth generated by migrants, especially those earning regular 
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incomes from oil palm or from full-time employment. This sharing of 
wealth is often portrayed as a form of indigenous exchange rather than 
market transactions devoid of social meaning. Being cast in the realm 
of indigenous exchange means that the relationship with landowners 
has social value and implies respect for the host group—respect for their 
authority as landowners, respect for their culture, and respect for their 
behavioural mores. Such relational conditions underpinning migrants’ 
access rights also extend to them supporting electoral candidates from 
the landowner group and supporting the landowners in disputes with 
neighbouring groups.
This practice of landowners striving to socially embed land transactions 
with migrants can be considered as a form of enacting personalised 
‘property rights for social inclusion’ or, to use Ribot and Peluso’s term, 
as ‘mechanisms of access’ that allow certain actors to gain, control and 
maintain access to resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 160). These ‘socially 
inclusive’ access mechanisms create opportunities for settlers to become 
incorporated into networks of obligations and exchange and become 
a subgroup of the landowning group, which partially erases their identity 
as ‘outsiders’ and confers on them certain rights and privileges, including 
ongoing access to land. Similar processes of ‘social inclusion’ that enable 
migrants to validate access rights to customary land have also been 
reported from other urban and rural areas of PNG (Levine and Levine 
1979; Goddard 2005; Martin 2013; also Chapter 4, this volume).
Whilst such access mechanisms enable migrants to move from being 
‘outsiders’ to being ‘insiders’, their status is not permanent, as social 
relationships with members of the landowning group must be nurtured 
continually. Most migrants readily accept that secure and long-lasting 
access rights are subject to meeting certain relational conditions, and they 
regularly engage, sometimes begrudgingly, in the maintenance of exchange 
relationships with the landowning group. Others, who have ‘purchased’ 
land or pay regular rental fees, attempt to discursively construct their 
dealings with landowners as market transactions and resist investing in 
regular exchange relationships with their hosts. These migrants are most 
at risk of harassment and eviction.
When landowners believe that migrants are not sustaining adequate levels 
of investment in social relationships with their hosts, they often interpret 
this as a downgrading of the migrants’ tenure rights with a corresponding 
strengthening of their own rights in the land. In oil palm, this reassessment 
of relationships is likely to occur on the death of either the clan leader or 
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the migrant involved in the initial land transaction, or at the end of an 
oil palm planting cycle (Curry and Koczberski 2009). At these points the 
land rights of ‘outsiders’ may be renegotiated or terminated. However, as 
demand for land increases, and the local economic context offers more 
lucrative opportunities, with investors or potential new migrants willing 
to invest more in these relationships, migrants who have neglected their 
relationships with their hosts may find their tenure security weakened 
as they negotiate with a new generation of younger landowners eager 
to extract more wealth from their land. Like their Wewak counterparts 
keen to capitalise on new opportunities presented by developers, younger 
landowners’ commitment to existing settlers may not be as strong as that 
of their parents’ generation.
The potential for dispute and exclusion is greater among second and 
subsequent generations of landowners and migrants as social distance 
increases. Also, as illustrated in the case studies, conflicts are increasingly 
likely as population and land pressures rise, as landowners see their 
development options constrained by the presence of large numbers of 
settlers, and as long-term, intergenerational migrants develop a sense of 
a birthright to the land where they reside (see Chapter 12, this volume). 
Thus, what worked well in the past, when most settlers had a direct 
personal relationship with landowners, and when there were fewer land 
pressures and competing land uses, is coming under increasing pressure 
and reassessment in the increasingly market-orientated contemporary 
economy of PNG.
Policy Implications
What general principles and lessons do the case studies provide to inform 
land reform discussions? In analysing the diverse range of land transactions 
in place, it was clear that, whilst landowners wished to capitalise on the 
new economic opportunities of their land, they were not after wholesale 
change with a transformation of customary tenure. They wish to preserve 
the key aspects of customary tenure. Most contemporary land use 
agreements between landowners and outsiders in West New Britain and 
Wewak are compatible with long-existing mechanisms of transferring 
land rights to individuals and lineages without birthrights to the land, 
which have been reported by researchers from many other parts of the 
country. Thus, although the ‘sale’ of land to migrants for the cultivation of 
introduced cash crops such as oil palm, and the informal ‘renting’ of land 
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for urban settlements, involve new types of land tenure arrangements, they 
are symbolically and materially modelled on old practices and customs 
that historically were widespread in PNG.
Further evidence that landowners do not want to see a radical change 
to customary tenure, despite a clear trend towards the commodification 
of land, is that relational identities remain central to the basis of land 
rights. Often the ‘sale’ and ‘renting’ of land in West New Britain, and 
the emergence of urban settlements in PNG, are interpreted by observers 
as a process of commodification of land and land rights. However, such 
land transactions remain, at least from the perspective of landowners, 
anchored in principles of customary land tenure and in long-standing 
concepts of clan identity, social inclusion and entitlements. It is these 
place-based frameworks of land tenure embedded in social relationships 
and non-market values that continue to play a critical role in gaining 
and maintaining access rights for land by ‘outsiders’, even if at times 
relationships are manipulated by landowners.
Given the enduring significance and widespread recognition of relational 
identities in access rights to land, new land policies should seek to align 
with these principles wherever possible. With the failure of previous land 
reform programs, there is now growing recognition among policy makers 
in PNG, and in other Pacific Island nations, that land reform should aim 
to support and build on existing customary tenure rather than replace it. 
As Jim Fingleton noted in a paper on land reform in the Pacific:
there is now a general acceptance that adaptation, not replacement, 
of customary tenures is the way forward. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations endorses the adaptation 
approach to land tenure reform. Even the World Bank, for long a critic of 
customary tenures, has given ground, now recognising customary tenures 
as a viable basis for growth and development (Fingleton 2008: 10–11).
The adaptation approach to land reform is more likely to be acceptable to 
landowners, and, as the case studies have shown, landowners are already 
one step ahead of government policy and are adapting their customary 
land tenure systems by entering into informal agreements with ‘outsiders’. 
Proponents of land reform often portray customary land tenure as 
archaic, inflexible and inappropriate for the modern market context. 
They often claim that land registration and titling are necessary for raising 
agricultural productivity. Where there is pressure for land reform, the 
adaptability and flexibility of customary land tenure is often downplayed 
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or ignored. Yet the case studies show that, in the absence of an effective 
land administration system and suitable state-led land reform, landowners 
seeking to capitalise on the demand for land are developing their own 
informal arrangements for land mobilisation and modifying customary 
land practices, in most cases successfully. Indeed, as shown in several parts 
of Africa, where land remains under customary tenure and demand for 
land by ‘outsiders’ is great, government efforts in land reform often lag 
well behind what is happening on the ground as landowners develop their 
own informal land arrangements (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006; 
Peters 2007; Becker 2013).
Where tenure practices are evolving rapidly, as in PNG, it is necessary, 
before embarking on land reform policies, that detailed empirical analysis 
be undertaken on how customary land tenure regimes are changing, the 
extent to which land is being excluded from customary ownership, and 
the basis and outcomes of land conflicts and dispossessions. For example, 
with the emergence of tensions among younger, second-generation 
migrants and landowners, and new forms of exclusion, both groups are 
seeking more formal arrangements. Landowners are seeking ways to 
ensure that their long-term customary tenure rights are not eroded, while 
some migrants are seeking to have formal recognition of their use rights to 
the land and more long-term security of tenure for housing and to pursue 
livelihoods. How will more formal or legal procedures be managed or 
regulated by the state, migrants, and landowner groups to provide some 
level of tenure security for migrants acquiring land, while recognising and 
preserving the underlying rights of landowners on the ground?
More challenging will be how policy makers can develop an effective 
reform program and land administration system to accommodate the 
range of informal and semi-formal arrangements already well established, 
and gain the cooperation and trust of landowners in the land reform 
agenda. Any new government system seeking to mobilise customary 
land for housing and livelihoods for ‘outsiders’ will find it difficult to 
compete with existing informal systems already widespread and operating 
for several decades in many parts of PNG. The policy aim should be to 
find a way to complement and build on existing informal institutions 
and land transaction agreements that recognise underlying customary 
ownership. To achieve this means developing procedures and practices, 
in consultation with landowning groups, local government and migrants, 
which ideally build on indigenous notions of land tenure to provide 
tenure security to both groups.
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The Formation of a Land 




Papua New Guinea (PNG) possesses a very unusual—probably unique—
legal institution whose abuse lies at the heart of current public debate 
about land grabbing. This institution is commonly known as the lease-
leaseback scheme. It was invented in 1979 in order to compensate for 
the absence of any other legal institution that would enable customary 
landowners to register titles to their own land. This absence was seen as 
an obstacle to rural development because 97 per cent of PNG’s total land 
area was still customary land, and the ownership of this land was almost 
entirely illegible to the state and to private capital. The idea behind the 
lease-leaseback scheme was that groups of customary landowners could 
lease some of their land to the government, which would then create 
a formal title over it and lease it back to the landowners. The landowners 
would then have a piece of paper that they could use as security for 
a bank loan or as the basis for granting a sublease to a third party for some 
developmental purpose. The current legal form of the lease-leaseback 
scheme is represented in two sections of the Land Act. Section 11 says that 
the minister ‘may lease customary land for the purpose of granting a special 
agricultural and business lease of the land’, while Section 102 says that 
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‘a special agricultural and business lease shall be granted: (a) to a person 
or persons; or (b) to a land group, business group or other incorporated 
body, to whom the customary landowners have agreed that such a lease 
should be granted’. Section 11 also says that:
an instrument of lease in the approved form, executed by or on behalf 
of the customary landowners, is conclusive evidence that the State has 
a good title to the lease and that all customary rights in the land, except 
those which are specifically reserved in the lease, are suspended for the 
period of the lease to the State.
PNG is also unusual (if not exactly unique) in the propensity of its 
national government to reveal the dark underbelly of its own dysfunction 
through the establishment of commissions of inquiry and the eventual 
dissemination of their findings. The establishment of a commission of 
inquiry into the operation of the lease-leaseback scheme was announced 
by PNG’s Acting Prime Minister, Sam Abal, in May 2011. In June, 
the National Executive Council (PNG’s cabinet) formally endorsed its 
establishment and imposed a moratorium on the further grant of special 
agricultural and business leases (SABLs) and related licences until the 
Commission reported its findings to Parliament. Three senior lawyers, 
led by former Chief Magistrate John Numapo, were appointed as 
commissioners. The commissioners began their hearings in August 2011, 
and continued to gather evidence until March 2012. An interim report 
of their findings was presented to Prime Minister Peter O’Neill in March 
2013, prompting him to voice his impatience over the length of time that 
was being taken to produce a final report (Nicholas 2013a). In response, 
the three commissioners cited a variety of political and bureaucratic 
obstacles that had hindered the progress of their work, but promised that 
a final report would be submitted by the end of April (Pok 2013). John 
Numapo and one of the other commissioners, Nicholas Mirou, submitted 
separate reports at the end of June (Mirou 2013; Numapo 2013), but 
the third commissioner, Alois Jerewai, refused to follow suit. When 
the Prime Minister tabled the two reports in Parliament in September 
2013, he threatened ‘disciplinary action’ against all three commissioners 
(Nicholas 2013b). Commissioner Jerewai claimed that he had finished 
his own report in 2012, but he thought there should be one final report, 
co-authored by all three commissioners, and threatened legal action 
against all the other parties, including the Prime Minister and the other 
two commissioners, for failing to insist on this outcome (Kelola 2013). 
Nothing more was heard from him, and no ‘disciplinary action’ was taken. 
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The interim report, the two final reports, and most of the transcripts of 
the hearings conducted by all three commissioners, were posted on the 
Prime Minister’s departmental website at the end of November.
This chapter describes the formation of a land grab policy network as 
a two-stage process. The first stage is the one that led to the government’s 
decision to establish the Commission of Inquiry in April 2011. 
The  second  stage is the one in which the network changed its shape 
during the period that elapsed between the start of the Commission’s 
hearings and the public release of its findings. My account of this process 
is based on the information that I was able to gather in my own capacity as 
a participant observer. Other participants would no doubt tell a different 
story, but all such stories must necessarily be partial.
The Network Assembled, 2008–2010
The Commission’s terms of reference made specific reference to a manifesto 
known as the ‘Cairns Declaration’, which had been produced in March 
2011 by ‘a large group of environmental and social scientists, natural 
resources managers and non-governmental organizations [sic] staff from 
Papua New Guinea and other nations [who] met in James Cook University 
in the city of Cairns, Australia to discuss the future management and 
conservation of Papua New Guinea’s native forest’. At the same time, the 
terms of reference noted that ‘[m]any segment [sic] of the community 
throughout the country, including civil society organisations, prominent 
leaders and landowner groups are increasingly objecting to SABL approval 
and management processes in recent times’ (GoPNG 2011: 2).
In a report later published by Greenpeace, Paul Winn also made reference 
to  the Cairns Declaration,1 but assigned even greater significance to 
a  please-explain letter that the PNG government had received from 
the UN  Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People following a complaint 
lodged by PNG’s Centre for Environmental Law and Community 
Rights and the UK-based Forest Peoples’ Programme (Winn 2012: 15). 
By this account, the government was primarily responding to a campaign 
1  Paul and I were both among the 26 signatories to the Cairns Declaration.
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organised by what I have previously called PNG’s ‘conservation policy 
community’ (Filer 2005)—an interest group in which Greenpeace itself 
has long played a prominent role.
It seems rather unlikely that PNG’s National Executive Council would 
have responded so rapidly and decisively to this kind of pressure if it 
had not been reinforced by pressure from other quarters over a longer 
period of time. Furthermore, such a decision would normally have to 
be based on a submission made by one or more cabinet ministers, and 
it is not obvious which ministers or departments would have taken this 
responsibility, nor is there any obvious reason why they would have been 
especially responsive to the arguments of conservationists. I suggest that 
the pressure came from a number of distinct interest groups that came to 
be joined up in a single policy network. One of the policy brokers who 
assembled this network is Paul Barker, the Director of PNG’s Institute of 
National Affairs, which might best be described as a civil society think-
tank. He was one of the first people to apply the phrase ‘land grab’ to the 
systematic abuse of the lease-leaseback scheme, and he did so in the title 
of a feature article published by one of PNG’s national newspapers in 
May 2009. Paul Barker summarised his evidence as follows:
Over recent months about two million hectares of land across lowland 
provinces have been granted as Special Purpose Agricultural/Business 
Leases under the Land Act, with seven of these areas (in Western, Sepik, 
Central and Oro Provinces) each exceeding 100,000 hectares.
As with a 38,000 ha Collingwood Bay scam launched in 1995, and finally 
thrown out of court in 2001, many (if not all) of the 50 known schemes 
have apparently lacked due process, with landowners never granting their 
‘informed consent’ for the State to lease their land and subsequently 
reallocate it to various named (largely overseas-controlled) interests 
(Barker 2009).
Members of the land grab policy network were essentially people who 
came to share the view that the land contained in SABLs of a certain size 
had indeed been ‘grabbed’, since it was not possible to imagine that the 
customary owners had given their free, prior and informed consent to 
the lease-leaseback process. However, it took some time for this network 
to be established, and it was never more than a ‘rainbow coalition’ 
of different interest groups.
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The List of Dodgy Deals
One thread in our story began with the appointment of Puka Temu as 
Minister for Lands and Physical Planning in January 2005. The new 
minister thought he had a mandate to discover more efficient and effective 
ways of mobilising customary land for urban and rural development. 
With this aim in mind, a National Land Summit was convened in August 
that year, and this was followed by the construction of a National Land 
Development Taskforce (NLDT) whose final report was ceremonially 
launched in February 2007. The 54 recommendations of the taskforce 
emerged from the deliberations of three different committees dealing 
with ‘land administration’, ‘land dispute settlement’, and ‘customary land 
development’.
While Minister Temu later showed great enthusiasm for the lease-
leaseback scheme as a means to ‘mobilise’ customary land, the report of 
the NLDT barely mentioned it—and then only to endorse its limited 
use by the existing oil palm industry (GoPNG 2007:  117). This is 
understandable, because the exponential growth in the number of large 
blocks of customary land alienated in this way had only just begun when 
the report was drafted in 2006. The taskforce was far more interested in 
plugging the legislative hole that had originally prompted the invention 
of the lease-leaseback scheme in 1979, and that was the absence of any 
legal mechanism by which incorporated groups of customary landowners 
could register formal titles to their land.
In August 2007, Brian Aldrich sent an email to Thomas Webster, with 
a copy to Pepi Kimas, expressing his concern about the number of 
SABLs that were being granted to private companies over large areas of 
customary land for the maximum allowable period of 99 years. Brian is 
a private land consultant and long-term PNG resident who had once 
worked as an expatriate contract officer in the Department of Lands and 
Physical Planning and was a member of the NLDT committee on land 
administration. Thomas Webster had been appointed to chair the NLDT 
in his capacity as Director of the National Research Institute, which is 
a government-funded think-tank accountable to the Minister for National 
Planning. Pepi Kimas was the Secretary of the Lands Department and had 
been a member of the NLDT committee on land dispute settlement.2
2  He had delegated one of his senior officers to participate in the central committee of the 
taskforce.
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Brian’s interest in the issue derived from the fact that he had played 
a key role in helping the oil palm industry to establish ‘mini-estates’ on 
relatively small areas of customary land by arranging for SABLs to be 
granted to incorporated groups of customary landowners so that they in 
turn could issue subleases to the oil palm companies and receive a range 
of economic benefits in return.3 His view was that the Land Act should 
never have made provision for SABLs to be granted to anyone other than 
the families or land groups that had agreed to lease their land to the state 
in the first instance. His email included a table showing that 10 leases 
over a combined area of more than 270,000 hectares had been granted to 
private companies since October 2005. This was in fact an underestimate, 
since his reading of the National Gazette later led him to discover another 
10 leases, with a combined area of roughly 130,000 hectares, which had 
been granted to private companies over the same period. So the area of 
concern already contained about 400,000 hectares of customary land that 
could have been alienated without the informed consent of the customary 
owners.
It is important to note here that the relevant notices in the National 
Gazette are somewhat mysterious, in the sense that they specify the size 
of the lease (in hectares), but they do not specify its actual boundaries, 
nor do they state how these relate to the boundaries of PNG’s provinces 
and districts, which are the political entities represented by members of 
parliament. Instead, they make reference to portion numbers on a national 
collection of provincial land survey maps that are used to record the 
creation of formal land titles (see Figure 6.1). These maps are not readily 
available to members of the public, so even those few people, like Brian, 
who make it their business to read every issue of the National Gazette 
would not be able to tell where each of the leases was located. What Brian 
did was to construct a spreadsheet in which he recorded the date of each 
gazettal notice that struck him as being suspicious, and then recorded 
most of the other details of the lease in question in the other columns.
By his own account, Brian met with officers of the Lands Department in 
November 2007, and was assured that no more leases would be granted 
directly to private companies. However, by the time Secretary Kimas 
responded to Brian’s original email, 12  months after it had been  sent, 
3  The mini-estates deserve their name because none of them covers more than 7,000 hectares of 
land. The total area covered by SABLs granted to local land groups for this purpose between 1998 and 
2007 was less than 20,000 hectares.
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his  officers had issued another 15 leases to private companies, with 
a  combined area of more than 625,000  hectares, thus taking the total 
area covered by such transactions to more than 1 million hectares. At this 
juncture the Secretary stated that he would hold a meeting with his 
officers ‘to address this issue further and to explore ways of informing the 
public of the potential risk involved’.
Land Act No. 45 of 1996 
———— 
NOTICE OF DIRECT GRANT UNDER SECTION 102 
I, Pepi S. Kimas, OL., Delegate of the Minister for Lands and Physical Planning, by virtue 
of the powers conferred by Section 102 of the Land Act No. 45 of 1996 and all other 
powers enabling me hereby directly grant a Special Agriculture and Business Lease to [A] 
over the land described in the Schedule hereunder. 
l. The lease shall be used bona fide for the purpose specified in the Schedule. 
2. The lease shall be for a term specified in the Schedule commencing from the date 
when the land was leased from the customary landowners to the State under 
Section 11 of the Land Act 1996. 
3. The lease shall be rent-free for the duration of the lease. 





A Special Agriculture and Business Lease for a period of [number] years over all 
that piece of land known as “[B]” surveyed and legally described as Portion [number], 
Milinch of [C], Fourmil of [D] in [E] Province with an area of [number] hectares as 
registered on Survey Plan Catalogue No. [number]. 
Dated this [numbered] day of [month], [year]. 
P.S. KIMAS, OL., 
Delegate of the Minister for Lands & Physical Planning. 
Figure 6.1 Format of notices advertising the grant of special agricultural 
and business leases in the National Gazette.
Source: Author’s rendition of common features of notices published in the National Gazette .
In an email sent to John Numapo shortly afterwards, Brian observed that 
no one appeared to be taking the issue seriously aside from himself and 
two other white men, Norm Oliver and Tony Power. John was at that time 
PNG’s Chief Magistrate, and had chaired the NLDT committee on land 
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dispute settlement. Norm was a former Land Titles Commissioner whom 
Brian had engaged to assist the oil palm industry in the establishment 
of ‘mini-estates’ by means of the grant of SABLs to incorporated land 
groups (Oliver 2001). Tony had long been an advocate for land group 
incorporation as a means of empowering customary landowners in the 
process of large-scale resource development (Power 2008), but also had 
a personal interest in the matter of current concern because land belonging 
to his wife’s clan (in East Sepik Province) had already been included in an 
SABL granted to a foreign company.4
Brian continued to update and circulate his spreadsheet until it 
finally became the basis of the list of 72 leases, covering a total of 
5.2 million hectares, which the Commission of Inquiry was directed to 
investigate when its terms of reference appeared in the National Gazette in 
July 2011.5 By that time, the number of people who had seen at least one 
version of Brian’s spreadsheet was much larger than it had been in 2008, 
but this new audience was not exactly his own creation. Once I started 
to receive copies of the spreadsheet in 2009, I noticed that he hardly ever 
sent them to more than three or four people, and although there were 
some variations in the identities of the recipients, there would not have 
been more than 10 recipients in the whole of that year. Thomas Webster 
was still one of them, but Pepi Kimas was not. Paul Barker was also one 
of the new recipients, and unlike Brian or Thomas, he was now prepared 
to turn the whole issue into a public scandal. If the land grab policy 
network therefore began to take a more public shape after the publication 
of his newspaper article in May 2009, who should be counted among its 
members by the end of that year?
The Land Development Group
At that juncture, it was possible to identify two distinct interest groups 
within the network, which I propose to call the ‘land development 
group’ and the ‘oil palm industry group’. The land development group 
consisted of people who were actively involved in efforts to implement 
the recommendations of the NLDT, including some who had been 
4  Neither Norm nor Tony had been members of the NLDT or any of its three committees, 
but could still be counted as members of the land grab policy network.
5  Brian’s spreadsheet was never a complete list of all the SABLs granted to private companies, 
but it did include all of the leases that had been granted to private companies since 2003 and covered 
areas of more than 100 hectares. The Commission of Inquiry eventually dealt with 75 leases granted 
to private companies (Numapo 2013: 3).
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members of the taskforce itself or one of its three committees. In theory, 
this should have been quite a large group. The recommendations were 
now known as the National Land Development Program (NLDP), and 
this program was meant to have a Project Implementation Unit that 
reported to the Management Committee, which in turn reported to the 
Economic Ministerial Committee, which was a committee of the National 
Executive Council. In addition, there was meant to be a National Land 
Development Advisory Group (NLDAG) providing the Economic 
Ministerial Committee with independent advice on the implementation 
of the program (Levantis and Yala 2008).6 This organisational cluster 
should have come to life in 2008, but an ‘implementation plan’ produced 
by the Management Committee in 2010 revealed that little progress had 
been made by the end of 2009 except for the drafting of amendments to 
the Land Registration Act and the Land Groups Incorporation Act, both 
of which had been passed by the national parliament in March of that 
year (GoPNG 2008). This document also gave the impression that further 
progress would substantially depend on foreign aid funding that was yet 
to be made available.7
In these circumstances, it is hard to tell how many people were actively 
involved in efforts to implement the NLDP, how many of these people 
were bothered about the land grab unfolding in Brian’s spreadsheet, and 
what, if anything, they were able to do about it. We now know that 
Thomas Webster and his colleagues at the National Research Institute 
were bothered about it. The same goes for John Numapo, who was still 
wrestling with the reform of PNG’s land court system. And the same 
goes for Lawrence Kalinoe, who had chaired the NLDT committee on 
customary land development and then been appointed Secretary of the 
Constitutional and Law Reform Commission, in which capacity he had 
6  The Management Committee was meant to include representatives from ‘Magisterial Services, the 
National Research Institute, the Constitutional and Law Reform Commission, Office of Urbanization, 
Department of Justice and Attorney General, Department of Provincial and Local Government 
Affairs, the Department for Community Development, Department of Lands and Physical Planning, 
Department of Treasury and Department of Planning and Monitoring’, while the Advisory Group 
was meant to include ‘Vice Chancellor, UPNG; Head, Social Sciences and Humanities, UPNG; 
President, PNG Real Estate Association; Head, Land Studies Unit, UniTech; Director, Transparency 
International; Director, National Agriculture Research Institute; Director, Institute of National Affairs; 
Director, National Research Institute (Chairman); Chairman of PNG Rural industries Council; 
President of PNG Bankers’ Association; President of PNG Chamber of Commerce and Industries; 
and the Chairman of PNG Association of NGOs’ (GoPNG 2010a: 34–5).
7  The implementation plan was drafted by an Australian consultancy company called Land Equity 
International (see Chapter 14) and funded by the Australian aid program.
KASTOM, PROPERTy AND IDEOLOGy
178
drafted the legislation that would now enable customary landowners to 
register titles to their own land. However, these people were all public 
servants, and could not therefore give voice to their concerns in the same 
way as Paul Barker. Furthermore, it was now evident that Minister Temu, 
Secretary Kimas and most of the other officials in the Lands Department 
were not part of the land grab policy network but part of the problem that 
had to be solved, and despite the organisational complexity of the NLDP, 
officials in other government agencies had no more influence over the 
Lands Ministry than Paul or Brian had. And even if the NLDP had been 
implemented with greater speed, they were also hamstrung by the  fact 
that it had nothing to say about measures to stop the abuse of the lease-
leaseback scheme.
The Oil Palm Industry Group
Members of the oil palm industry group were bothered about the land 
grab because they realised that the lease-leaseback scheme was being 
abused by the proponents of so-called ‘agro-forestry’ projects. In PNG, the 
term ‘agro-forestry’ refers to the practice of clearing large areas of native 
forest on the pretext of making space for the cultivation of export crops 
and undertaking to use the revenues obtained from the export of raw 
logs to defray the cost of developing the plantation infrastructure. This 
idea originated in the 1990s as a device by which disreputable logging 
companies could circumvent the onerous regulations associated with the 
grant of selective logging concessions under PNG’s ‘sustainable forest 
management’ regime. One of the earliest examples of the lease-leaseback 
scheme being used for this dubious purpose was the ‘Collingwood Bay 
scam’ mentioned in Paul Barker’s feature article (Barker 2009), but this 
project had been blocked by legal action on the part of the customary 
landowners. The World Bank, in its capacity as one of the main architects 
of PNG’s forest policy reforms, had also made strenuous efforts to block 
the legal loopholes through which such projects had occasionally gained 
some form of government approval (Filer 2000: 39–40).
The concept and practice of ‘agro-forestry’ received a new lease of life 
in 2005 when Michael Somare’s government finally removed the World 
Bank from the forest policy process and hailed the dawn of a new ‘green 
revolution’ (Bonsella 2005). One of the earliest of the big SABLs in Brian’s 
spreadsheet was the one issued to a company called Baina Agro-Forest Ltd 
in October of that year. This lease covered more than 40,000 hectares of 
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land in Central Province and lasted for 40 years. Even before the SABL 
was gazetted, the president of the Forest Industries Association, Stanis 
Bai, was complaining that a logging company, Nasyl No. 98 Ltd, had 
‘illegally’ entered the area on the false pretext of developing an oil palm 
estate (Anon. 2005a). This complaint was echoed by his brother, Brown 
Bai, who was chairman of the Rural Industries Council (Anon. 2005b). 
Their concerns seem to have been justified. The logging company managed 
to secure a log export licence in 2007, exported a large quantity of logs in 
2008, and then disappeared.
Despite the negative publicity that this project attracted in 2005, there 
was no mention of it in the NLDT report, even though a representative 
of the oil palm industry, Lillian Holland, was a member of the taskforce 
committee on land administration. Nevertheless, Mike Manning, who 
was a member of the central committee, and had preceded Paul Barker 
as Director of the Institute of National Affairs, voiced another public 
complaint about ‘so-called agro-forestry projects’ in September 2007. 
He did this in his capacity as chair of the PNG National Interpretation 
Working Group of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). 
This group was said to consist of ‘all PNG’s existing palm oil companies, 
the Oil Palm Industry Corporation, the PNG Oil Palm Research 
Association, the Department of Environment and Conservation, the 
Rural Industries Council and some environmental non-government 
organisations’ (Anon. 2007).
The issue at stake here was that companies wishing to be members of 
the RSPO were obliged to prove that they were not responsible for the 
clearance of any new area of primary forest or destruction of ecosystems 
with high conservation value. Industry representatives were thus opposed 
to the new generation of agro-forestry projects—especially those that 
purported to be oil palm schemes—because of the risk they posed to its 
own reputation as a producer of ‘sustainable’ palm oil, even if the schemes 
proved to be illusory. Furthermore, the industry’s own use of the lease-
leaseback scheme was at risk of being tainted by association with land 
grabbers who had saved themselves the expense of securing the informed 
consent of customary landowners to a complex sequence of transactions 
that Brian Aldrich and Norm Oliver had shown to be required for 
the creation of new leasehold titles over relatively small areas of land 
(Filer 2012).
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Despite this demonstration of concern, the government proceeded to 
amend the Forestry Act at the end of 2007 in ways that made it harder 
for the National Forest Board to refuse the grant of what were now called 
‘forest clearing authorities’ to the proponents of agro-forestry projects 
(McCrea 2009:  23).8 Once these amendments had been made, SABLs 
became the platforms from which landowner companies and their 
‘development partners’ could launch their applications for such permits. 
That is why Paul Barker, who succeeded Mike Manning as chair of the 
National Interpretation Working Group, followed his feature article 
on the ‘land grab’ with a fresh complaint about the spread of oil palm 
development proposals that were ‘clearly not designed as viable “oil palm” 
projects’ (Anon. 2009). Since Paul had many other hats to wear, the role 
of representing the oil palm industry in the land grab policy network then 
fell to Ian Orrell, another member of the working group who was then the 
head of PNG’s Oil Palm Research Association but soon became the head 
of a new peak body called the PNG Palm Oil Council.
The Silence of the Greens
If the land development group and the oil palm industry group had 
both established themselves as key constituents of the land grab policy 
network by the end of 2009, very few members of the ‘conservation 
policy community’ appeared to have taken much interest in the issue. 
This seems rather odd, given that they had played such a prominent role 
in the defence of customary land rights against the first generation of 
agro-forestry project proposals, including the ‘Collingwood Bay scam’ 
(Seri 2005). Although Paul Barker was forwarding copies of Brian’s 
spreadsheet to other members of the green community throughout the 
course of 2009, the response was muted.
When I wrote about the conservation policy community in 2005, 
I  discussed the evidence of internal conflict between big international 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and their small local 
counterparts. Four years later, there was still evidence of a division, but 
I would now describe it as a split between the ‘sustainability group’ and 
the ‘anti-dependency group’. Insofar as Paul and I belong to this policy 
community or network, we would count as members of the sustainability 
8  The National Forest Board is the decision-making arm of the PNG Forest Authority. Its decisions 
are implemented by the staff of the National Forest Service.
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group because we think it is worthwhile to discuss the achievement of 
‘sustainable development outcomes’ with representatives of the oil palm 
industry, the mining industry, or even the logging industry. Opponents 
of the anti-dependency group tend to describe it as an ‘anti-development’ 
group, in the hope or expectation that this label will subtract from its 
popular appeal, but members of this group say that they are only opposed 
to ‘development’ in the sense of sharing a belief that large-scale resource 
development is a bad thing because it induces a form of social and economic 
dependency at the same time that it causes serious environmental damage. 
The removal of the World Bank from PNG’s forest policy process in 2005 
was symptomatic of a change in the constitution of the conservation 
policy community, because foreign aid agencies and foreign NGOs had 
less money to spend on forest conservation projects. But if this changed 
the balance of power within the conservation policy community, it did 
not enable the anti-dependency group to wield any greater influence over 
any aspect of national government policy—whether it be forest policy, 
conservation policy or land policy. If anything, it had the opposite effect.
There was one environmental NGO, the Centre for Environmental 
Law and Community Rights (CELCOR), which had a representative 
on one of the NLDT’s three special committees, and that was the 
committee on customary land development chaired by Lawrence 
Kalinoe. However, there is no evidence to indicate that CELCOR or any 
of the other organisations in the anti-dependency group endorsed the 
recommendations of that committee. On the contrary, a meeting of group 
members in July 2008 expressed strong opposition to the whole idea of 
registering group titles over customary land (Anon. 2008a). This  was 
consistent with a common belief among members of this group that any 
legal device for the ‘mobilisation’ of customary land in Melanesia is the 
work of a neoliberal conspiracy masterminded by the World Bank and 
the Australian government (Anderson and Lee 2010), even though the 
architects of the taskforce had been at pains to exclude all foreign agencies 
from their deliberations (Levantis and Yala 2008). But it also reflected a 
total lack of trust in the capacity of the Lands Department to manage 
a process of registration without somehow turning it into a process of 
expropriation (Filer 2011a). Some members of the land development 
group might have felt the same way, but there was hardly any direct 
communication between the members of these two groups.
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Even so, one might have supposed that members of the anti-dependency 
group would have seized on the evidence contained in Brian’s spreadsheet 
to bolster their case against the registration of customary land. Their initial 
failure to do so might best be explained by the scarcity of the resources at 
their disposal and their dedication to campaigns that distracted them from 
the implications of this evidence. One example of such distraction was 
the complaint that Damien Ase, CELCOR’s executive director, lodged 
with the World Bank Inspection Panel in November 2009, in which he 
claimed that a project intended to provide support to smallholders in 
PNG’s existing oil palm industry was in breach of several of the bank’s 
safeguard policies. Given that CELCOR is an organisation whose stated 
mission is to provide legal assistance to ‘landowners affected by large scale 
environmentally destructive projects including industrial logging, mining 
and oil palm plantation development’ (Ase 2009: 1), it seems rather odd 
that disgruntled smallholders were still getting more of this assistance 
than the customary owners of huge tracts of land then being dedicated 
to the new generation of agro-forestry projects. It certainly seemed odd to 
members of the oil palm industry group in the land grab policy network.
The REDD Distraction
But in 2009, the biggest distraction of all was the chaos that surrounded 
the prospect of securing foreign investment in projects designed to 
reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. 
These so-called REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation) projects had been a matter of interest to national 
policy makers since 2005, when Prime Minister Michael Somare made 
PNG one of the founding members of the Coalition for Rainforest 
Nations—an organisation dedicated to the aim of amending the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in ways that would 
enable ‘rainforest nations’ to claim carbon credits from the international 
community. In 2009, a sort of climate policy group began to take shape 
as the fifth group in the land grab policy network, but it took such an odd 
sort of shape that it hardly qualified as a group with any sort of common 
interest.
The catalyst for the chaos was a notice published in the National Gazette 
at the end of April 2009, advising that a company called Tumu Timber 
Development Ltd (TTDL) had been granted an SABL over an area of 
almost 800,000 hectares in Western Province for a period of 99  years. 
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Several members of the land grab policy network realised that this was the 
area known to the PNG Forest Authority as the Kamula Doso forest area. 
The anti-dependency group already had an interest in this area because 
one of its member organisations, the PNG Eco-Forestry Forum, had 
issued a legal challenge to a decision made by the National Forest Board 
to allocate this area to Rimbunan Hijau, PNG’s biggest logging company, 
which already held an adjacent concession. This case was still before the 
courts. In the meantime, some members of the anti-dependency group 
and some government officials had separately decided that this would 
make an ideal site for a REDD project. Among the government officials 
was Theo Yasause, who had been appointed to head a new Office of 
Climate Change in the Prime Minister’s Department in 2008.9 Yasause 
made some sort of arrangement with an Australian entrepreneur, Kirk 
Roberts, to market carbon credits from the Kamula Doso forest area, and 
Roberts sought the backing of an Australian carbon-broking company, 
Carbon Planet, for his own efforts to secure the backing of the TTDL 
board (Wood 2015).
Some members of the conservation policy community were already 
making complaints about this sort of arrangement in the middle of 
2008 (Melick 2008). Their concerns were reflected in newspaper articles 
that complained about the state ‘grabbing virgin forests’ for REDD 
projects (Anon. 2008b), or warned of an invasion of ‘speculators’ and 
‘carpetbaggers’ looking to make a fast buck out of the carbon business 
(Anon. 2008c). When TTDL was awarded its SABL in 2009, they readily 
assumed that this must be the work of Kirk Roberts and Theo Yasause. 
Shortly afterwards, the plaintiffs in the long-standing legal dispute 
over the area therefore asked the National Court to restrain the Lands 
Department from issuing the SABL on the grounds that Yasause had been 
wrong to grant carbon trading rights to Roberts. The Court then ordered 
both parties, along with the Minister for Lands and the Registrar of Land 
Titles, to be joined with Rimbunan Hijau and the PNG Forest Authority 
as defendants in the case. Following this order, the Eco-Forestry Forum 
issued a press release announcing that it had been successful in persuading 
the Court to grant ‘injunctions to stop the Office of Climate Change and 
the Department of Lands from taking any further steps to issue rights over 
the forests of Kamula Doso’ (PNGEFF 2009a).
9  This body was initially known as the Office of Climate Change and Carbon Trade, then as the 
Office of Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability. In 2010, it became the Office of Climate 
Change and Development.
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The assumption was later shown to be false. The TTDL board contained 
two different factions, one aligned with Roberts and one aligned with 
another Australian entrepreneur, Neville Harsley. It was Harsley who 
arranged the lease, and he had no interest in carbon trading, nor in the 
kind of agro-forestry project that was agitating the oil palm industry group. 
But key members of the conservation policy community had now decided 
to use the Kamula Doso ‘carbon credits’ as a weapon in their campaign to 
dislodge Yasause from his post. So they started to circulate evidence of his 
dealings to journalists whose connections ensured that it would make for 
an international scandal. In doing so, they made a second assumption that 
also proved to be false. They thought that Yasause must have been acting 
on instructions from PNG’s ‘climate change ambassador’, Kevin Conrad, 
an American friend of the Somare family who was the real architect of the 
Coalition for Rainforest Nations. The reasoning was that Somare would 
not have put Yasause in charge of the Office of Climate Change without 
taking Conrad’s advice. And since Conrad’s remote control over PNG’s 
climate policy process was a source of great annoyance to many members 
of the conservation policy community, there seemed to be a chance of 
killing two birds with one stone. But that did not happen. When the 
scandal broke, Yasause was removed from his post, official control of 
climate policy was restored to the Department of Environment and 
Conservation, and Kevin Conrad retained his own position of influence 
(Filer and Wood 2012; Filer 2015).
At this juncture, I was asked to advise the department on REDD matters 
in the lead-up to the United Nations climate change conference (the 15th 
‘conference of parties’) to be held in Copenhagen at the end of the year. 
This was a source of additional annoyance to members of the Eco-Forestry 
Forum, who even went to the expense of publishing a full-page advertorial 
deploring my engagement (PNGEFF 2009b). The reason was that I had 
previously given advice to Carbon Planet on possible ‘benefit sharing 
arrangements’ for REDD projects in PNG, and was therefore thought 
to be one of the alien ‘carbon cowboys’ whose wicked schemes had been 
exposed and denounced in the media scandal that had gotten rid of Theo 
Yasause. The advertorial had no effect on Wari Iamo, the Secretary for 
Environment and Conservation, partly because he had already planned 
to seek my advice before his department lost its official control of 
climate policy in 2008, but mainly because he had been party to the 
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National Forest Board’s decision to allocate the Kamula Doso forest area 
to Rimbunan Hijau, and was therefore regarded as a public enemy by 
members of the anti-dependency group.
It was in fact my interest in REDD matters that led me to take an interest 
in Brian’s spreadsheet at the start of 2009. In the advice that I provided to 
Carbon Planet in March that year, I observed that there was ‘now some 
evidence that the lease-leaseback scheme has been subject to political 
manipulation of the sort feared by the opponents of customary land 
registration in 1995, and on a scale far greater than anything seen in the 
highland coffee industry or the current lowland oil palm industry’, and 
that ‘[m]any of these leases are of a size that would rule out any process of 
informed consent and participation on the part of the customary owners’ 
(Filer 2009a: 24). I made the same point in my subsequent report to the 
Department of Environment and Conservation (Filer 2009b). Like my 
opponents in the conservation policy community, I was still under the 
impression that the SABL granted over the Kamula Doso forest area had 
somehow been organised by Kirk Roberts, and was therefore suggesting 
that the lease-leaseback scheme might not be the best way to secure large 
areas of customary land for REDD projects.
But there was also another issue here. It was already clear that most of 
the big SABLs were being engineered by the proponents of agro-forestry 
projects, not forest conservation projects. Since agro-forestry projects 
entail a substantial increase in the rate of deforestation, and not just in the 
sort of forest degradation associated with selective logging concessions, 
it was also reasonable to suggest that the approval of a new generation of 
agro-forestry projects might cause as much damage to PNG’s reputation 
in the global climate policy domain as it was causing to the reputation 
of the existing oil palm industry in the global market for sustainable 
palm oil (Filer 2010). This was a point that I made to Secretary Iamo 
and his officers (Filer 2009c). The trouble was that he and his department 
had already been granting environment permits for these projects, and 
thus facilitating the subsequent grant of forest clearing authorities by 
the National Forest Board. If other members of the conservation policy 
community had been paying closer attention, they might have begun 
to wonder why such permits were being granted, especially when they 
required the approval of an independent Environment Council that was 
meant to review the environmental impact statements that were required 
under the terms of the Environment Act.
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The Network Comes to Life
Between the beginning and end of 2009, the area covered by the SABLs 
recorded in Brian’s spreadsheet had grown from just over 1 million hectares 
to almost 2.5 million hectares. In January 2010, Paul Barker published 
a  second feature article suggesting that the lease-leaseback scheme had 
been turned into a scam that was ‘jeopardising landowners’ customary 
rights over vast areas of the country, without their apparent informed 
consent’ (Barker 2010). According to this article, the discretionary powers 
granted to the Lands Minister under Section 102 of the Land Act had 
been systematically abused, and the only way to remedy the situation 
would be to revoke these powers, cancel the leases that had been granted 
to private companies, and move ahead with the implementation of the 
new legislation that would enable customary landowners to register titles 
to their own land before granting leases to anyone else.
Paul attached a copy of this article, including the latest version of 
Brian’s spreadsheet, to an email that he subsequently sent to 18 other 
members of the conservation policy community—mostly members of 
the anti-dependency group—in which he told them to ‘get real’, stop 
picking pointless fights with the World Bank and the existing oil palm 
industry, and start devising a strategy to ‘ensure landowners are aware 
of issues, realities and options before these massive and often bogus new 
schemes are driven in’ to their land. Paul’s own strategy was to combine 
the SABL issue with the REDD issue and make both issues the subject 
of a multistakeholder workshop at the beginning of March that year.10 
This was the first of several meetings that Paul organised with different 
groups of stakeholders involved in both of these issues over course of the 
following 12 months.
Meanwhile, Kevin Conrad seems to have persuaded the National 
Executive Council to engage McKinsey & Company to develop PNG’s 
climate change policy in the aftermath of the Copenhagen climate 
change conference. Indeed, they may well have started work on this 
subject before the end of 2009, since their initial proposal to the PNG 
government was made in June that year (Lang 2010), but they did not 
set up shop in the Environment Department until 2010. The McKinsey 
team had fairly limited contact with other members of the land grab 
10  The costs of this meeting were largely borne by the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies 
based in Japan, and a focus on the REDD issue was probably a condition of this funding.
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policy network, but they were still quick to appreciate the argument that 
international funding for REDD projects would be harder to obtain if 
the PNG government appeared to be promoting an accelerated process 
of deforestation.11
In the second draft of their first policy document, the McKinsey team 
called for a moratorium to be imposed on the further grant of SABLs 
pending a review of the social and environmental impact of the country’s 
agricultural development policies (GoPNG 2010b: 29). This document 
was endorsed by the National Executive Council soon after it was 
circulated in March 2010 (GoPNG 2010c: 2), and an Agriculture Sector 
Working Group was established to investigate the workings of the lease-
leaseback scheme in the promotion of agro-forestry projects. Three of the 
four government agencies involved in the process sent representatives to 
the first of its meetings, but the Lands Department was notable by its 
absence (Valentine Thurairajah, personal communication, May 2010).12 
The Interim Action Plan drafted by the McKinsey team and published 
by the newly reconstituted Office of Climate Change in August 2010 
included an estimate of the amount of carbon emissions that could be 
avoided if forest clearing authorities were withdrawn from 60–80 per cent 
of the area (about 670,000  hectares) for which they had already been 
granted (GoPNG 2010c: 10).
In July 2010, the National Court finally issued a consent order reflecting 
the government’s admission that the PNG Forest Authority had failed to 
secure the consent of the local landowners to the grant of a timber permit 
over the Kamula Doso forest area. This meant that the Eco-Forestry 
Forum was no longer distracted by the need to pursue that particular case. 
Meanwhile, some of the customary owners of other areas now covered by 
big SABLs had begun to seek help from the lawyers in the conservation 
policy community. These included the customary owners of an area in 
East New Britain Province where the proponent of an agro-forestry project 
11  In February 2010, I worked with members of the McKinsey team to locate and digitise all of the 
environmental inception reports and environmental impact statements for agro-forestry projects that 
could be found on the shelves of the relevant section of the Environment Department—a total of 19 
documents in all. This evidence made it possible to figure out the boundaries of the relevant leases, 
and also revealed the identities of the foreign companies involved in the projects. This in turn made 
it possible to hunt down the relevant company records held by the Investment Promotion Authority. 
At that time, we could not have known that all such information would eventually be tabled at the 
Commission of Inquiry.
12  This activity did at least result in the circulation of a document that showed that the National 
Forest Board had approved the grant of 14 forest clearing authorities by April of that year.
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proved to be none other than Rimbunan Hijau—public enemy number 
one for nearly all members of the anti-dependency group (Greenpeace 
2004).13 So Paul Barker’s call to arms could finally be answered by plans 
for a new round of litigation if funds could be raised to pay for it, and 
that was a hot topic in email conversation among members of the anti-
dependency group in November 2010.
This conversation intensified in the wake of a meeting convened by 
members of the land development group at the National Research Institute, 
where Damien Ase produced the latest edition of Brian’s spreadsheet and 
demanded to know what former members of the NLDT were going to 
do about it. In response, Lawrence Kalinoe, now Secretary for Justice, was 
reported to have said that the Lands Department was ‘totally corrupt’, 
because ‘[o]fficers and certain rouge [sic] landowners are colluding and 
conniving with each other to sell off customary land for their own benefit 
and interest while the majority of landowners are left out’ (Joku 2010). 
In the same newspaper article, it was reported that Lawrence called for the 
department to be subject to a commission of inquiry in order to ‘put it 
back on track’.
To the best of my knowledge, Lawrence was the first person to make this 
suggestion—at least in public—and it was he who drafted the relevant 
submission for his minister to present to the National Executive Council 
in 2011 (Lawrence Kalinoe, personal communication, February 2016). 
The McKinsey team also took an interest in this cabinet submission 
when they got wind of it in March that year. They asked me to work out 
which government ministers were likely to have a vested interest in one or 
more of the big SABLs that featured on Brian’s spreadsheet. By matching 
the available spatial information to the boundaries of parliamentary 
electorates, I thought I could identify seven ministers who fell into this 
category, although Puka Temu was not one of them, because he had joined 
the ranks of the parliamentary opposition. I was therefore somewhat 
surprised when the Acting Prime Minister announced the decision to 
establish a commission of inquiry in May 2011.
13  Rimbunan Hijau obtained its forest clearing authority for this area in October 2010, but the 
company had announced its intention to develop at least one oil palm estate in PNG back in 2006 
(Anon. 2006).
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As we have seen, the Commission’s published terms of reference did point 
to the Cairns Declaration as a motivating factor, but they also stated 
that ‘[i]ssues surrounding SABL management are jeopardising PNG’s 
chances of securing funding for REDD+ and combating climate change’, 
and given PNG’s position of leadership in global climate policy debates, 
the country ‘must be seen to live by its words in respect of conserving 
forests to help reduce the green house gas emission [sic] and its effect on 
climate’ (GoPNG 2011: 2). Kevin Conrad and the McKinsey team had 
no reason to say any more than this about their own role in the land grab 
policy network, since this would only have undermined the legitimacy of 
the Commission.14 And in any case, the cabinet decision may not have 
been wholly motivated by the appearance of a cabinet submission, but also 
by the appearance of a groundswell of public protest facilitated by other 
members of the network, including the urban representatives of specific 
rural communities whose land had been expropriated (Filer 2011b).
The Network Reassembled, 2011–2013
The first step in the transformation of the land grab policy network was 
a radical change in the position of the climate policy group as one of its 
distinctive elements. Kevin Conrad and the McKinsey team disappeared 
from the network in August 2011, when the national parliament voted 
to remove Michael Somare from office and elect Peter O’Neill as his 
replacement. This did not spell the end of the Office of Climate Change, 
but the position of that agency was compromised by the decision that 
it should henceforth be accountable to Belden Namah. Namah had 
been the Forests Minister who sponsored the 2007 amendments to the 
Forestry Act, and had subsequently taken advantage of these amendments 
to secure a forest clearing authority for a very large agro-forestry project 
in his own electorate. He had been outraged by the decision to establish 
a commission of inquiry, and might well have taken it as a personal 
attack, since he had just been elected Leader of the Opposition at the 
time of its announcement. The price of his support for O’Neill’s move 
against Somare was the position of Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for 
14  It is equally understandable that the Greenpeace account of what happened also made no 
reference to their involvement, since Greenpeace has no time for the McKinsey method of calculating 
the economic costs and benefits of forest carbon sequestration (Greenpeace 2011).
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Forests, and Minister for Climate Change. While his occupation of these 
positions enabled him to get rid of the Conrad-McKinsey group, they did 
not enable him to interfere with the inquiry.
Following the national elections of July 2012, O’Neill was able to assemble 
a governing coalition without the support of Namah, who returned to his 
former role as Leader of the Opposition. The Office of Climate Change 
was still accountable to the new Forests Minister, Patrick Pruaitch, but 
its officials no longer had much reason to worry about the findings of the 
Commission of Inquiry, nor did they have much capacity to influence 
the government’s response. Although they were still charged with the task 
of producing legislation that would regulate foreign investment in forest 
carbon projects, it was already evident that the lease-leaseback scheme 
would not be part of this legal framework. The McKinsey team had left 
behind a number of policy documents and a very fine suite of PowerPoint 
slides, but while the legislative task was still unfinished, the Forestry 
Act remained the most appropriate legal instrument for the control of 
deforestation and forest degradation. Officials in the National Forest 
Service therefore included some carbon emission reduction proposals 
in the latest draft of the National Forest Plan (GoPNG 2012), but 
discussion of such activities seemed increasingly remote from the debate 
about what should be done with agro-forestry projects. That is because 
most members of the land grab policy network now realised that there was 
no immediate prospect of anyone harvesting a large amount of foreign 
carbon finance from decisions of the National Forest Board to withhold, 
revoke or suspend the grant of forest clearing authorities.
While members of the conservation policy community retained some 
interest in the question of how customary landowners might benefit from 
a new generation of forest conservation projects, members of the anti-
dependency group were now convinced that the new generation of agro-
forestry projects was simply the logical extension of a process by which 
the destruction of native forests was intimately tied to the corruption 
of the state. As news of the Commission’s hearings percolated through 
the media, evidence of corporate and bureaucratic misbehaviour was 
used to garner additional international support for a domestic campaign 
against the foreign capitalists who had supposedly conspired with their 
local political cronies to undermine the rule of law and deprive innocent 
customary landowners of their constitutional rights. The amplification 
of this message entailed a simplification of the problem of consent that 
the Commission had been asked to investigate. Customary landowners 
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in their right minds could not possibly consent to the theft of their own 
property, so the state must have been corrupted in a way that enabled the 
country’s political elite to steal the property of their fellow citizens and 
sacrifice it to the foreign devils of resource development. So the lease-
leaseback scheme was just the latest manifestation of the resource curse 
that had bewitched the nation.
The amplification and simplification of this message did not allow for 
any  further debate about the relative merits of different foreign devils. 
It made more sense to portray them all in the same bad light, and even 
to link them together as members of a single community or conspiracy. 
Greenpeace was the first foreign organisation to support the campaign 
against the land grab because of the discovery that its old enemy, 
Rimbunan Hijau (RH), was one of the companies engaged in the practice 
of agro-forestry. This made it possible for the anti-dependency group to 
claim that RH must somehow have masterminded the abuse of the lease-
leaseback scheme, just as it was previously thought to have exercised some 
sort of monopoly over PNG’s selective logging industry during the forest 
policy reform process of the 1990s (Filer 1997, 2013). To consolidate 
this impression, Greenpeace mounted a seaborne expedition to collect 
evidence of popular discontent at the site of the company’s agro-forestry 
project in East New Britain. This event was carefully timed to coincide 
with the hearings that Alois Jerewai conducted in that province in 
October 2011 (see Chapter 7, this volume).
In the blaze of publicity that accompanied this confrontation, the company 
protested that it was not responsible for any of PNG’s other agro-forestry 
projects, its own project had the full support of the provincial government 
and most of the local landowners, so it did not deserve this level of critical 
attention (Gabriel 2015). We do not know what Jerewai would have said 
about this project in the final report that he did not submit to the Prime 
Minister, but John Numapo’s final report includes an assertion that more 
than half of the companies holding subleases from the holders of SABLs 
were ‘connected in one way or another’ to RH (Numapo 2013:  242). 
This statement was music to the ears of some members of the anti-
dependency group (Act Now 2014a), but it was not warranted by the 
evidence contained in the transcripts of the hearings conducted by all 
three commissioners. It is true that RH was found to have some sort of 
connection to several of the leases that were investigated, but certainly not 
to half of them, and most of those with which it did have some connection 
had not become the sites of actual agro-forestry projects. The records of 
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the PNG Forest Authority indicate that RH held only one of the 22 
forest clearing authorities that are known to have been granted before the 
Commission was established, and this was indeed the one that had been 
granted for the Sigite-Mukus project in East New Britain.
Greenpeace published its own report on the land grab in August 2012 
(Winn 2012), shortly after the national elections that enabled Peter 
O’Neill to consolidate his grip on political power. The report made good 
use of the evidence presented in some of the Commission’s hearings, but it 
was hard to assess its likely influence on the government’s future response 
to the commissioners’ recommendations. My own concern, shared with 
some other members of the land grab policy network, was that the 
government might play the national sovereignty card when confronted 
with a radical populist campaign in which foreign voices made much 
of the noise. However, the Papua New Guinean members of the anti-
dependency group needed money to fund their own domestic campaign, 
so they stuck to the strategy of broadening their international support 
network in order to avoid being tainted by association with any part 
of PNG’s private sector, let alone its politicians and public servants.
The next foreign organisations to add their own voices to the campaign 
were the California-based Oakland Institute and the Fiji-based Pacific 
Network on Globalisation, whose representatives teamed up with several 
members of the anti-dependency group to produce another account of the 
corruption unveiled by the Commission of Inquiry. Their evidence was 
collected in March 2013, around the time that the commissioners were 
presenting their first interim report to the Prime Minister, and their own 
report was published in November 2013, just before the Commission’s 
two final reports were placed in the public domain. Their report did not 
add much of substance to the information already contained in previous 
publications, including the Greenpeace report, but was interesting 
primarily because of its argument that the amount of customary land 
‘in the hands of foreign corporations’ was much greater that the amount 
covered by SABLs granted to private companies (Mousseau 2013: 4), and 
the subsequent argument that agro-forestry projects ought to be resisted 
because of the negative social and environmental impact of the existing 
oil palm industry (ibid.:  18). The first argument seems to assume that 
the lease-leaseback scheme did not involve a more complete form of 
expropriation than the legal arrangements by which customary landowners 
have agreed to alienate their timber harvesting rights for the purpose of 
creating selective logging concessions, while the second argument seems 
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to imply that selective logging, forest clearance and the development of 
oil palm estates are all equally destructive if carried out on a large scale, 
so the failure of agro-forestry projects to develop oil palm estates with the 
proceeds of forest clearance might actually be a good thing.
The Pacific Network on Globalisation later added another twist to this 
line of argument by suggesting that the World Bank was implicated in the 
PNG land grab because its ‘ease-of-doing-business’ index had encouraged 
the government to deregulate the land acquisition process (Act Now 
2014b). The idea that the World Bank, RH and New Britain Palm Oil 
Ltd were the three key players in a global conspiracy to expropriate the 
poor peasants of PNG might have some appeal to academic anarchists 
(Anderson 2011, 2015), but it does not reflect the history of forest policy 
reform in PNG, nor was it likely to influence the direction of the policy 
process that would follow on from the Commission of Inquiry. Members 
of the other three groups in the land grab policy network—the oil palm 
industry group, the land development group and even the sustainability 
group—were not concerned with the question of how to reverse the 
alienation of all customary land rights, but rather with the more specific 
questions addressed by the Commission itself, which was how to rectify 
the abuse of the lease-leaseback scheme and how to ensure that such abuse 
could not be repeated in future.
Members of the oil palm industry group continued to gather evidence 
about the economic credentials of companies that had been granted forest-
clearing authorities, and other companies that showed an interest in the 
future development of agro-forestry projects, even during the period in 
which the findings of the Commission had not yet been released. They 
also continued to monitor the progress of existing projects that promised 
the eventual production of palm oil in order to assess the likelihood that 
this promise would be kept. The National Forest Board also made some 
effort to monitor the compliance of existing projects with conditions 
attached to their forest clearing authorities and, in some cases, this led 
to a temporary suspension of the permits because the area that had been 
cleared was too far in excess of the area that had been planted with cash 
crops. The commissioners also took an interest in such matters, but it was 
not clear how evidence of this kind might eventually be used to justify 
the cancellation of the SABLs granted to landowner companies that had 
then issued subleases to the foreign investors who were clearing the forest.
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Some of the senior government officials who were members of the 
land grab policy network were more concerned by the possibility that 
the state would be liable to pay these investors substantial amounts in 
damages if the SABLs were to be cancelled (Lawrence Kalinoe, personal 
communication, July 2013). Even if the investors had colluded in the 
process by which the original leases were granted, it might be hard to 
prove this in court, and if other government officials had already helped 
the investors to get their hands on the land, they might now help them 
to get their hands on a financial reward for the opportunity cost of losing 
control of it.15 The particular case that prompted this concern was one 
brought by a  company called Albright Ltd, which had entered into 
a sublease agreement with a landowner company called Mekeo Hinterland 
Holdings Ltd after the latter had been granted an SABL over a large area 
of land in Central Province. This SABL was nullified by a decision of the 
National Court at the end of 2010, before the Commission of Inquiry was 
established, but in March 2012, Albright claimed damages of more than 
K153 million from the landowner company and the government, and 
initially secured a default judgement in its favour when the state failed to 
file a defence. In July 2013, the state defendants returned to the National 
Court with a request for this judgement to be set aside on the grounds 
that they had no ‘actionable statutory duty’ towards Albright in respect 
of the sublease agreement. The Court agreed with this argument,16 but 
Albright was given leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the appeal 
was finally rejected in May 2014.17
Even though the outcome of this case seems to confirm the power of 
the National Court to cancel SABLs without creating additional 
financial  liabilities for the state, it is not so clear that the National 
Executive Council or the Lands Minister could exercise the same power 
in the absence of a case brought by a group of disaffected landowners, 
and such cases have so far been relatively rare. One such case arose from 
the decision of the Lands Department to grant a couple of SABLs to 
landowner companies in Oro Province in July 2012, in apparent defiance 
of the moratorium imposed when the Commission of Inquiry had been 
established. It soon transpired that these leases covered the same area that 
15  The role of government officials in aiding and abetting spurious compensation claims against 
the state had been the subject of a previous commission of inquiry into the Department of Finance 
(Sheehan et al. 2009).
16  Albright Ltd v Mekeo Hinterland Holdings Ltd [2013] PGNC 262.
17  Albright Ltd v Mekeo Hinterland Holdings Ltd [2014] PGSC 30.
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had been covered by the SABLs previously granted to another landowner 
company in the 1990s, which formed the basis for what Paul Barker 
called the ‘Collingwood Bay scam’ (Barker 2009). The original leases had 
been revoked by an order of the National Court in 2002, before the Lands 
Department began to grant any of the SABLs that the commissioners 
were investigating. Nevertheless, Thomas Webster took this latest action as 
proof that the Lands Department was incorrigible, while the landowners 
who had got the National Court to cancel the original leases were now 
faced with the prospect of having to engage in a fresh round of legal action 
to obtain the same result (Pok 2012a, 2012b). They finally won this 
second battle in May 2014, around the same time that Albright finally 
lost its compensation claim. Although their victory had no direct bearing 
on the question of what the government should do with the Commission’s 
recommendations, the case was still significant because the legal action had 
been backed by the newly elected Governor of Oro Province, Gary Juffa, 
who declared that there was nothing to prevent members of parliament 
or provincial governments from taking such action to defend the rights of 
their constituents (Miae 2014).
The second iteration of the ‘Collingwood Bay scam’ had a somewhat 
different significance for members of the land development group 
and the oil palm industry group. When Thomas Webster deplored the 
misbehaviour of the Lands Department, he observed that such action 
was not only a breach of the moratorium imposed by the National 
Executive Council, but should have been rendered redundant by the fact 
that customary landowners could now register titles to their own land 
and issue their own leases to developers of their choice without any need 
to resort to the chicaneries of the lease-leaseback scheme (Pok 2012a). 
That is because the amendments to the Land Registration Act and the 
Land Groups Incorporation Act that had been passed by the national 
parliament in March 2009 had actually been certified and gazetted in 
February 2012, shortly before the Commission of Inquiry got to the end 
of its hearings. However, this legislation posed a new problem because 
of its requirement that all of the existing land groups in the country, 
including those that had participated in the lease-leaseback scheme, 
should undergo a complex process of reincorporation within a period 
of five years in order to retain their legal status. Only those groups that 
were incorporated or reincorporated under the amended version of the 
Land Groups Incorporation Act would be allowed to register titles to their 
land under the amended version of the Land Registration Act. A new 
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world of properly constituted land groups with registered land titles was 
one of the ideals of the NLDP, but that program’s machinery had almost 
ground to a halt since the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry, 
so the implementation of the new legislation was now the responsibility 
of  a  Lands Department whose failings had been documented in 
minute detail.
Conclusion
A commission of inquiry is one phase in the process by which public 
scandals generate new policies, laws and institutions. The formation of 
a policy network is one aspect of this process. The number of people and 
range of interests represented in the network will normally reflect the 
magnitude of the scandal that starts the process and the amount of time 
and effort spent on the reforms that bring it to an end. But political cycles 
of this type do not always run their course in isolation from each other, 
nor are they always immune from interference by other changes in the 
political landscape.
The direction of the process started by the land grab scandal has been 
affected by that of two previous cycles containing their own commissions 
of inquiry. One was an inquiry into the regulation of the logging industry, 
whose findings and recommendations started a process of forest policy 
reform in 1989 (Barnett 1989, 1992); the other was an even earlier inquiry 
into the regulation of land tenure, whose findings and recommendations 
started a process of land policy reform in 1974 (GoPNG 1973; Ward 
1983). If the recommendations for land policy reform had been 
implemented in a timely fashion, there would have been a legal avenue for 
the registration of customary group titles before the end of the 1970s, and 
the lease-leaseback scheme would never have been invented. The process 
of forest policy reform did not result in a legal and institutional framework 
that was quite so obviously incomplete, but it did produce a situation 
in which the World Bank and its national allies struggled to defend the 
new framework against the sort of scandalous behaviour that led to that 
commission of inquiry (Filer 2000; Forest Trends 2006).
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The two cycles were briefly entangled in 1995, when the World Bank’s 
investment in forest policy reform was compromised by rumours that it 
was also in the business of ‘stealing the people’s land’ because it had made 
a parallel investment in completion of the land policy reform process 
initiated by the earlier commission of inquiry (Filer 2000: 32–7). This is 
the point at which the anti-dependency group made its first appearance 
on the national political stage as a group of people who were equally 
opposed to the registration of customary land titles and to any industrial 
exploitation of customary land. But the fuss they made at the time was 
also the reason why members of the land development group insisted on 
excluding the World Bank and other members of the ‘donor community’ 
from the appearance of any involvement in the next attempt to start 
finishing the land policy reform process in 2005.
If World Bank staff had any cause for disappointment over this act of 
exclusion, it would not have matched the frustration caused by their 
simultaneous exclusion from the cycle of forest policy reform. That wheel 
soon turned full circle, when amendments to the Forestry Act made it 
easier for the lease-leaseback scheme to become the site of a new scandal. 
But this new point of intersection between the cycles of land and forest 
policy reform had more chaotic effects than the momentary (and largely 
fabricated) scandal of 1995. Here we had a national conference (the 
National Land Summit) that was convened to deal with the problems 
that had arisen from the implementation or non-implementation of the 
recommendations made by a commission of inquiry more than three 
decades beforehand. The conference led to the creation of a taskforce 
(the National Land Development Taskforce) that produced a program 
of policy reform (the National Land Development Program) whose 
implementation was rudely interrupted by a new scandal that led to 
a new commission of inquiry. As a result, the land grab policy network 
assembled a couple of groups that originated in the process of forest policy 
reform, a couple of groups that originated in the process of land policy 
reform, and one group—the climate policy group—that had not been 
part of either process until the scandal broke. So the process generated 
by this scandal was almost bound to be a sort of hybrid policy process 
in which it would not be possible to reconcile the interests of all these 
different groups in one new package of policies, laws and institutions. 
The resulting stalemate is explored in Chapter 8.
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Introduction
Throughout the developing world, large tracts of land are being acquired 
from customary owners by corporations for the purpose of commercial 
agriculture (Deininger and Byerlee 2011; Anseeuw et al. 2012). This 
‘land grabbing’ typically occurs in conditions of poor governance and 
results in benefits to powerful elites at the expense of local populations 
(Nolte 2014). It has been argued that the loss of access to land by customary 
owners in developing countries will be offset by investments that will 
create new jobs and bring new knowledge and infrastructures that will 
benefit the local population (Toft 2013). However, this process can also 
entail serious long-term consequences for these same local people (Sayer 
et al. 2012; Feintrenie 2014; Rulli and D’Odorico 2014). Large-scale 
acquisitions have been going on for a long time in many regions of the 
world, but there has been a marked recent acceleration to supply an 
increasing global  demand for food, fibre and biofuels (von  Braun and 
Meinzen-Dick 2009; Cotula et al. 2011; Rulli et al. 2013). Those who 
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advocate for large-scale investments in productive agricultural land point 
out that measures should be in place to ensure that the benefits are shared 
equitably with the local populations (Cotula 2013; Toft 2013).
In Papua New Guinea (PNG), the recent large-scale acquisition of more 
than 5 million hectares of potential agricultural land has been described as 
the largest land grab in modern history (Global Witness 2014). This has 
caused great anguish among customary landowners, and was made 
possible by the abuse of legal loopholes, bureaucratic incompetence, 
and ‘permissive ambiguities’ in the leasing process (Numapo 2013:  4). 
To prevent such abuses in the future, and maximise the benefits of 
agricultural developments such as oil palm for customary landowners, 
transparent consultation and agreements between developer companies 
and representative landowner groups will be needed (Nelson et al. 2014). 
Our intention in this chapter is to facilitate such change by describing the 
nature of the actors and their actions to date, with a particular focus on 
landowner representatives and corporate developers.
We focus on proposed oil palm plantation projects for three reasons. 
First, oil palm has been the most common crop proposed for large-
scale agricultural development schemes in PNG, so oil palm schemes 
account for 2.2 million of the total of more than 5 million hectares of 
land that has been alienated through the grant of ‘special agricultural and 
business leases’ (SABLs). Second, a focus on this particular industry allows 
us to assess the nature and activities of players more readily than if we 
examined all the other proposals for crops with less specific requirements 
for establishment of a viable economic enterprise. Finally, the palm oil 
industry has been a major transformer of landscapes and livelihoods 
throughout the tropics in the recent past, and is likely to remain so in 
the foreseeable future (Sheil et al. 2009; Cramb and Curry 2012; Sayer 
et al. 2012).
We reveal examples of complex interactions in specific policy and political 
contexts between people representing the interests of landowners, 
companies and government agencies, as well as the failure of government 
officials to ensure compliance, accountability and transparency in all stages 
of the leasing process. An understanding of these developments gives 
insights into how they occurred and how future abuses of people’s rights 
might be prevented. We also identify some opportunities for improved 
outcomes in programs to rationalise the use of land.
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Land Acquisitions for Oil Palm Development
In PNG, the law does not allow for the permanent alienation of customary 
land. Around 31 per cent of PNG’s current palm oil production originates 
from fruit produced by smallholders, with the remainder originating from 
the plantations of the two oil palm companies, New Britain Palm Oil Ltd 
and Hargy Oil Palms Ltd. The smallholders fall into three categories: those 
who cultivate oil palm on their own customary land; those in occupation of 
6-hectare blocks established on state land under so-called land settlement 
schemes; and those who have gained access to other people’s customary 
land through clan land usage agreements (Koczberski et al. 2013; also 
Chapter 5, this volume). Most of the plantations operated by the existing 
two palm oil-producing companies are on land alienated during the 
time of the Australian administration, although they also operate some 
‘mini-estates’ on land subleased from groups of customary landowners 
holding SABLs (see Chapter 6, this volume). The two oil palm companies 
started making use of these lease arrangements in the late 1990s, but the 
amount of land they acquired through this process is only a tiny fraction 
of the area of more than 5 million hectares allocated to other companies 
under SABLs issued since 2003 (Filer 2011, 2012a; Moore 2011; Winn 
2012; Nelson et al. 2014). Most of this land has been subleased to foreign 
investors, which has caused an outpouring of frustration and anger among 
rural people in many parts of the country about the loss of rights to their 
land and resources (Mirou 2013; Mousseau 2013; Numapo 2013).
The SABL process was originally designed to enable customary landowners 
to use their land productively for business development purposes and 
thereby gain access to the cash economy (Oliver 2002; Filer 2011). The 
fundamental title remains with the customary owners, but other rights 
and components of the title can be partially alienated through the SABL 
mechanism. Land acquisition through this mechanism involves a three-
step process (Table 7.1). First, the state acquires a lease over the customary 
land, sometimes referred to as the ‘head lease’, which is executed between 
the customary landowners and the Minister for Lands and Physical 
Planning on behalf of the state. Then the state issues an SABL to a family 
or corporate body approved by the customary landowners. This entity 
may then grant a sublease to a developer or investor on the basis of this 
SABL. Due to the compensation provisions in many of the development 
agreements, it is virtually impossible for most villagers to reclaim the land 
that has been leased or subleased with their supposed approval. In these 
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circumstances, leasing land becomes a form of self-dispossession (Anderson 
2010:  13). In some cases, this bureaucratic process of commercialising 
customary land in effect transfers clan rights to one or more individuals 
who may not be clan leaders but are supported by a developer who has 
a close connection with elected politicians or government officials.
While the main justification for the scale of alienation was the establishment 
of large-scale commercial agricultural ventures, it is now clear that many 
of the development agreements were being used as a pretext for logging, 
with many developers having no experience or interest in establishing the 
agricultural industries promised in the agreements (Nelson et al. 2010, 
2014; Filer 2011; Winn 2012).
Table 7.1 Summary of the process intended by government 
(since approximately 2003) for large-scale agricultural developments 
in Papua New Guinea, and the variations that have occurred.
Intended process and actors Variations that have occurred
Customary landowners and developer 
agree on a development proposal for 
a particular parcel of land .
Developer and landowner companies 
frequently changed in structure and 
ownership .
Customary landowners of land parcel 
form incorporated land group (ILG) 
and register it with the state .
Individuals (usually some landowners, not 
necessarily living on their customary land) 
formed ILG without full consent of landowners .
Multiple dissenting ILGs formed .
ILGs initiated negotiations with alternative 
developers and new projects were formulated, 
which may or may not involve oil palm .
Land parcel surveyed and Local Land 
Court approves agreement reached 
among landowners . ILG registers 
land parcel for development with the 
state . Application for lease‑leaseback 
lodged with Provincial Government 
and forwarded to Department of 
Lands and Physical Planning (DLPP) . 
Land investigation report prepared by 
Provincial Lands Office and forwarded 
to DLPP .
Boundaries were not clearly defined or agreed.
Overlapping boundaries for land parcels 
nominated in competing development 
proposals .
Land investigations and awareness programs 
funded by entities outside the government and 
mostly by the developers .
Land investigation report not prepared or not 
properly prepared .
Landownership disputes not properly 
investigated .
Landowner representatives and ILG 
representatives manipulated by developers 
to fast‑track the issuing of the special 
agricultural and business lease (SABL) titles .
ILG leases land parcel to the Minister 
of Lands on behalf of the state at no 
rent (‘head lease’ or ‘customary land 
dealing’), which formalises the title 
and allows transfer to non‑citizens . 
Government departments lost records 
and acted outside of the law .
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Intended process and actors Variations that have occurred
Minister of Lands grants SABL back to 
‘a person, group or incorporated body’ 
(e .g . an ILG) approved by customary 
landowners for a period of up to 
99 years for the purpose of agricultural 
or business development at no rent .
Minister leased land to a company (to whom 
customary landowners have not agreed such 
a lease should be granted) rather than ILG .
Projects sometimes approved on the basis 
of agricultural plans submitted to Department of 
Agriculture and Livestock (DAL) by a developer 
who is no longer involved in the project.
ILG makes sublease (development 
agreement) with developer 
(a registered company) . Foreign 
developers should have Investment 
Promotion Authority (IPA) certification 
to conduct oil palm development . 
Sublease should be registered with 
DLPP . Full proposal should include 
evidence of the technical and financial 
capacity of the developer, land use and 
capability maps, design and layout of 
nurseries, plantations and mills, proof 
of landowner consent and minutes of 
a public hearing, as well as various 
endorsed documents from provincial 
and local‑level governments supporting 
the project proposals.
Brokers negotiated agreements .
Agreements lacked transparency 
in negotiations .
SABL grantees often did not return to 
the DLPP to register their subleases 
as prescribed .
Subleases were transferred between 
developers without registration .
Developers not licensed by the IPA to conduct 
oil palm development in PNG .
Sublease agreements grossly unfair to the 
landowners in terms of ownership of the 
infrastructure development and the tree crops .
Foreign developers mostly lacked financial 
backing of an overseas parent company with 
sufficient experience in oil palm development.
DAL assesses feasibility of the 
proposal and gives approval .
DAL did not adequately assess proposal 
or monitor progress .
Political pressures placed on government 
officials by senior ministers and politicians 
to fast‑track SABL applications .
Developer applies to PNG Forest 
Authority (PNGFA) for forest clearing 
authority (FCA) .
Logging proceeded without FCA .
DAL officials supported the view of developers 
that logging activities within SABL areas 
were justified in order to fund the proposed 
agricultural project.
Developer proceeds with forest 
clearing, establishment and operation 
of plantation according to sublease 
agreement, monitored by PNGFA, 
which ensures that no more than 
500 hectares are cleared at one time, 
and by DAL, which ensures adherence 
to other applicable regulations and 
codes of practice .
Developer cleared forest and exported logs 
from areas much larger than 500 hectares .
Developer did not implement agricultural 
development plan .
Sources: Derived from descriptions by Oliver (2002), Moore (2011), Filer (2012b), 
Mirou (2013) and Numapo (2013) .
Note: There are discrepancies between various versions of the process described here, 
since the sources focus on different aspects and involve interpretation of several sets 
of rules that were produced at different times for different reasons.
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A commission of inquiry (COI) established by the PNG government 
in 2011 found much legally questionable activity and serious abuse 
and subversion of the SABL process (Mirou 2013; Numapo 2013). 
Commissioner Nicholas Mirou noted ‘one unmistakable cry from 
the vast majority of the rural population of PNG [for] development’, 
along with frustration arising from unmet expectations of benefits from 
exploitation of their land by developers (Mirou 2013: 167). Two of the 
three commissioners submitted their reports to the Prime Minister in 
June 2013, and these were later tabled in Parliament (see Chapter 8, 
this volume). Along with a number of recommendations to improve 
transparency, the inquiry recommended that the SABL process be reserved 
for the development of high-impact projects, with strict conditions to 
ensure maximum landowner benefit and participation. While in principle 
these recommendations point to some positive reforms, the government 
has been slow to remedy situations where evidence of criminality or 
negligence was uncovered.
Oil Palm Development Proposals
We examined 29 proposed oil palm projects associated with 51 separate 
SABLs in 10 different provinces (Table 7.2). The areas shown as 
being earmarked for the planting of oil palm are those specified in the 
development plans or environmental impact statements submitted to the 
PNG government. Where these areas are ‘unknown’, this is normally due 
to the fact that no such plans have so far been submitted or sighted.
Most of the development proposals we examined are ‘agro-forestry’ 
proposals involving oil palm development. The term ‘agro-forestry’, 
which is commonly used in the development discourse in PNG, and that 
we use in this chapter, has a different meaning in PNG to the more widely 
accepted definition. In the broader literature, ‘agro-forestry’ refers to a 
mixed cropping system that includes trees. In PNG, the term refers to 
clearance of native forest for timber, followed by agricultural development.
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In Table 7.2, the 12 projects that count as operational agro-forestry projects 
because of their log exports are listed first in order of the total volume 
of their log exports over the period from 2007 to 2015. All but one of 
these projects has been exporting logs under the terms of a forest clearing 
authority (FCA) issued by the PNG Forest Authority (PNGFA), although 
some of these licences have been suspended or cancelled at one time or 
another. Most of the remaining 17 projects have never been granted an 
FCA, and the revenues from log exports have not been used to finance 
any kind of agricultural development. These projects are therefore listed 
in order of the size of the SABLs acquired by their proponents. The last 
two projects in the list are examples of the ‘mini-estates’ established in the 
vicinity of the existing oil palm schemes in West New Britain Province 
(see Chapter 6, this volume), and they do not count as agro-forestry 
projects since log export revenues have not been treated as the basis for 
financing their development.
Table 7.3 shows the identity and origin of each of the ‘development 
partners’ who have obtained subleases from the landowner companies 
holding SABLs. It also shows the dates on which the holders of these 
subleases were registered with the Investment Promotion Authority (IPA), 
whether they were registered to undertake oil palm production (ROP), 
and whether there is documented evidence of their capacity to do so 
(COP), either on their own account or through their parent companies.1
In many cases it was difficult to identify the developers due to frequent 
changes in agreements and lack of the legally required registration of the 
participants or their agreements. This is partly due to the developers and 
landowners trying to keep their involvement in SABLs secret. Logging 
companies have also been known to set up fake incorporated land groups 
(ILGs) to further confuse the process (Anderson and Lee 2010: 4).
Data was obtained from the COI reports presented to Parliament by 
Prime Minister Peter O’Neill in September 2013 (Mirou 2013; Numapo 
2013), which cover 49 of the 75 leases investigated by the Commission, as 
well as the transcripts of COI hearings in individual provinces, especially 
the hearings conducted by Commissioner Jerewai, who failed to finalise 
his own report (see Chapter 8).
1  In those few cases where the sublease holder is a joint venture between a landowner company 
and a foreign company, the ‘parent company’ shown in Table 7.3 is the parent of the foreign company.
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Aside from company records filed with the IPA, and the annual reports on 
log exports by the ‘forest industry participants’ recognised by the PNGFA, 
we also consulted company annual reports, industry and media reports, 
academic articles, stock market announcements, and stock analyst reviews. 
Company reports provided information on the scale and investment 
portfolios of public companies in oil palm development and processing, 
while analyst reviews provided broader information on market trends and 
industry responses. Information about the existing oil palm plantations 
and companies was obtained from the PNG Palm Oil Council.
Table 7.3 Developers of proposed oil palm projects associated with 
special agricultural and business leases in Papua New Guinea.









1 Gilford & Sinar Tiasa 
(PNG)
Rimbunan Hijau Malaysia 2007
2010
y y
2 KK Connections Kerawara Malaysia 2010 N N
3 Tutuman Development Mantorras PNG Malaysia 1999 N N
4 Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Wewak Agricultural 
Development
Malaysia 2008 y n .a .
5 Tzen Niugini & Tzen 
Plantation
Kenlox Global Malaysia 2004 N N




Malaysia 2010 y n .a .
7 Brilliant Investment (None listed) Malaysia 2005 N N
8 Vanimo Jaya (None listed) Malaysia 1995 N n .a .
9 Mekar Harvest (PNG) Brilliant Investment Malaysia 2007 N N
10 River Estate Plantations Reko (PNG) Malaysia 2007
2011
N N
11 Global Elite (PNG) (None listed) Malaysia 2010 N N
12 Albright Willsmart 
International
Malaysia 2009 N y
13 Musa Century Musa Holdings Malaysia 2010 N N







15 Aramia Plantations (None listed) Unknown None N N
16 Continental Venture Giant Kingdom 
International
Malaysia 2010 n .a . y
17 SPZ Enterprises (PNG) Geoff Palm Australia 2008 N y
18 Sovereign Hill Rimbunan Hijau Malaysia 1995 N y
19 Double Dynasty Lumber Brilliant Investment Malaysia 2008 N N
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Malaysia 2006 N N
21 Monarch Investments Rimbunan Hijau Malaysia 1996 N y
22 PMS Timbers (None listed) Malaysia None N N




Malaysia 2007 N y




Malaysia 2011 y y
25 Starlink Brilliant Investment Malaysia 2010 N N
26 Feflo Plantation (PNG) Feflo (PNG) Malaysia 2009 N N
27 Sovereign Hill (PNG) Rimbunan Hijau Malaysia 1995 N y
28 New Britain Palm Oil Kulim Malaysia 1999 y y
29 Greenlands 
Development
(None listed) Malaysia 2011 n .a . N
Sources: PNG Investment Promotion Authority and PNG Forest Authority .
State Actors and Their Actions
According to the conventional wisdom, state actors in PNG—whether 
elected (as politicians) or appointed (as public servants)—should not only 
represent the interests of the state. They should also favour the interests 
of customary landowners, who are their own people, against the interests 
of foreign companies that seek access to customary land. However, the 
political and bureaucratic process through which SABLs have been granted 
to private companies, and agro-forestry projects have been granted other 
permits and licences as a consequence, shows how the capacity of these 
actors to represent anyone’s interest is constrained by their relationship 
with other actors whose own interests have often been compromised, 
or whose involvement in the process may have no legal basis.
In order to obtain an FCA under Section 90B of the Forestry Act, 
the proponents of an agro-forestry project normally had to begin by 
assembling a set of ILGs whose representatives could alienate a large 
area of customary land to the state (see Table 7.1). Local politicians and 
landowner company directors both played important roles in facilitating 
the process through which a set of land group certificates was presented 
to the Lands Department in support of an application for ‘their’ land to 
be leased back to a company of ‘their’ choice. By the time this happened, 
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a ‘development partner’ would normally be party to the process, and 
may well have helped in its facilitation. In theory, officers of the Lands 
Department should undertake a ‘land investigation’ in order to establish 
the connection between the land group certificates and the customary land 
under consideration before granting an SABL (Moore 2011). This type 
of investigation was also meant to establish the free, prior and informed 
consent of the customary owners to the project for which the land was to 
be alienated, and that is why the COI went to such great lengths to show 
that national and provincial lands officers had failed to perform this task 
in accordance with existing laws and policies.
Once an SABL had been gazetted, if not before, the developer would 
submit its project proposal to the Department of Agriculture and Livestock 
(DAL). In order to comply with Section 90B of the Forestry Act, officers 
of this department were supposed to conduct some form of ‘awareness’ 
activity with landowners and other stakeholders to establish the extent of 
local support for the project. There is some evidence of this activity being 
undertaken, but the outcomes were not clearly documented. These were 
likely to be occasions on which the local member of parliament delivered 
a speech of encouragement to his band of loyal supporters, including 
landowner company directors, preferably in the company of other 
political and bureaucratic heavyweights from the national and provincial 
centres of political power.
Once the DAL staff had placed their stamp of approval on a project proposal, 
the proponents would attach this to their application for an FCA, which 
would be sent to the PNGFA.2 Knowing that the National Forest Board 
would not normally approve a large-scale conversion concession in the 
absence of an environment permit issued by the Minister for Environment 
and Conservation, the proponents would also have initiated a process of 
environmental impact assessment once the project proposal had been 
finalised. The National Forest Board also required a recommendation 
from the relevant Provincial Forest Management Committee before 
granting an FCA. Landowner interests should have been represented in 
the deliberations of that committee, but were normally represented by 
supporters of the project under consideration. Figure 7.1 shows that the 
2  The PNGFA has three component parts: the National Forest Board, which makes key 
decisions at the national level; a number of Provincial Forest Management Committees, which make 
recommendations to the Board about activities to be undertaken in their respective provinces; and the 
National Forest Service, which implements the decisions made by the Board.
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volume of logs exported under FCAs continued to increase, even after 
the establishment of the COI, and the imposition of a moratorium on the 
grant of new FCAs, in 2011.
Figure 7.1 Volume of raw log exports from areas covered by FCAs 
granted to developers of agro-forestry projects, 2007–2015.
Source: SGS PNG Ltd 2008–2015 .
In recent years, there has been widespread enthusiasm for agro-forestry 
projects at all levels of government. This enthusiasm was reflected in the 
National Agriculture Development Plan (GoPNG 2007), for which DAL 
is meant to be the implementing agency. Yet DAL staff were also charged 
with the task of screening and evaluating project proposals to ensure that 
the proponents had the necessary technical and financial capacities, had 
conducted the necessary land use assessments, and had produced realistic 
implementation schedules. However, the COI found ‘disturbing evidence’ 
of senior DAL officials simply accepting the idea that logging activities in 
SABL areas were an acceptable way of financing agro-forestry projects 
(Mirou 2013: 139; also Chapter 8, this volume).
The perfunctory nature of the project appraisal carried out by DAL 
staff can also be explained by the institutional disconnection between 
the national department and its provincial counterparts (Allen 2009). 
This means that national-level officials had no way to assess the extent of 
landowner support for a project when it was first presented for appraisal. 
As Secretary Anton Benjamin explained to the COI:
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There are proposals or projects that have come directly to the Department 
but where the investors have consulted the landowners—and we are not 
aware of the manner in which this was done—and so they come with 
landowners to us to assist them. And there are cases where landowners 
have their differences. There are people in the community or in the village 
who are not party to that, who have not been consulted and this is where 
the problem is. After the endorsement is being given by the Department, 
we get letters from the landowners to us advising us that they have not 
been consulted, they are not party to this one and they want the project 
stopped until it is [sic] all been reviewed. So these are some of the issues 
that arises from the projects that when investors are actually dealing with 
the landowners themselves without coming to the Department and so 
those are issues that we are not aware of until after we have given approval, 
then we start to see this problem arises (Numapo et al. 2011: 24).
Similar sentiments were voiced by other public servants who testified to 
the COI. They felt they did not have the knowledge or the authority 
to question the agreements made between landowner representatives 
and their ‘development partners’. And they were even less likely to do 
so when the ‘landowner representatives’ included government ministers 
or other national politicians. For example, the former head of the Lands 
Department, Pepi Kimas, testified that he was subjected to a lot of 
‘political pressure … from the Prime Minister’s level down’, to grant an 
SABL for the Bewani oil palm project in West Sepik Province, while the 
former Provincial Administrator, Joseph Sungi, said that he was ‘forced’ 
by officers of the same department to accept a land investigation report 
that he had not actually sighted (Numapo 2013: 131, 137–8).3 This does 
not mean that all elected politicians have been equally enthusiastic in 
their support of this particular type of development (see Chapter 6, this 
volume). However, the nature of PNG’s current political system does 
not provide much opportunity or incentive for members of parliament, 
including government ministers, to obstruct each other’s plans for their 
respective constituencies, especially when these plans are backed by 
foreign investors. Public servants have therefore been inclined to act on 
their perception of the weight of political support behind each project, 
without considering the possibility of political opposition.
3  In 2012, Mr Sungi was elected to represent an electorate in which nearly all the land was already 
covered by SABLs that he had authorised in his former capacity as Provincial Administrator.
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Developers and Their Actions
The investors in agro-forestry projects, who have normally been the holders 
of subleases issued by the holders of SABLs, can be classified by reference 
to the identity of their owners or shareholders, the assets or experience at 
their command, the types of licence they have obtained from the PNG 
government, their relationships to other corporate entities, and various 
other criteria. In some projects, the leasing arrangements have involved a 
joint venture between a landowner company and a foreign company, but 
the majority of projects have involved a sublease by a landowner company 
to a foreign investor. Some project proponents already have had a track 
record in the PNG forestry sector, while others have been new to the 
country, but established companies and new entrants have both been 
making use of the SABL mechanism to gain access to timber (Filer 2013). 
In addition to providing access to new sources of timber for export, one of 
the reasons that SABLs have been attractive to foreign investors is that the 
value of land and timber assets can be traded on a foreign stock exchange. 
On the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, for example, land can be traded 
in similar ways to stocks and bonds.
Our analysis of oil palm SABLs has revealed that around half of the 
projects involved negotiations with alternative developers before or after 
the COI hearings, while some have engaged multiple developers. This 
has been problematic when the project has been approved on the basis 
of agricultural plans submitted to DAL by a developer that is no longer 
involved in the project. Part of the problem of regulation, as the COI was 
told by the Registrar of Titles, is that the SABL grantees rarely returned to 
the Lands Department to register their subleases, so the Department and 
the Registrar were often not aware of the transactions that had transpired 
after the state lease had been granted.
Twenty-six of the 29 oil palm project proposals we investigated involved 
investors from Malaysia (Table 7.3). The most prominent among these has 
been the Rimbunan Hijau (RH) group, a large and diverse multinational 
company, with many business activities in PNG, including logging, in 
which it is the country’s dominant player. RH is involved in logging 
and oil palm plantations in Malaysia through three public companies—
Jaya Tiasa, Subur Tiasa and Rimbunan Sawit. It has approximately 
176,000 hectares of land already planted to oil palm in Sarawak.
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Nine of the investors had individual shareholders, with no identified 
corporate entity in the shareholding structure. This form of ownership 
may be something of an illusion if it constitutes a way of limiting or 
concealing corporate liability. Where the activities of a corporate group 
are highly integrated and interconnected, to the extent that each unit 
can be seen as performing a function conducive to realising the group’s 
common economic goal, regulators can disregard the formal separation 
between the units and impose liability on the parent, regardless of which 
members of the group were actually responsible for a particular action 
(Amnesty International 2014).
Most of the developers could produce no evidence of being licensed to 
invest in oil palm projects by the IPA, which also functions as a regulator. 
Only 10 of them could be clearly identified as having the financial backing 
of an overseas parent company with demonstrable experience in oil palm 
development, and four of these were RH subsidiaries. One proposal 
(the Lolokuru estate in West New Britain) was an initiative of New Britain 
Palm Oil Ltd (NBPOL), the largest palm oil company already operating 
in PNG, which has recently become a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
Malaysian multinational Sime Darby. Another of the smaller projects (the 
Akami estate in West New Britain) would also be dependent on NBPOL 
as its sole customer. Aside from RH, there were four other foreign 
investors with some experience of oil palm development, all of them 
owned by Malaysian shareholders. Some of the investors (including RH) 
have established markets for non-certified palm oil, and are not members 
of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), while others have 
stated an intention to seek certification. Investors differ in the extent of 
support they have received from government; RH is known to have the 
most government support because of the scale and diversity of its past 
investments in PNG.
The COI highlighted that the legal status of the SABLs is both complex 
and questionable. Transparent negotiations in the sublease agreements of 
some of the SABLs were hindered to a significant extent by landowner 
company directors and foreign investors undertaking negotiations in the 
nation’s capital, Port Moresby. The COI noted with interest, for example, 
that before an SABL was granted directly to a foreign investor, Brilliant 
Investment Ltd, this company entered into an agreement with a local 
landowner company, Marienberg Hills Development Ltd, which invited 
the former to undertake logging operations within a former logging 
concession in the Marienberg area. The landowner company representative 
signed the agreement with the managing director of Brilliant Investment 
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in Port Moresby, yet the transaction was not agreed to by the majority of 
the landowners, as represented by the shareholders and directors of the 
company, in contravention of the requirements of the Companies Act 
(Mirou 2013:  719). Clan signatures collected by government officials, 
who sometimes never went into the villages to collect the signatures, were 
often found to be fraudulent and not those of the legitimate clan leaders. 
This in turn has legitimised the destruction of existing cash crops, such as 
cocoa and copra, which some villages had spent decades cultivating. These 
crops have simply been bulldozed to make way for roads and oil palms 
without the owners being compensated for their losses (Lattas 2014).
Developer actions are driven by global economic factors, corporate and 
shareholder goals, and the local socio-legal environment. The primary 
economic factors include strong demand for timber and palm oil, the costs 
and returns of clearing the forest, establishing and operating plantations 
and a palm oil mill, and the cost of raising capital. All companies 
operating in PNG are required by law to register their proposed business 
activities. In the case of foreign companies entering the country with the 
express intention to develop large-scale agro-forestry projects, either on 
their own or in partnership with landowner companies, the IPA’s role does 
not seem to extend beyond the grant of a foreign enterprise certificate 
(Mirou 2013:  154). It is not given any powers under legislation to 
specifically require evidence of capital and expertise in the particular type 
of business activity to be undertaken in a particular area. This has resulted 
in concessions over many SABLs being given to logging companies with 
absolutely no agricultural background in their past operations and with 
a total absence of agricultural specialists among their employees (Mirou 
2013: 202–3). In several projects, the terms and conditions in sublease 
agreements had the effect of putting the SABL title in the control of the 
developer. In cases such as the Wewak Turubu Integrated Agriculture 
Project, the sublease holder was a joint venture between a landowner 
company and a foreign company. Such entities have frequently changed in 
structure and ownership, and some have acted in the developer’s interests 
rather than that of the landowners.
The COI found that 58 out of 75 SABLs investigated were subleased 
to developers for 99 years and left no residual rights to the landowners 
(Numapo 2013: 241). Many of the sublease agreements contain provisions 
that the COI found to be grossly unfair to the landowners in terms of the 
ownership of any infrastructure development or tree crops. In the event 
of objections and disputes arising, legal clauses have been included in 
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a number of sublease agreements that allow the developer to take out 
restraining orders in the National Court and be compensated for loss of 
revenue and other costs incurred (Winn 2012: 32; Mirou 2013: 693). 
In these instances, if the lease is terminated by the landlord (normally 
a landowner company), then compensation for the tenant’s (developer’s) 
loss will be borne by the landlord, including the tenant’s projected profit 
from the harvest of oil palm for the duration of the agreement (Mirou 
2013: 781).
Many of the land investigations and awareness programs necessary for 
securing SABLs were funded by entities outside the government, mostly 
by the developers (Mirou 2013: 158). The lack of government funding 
placed government officials in vulnerable positions to the extent that 
they were easily compromised when developers offered to pay for the 
cost of carrying out land investigation and awareness programs. The COI 
found that, in most instances, the reports and recommendations made 
by the government officials were in favour of the developers, with no 
proper consent obtained from the landowners, involved erroneous land 
boundary descriptions, and generally entailed unethical manipulation 
of both landowners and government officials by the developers (Mirou 
2013: 181–2). The COI found instances of landowner company and land 
group representatives being manipulated by developers to fast-track the 
issuing of the SABL titles, as in the case of the Musa-Pongani project in 
Oro Province (Numapo 2013: 239).
Landowners and Developers
In PNG, the ‘incorporation’ of a customary landowner group means 
that it is formally recognised as a legal entity, becomes the representative 
of the customary owners in the formal legal system, and is thus able to 
enter into agreements and make decisions on behalf of the customary 
group (Power 2008). However, the complexities of customary land tenure 
often result in disputes. In new conjunctions of the legal and the social, 
disputing landowners and marginalised groups have made increasing use 
of social media, the internet and the mainstream media to pursue their 
different trajectories of struggle and engagement.
The most frequently expressed motivator for development among PNG 
landowners is the desire for income, infrastructure and services that 
may come with agricultural developments. Large-scale oil palm schemes 
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can provide income streams that are sustained over fairly long periods 
of time, unlike short-term alternatives such as logging (Oliver 2002). 
Other drivers of landowner actions include existing infrastructure, public 
services, land use, land availability and competing claims to ownership 
of land. Processes that lead to loss of control over a resource are complex 
and multidimensional, but commonly involve power imbalance and 
complex politics organised around the opposition between development 
and conservation priorities (Nayak et al. 2014). In the determination of 
land use options, landowners or their representatives have acted to enter 
agreements with developers, change developers, form alliances, petition 
the RSPO, attend RSPO meetings, publicly express disapproval, lodge 
written complaints to government agencies, and participate in national 
and international forums.
In SABL areas, where the politics of landownership has generated new 
forms of inclusion and exclusion, some landowner representatives have 
been making formal alliances with international and national non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in order to raise awareness of social 
justice issues involving the development of customary land. These alliances 
attempt to redress the unequal balance of resources between landowners 
and developers when it comes to creating, negotiating and contesting 
leases. Correspondingly, other landowners who prefer the development 
option draw on support from developers to challenge NGO–landowner 
alliances. Two case studies, one in Oro Province and the other in East 
New Britain Province, are presented here to highlight these contrasting 
strategies.
Ijivitari District, Oro Province
In Chapter 6, Colin Filer has shown how the so-called ‘Collingwood Bay 
scam’ featured in the political process that led to the establishment of 
the COI, and then gained a new lease of life in 2012, after the COI 
had completed its hearings, when the Lands Department attempted to 
reissue a pair of SABLs that had been revoked by the National Court 
10 years earlier. Since these two SABLs were not thought to be extant 
when the COI was established, they were not included in the list of 75 
leases that were subject to the inquiry. However, the apparent breach of 
the moratorium imposed on the grant of ‘new’ leases resulted in a new 
round of litigation that had the backing of the newly elected Governor of 
Oro Province, Gary Juffa.
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Figure 7.2 Location of SABLs and potential logging concessions 
in Ijivitari District, Oro Province.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
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The first of the two leases gazetted in July 2012 covered an area of 
21,520 hectares (Portion 113C), and was issued to a landowner company 
called Sibo Management Ltd for a period of 50 years. The second lease 
covered an area of 16,830  hectares (Portion 143C), and was issued to 
another landowner company called Wanigela Agro Industrial Ltd for 
the same period. Both leases were associated with an oil palm project 
generally known as the ‘Wanigela Integrated Agriculture Project’ (which 
we shall refer to simply as the Wanigela project). These two blocks of 
land are part of a much larger area of forest in Ijivitari District that has 
long been regarded by the PNGFA as a cluster of three potential logging 
concessions known as Collingwood Bay, Musa Pongani and Goro 
Itakama (Figure  7.2). Two of the SABLs that were investigated by the 
COI (over Portions 17C and 146C) are also located within this larger 
area of forest. One of these (Portion 17C) was associated with the ‘Musa-
Pongani Integrated Agro-Forest Project’ (which we shall refer to simply 
as the Musa-Pongani project), while the other one (Portion 146) was 
associated with the ‘Tufi-Wanigela Tree Farming Project’. The second of 
these projects did not involve any proposal to develop an oil palm estate, 
so is not included in our list of proposed oil palm projects (Table 7.2).
The Musa-Pongani project has been just as contentious as the Wanigela 
project, but has not attracted the same amount of national and 
international publicity. It also covered a much larger area of customary 
land. In January 2009, an SABL over 211,600 hectares of land was issued 
to a landowner company called Musida Holdings Ltd (MHL) for a period 
of 99  years. This followed the production of an environmental impact 
statement by a Malaysian company called Musa Century Ltd (MCL), 
which envisaged the cultivation of 100,000  hectares of oil palm and 
100,000 hectares of other crops (MCL 2008). However, this document 
shows that Musa Century Ltd had formed a partnership (in  2007) 
with another landowner company called Musa Valley Management 
Company Ltd (MVML). When the SABL was issued to MHL, MCL 
and MVML took legal action to have the lease revoked on the grounds 
that the landowners had not consented to it, and they obtained a national 
court order in their favour in January 2010.4 Some observers welcomed 
this decision in the belief that the land would then revert to customary 
ownership (Pok 2010), as had been the case when the National Court 
revoked the SABLs over Portions 113C and 143C in 2002. But in 
4  Musa Valley Management Company Ltd v Kimas [2010] PGNC 281.
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this case, the Lands Department proceeded to grant a new SABL over 
a considerably larger area (320,060  hectares) to MVML in September 
2010.5 Meanwhile, in January 2010, a few days after the National Court 
had made its ruling, the National Forest Board granted an FCA over an 
even larger area (350,000  hectares) to MVML’s ‘development partner’, 
MCL, but this licence was later cancelled in August 2011, and no logging 
has so far taken place. 
When the COI came to unravel this case, it was found that the ‘successful’ 
landowner company, MVML, had been set up by landowners living 
in the national capital, Port Moresby, while the other one, MHL, had 
been set up by landowners living in local villages (Numapo 2013: 208). 
It was also noted that MVML’s apparent success had been diluted by 
a second court order that granted MHL a right of judicial review, and 
that seems to explain why the FCA had been cancelled. John Numapo 
certainly found no evidence to indicate that local landowners had given 
any more consent to the second lease than they had given to the first one 
(ibid.: 218–9). From the transcripts of his hearings, it is also evident that 
MHL had its own ‘development partner’ (a company called Idamin), that 
the contest between the two landowner companies had been going on 
for almost 10 years, and that various politicians and public servants had 
taken different sides at different points in time. Nevertheless, one witness 
observed that the directors of the two companies were ‘all relatives, very 
close brothers, uncles, sons, very close’, while their former member of 
parliament compared their relationship to that of ‘the Talibans and the 
headhunters fighting amongst themselves’ (Numapo 2012: 88, 95).
A division between the urban and rural branches of a single ‘landowning 
community’ may also be part of the history of the Wanigela project, but if 
so, it has taken a different form because some members of this community 
have been resolute in their opposition to any form of agro-forestry, and 
not simply divided in their allegiance to different ‘development partners’.
After the Lands Department had granted the SABLs over Portions 113C 
and 143C in July 2012, a landowner representative claimed that the 
original leases over these two portions had been granted in January 1998 
(Pok 2012). However, the National Gazette contains no record of the 
leases being granted around that time, and other sources suggest that they 
5  This is the area shown as Portion 17C in Figure 7.2: it includes nearly all of the Musa Pongani 
forest area and part of the Goro Itakama forest area as well.
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may have been granted in 1995, before the Land Act was amended in 
such a  way as to require their gazettal (Barker 2009). The earlier date 
would certainly seem to be consistent with the fact that the former 
premier of Oro Province was already supporting a Filipino company’s 
proposal for an agro-forestry project in Collingwood Bay in 1996, 
and this proposal had already met with opposition from local and 
international supporters of a  forest conservation project in the same 
area (Filer 1998:  195,  255). Since  then, Collingwood Bay has almost 
attained the status of a ‘sacred site’ for members of PNG’s conservation 
policy community (Barker  2004),  especially members of the ‘anti-
dependency group’ (see Chapter 6, this volume). In Oro Province, this 
group is primarily represented by the Oro Community Environmental 
Action Network (OCEAN), and the Collingwood Bay Conservation and 
Development Authority (CBCDA), but also has strong ties to the Centre 
for Environmental Law and Community Rights.
Towards the end of 2009, local members of this section of the land 
grab policy network got wind of the landing of a barge full of logging 
equipment on the shoreline of Portion 113, and its transportation inland 
to the adjacent Portion 5.6 Shortly afterwards, Adelbert Gangai from 
OCEAN held a ‘community consensus meeting’ that identified Tony 
Wong and Vincent Lee as the individuals responsible for this incursion 
(Gangai 2010). This was a source of some confusion, since these two men 
were operating out of Tufi, and the companies they represented (Victory 
Plantation Ltd and Matufi Ltd) were mainly interested in logging the leases 
associated with the Tufi-Wanigela Tree Farming Project. It was a third 
company, Ang Agro Forest Management Ltd (AAFML) that was seeking 
to obtain an FCA over Portions 113C and 143C, and opponents of this 
Wanigela project thought that Tony Wong and had acquired an interest 
in it through his relationship with the directors of Keroro Development 
Corporation Ltd (KDCL), the landowner company to whom the original 
SABLs had been granted in 1998 or 1995 (Gangai 2010; Nilles 2010). 
They also believed that Tony Wong was operating as a ‘front man’ for 
Rimbunan Hijau (Nilles 2010), as was Eii Sing Hii, who held all the 
shares in AAFML (OCEAN and CBCDA 2013).7
6  Portion 5 covers an area of just under 6,000 hectares that was alienated during the colonial 
period, and was at that time still owned by the government.
7  In 2010, the company records showed that AAFML had been incorporated in 2006, and that 
Eii Sing Hii held the shares in trust for unspecified financial interests.
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In November 2009, the Oro Provincial Forest Management Committee 
approved the grant of an FCA to AAFML, and this is presumably what 
triggered the appearance of the logging equipment. The National Forest 
Board accepted the provincial recommendation in January 2010, but 
its decision was based on incorrect advice to the effect that KDCL still 
held the land titles. During the course of that year, the loggers and 
conservationists took turns at engaging different state actors (including 
members of the police force) in support of their endeavours (Nilles 2010; 
Pangkatana 2010). As a result of the attendant publicity, the managing 
director of the PNGFA announced that no logging operation would be 
approved until the land tenure issue had been resolved (Anon. 2010). 
The FCA was formally cancelled by the National Forest Board in August 
2011, on the same day that it cancelled the FCA granted to the Musa-
Pongani project. In the meantime, in April 2011, AAFML had secured 
an agricultural lease over Portion 5, but the value of this acquisition was 
now in doubt.
Gary Juffa was one of the state actors who had supported the 
conservationists  in his capacity as the head of PNG’s Internal Revenue 
Commission. The legal action he supported in his new capacity as 
Governor of Oro Province was initiated by Lester Seri and six other 
landowners in November 2012. The defendants in the case were officials 
of the Lands Department, AAFML and the two landowner companies to 
whom the SABLs had been granted in July that year. Shortly before the 
case was launched, one of PNG’s national newspapers announced that 
AAFML’s Malaysian parent company, Collingwood Plantations, had been 
taken over by a much bigger Malaysian company, Kuala Lumpur Kepong 
Bhd (KLK).8 A spokesman for KLK was quoted as saying that the takeover 
‘presents an opportunity for KLK to develop new oil palm plantations in 
PNG in view of the increasing difficulty and expense to source suitable 
land in Malaysia and/or Indonesia’. The newspaper story concluded with 
the statement that AAFML:
has a 99-year lease on more than 5,992ha in the town [sic] in Northern 
[Oro], expiring in April 2110; a 49-year sublease on more than [21,520ha] 
of land in Northern, expiring in August 2061 and a 49-year sublease 
on more than 16,830ha of land in Northern, expiring in August 2061 
(Anon. 2012a).
8  The same article had been published in an English-language Malaysian newspaper on the 
previous day.
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KLK is a public company listed on the Malaysian stock exchange, and 
had a market capitalisation of approximately RM24 billion in 2013. 
The company’s annual report for 2013 showed that it had paid almost 
RM11 million for its controlling interest in the Collingwood Bay leases 
(KLK 2013a: 123). By the time the acquisition was completed in December 
2012, the company’s managers might have begun to wonder whether they 
had got value for their money, since they would now have been aware of 
the court case in which their new subsidiary was one of the defendants. 
This problem was compounded by the fact that KLK, unlike most of the 
developers of agro-forestry projects in PNG, is a member of the RSPO, 
and was therefore obliged to show that it had obtained the free, prior and 
informed consent of the local landowners to its development proposal.
This created an opportunity for the dissident landowners to lodge 
a complaint with the RSPO Secretariat in April 2013, in which they stated 
that ‘the Traditional paramount chiefs of the 9 tribes of Collingwood Bay 
representing 326 clans have irrevocably stated their disapproval … in the 
strongest possible terms of any plans to introduce the oil palm industry 
in the Collingwood Bay area’, and that KLK personnel had recently 
sought to overcome this opposition by persuading local villagers to sign 
a new agreement in exchange for ‘100 kina, some rice and canned fish’ 
(OCEAN and CBCDA 2013). The dissidents were then able to secure 
the backing of the Rainforest Action Network (RAN), an NGO with a 
particular interest in demonstrating the absence of corporate compliance 
with RSPO standards. With their support, Lester Seri and Adelbert 
Gangai attended the RSPO’s annual meeting in Sumatra in November 
that year to reiterate their complaint, while Laurel Sutherlin from RAN 
observed that KLK’s project proposal was ‘the ugly face of Conflict Palm 
Oil and … would create an entirely predictable and preventable disaster 
for the people and wildlife of Papua New Guinea’ (Sutherlin 2013).
When the RSPO’s Complaints Panel found that there was merit in 
the complaint, KLK responded with a claim that they had obtained 
the  written  consent of all local clan leaders to their project proposal, 
and this evidence was being presented in the court case over the SABLs. 
They also denied any link to Tony Wong and Vincent Lee (KLK 2013b). 
Shortly afterwards, in January 2014, the directors of Sibo Management 
Ltd, the landowner company that had been granted the new SABL over 
Portion 113C, published an advertorial claiming that all the genuine 
landowners were fully in support of the Wanigela project, and those 
opposing it, such as Lester Seri and Adelbert Gangai, as well as Governor 
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Gary Juffa, should keep their mouths shut unless they could provide 
genuine development alternatives (SML 2014). However, this had no 
material effect on the progress and outcome of the court case.
After the National Court had once again revoked the two SABLs in 
May 2014, Lester Seri was quoted as saying that:
The people of Collingwood Bay have spoken clearly through the voices 
of our chiefs that we are against large scale palm oil development on our 
lands.… The chiefs of our nine tribes have spoken. Tens of thousands 
of our international allies have spoken. The Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO) has spoken. And now the National Court of PNG has 
agreed: these permits are illegitimate. KLK must leave Collingwood Bay 
immediately and not return (RAN 2014).
KLK did not leave immediately, since the court decision did not affect its 
right to occupy the lease over Portion 5, where its base camp was located. 
However, the cancellation of the other leases effectively meant that the 
Wanigela project would not be viable unless some other way could be 
found to access the adjoining areas of customary land in the face of 
opposition from a well organised group of opponents operating at local, 
national and global scales.9 In March 2016, the company announced that 
it had no personnel in the area, and would remove the equipment still 
stored on Portion 5 by the end of the year if the ‘citizens of the various 
tribes’ with an interest in Portions 113C and 143C did not give free, prior 
and informed consent to the development of the project (KLK 2016).
Pomio District, East New Britain Province
So long as Gary Juffa remains as Governor of Oro Province, it could be 
argued that his province and East New Britain Province are at opposite 
ends of the spectrum of political and public opinion that surrounds 
the costs and benefits of agro-forestry projects in PNG. With very few 
exceptions, all of East New Britain’s members of parliament, including the 
governor, have consistently supported the development of new oil palm 
schemes, especially in the more remote parts of the province. That is partly 
because they have espoused a conception of ‘public–private partnerships’ 
in which the developers of these schemes will fund a major upgrade of 
9  Industry sources estimate that the capital cost of an entirely new oil palm scheme in PNG would 
be close to US$100 million, and the investment would only make sense if the investor had guaranteed 
access to 30,000 hectares of land (Ian Orrell, personal communication, February 2011).
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the provincial road network, and partly because oil palm has been seen 
as suitable substitute for cocoa, formerly the main export crop, which has 
recently been ravaged by disease (Curry et al. 2011).
The Ili-Wawas Integrated Agriculture Project in the eastern part of Pomio 
District was the first of this new generation of oil palm schemes in East 
New Britain, and was heavily promoted by former Member of Parliament 
Paul Tiensten. It was not investigated by the COI because the SABL that 
covers the nucleus estate was issued to an ILG rather than a landowner 
company. Before this lease was issued in November 2008, the developer 
(Tzen Niugini) had already been logging parts of the project area under 
‘timber authorities’ granted before the Forestry Act was amended in 2007, 
and continued its logging operations under three FCAs granted in March 
2007. These licences covered an area of approximately 50,000 hectares, 
about half of which was earmarked for the cultivation of oil palm. Tzen 
Niugini has exported about 500,000 cubic metres of logs from the project 
area since 2005. The oil palm mill was opened with great ceremony by 
PNG’s Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister (the former Provincial 
Governor) in October 2014.10
The Mukus-Melkoi Large Scale Integrated Agriculture Project, on the 
other hand, is an example of a project that never got off the ground, or to 
be more precise, has not (so far) gone beyond the paper planning stage. 
In August 2008, an SABL over 68,300 hectares was issued to a landowner 
company called Rera Holdings Ltd (RHL) for a period of 99 years. This 
is the area shown as Portion 2C in Figure 7.3. Company records show 
that RHL was incorporated in September 2006, and would count as an 
‘umbrella company’, because its shareholders were three other landowner 
companies.11 As soon as it had been incorporated, the directors had written 
a letter of invitation to the general manager of a company called Double 
Dynasty (or DD) Lumber Ltd (DDLL), and Paul Tiensten had written to 
East New Britain’s Provincial Administrator to express his own support for 
the project (DDLL 2010; Jerewai 2012). DDLL is a subsidiary of Brilliant 
Investment Ltd, which was able to secure an SABL (in 2007) and an FCA 
(in 2009) for the Angoram (Marienberg) Integrated Agriculture Project 
in East Sepik Province (see Table 7.3), and then proceeded to harvest and 
export about 340,000 cubic metres of logs from that area between 2010 
10  Paul Tiensten could not attend the ceremony because he had been convicted of corruption and 
sent to prison.
11  The three shareholding companies were deregistered in 2009.
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and 2013. However, that project did not include any serious plan for the 
development of an oil palm estate, and DDLL has not even got as far as 
logging the Mukus-Melkoi project area. It did manage to secure an FCA 
over the project area in October 2010, on the basis of a proposal to plant 
30,000 hectares of oil palm, but the forester who prepared this proposal 
told the COI that he had no agricultural qualifications and had not even 
visited the project area (Jerewai 2012: 134, 141). In February 2011, the 
managing director of the PNGFA advised the company that its forest 
clearance plans had not been approved (Numapo 2011: 7), and there is no 
evidence to indicate that new plans have since been submitted.
Figure 7.3 Location of SABLs and potential logging concessions in part 
of Pomio District, East New Britain Province.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
The Sigite-Mukus Integrated Rural Development Project is a far more 
serious venture—more like the Ili-Wawas project. In July 2008, three 
99-year SABLs over a combined total of 42,400  hectares of land were 
simultaneously issued to three landowner companies: Pomata Investment 
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Ltd (15,000  hectares), Ralopal Investment Ltd (11,300  hectares), and 
Nakiura Investment Ltd (16,100  hectares). These are the areas shown 
in Figure 7.3 as Portions 196C, 197C and 198C. In December 2009, 
a  fourth 99-year SABL over 13,000  hectares of land was issued to 
another landowner company called Unung Sigite Ltd. This is the area 
shown as Portion 27C. These four landowner companies, along with two 
other landowner companies called Ura-Mosi Ltd and Mosi-Ngelu Ltd, 
are shareholders in an umbrella company called Memalo Holdings Ltd 
(another MHL), which was incorporated in 2004.
Immediately before this company was incorporated, its directors signed 
a project agreement with Paul Tiensten and a company called Sumas 
Timber & Development International Ltd (STDIL), in which STDIL 
agreed to lend K300,000 to MHL and Paul Tiensten so that they could 
secure the cooperation of the local landowners and later arrange for the 
loan to be repaid from logging revenues. This agreement was attached 
to an environmental inception report that MHL and STDIL submitted 
to the Department of Environment and Conservation in July 2006 
(MHL and STDIL 2006). This report indicated that the bulk of the local 
revenues secured from the logging operation would then be used to fund 
the construction of a road from the Sigite Gorge to the Melkoi River, as 
well as a nucleus oil palm estate and an associated corridor of smallholder 
oil palm blocks between 5 and 10  kilometres inland of the shoreline. 
The proposed road would have the effect of connecting most of the coastal 
villages in this coastal corridor with the Pomio district headquarters at 
Palmalmal, on the shores of Jacquinot Bay, and also with the headquarters 
of the Melkoi local-level government area at Uvol (Figure 7.3).
By April 2008, MHL had abandoned its former deal with STDIL and 
had signed a new development agreement with Rimbunan Hijau. At the 
ceremony held to commemorate this event, a senior official from the 
Lands Department told the assembled landowner company directors that 
the lease-leaseback arrangement ‘would enable the landowners to have 
more control over their land, unlike before’, while the chairman of MHL, 
John Parulria, reportedly ‘urged the civil society to work hand in hand 
with the lands, forestry and public services sectors to get the projects 
going’ (Anon.  2008). In October that year, one of RH’s subsidiary 
companies, Gilford Ltd, submitted its own development plan to the 
relevant government authorities (GL and MHL 2008). This document 
contains copies of sublease agreements covering Portions 196C, 197C 
and 198C, over which the SABLs had been granted in July that year.
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The East New Britain Provincial Forest Management Committee 
recommended the grant of an FCA over these three blocks of land in 
September 2010, and the National Forest Board implemented the 
recommendation one month later. Shortly afterwards, the vice chairman 
of MHL, Joe Tali, was reported as saying that ‘people were not consulted 
during the time of the sublease agreement on the selection criteria 
of the project developer, especially on oil palm’, and that ‘some non-
governmental organisations and stakeholders had caused confusion and 
in-fighting among landowner companies on the fair distribution of 
benefits’ (Vuvu 2010). This was an allusion to the fact that members of 
the ‘anti-dependency group’ were already helping community groups in 
two of the four SABL areas to mount a legal challenge to the leasing 
arrangements (Peter Dam, personal communication, February 2011).
Conflict among the landowners became a national issue in April 2011, 
after Gilford was reported to have moved its logging equipment into the 
area, and dissident landowners complained of police harassment when 
they tried to organise a protest (Anon. 2011a). This prompted Paul 
Tiensten to announce that he would ‘not allow any foreign elements to 
sabotage my projects’, while the Provincial Governor, Leo Dion, ‘called 
on all development partners in East New Britain to stand united for the 
progressive development of the province’ (Nicholas 2011). It is not clear 
whether news of this particular conflict had any direct influence on the 
national government’s decision to establish the COI, but Greenpeace 
made sure that the story made much bigger headlines when Commissioner 
Jerewai arrived in the province to conduct his hearings in November that 
year (see Chapter 6, this volume).
Greenpeace was not the only ‘foreign element’ that had an interest in 
opposing the Sigite-Mukus project. In 1995, around the same time that 
Collingwood Bay became a place of special interest to conservationists, 
the European Union began to fund the Islands Region Environment and 
Community Development Programme in West New Britain Province. 
This was designed to support small-scale community-based ‘eco-forestry 
projects’ as alternatives to large-scale selective logging projects (Bird et 
al. 2007). This program soon extended its reach to East New Britain, 
and three such projects were established in the three local government 
wards located along the coastal margin of what is now Portion 197C—
Bairaman, Lau and Mauna (Scheyvens 2009). These three projects were 
still being supported by an NGO called the Forest Management and 
Product Certification Service (commonly known as ForCert), which 
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is closely related to PNG’s Eco-Forestry Forum, which is the body 
that nominates an NGO representative to the National Forest Board. 
PNG’s eco-forestry projects have been subsidised by a number of foreign 
organisations (including Greenpeace) over the past two decades.
It is not surprising that the three coastal wards with eco-forestry projects 
turned out to be home to some of the landowners most strongly opposed 
to the agro-forestry project, since the clearance of their native forest would 
destroy their business model (Paniu 2011). Yet these were only three out 
of a total of 34 wards in the West Pomio/Mamusi local-level government 
(LLG) area, which is bounded by the Wunung River in the north and the 
Melkoi River in the south (Figure 7.3). There were other dissidents to be 
found in the coastal villages located in Portion 196C, but the dissidents 
were still greatly outnumbered by supporters of the agro-forestry project 
who lived beyond the zone covered by the FCA. The political geography 
of the project area was further complicated by a cultural division between 
speakers of the Mengen language, who occupy these coastal villages and 
others around the shores of Jacquinot Bay, and speakers of the Mamusi 
language, who occupy the coastal villages located in Portion 198C and 
nearly all of the hinterland villages as well.12 The available evidence 
suggests that the hinterland people have generally supported the agro-
forestry project, not only because it promised to provide them with better 
road access to the outside world, but also because it would not destroy 
their existing land-based livelihoods (Pangkatana 2011; Tiden 2011). 
The  same could even be said of John Parulrea, the chairman of their 
umbrella company, whose own (Mengen-speaking) village is located at the 
northern tip of Portion 196C. Aside from his role as chairman of MHL, 
he is also the chairman of Unung Sigite Ltd, the holder of the SABL over 
Portion 27C, which is located in the Central/Inland Pomio LLG area. 
Whether or not the forest in this block of land is eventually cleared for oil 
palm cultivation, it does not include the adjacent coastal zone from which 
local villagers derive most of their subsistence (Figure 7.3).
The 2008 development plan (GL and MHL 2008) included a map 
showing  the division of a much larger area, extending inland to the 
border with West New Britain Province, between six ‘consolidated land 
blocks’. These were the six blocks supposedly represented by the six 
landowner companies covered by John Parulrea’s umbrella company. This 
12  There are two wards in the far north of the LLG area, close to the provincial boundary, where 
another language (Wasi) is spoken.
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map represents a peculiar reconfiguration of this part of Pomio District, 
which had the effect of eliding the political boundary between two 
LLG areas at the same time that it distorted the biophysical boundaries 
between potential  logging concessions that had been inscribed in the 
National Forest Plan.13 It is not clear who was responsible for this act of 
‘re-territorialisation’, but it seems to have ensured that the coastal Mengen-
speaking villagers would be a minority of the landowners represented by 
‘their’ three landowner companies.
Figure 7.4 Division of the Sigite-Mukus project area into six blocks, with 
the location of Bairaman, Lau and Mauna council wards in Block 2.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
Commissioner Jerewai took no interest in these spatial fault lines. 
He noted that he could not find any sign of opposition to the project 
when he visited the area at the end of October 2011, but was interested to 
discover that the first three witnesses to testify at the first day of hearings 
13  In 1995, the National Forest Service had recognised the Upper and Lower Nakanai Plateau areas 
as potential logging concessions, but not with the same boundaries as those shown in Figure 7.4.
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in Kokopo were all opposed to it (Jerewai 2011a). He then spent two days 
trying to persuade the landowner company chairmen that their sublease 
agreements with Gilford were thoroughly unfair and unreasonable 
(Jerewai 2011b, 2011c). At one point, he chided the chairman of Nakiura 
Investment Ltd:
It is like you have been placed in a boxing ring, pushed into one corner 
and you cannot get out of it. The only way is to go down—it is a knock-
out (Jerewai 2011b: 102).
Jerewai’s other main concern was to figure out why men had occupied all 
the positions of authority from which the leasing arrangements had been 
negotiated, when the local custom of matrilineal inheritance surely meant 
that women were the true landowners (Jerewai 2011d, 2011e). One of the 
male witnesses explained this apparent paradox as follows:
Yes, it is true that the women are—through women, land is passed on. But 
in the Pomio custom, man is in charge of partaking in discussions about 
land matters, dealing with land boundaries, and dealing with disputes 
within the clan or among clans, and dealing with the houseboy where 
important issues about the lives of Pomio people are discussed by men 
… (Jerewai 2011e: 5).
In May 2012, Greenpeace produced a press release declaring that 
the Supreme Court had upheld an appeal by MHL against previous 
court decisions that would have allowed for judicial review of the 
leasing arrangements for the Sigite-Mukus project (Greenpeace 2012). 
We have not been able to discover the trail of court proceedings, which 
had apparently  begun when Gilford landed its logging equipment in 
April 2011, and there is some confusion about which court made what 
orders at what point in time. In any case, the dissident landowners 
and their  allies now switched the main focus of their campaign from 
the problem of consent, as investigated by the COI, to the problem of 
violence, as manifested in a sequence of police raids that also began when 
the logging equipment was first landed in the area (Anon. 2011a; Makis 
2011; Tiden 2012a, 2012b). In October 2012, a ‘fact-finding mission’ 
arrived in the area to investigate previous allegations of police brutality 
against the residents of five villages—including Bairaman, Lau  and 
Mauna—in light of an announcement previously made by the police 
commissioner that he had ordered ‘the withdrawal of all police personnel 
from logging camps following allegation of abuse of power against them’ 
(Anon. 2011b).
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This expedition seems to have been organised by the Eco-Forestry 
Forum, but supposedly included representatives from a number of 
government agencies, including the police force itself. The resulting 
report documented several instances of police brutality, some of which 
had not been reported in the national newspapers, and concluded that 
the officers responsible had been ‘used by Gilford Ltd for their purposes 
which is to thwart any attempt by the local people to stop the logging 
operation’ (IFFM 2013: 19). However, it also attached a letter in which 
the police sergeant who accompanied the team acknowledged that the 
police were accommodated at the logging camp, but ‘were there on the 
request of the landowner company through its chairman to deal with the 
law and order issues which is [sic] on the rise since the company moved 
into the area’ (ibid.: 24). His argument echoed the line consistently taken 
in the pages of The National newspaper, which happens to be owned by 
RH, in response to stories published by its opposite number, the Post-
Courier (Anon. 2011c, 2011d, 2011e, 2012b). As if to anticipate the 
findings of the ‘fact-finding mission’, The National also published an 
article reporting that 10 government officials had conducted their own 
fact-finding mission in September 2012, from which they had concluded 
that there was no truth to claims being made by opponents of the project 
that local people had been ‘affected by an increase of sexual transmitted 
diseases, prostitution, pornography, domestic violence in the logging 
camps and nurseries, gambling, stealing of garden food, academic level of 
schools declining in the project area, underage employment and chemical 
contamination’ (Apina 2012).
The next round in the contest took place towards the end of 2013, 
after the publication of the two final reports of the COI, when the 
dissidents reportedly sent a petition to the Prime Minister demanding the 
revocation of the SABLs granted over Portions 196C, 197C and 198C 
(Kolma 2013). When this had no effect, the dissidents took another 
tack. In August 2014, Bairaman, Lau and Mauna ward councillors, along 
with the representatives of 15 local land groups, wrote to the chairman 
of the National Forest Board, requesting that Gilford’s FCA should not 
be renewed when it expired in October 2014. The key point in their 
argument was that these land groups had been incorporated in 2003, 
when the eco-forestry projects were initiated, but a different set of land 
groups had been fraudulently incorporated in 2006 as part of the political 
process that led to the grant of the SABL over Portion 197C (Samo et al. 
2014).
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Figure 7.5 Forest cleared for cultivation of oil palm in Portion 196C, 
February 2015.
Source: Photograph by Simon Foale .
Their request was backed by several local NGOs, and also by the London-
based Global Witness, which had come to occupy the space previously 
occupied by Greenpeace in the land grab policy network (see Chapter 8, 
this volume). Although the chairman was at that time the board member 
who had been nominated by the Eco-Forestry Forum, and seems to have 
sympathised with the request, the National Forest Board accepted the 
recommendation of East New Britain’s Provincial Forest Management 
Committee and renewed the FCA for a further six years. The dissident 
landowners then went back to court to obtain another injunction that 
apparently failed to halt the process of forest clearance (PNGexposed 
2014), while Global Witness published a report that showed the extent 
of the clearance that had already taken place in Portions 196C and 
198C (Global Witness 2014). RH responded in the same way that it 
had previously responded to attacks by members of the anti-dependency 
group: by hiring the Australian-based consulting firm ITS Global to 
document the social and economic benefits of the project and refute 
all claims previously made about its negative social and environmental 
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impact (ITS Global 2014).14 In 2014, the company managed to export 
almost 340,000  cubic metres of logs from the project area—100,000 
more than it had exported in the previous year.
By the end of 2014, Portion 197C had barely been logged at all, and 
the court injunction may have served to keep the chainsaws at bay. 
However, we understand that the injunction was lifted in July 2015, and 
satellite imagery confirms that forest clearance is now proceeding at a rate 
equivalent to that seen in the other two portions.
Conclusion
Palm oil companies have been looking to other countries, including 
PNG, as land availability in the largest producing countries, Malaysia 
and Indonesia, has been reduced. However, some of the larger palm oil 
companies have delayed investment in PNG because of problems with 
the legitimacy (and legal contestability) of the land titles being offered 
to them (Ian Orrell, personal communication, February 2013). SABLS 
have failed to offer security of land tenure, largely because relationships 
between players are dynamic, with changes in bargaining power being 
fuelled by a discourse that raises rural people’s hopes and expectations, 
driven by actors who benefit from short-term deals.
Some simple changes in negotiation procedures might have a large impact 
on landowner equity. For example, lease and sublease agreements should 
be signed in the district where the land is located, or even within the 
boundaries of the lease area itself, not in Port Moresby or provincial 
capitals. That might make landowner companies more accountable to the 
landowners. The land investigation process should also be improved, as 
Commissioner Numapo pointed out: ‘Landowners must be free to attach 
qualification or conditions to their consent if they wish because merely 
offering signatures may not reflect their real (contextual or relative) 
position’ (Numapo 2013: 66). The COI recommended a review of the 
current lease-leaseback provisions under the Land Act, with a 50-year cap 
on the lease period. The COI also recommended the promulgation of 
a regulation that clearly sets out the ‘processes and procedures’ relating 
to the SABL application, registration, processing, approval and issuance. 
This would mean that non-compliance with prescribed procedures and 
14  Their report also purported to show that the local eco-forestry projects produced no benefits at all.
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processes (including those related to demonstration of developer capacity) 
would render the whole SABL null and void (Numapo 2013: 263–4). 
Transparency in the structure of sublease agreements is also critical to the 
avoidance of fraud or injustice.
Developers and their relationships with landowners are likely to evolve 
further in the future. Of the land controlled by companies that have 
recently acquired an interest in developing plantations, most is under 
serious legal dispute, which constitutes an obstacle to development, but 
some of the larger companies could feasibly weather the risks and costs 
of such problems and eventually develop plantations and mills, perhaps 
taking over the leases of companies that have failed or have completed 
logging activities. To manage risks over customary land use for oil 
palm development, it may be increasingly important for landowners 
to draw upon the Fairness of Transactions Act, which allows for the re-
opening and review of any transaction irrespective of fault and validity, 
enforceability or effect, of any agreement. This law is intended to ensure 
the fair distribution and adjustment of rights, benefits, duties, advantages 
and disadvantages arising out of a transaction, but has hardly ever been 
applied. It is critically important to address the breakdown and subversion 
of processes intended for genuine and equitable agro-forestry ventures 
in PNG, because failed or stalled developments mean that landowners 
and companies both forego substantial sustained income if agricultural 
developments do not eventuate. Moreover, if poverty alleviation is a key 
goal of the mobilisation of customary land for palm oil production, it is 
important to ensure that the process of establishing and negotiating a lease 
or sublease for development purposes does not accelerate impoverishment.
Communities across Melanesia have sought to pursue their own ‘roads 
to development’ (Curry 2003). Our research has shown how land groups 
and landowner companies sometimes deal with multiple developers 
as they attempt to shape the political landscape of large-scale resource 
development. At the same time, dissenting landowner groups are 
mobilising the support of international NGOs in the hope of restorative 
justice. As we have highlighted, one of the key strategies adopted in 
PNG has been the establishment of linkages between landowners and 
international NGOs to address the social and political dimensions of palm 
oil production. To address the power imbalances between developers, state 
actors and customary landowner groups, the strengthening of long-term 
relationships built on trust, respect and honesty, as well as transparent 
communication and information, will be critical. In PNG, increased 
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interaction with accelerated technological developments has resulted 
in an upsurge in the use of social media and internet forums by PNG 
landowners, providing a framework for communication and partnership. 
Although these socio-technical forms of engagement are currently largely 
restricted to protesting against social injustice in resource projects, the 
development of resilient network structures may also help marginalised 
people to pursue other goals. However, unless the PNG government 
keeps its promise to support positive reform, the legitimacy and equity of 
foreign investment in new oil palm schemes remains highly questionable.
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1  Another interview with John had been conducted by ABC Radio journalist Jemima Garrett 
in February 2014 (Act Now 2014a).
The Political Ramifications 
of Papua New Guinea’s 
Commission of Inquiry
Colin Filer with John Numapo
Introduction
The circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Commission of 
Inquiry (COI) into special agricultural and business leases (SABLs) in 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) have already been described in Chapter  6. 
This chapter deals with the political ramifications of the findings and 
recommendations that were officially published at the end of 2013, and 
explores some of the factors responsible for the length of time that it took 
for the Commission to finish its work, and the length of time that it has 
since taken for the PNG government to produce a coherent response.
This chapter has two main parts. The first part contains an interview 
that I (Colin Filer) conducted with Chief Commissioner John Numapo 
in April 2014, six months after the public release of his final report.1 
The interview was conducted by email correspondence between the two 
of us. At that juncture, John had been contracted by the Australian aid 
program to strengthen the magisterial services of Solomon Islands, and 
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was therefore resident in Honiara. His responses to my questions are 
printed in italics. These responses have only been edited for the sake of 
stylistic consistency with the rest of the chapter. I have added occasional 
footnotes to his responses to clarify or query the significance of some of 
his statements. John has no responsibility for any of the other statements 
made in this chapter.
The second part of the chapter consists of an account of some of the 
more significant actions, decisions and arguments that have taken place 
since this interview was conducted, and that cast some light on the PNG 
government’s response to the recommendations made in John’s report 
and  that of his fellow commissioner, Nicholas Mirou. This shows that 
there is no clear direction to the policy process in which the COI was 
embedded, and leads to some rather depressing conclusions about the rule 
of law in PNG.
An Interview with John Numapo, April 2014
COLIN:
Can you tell us what factors delayed the tabling of the Commission’s 
final reports in the national parliament for a period of 18 months after 
the Commission completed its hearings in March 2012?
JOHN:
Let me start by giving you some background to the whole inquiry itself 
and how we structured it. The COI adopted a ‘four-phased’ approach in 
this SABL inquiry. The first phase was the start of the inquiry in which 
we focused mainly on receiving preliminary evidence from the principal 
agencies of government responsible for the management and administration of 
SABLs. They included the Department of Lands and Physical Planning; the 
Department of Agriculture and Livestock; the Department of Environment 
and Conservation; the PNG Forest Authority; and the PNG Investment 
Promotion Authority. We also received evidence relating to the legislative and 
policy frameworks that govern the grant of SABLs. The second phase involved 
provincial hearings whereby the COI was divided into three teams headed 
by a commissioner and dispatched to the provinces where the SABLs were 
located to conduct on-site hearings as well as inspecting the actual SABL sites. 
Phase three was the final hearing conducted by the commissioners separately or 
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jointly as appropriate to consolidate and adjust evidence gathered during both 
the preliminary hearings and the provincial hearings. The fourth and final 
phase involved the final submissions by counsels assisting the inquiry and the 
write-up of the final reports by the commissioners.
Phases 2 and 3 activities were disrupted by funding issues, lack of resources 
and other critical intervening factors that affected the inquiry. The 2012 
national elections, the political in-fighting, the change of government, the 
lock-down of the Government Printing Office that housed the COI and 
the ‘threat’ by the new in-coming government to stop the SABL inquiry were 
some events that directly affected the inquiry. The COI was virtually locked 
out of the building during the political impasse.2 This created a lot anxiety 
and uncertainties amongst the members of the COI. The interruptions went 
on for weeks. Delays in funding support resulted in personnel engaged by the 
COI not being paid for months, resulting in people not turning up for work. 
In fact, the government still owes the commissioners and members of the legal 
and technical teams 15 months of unpaid allowances and salaries that are 
still yet to be paid to this day. The delay in the production of the recorded 
transcripts to assist the commissioners with their final write-ups, and the lack 
of cooperation and display of arrogance by certain members of the COI, also 
affected the completion of the final reports by the given deadline. Certain 
factors that contributed towards the delay were totally beyond our control and 
were not of our making.
Due to the above factors, I then wrote to the Chief Secretary and the Prime 
Minister seeking extension of time to submit the final reports. The Prime 
Minister granted us an extension to the end of June 2013. With respect to the 
delay in presenting the final reports to Parliament, this is a matter entirely 
within the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and I cannot 
comment on that. What I can say is that we have delivered the final reports 
by the given deadline. The final reports were submitted to the government on 
26 June 2013.
2  John appears to be referring to the constitutional crisis that occurred in December 2011, when 
the Supreme Court ruled that the parliamentary vote by which Peter O’Neill had replaced Michael 
Somare as Prime Minister had been unconstitutional. This produced a standoff that lasted for several 
weeks as each man tried to assert his legal authority over the executive arm of the state. O’Neill won 
this battle because he retained his parliamentary majority, but the authority of the Supreme Court was 
seriously weakened.
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COLIN:
To what extent do you think that the failure of one of the three 
commissioners to submit his own final report has made it difficult for the 
government to implement the Commission’s recommendations? What is 
to be done about the 30 or more leases which Commissioner Jerewai 
investigated, given that his recommendations are not available to  the 
government?
JOHN:
Apart from the delay in submitting the final reports, as alluded to above, 
Commissioner Alois Jerewai’s failure to submit his final report is the biggest 
set-back to what could have been a very successful inquiry. Commissioner 
Jerewai blamed lack of funding as a reason for not submitting his report, 
which I think is an absolute nonsense. If Commissioner Nicholas Mirou and 
I can complete our final reports, despite financial difficulties, surely Jerewai 
could have done the same.
Failure by one commissioner to submit his final report should not be an excuse 
for the government not to implement the findings and recommendations of 
the two other commissioners. There are two things the government can do 
under the circumstances. First, appoint a commissioner to conduct a fresh 
inquiry into the 30 or so SABLs, especially in East and West New Britain 
provinces and Gulf Province. Secondly, drawing some general conclusions 
from the findings of the two final reports, the government could assume that 
the 30 or so leases were also unlawfully issued, like the majority of the other 
SABLs around the country, and therefore should be revoked. However, this 
presumption is risky and the government may have to carefully consider that.
COLIN:
At the beginning of your own final report, you recommended ‘that the 
current SABL setup be done away entirely’ (Numapo 2013:  4), but 
towards the end, you recommended that special agricultural and business 
leases should ‘be retained … [as] a national development and customary 
landowner empowerment mechanism’ (ibid.:  255). In his statement to 
Parliament in September 2013, the Prime Minister himself expressed 
some surprise that you had recommended retention of the ‘SABL setup’ 
after finding that only four of the leases investigated by yourself and 
Commissioner Mirou had genuine landowner consent. Can you explain 
this apparent contradiction in your recommendations?
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JOHN:
The overall recommendation of the COI is that the current SABL setup is 
a complete failure and must be abolished. The current setup is riddled with 
loopholes, shortfalls and inadequacies—so much so that corrupt public 
officials and unscrupulous individuals are taking advantage of it to enrich 
themselves. There is simply no transparency and accountability in the whole 
process, starting from application to processing to the final issuing of SABLs. 
Although well intended, the SABL concept has lost its meaning over time and 
is no longer serving the purpose for which it was set. The SABL scheme was 
conceived as an empowerment option for customary landowners that would 
facilitate economic opportunities for landowners. It has lost its focus over time 
as a system and a process to offer financial incentives to the landowners and at 
the same time protect their interests over their land.
What I am trying to say on page 255 is that SABL as a ‘concept’ (not necessarily 
the SABL itself ) is good and should be continued in some form (other than 
the current setup) as it is all about empowering landowners to participate 
meaningfully in the economic development of the country by freeing up their 
customary land through the lease-leaseback scheme. Ninety-five per cent of 
the land in PNG is tied up under customary ownership, and unless that is 
unlocked, there will be very little in terms of real progress and development. 
The SABL scheme was introduced because of the long delay in the introduction 
of customary land registration and the tenure conversion of customary land. 
Customary land registration was vigorously opposed by the people for fear of 
losing their land outright. Tenure converted land was subject to very strict 
limitations which discouraged banks and other lenders from lending money 
using land as security.3 The SABL concept seems to provide a good guarantee 
for the banks (Numapo 2013: 9). It is for this reason that I am suggesting that 
whilst the concept (lease-leaseback) is good, the abuse and hijack of the current 
SABL setup has grossly tarnished the integrity of what was once a noble and 
well-intended concept to allow landowners to partner government in national 
development through the use of their customary land whilst retaining residual 
rights to usage and ownership. The time is now ripe for introduction of 
another viable alternative mechanism that is risk-free, robust, transparent, 
and landowner friendly.
3  This is a reference to the Land (Tenure Conversion) Act that dates from the period of Australian 
colonial administration and allows for the conversion of customary land to individual freehold titles. 
Very little use has been made of this legislation, and the National Land Development Taskforce 
recommended that it be repealed (GoPNG 2007: 96).
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COLIN:
At the beginning of your final report (Numapo 2013: 5), you also talk 
about the need for a ‘policy platform [that] will set the foundation for 
harmonizing the legal framework and pave the way for the State to access 
customary land in a non-threatening and landowner friendly way’. At the 
end of your report (ibid.:  261), you call this a ‘National Land Policy 
Harmonization exercise’. What do you think is the single most essential 
ingredient of such a policy platform?
JOHN:
The policy platform is first and foremost intended to safeguard and protect the 
interests of the landowners and also to make sure that customary land is not 
totally alienated under the various acquisition schemes. The current piecemeal 
and ad hoc approach to acquiring customary land has caused more harm 
than good because of the different laws and policies that govern it. We hope 
that the ‘harmonisation of laws’ and ‘standardisation of practice’ will bring 
about some degree of consistency, clarity, parity and regularity in the various 
land acquisition processes. The policy will provide the basis for streamlining, 
harmonising and synchronising the various different practices and procedures 
on ‘acquisition of customary land by agreement’ for economic development, as 
in the case of SABLs (under Sections 11 and 102 of the Land Act 1996) and 
‘compulsory acquisition’ of customary land (under Section 12) for national 
development purposes that are currently managed under different schemes and 
governed by separate legislations and policies. A number of land acquisition 
schemes were introduced over the years for ‘specific purposes’ regulated by 
different sets of rules and guidelines. Legislative and policy frameworks were 
done on a piecemeal basis and were, in most cases, ad hoc. Consequently, many 
land acquisition schemes were created with no proper oversight and control by 
the relevant agencies of government, resulting in abuses and manipulations 
by corrupt government officials and unscrupulous foreigners. We believe that, 
by harmonising the laws and standardising the practices, we will remove 
ambiguities and generality in the laws and practices. The outcome will then 
inform the National Land Policy as part of the overall reforms going forward.
COLIN:
At the end of your report (Numapo 2013:  264), you say that special 
agricultural and business leases should be reserved for so-called 
‘high-impact’ projects that need large areas of land. But, by my calculation, 
98 per cent of the land that has been covered by such leases since 1996 
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has been devoted to projects with a size of more than 10,000 hectares, 
which their supporters would all probably describe as ‘high-impact’ 
projects. So how do you expect the process of acquiring customary land 
for projects of this kind to be different and better in future?
JOHN:
Let me put some background to it before I attempt to answer the question. 
There are two types of permission to clear forests. Type 1 is the timber authority 
issued by Provincial Forest Management Committees to carry out ‘small scale 
agriculture projects’ or other land use pursuant to Section 87 of the Forestry 
Act 1991. Type 2 is the forest clearing authority (FCA) to undertake ‘large 
scale forest clearance’ issued by the National Forest Board (NFB) pursuant to 
Sections 90A, 90B, 90C and 90D of the Forestry Act. For SABL purposes, 
the FCA applies in most cases. Sections 90A and 90B deal with large-scale 
conversion of forest for agriculture and other land use, whilst 90C and 90D 
deal with large-scale conversion of forest for major road construction projects. 
These are sometimes referred to as ‘high-impact’ projects.
The Forestry Act requires forest clearance (clear felling) for SABL purposes 
to be limited to 500 hectares initially on application. This is to ensure that 
planned agriculture projects are commenced on the initial 500 hectares before 
the developer moves on to the next 500 hectares. The developer is required to 
apply to increase the number of hectares, and based on proper assessment and 
technical advice provided by the Department of Agriculture and Livestock 
(DAL), the NFB may increase it up to 5,000 hectares. However, in many 
instances we found that the developers and FCA holders are carrying out ‘clear 
felling’ well outside of the 500 hectares covered by their FCA. This is outright 
illegal and a direct breach of Section 90A of the Forestry Act. DAL has been 
allowing that clearance to go beyond the required 500 hectares for ‘practical 
purposes’ until the maximum land required for the agriculture project is cleared 
instead of stop-start for every 500 hectares. In addition, the developers are 
allowed to sell logs of merchantable value to ‘raise capital’ for the agriculture 
component. Again, this is unlawful as developers must have sufficient starting 
capital before getting an SABL in the first place.
To answer the question: yes it is true that the majority of the land that has 
been acquired is in SABLs that are over 10,000 hectares, and most of these 
are referred to as ‘high-impact’ projects because they not only involve large 
areas of land, but are often associated with large-scale agriculture projects or 
road line projects that impact on the people and the immediate environment. 
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The practice to increase the hectares is currently condoned and promoted by 
DAL and the PNG Forest Authority despite the fact it is unlawful. DAL 
considers that to be a more ‘realistic and practical’ approach for agriculture 
projects as they require land of more than 10,000 hectares. The fact of the 
matter is that this practice will no doubt continue into the future as it is 
considered to be a more viable option and an attraction to current and 
potential investors. What we need to do right now is to properly distinguish 
between large-scale and small-scale forest clearance permits and introduce 
different monitoring guidelines for different types of permit to avoid applying 
the same rules for the two as their impacts are different. This also applies to 
lease conditions and the types of benefits, royalties and compensation that are 
paid to the landowners. Those operating large-scale agriculture projects should 
pay more in consideration of the area of land obtained under the SABL, and 
should be more accountable under a set of stringent guidelines to ensure that 
they develop the agriculture projects as required under the terms of the lease 
and not use it as a pretext for logging operations.
There are currently no FCA monitoring guidelines nor an oversight committee 
to monitor the FCAs that are issued. It is for this reason that we recommend 
DAL to implement as a matter of priority the recommendations of the National 
Agriculture Council to develop proper FCA Project Approval and Monitoring 
Guidelines and to establish an oversight committee to monitor all FCAs and 
ensure that they comply with the guidelines and the requirements of the law. 
Oversight and monitoring of the FCAs is seriously lacking at the present time.
COLIN:
Some senior public servants have been saying that the government is afraid 
to revoke those leases under which subleases have been granted to foreign 
investors because of the risk that these investors will sue the government 
for compensation and the courts will grant their claims. How would you 
assess the validity of this argument?
JOHN:
I am not surprised at all to hear this. Two separate incidents happened during 
the course of the inquiry. First, I was approached by a very senior minister of 
the current government to carefully consider the ramifications of revoking the 
SABLs that were issued to foreign investors because of the possibility of legal 
action against the State for compensation due to loss of business. The second 
incident involved yet another senior minister of the current government telling 
me in no uncertain terms that the final reports of the inquiry ‘will not see the 
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light of day and will be swept under the carpet’. He went on to say that my 
commissioners and I are wasting our time conducting the inquiry and writing 
up the reports as it will not be tabled in Parliament and the government has 
engaged a Queen’s Counsel from Australia to go to court to stop the inquiry. 
I told the two senior ministers that I and my commissioners have a duty to do 
as required by our terms of reference, and we would continue with the inquiry 
and deliver the final reports containing our findings and recommendations as 
we owe it to the people of PNG (especially the customary landowners) to do so. 
No amount of pressure or threats would deter us from delivering the reports.
Putting one and one together, this is probably the reason why the following 
things happened:
1. The Prime Minister went public and threatened to refer me and my other 
two commissioners to the Fraud Squad to investigate us (for what reasons 
we do not know to this day).
2. There was delay in his tabling of the final reports in Parliament despite the 
fact that the reports were already submitted to him two months previously 
(minus Jerewai’s report).
3. There was criticism of the final reports and misleading of Parliament on 
the findings and recommendations of the COI.
4. There was refusal to pay 15  months’ worth of salaries owed to the 
commissioners and other COI staff.
The findings of the inquiry are very clear, including the recommendations. 
Over 95 per cent of the SABLs were unlawfully issued and must be revoked. 
They cannot lawfully stand in law. Foreign investors, politicians and corrupt 
public officials have all conspired and colluded to create bad leases and titles 
over customary land, as was discovered during the inquiry. They are all equally 
liable and should be investigated and prosecuted as some of them have been 
named in the reports. The government has no choice but to revoke the SABLs 
that were illegally issued, as has been recommended. The issue of compensation 
is a different matter altogether, and should not be used as an excuse not to 
implement the recommendations of the COI. The threat of compensation 
claims against the government is yet another excuse not to implement the 
recommendations.
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COLIN:
In March 2011, I wrote a brief for the PNG Department of Environment 
and Conservation in which I identified eight current government ministers 
and several other members of parliament who appeared to have vested 
interests in the grant of SABLs in their own electorates. The current make-
up of the national parliament does not seem to be all that different. Given 
the extent of these vested interests, why do you think the government 
set up the COI in the first place, and what makes you think that there is 
enough political will to implement its recommendations?
JOHN:
It’s all about ‘political correctness’ I guess. The setting up of the COI was 
a reaction to the public outcry over the manner in which SABLs were issued 
for dubious agriculture and business purposes and instead used as a licence 
for full-scale logging operations over large virgin forest tracts. It attracted 
international attention following the James Cook University conference in 
March of 2011. The government had to act quickly to ‘save face’ and it decided 
to set up the COI. For the politicians and those in government there was a lot 
at stake. It’s all about balancing the competing interests of foreign investors on 
the one hand and landowners on the other. It is common knowledge that some 
political parties are funded by foreign investors, particularly those involved 
in logging operations in the country. Many of the SABLs were initiated and 
driven by politicians as part of ‘bringing development’ into their electorates. 
There was evidence of political pressure, influence and interference in the 
granting of SABLs. This went up as far as the Prime Minister, as in the case 
of Bewani (Portion 160C in West Sepik Province) and Changhae Tapioka 
(Portions 519C, 444C, 446C, 517C, 518C, 521C and 520C in Central 
Province).
Despite the assurances from Prime Minister Peter O’Neill that the 
recommendations of the COI will be fully implemented, no action has 
been taken to date to revoke the SABLs that were unlawfully issued, as 
recommended by the COI. I do not know how long it will take to implement 
the recommendations as the landowners are already tired of waiting. I think 
the government is trying to buy time until people forget about it (unfortunately, 
this is becoming a trend now in PNG).
I have my own doubts about the genuineness of the government’s promise 
to revoke the unlawfully issued SABLs. There is too much at stake, and given 
the current political make-up and the fact that many of those who were named 
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in the reports are part of the current government, it will be a difficult task 
for the Prime Minister to live up to his word to revoke the unlawfully issued 
SABLs. And based on that, I do not know if there is enough political will 
to implement the recommendations. I doubt it.
COLIN:
At one point in your final report (Numapo 2013: 236), you said that the 
Commission ‘received evidence of undue “political pressures” being put 
on government officials by senior ministers and politicians to fast-track 
SABL applications and issue titles’. You gave a couple of examples of such 
pressures being applied. However, I wonder if you felt constrained by your 
terms of reference from telling a more detailed story about the extent to 
which such pressures were driving public servants to neglect their duties.
JOHN:
I am reluctant to go into any more details than what I have already stated in 
the report, as this might be the subject of another investigation to be carried 
out in the future, and as we have recommended for such to take place. I do 
not want to pre-empt or speculate on anything at this point in time. There 
may also be legal implications. The only thing I can say is that the evidence we 
received during the inquiry suggests that pressure was applied to government 
officials to short-cut the processes and procedures to issue SABLs. Threats were 
issued to sack them if they failed to act, and promises of promotion and a ‘good 
life’ were also made. I will stop there.
COLIN:
In September 2013, Prime Minister Peter O’Neill announced that the 
Minister for Lands would appoint a task force to establish a new legal 
framework to protect the interests of customary landowners. In February 
2014, he said that the ministers of lands, forests and agriculture would 
oversee the process of cancelling the leases that were acquired illegally. 
Nothing more has been said in public about the way this process is being 
organised. How do you think it should be organised?
JOHN:
This is totally absurd and ridiculous. It defies logic and does not make any 
sense at all. These are the very people who screwed up the SABL scheme in 
the first place. The whole SABL process was hijacked and mismanaged under 
their watch. I am at a loss to understand why the ministers for lands, forestry 
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and agriculture have been given the task to implement the recommendations 
of the COI when it was their respective departments that were responsible for 
the management and administration of SABLs, and that messed up the whole 
SABL scheme. Adverse findings were made against these government agencies, 
including their respective ministers, so how on earth do we expect them to 
effectively implement the recommendations of the COI? The Prime Minister 
must re-think the composition of the task force and appoint some independent 
individuals and entities to implement the recommendations.
I wrote to the Prime Minister when presenting my final report and suggested 
to him that an independent body such as the National Land Development 
Program (NLDP) be given the task to study the recommendations of the 
COI and advise the government on how to implement the recommendations, 
including the cancellation of the illegally issued SABLs. The NLDP is a multi-
government entity made up of representatives from other government agencies, 
but also including civil society, facilitated by the National Research Institute. 
It was set up five years ago to initiate some reforms across the board on land 
management and administration generally, including acquisitions through 
the various processes. The NLDP has made some headway on some reforms 
in recent times and is currently ongoing. I made some references to the NLDP 
towards the end of my final report (Numapo 2013: 262–3).
COLIN:
During the course of the Commission’s hearings, you and the other 
commissioners were sometimes at pains to point out that you were not 
pursuing an agenda set by local or international environmental non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) or ‘greenies’. Do you think that the 
extent of lobbying by these groups could actually be giving the government 
an excuse to ignore the Commission’s recommendations?
JOHN:
I would say ‘yes’ but I think it would be one of the many reasons why the 
government would ignore the recommendations or will be slow at implementing 
them. The SABL scandal has no doubt put PNG on the world map, with 
NGOs and greenies all over the world criticising the PNG government for the 
abuse that is going on and not doing anything to stop it. It is a big agenda, 
especially in the context of global warming and carbon pollution.
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During the course of the inquiry we received a lot of requests from NGOs 
and greenies to make representations at the inquiry and give evidence. 
Unfortunately, our terms of reference did not allow for that as the inquiry 
was more focused on landowners and government agencies that were expected 
to appear and give evidence. We did not have the discretion to invite the 
public at large, and also time was not on our side. NGOs and others have 
had a field day in pre-empting the outcome of the inquiry, using social media 
to discuss specific SABLs and the corrupt activities that went on. One of the 
dailies (the Post-Courier) had a field day by publishing the views of NGOs 
and the greenies nearly seven days a week when the inquiry was still running, 
prompting Rimbunan Hijau (owners of the other daily, The National) to 
threaten to take the Post-Courier to court for defamation and for pre-empting 
the outcome of the inquiry whilst it was still going on.4 It was a real circus, 
and it could have affected us one way or the other, as those of us involved in 
the COI also read papers and access social media sites. That is why we were at 
pains to explain that, despite the writings and the newspaper articles, we were 
not influenced one way or the other, as we have restricted ourselves to making 
our findings based on the evidence before us, as adduced through the formal 
hearings of the inquiry. I am glad to say that the final reports reflected the 
kind of findings one would have expected, based on the evidence presented to 
the inquiry. Evidence given before the inquiry was on oath and was subjected 
to the usual examination in accordance with the rules of evidence.
COLIN:
Some people have argued that amendments recently made to the Land 
Groups Incorporation Act and the Land Registration Act, which make 
it possible for incorporated land groups to directly register titles to their 
customary land and then grant subleases to investors, make the whole 
of the ‘lease-leaseback scheme’ redundant, so all reference to special 
agricultural and business leases should simply be removed from the Land 
Act. What are your thoughts on this subject?
JOHN:
I disagree. The recent introduction of the Land Groups Incorporation Act 
and the Land Registration Act is a policy initiative of the government to give 
the landowners the option to voluntarily register titles to their customary land 
4  This is a reference to the Greenpeace campaign against the Sigite-Mukus project in East New 
Britain Province (see Chapters 6 and 7, this volume).
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so that the issue of titles is clearly settled before the granting of a sublease, 
whether it be for an SABL or for other purposes. However, it is not clear 
if  this  will replace altogether the ‘lease-leaseback’ scheme and make it 
redundant. The option to voluntarily register the title must interface with the 
concept of the SABL regime so that the lease-leaseback scheme can continue 
for large-scale, high-impact, intensive land-based development, as I alluded to 
earlier. Voluntary land registration is best suited as a landowner empowerment 
option for more general land use (Numapo 2013: 262). Removing the SABL 
scheme from the Land Act, and replacing it entirely with a new scheme that is 
untested, is too risky. The SABL as a concept offers opportunities to customary 
landowners to participate in economic development through a lease-leaseback 
arrangement, which in itself already guarantees the return of the land after 
the term of the project has lapsed. The title reverts back to the customary 
landowners, and that in itself is a form of security. The area that needs to be 
looked at is the reduction of the lease period from 99 years to something like 
50 years as the maximum period for the lease.
COLIN:
In a number of cases investigated by the Commission, it turned out that 
the landowners opposing the grant of leases to one particular landowner 
company and its preferred foreign investor were mainly interested in 
having the leases granted to a different landowner company and another 
foreign investor. In some cases, you suggested that the competing factions 
should just sit down, sort out their differences, and come up with a plan 
on which both sides could agree. As a former chief magistrate, what is 
your view of the local-level disputes that seem to make land issues so 
intractable in PNG?
JOHN:
Usually the village court magistrates would try to resolve such a dispute. It is 
not a land dispute per se, and therefore cannot come before the formal court 
system because the land is communally owned. It is only a difference of opinion 
between different members of the landowning clans with respect to which 
foreign investor they prefer. Unfortunately, it seems that even the village court 
magistrates are taking sides when dealing with such issues, as it really has 
got to do with the benefits that flow from the deal, which only adds to the 
problem. The land issue is always very sensitive and runs deep, with family 
ties and connections coming into play. We try to encourage the settlement of 
such disputes through the usual Melanesian ways, where everybody sits down 
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together and talks through things. We believe that, if they resolve the dispute 
using their own traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, the result will 
stick. They will also honour it and will abide by it. If it is imposed on them, 
it might lead to further disputes.
Another Cabinet Decision
When Peter O’Neill presented the two final reports of the COI to the 
national parliament in September 2013, he declared that ‘[w]e will 
no longer watch on as foreign owned companies come in and con our 
landowners, chop down our forests and then take the proceeds offshore’ 
(Nicholas 2013a). But what was he going to do about it? He initially 
undertook to establish a ministerial committee that would recommend 
an appropriate course of action within a period of two months (Nicholas 
2013b), but when he tabled the reports in Parliament, he said that the 
Minister for Lands and Physical Planning would appoint a taskforce to 
design a new legal framework for the conversion of customary land into 
leasehold land (Nicholas 2013a). It was not clear whether these were 
meant to be two distinct initiatives, nor was there any indication of how 
the new legal framework might relate to the one that had come into effect 
at the start of the previous year.
Nothing more was heard of the committee or the taskforce until 
February 2014, when the Prime Minister told a radio audience that the 
committee would be chaired by the Forests Minister, Patrick Pruaitch, 
and the other members would be the Lands Minister, Benny Allan, and 
the Agriculture Minister, Tommy Tomscoll (Nicholas 2014). This news 
prompted the Eco-Forestry Forum to call for the removal of Pruaitch 
from the whole process on the grounds that putting him in charge of it 
would be like ‘giving the keys of the blood bank to Dracula’ (Act Now 
2014b). It is not clear whether this observation was based on the belief 
that any forests minister would be reluctant to cancel forest clearing 
authorities or on the fact that two such permits had been allocated to 
agro-forestry projects in this minister’s own electorate. In any case, it does 
not seem to have been a factor in O’Neill’s subsequent decision to give 
Pruaitch the treasury portfolio and appoint Douglas Tomuriesa as the 
new Forests Minister. Tomuriesa convened a meeting of the Ministerial 
Committee in May 2014, and its recommendations formed the basis of 
a cabinet decision made in June (Act Now 2014c).
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On the question of how to rectify the previous abuse of the lease-leaseback 
scheme, there were three key elements to this decision:
• all SABLs that John Numapo and Nicholas Mirou had recommended 
for revocation were to be revoked;
• the Ministerial Committee was granted leave to make further 
recommendations on what should be done with SABLs on which 
Alois Jerewai had failed to report; and
• a Special SABL Taskforce was to be established under the Forests 
Ministry, reporting to the Ministerial Committee, with a remit to: 
(a) address matters raised by the findings of the COI; (b) implement 
recommendations of the COI; (c) investigate SABLs on which the 
COI made no recommendations; and (d) implement further decisions 
of the National Executive Council and the Ministerial Committee 
with regard to SABLs.
In order to ensure that such abuse could not be repeated:
• the Lands Department was directed to keep following the previous 
instruction not to grant any more SABLs, and the NFB was directed 
to keep following the previous instruction not to grant any more forest 
clearing authorities over areas covered by SABLs;
• the Land Act was to be amended to remove the provisions allowing for 
the grant of SABLs; and
• administration of the land group incorporation process was to be 
transferred from the Lands Department to the Investment Promotion 
Authority.
Despite the length of time that had elapsed since the Prime Minister 
promised to act on the COI’s findings, this decision seemed at first sight 
to satisfy most of the demands that had been made by various members of 
the land grab policy network, including members of the anti-dependency 
group.5 It may have fallen short of their demand for an immediate 
cancellation of all forest clearing authorities, but it still ignored an earlier 
ruling of the National Court that said the National Executive Council 
did not have the power to prevent the NFB from granting such permits 
5  The decision to remove Sections 11 and 102 from the Land Act actually went beyond the 
recommendations contained in John Numapo’s final report.
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in the first place.6 Tiffany Twivey (formerly Nonggor), who had been a 
member of the conservation policy community in her capacity as legal 
adviser to the Eco-Forestry Forum, but was now Peter O’Neill’s legal 
adviser, welcomed the cabinet decision as a great victory for the people 
of PNG and proof of the Prime Minister’s good faith (Act Now 2014d).
But then something strange happened. In July 2014, the Office of the 
Registrar of Titles in the Lands Department published notices in the 
national newspapers that summoned the 22 corporate entities holding 
29 SABLs to return the original copies of their leases in compliance 
with the cabinet decision. Fourteen agro-forestry projects were affected 
by this order, but only three of these had forest clearing authorities that 
were still valid.7 Needless to say, the notices made no mention of the 26 
leases on which Alois Jerewai had failed to report, but they also left out 
another 20 leases on which the other two commissioners had provided 
recommendations. Some of these 20 leases had already been invalidated 
in one way or another, and some of the smaller ones did not exhibit the 
sort of abuse that would warrant their cancellation, but eight of them were 
associated with major agro-forestry projects, and these eight leases should 
have been revoked if the cabinet decision was going to be implemented 
(see Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 Agro-forestry projects whose leases were recommended for 
revocation in June 2013 but were not listed for revocation in July 2014.
Province Project SABL area (ha)
Central Abeda Integrated Agriculture 11,700
Oro Musa‑Pongani Integrated Agro‑Forest 320,060
East Sepik Angoram (Marienberg) Integrated Agriculture 25,600
West Sepik Aitape West Integrated Agriculture 47,626
West Sepik Bewani Oil Palm Development 139,909
West Sepik Nuku Integrated Agroforestry 239,810
New Ireland Danfu Integrated Agriculture 24,581
New Ireland Central New Hanover Integrated Agroforestry 56,592
Source: The National, 18 July 2014 .
6  Musa Century Ltd v O’Neill [2013] PGNC 152. The case against the state had been mounted by 
the developers of the largest agro-forestry project in Oro Province. It is not clear whether this project 
has ever been granted a forest clearing authority.
7  Oddly enough, the list of leases to be surrendered included the one granted to Mekeo Hinterland 
Holdings Ltd, which had already been revoked by the National Court in 2010.
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It was not immediately obvious what these eight projects had in common 
that might explain their omission from the list. Six of them had been 
granted forest clearing authorities that were still valid, five were exporting 
logs in 2012, four were doing so in 2013, and three were still doing so 
in 2014. One of the two projects that exported logs in all three of those 
years was the Bewani project in West Sepik Province, but this project 
was sponsored by Belden Namah, and he was now an enemy of the 
Prime Minister. The other project that exported logs in all three years 
was the Central New Hanover project in New Ireland Province, but this 
project, like the Danfu project in the same province, was sponsored by 
a former Provincial Premier, Pedi Anis, whose influence over the relevant 
government ministers was equally tenuous. Perhaps some clue may be 
found in a statement attributed to the Prime Minister a few days after 
the cabinet decision, in which he said that ‘those SABLs with genuine 
investors and genuine partnerships with the landowners should work 
through the Lands Department to acquire new leases to enable them to 
continue their projects’ (Miae 2014), but this does not reflect the decision 
that was actually made. One might also speculate about the capacity of 
the various project sponsors or developers to influence the officials in the 
Lands Department who were responsible for making up the public notices, 
but one might equally suppose that the latter were guilty of that same 
negligence for which they had been taken to task by the commissioners. 
The Forests Minister was later quoted as saying that some SABLs were 
not revoked because of the amount of money already invested in their 
development (Tlozek 2015), but this point would hardly seem to apply to 
the two leases from which no logs had yet been extracted.
The Twists and Turns of Turubu
Another clue to the mystery surrounding the implementation of the 
cabinet decision may be found in the political and legal history of one big 
operational agro-forestry project whose SABL was included in the public 
notice issued by the Lands Department. This was the Wewak Turubu 
Integrated Agriculture Project, generally known as the Turubu project, 
which operates on a lease of more than 100,000 hectares in the vicinity 
of Wewak, the capital of East Sepik Province. This is one of several agro-
forestry projects, in various stages of development, that have generally 
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been endorsed by local politicians, including the former Prime Minister, 
Michael Somare, as part of a grand plan to create what is sometimes called 
an ‘economic corridor’ running through the middle of the province.8
The Turubu project has been established on an SABL that was granted 
to a  company called Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Ltd in 2008. This is 
actually a joint venture between a local landowner company called 
Limawo Holdings Ltd and a foreign investor called Wewak Agriculture 
Development Ltd. The project secured a forest clearing authority in 2009, 
and more than 400,000 cubic metres of logs were exported from the area 
over the following five years. Like the Sigite-Mukus project in East New 
Britain, this project has attracted a good deal of attention from members 
of the conservation policy community, first because the area is home to an 
eco-forestry project that has served as a conduit for protests by dissident 
landowners, and second because it has been claimed that the foreign 
investor is one of PNG’s well-established logging companies.9 When 
Nicholas Mirou conducted his hearings in Wewak in February  2012, 
he was harassed and abused by supporters of the agro-forestry project 
because they thought he was secretly in league with the dissidents 
(Mirou 2013: 831–2).
It seems that two different groups of dissident landowners took legal 
action to get the SABL revoked by the National Court, the first in 2011, 
the second in 2012 (Sheila Sukwianomb, personal communication, 
December 2014). The first group obtained a restraining order to halt the 
logging operation in May 2012 (Matthias 2012), but it does not seem 
to have had much effect. It was the second group that eventually won its 
case in July 2014, when Justice Gavara-Nanu nullified the SABL on the 
grounds that it breached the provisions of the Land Act and the National 
Constitution.10 This judgement was delivered during the interval between 
8  Much of the inspiration for this plan came from Sepik migrants who were involved in the 
development of the existing oil palm schemes in West New Britain.
9  The logging company in question is WTK Realty Ltd, which has held concessions in West Sepik 
Province for many years. Its purported link to Wewak Agriculture Development Corporation Ltd was 
first aired in the Greenpeace report, where the two companies were said to share a common address 
in Port Moresby (Winn 2012: 33). A more complex set of corporate connections was described in 
a subsequent report by Oxfam Australia, which aimed to hold Westpac Bank accountable for the 
Turubu project because of its financial relationship with WTK Realty Ltd (Oxfam 2014: 16). There 
is no firm evidence to substantiate these claims. The two companies have offices in Port Moresby 
that are close to each other but are not identical. The connections described in the Oxfam report are 
supposedly based on evidence provided to the COI, but the transcripts of the relevant hearings show 
that this evidence has been misinterpreted.
10  Maniwa v Malijiwi [2014] PGNC 25.
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the cabinet decision and the publication of the notices demanding the 
surrender of 29 leases, so it might perhaps explain why the Turubu lease 
was one of them. However, the judgement attracted no publicity at the 
time, and there is another plausible explanation for its inclusion.
One of the new entrants to the national parliament in 2012 was Richard 
Maru, who was elected to represent Yangoru-Saussia District in East 
Sepik Province. He had an interest in the Turubu project because the 
lease included part of his electorate, and he lost no time in voicing his 
suspicion that the developers were more interested in taking out the logs 
than putting in the oil palm (Anon. 2012). This initially led members of 
the anti-dependency group to hope that Richard Maru would be another 
champion of their cause, like Governor Gary Juffa, but they were soon 
disappointed, because it turned out that he was planning to develop 
another oil palm project in partnership with a different foreign investor. 
The focal point of this project, which is commonly known as the Sepik 
Plains project, would be a nucleus estate constructed on a fairly large 
portion of government land in his own electorate that should not have 
been included in the Turubu SABL because it had already been alienated 
by the Australian colonial administration (Anon. 2013).11 His  own 
promise to cancel the SABL and give the rest of the land back to the 
customary landowners was thus connected with his plan for them to 
become smallholders producing raw material for the mill to be built by 
his own development partners. In his capacity as Minister for Trade and 
Industry, Maru was also able to secure a major grant from the Treasury to 
subsidise the development of his own scheme. So he could well have taken 
some pains to ensure that the Turubu lease would be cancelled by the 
Lands Department, regardless of what transpired in the National Court.
From a strictly legal point of view, the matter now got quite confusing. 
Limawo Holdings and its own development partner, Wewak Agriculture 
Development Ltd, lodged separate appeals to the Supreme Court to 
overturn the ruling of the National Court, while the landowner company 
teamed up with the East Sepik Provincial Government to launch a new 
11  The greater part of the SABL area is located in the neighbouring electorate of Wewak. Jim 
Simatab, the member of parliament who has represented this electorate in most years since 2007, has 
been an enthusiastic supporter of the Turubu project. Simatab was the Parliamentary Secretary for 
Agriculture between 2007 and 2010, and was appointed as Minister for Correctional Services after 
the national elections of 2012.
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case in the National Court to overturn the cabinet decision, and the joint 
venture company, Sepik Oil Palm Plantation Ltd, did the same thing 
(Sheila Sukwianomb, personal communication, December 2014).
To the best of my knowledge, only one of these cases had been resolved 
by the end of 2015, but this was hardly a resolution. In May 2015, 
Justice Geita began hearing the case brought by the landowner company 
and the provincial government. Three months later, he ruled that the 
recommendations of the COI should not have formed the basis for a 
cabinet decision because the national government had failed to gazette 
an instrument that would extend the lifetime of the COI beyond March 
2012.12 He also ruled that it was unreasonable of the National Executive 
Council to include the Turubu lease in the list of 29 that were cancelled in 
June 2014 without considering the amount of capital already invested in 
the project. So he reinstated the lease. However, he was careful to say that 
his own ruling had nothing to do with any future rulings of the Supreme 
Court in respect of the appeals lodged against the previous ruling of the 
National Court that cancelled this lease on grounds that were unrelated 
to the recommendations of the COI. He was also careful to say that his 
ruling did not necessarily apply to the other 28 leases that the Lands 
Department had sought to cancel in the wake of the cabinet decision.
Law, Politics and Ideology
Two years after the COI’s reports were made available to the public 
in November 2013, it was still impossible to see an end to the policy 
process from which it had emerged. It was unclear whether the national 
government  would appeal to the Supreme Court to overturn Justice 
Geita’s ruling, or simply wait to see what the Supreme Court did with 
the appeals that had already been lodged. The power of the National 
Executive Council to act on the findings of the COI was as uncertain as 
the real interest and intent of the ministers responsible for implementing 
its decisions. By the end of 2015, little more had been heard from the three 
members of the Ministerial Committee, except for an announcement 
by the Lands Minister, Benny Allan, that it would not be possible to 
cancel existing SABLs without enacting some new legislation that his 
departmental staff would draft ‘as  soon as possible’ (Anon. 2015a). 
12  Limawo Holdings Ltd v Numapo [2015] PGNC 155.
KASTOM, PROPERTy AND IDEOLOGy
272
The ‘Special SABL Taskforce’ seems to have been established at the end 
of 2014, but then became an ‘SABL Implementation Taskforce’ reporting 
directly to the head of the Prime Minister’s Department (Anon. 2015b). 
The recommendations of this body were due to be submitted to the 
National Executive Council in October 2015, but they had not been 
made public by the end of that year. To judge by notices published in the 
National Gazette, officials in the Lands Department have not made any 
further attempt to grant additional SABLs under the current provisions of 
the Land Act, but there is no evidence that they have drafted amendments 
to the current legislation that would either get rid of those provisions or 
change the administration of the land group incorporation process.
For some members of the land grab policy network, the government’s 
failure to take decisive action on this issue is not just a sign of legal 
complexity or bureaucratic incompetence but proof of systemic 
corruption at all levels of the political establishment. For members of the 
anti-dependency group, Gary Juffa, the Governor of Oro Province, is the 
only member of parliament who has shown that he really cares about the 
rights and interests of customary landowners, and the only public servants 
who have shown a comparable concern with the ‘rule of law’ are members 
of the judiciary, including John Numapo and Nicholas Mirou. If other 
politicians and public servants have been unable to avoid the pretence of 
sharing this concern, then that is only because a new popular front has 
been mobilised to remind them of their constitutional duties.
Of course, politicians are never immune to public opinion, especially in 
a country like PNG, where roughly half of the members of parliament 
have lost their seats at each successive national election. And there is no 
doubt that members of the anti-dependency group have done a fine job 
of maintaining a semblance of public outrage through every available 
medium of communication. In this respect, special credit must go to 
Effrey Dademo, the founder of an NGO called Act Now (sometimes with 
an exclamation mark), and Rosa Koian, the campaign manager for another 
NGO, the Bismarck Ramu Group, which was born out of the ruins of 
a conservation program funded by the Global Environment Facility 
in the 1990s (van Helden 2009).13 Effrey, in particular, has performed 
a valuable service for all members of the land grab policy network by not 
13  Effrey and Rosa were two of the 18 members of the conservation policy community who 
received the email message in which Paul Barker called for a strategy to make landowners aware of the 
land grab issue back in January 2010 (see Chapter 6, this volume).
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only making regular posts to a dedicated section of the Act Now blog, 
but also harvesting and recycling information from every corner of the 
internet that serves to keep the scandal alive.
Effrey and Rosa were the primary authors of an ‘open letter to the 
Prime Minister’ that was published as an advertorial in one of the 
national newspapers in December 2013, shortly after the public release 
of the COI’s final reports, but they wrote this on behalf of a group of 
20 NGOs that formed the core of the anti-dependency group at that 
time (Act Now PNG and Bismarck Ramu Group 2013). The letter 
simply demanded that all the ‘unlawful’ leases must be revoked, the land 
covered by the leases must be returned to its customary owners, and all 
the ‘illegal’ forest clearing authorities must be cancelled. It also called for 
the COI’s reports to be referred to yet another taskforce known as Task 
Force Sweep, an agency based in the Justice Department that had been 
established around the same time that the COI started its hearings, and 
had a mandate to investigate and prosecute cases of corrupt behaviour 
on the part of politicians and public servants. By the end of 2014, this 
body had lost the support of the Prime Minister because it had started to 
investigate his own behaviour, and it never did get around to investigating 
the abuse of the lease-leaseback scheme, but the call made by the anti-
dependency group still had the effect of aligning the campaign against 
the land grab with a broader campaign supported by people whose 
concern with political corruption was not simply a function of their 
opposition to all forms of large-scale resource development. That is how 
organisations like Transparency International and Global Witness became 
part of the reconstructed land grab policy network, almost as if they were 
occupants of the space vacated by the climate policy group (see Chapter 6, 
this volume).
Some of the demands made by members of the network since the release 
of the COI’s findings have been somewhat misguided. For example, it is 
hard to justify the claim that there is anything technically ‘illegal’ about 
the grant of forest clearing authorities, and equally hard to see how these 
could simply be cancelled by the NFB without creating a legal liability 
to compensate the holders of such permits. As we have seen, the Board 
has sometimes suspended the permits of companies that failed to comply 
with their permit conditions, and it does not seem to have granted any 
new permits until the National Court ruled that the moratorium imposed 
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by the National Executive Council was itself illegal.14 In October 2014, 
Act Now teamed up with Transparency International and another local 
NGO to complain about the Board’s decision to renew the forest clearing 
authority that had been granted to the Sigite-Mukus project four years 
previously, but were told by forestry officials that nothing could be done 
so long as the leasehold arrangements were still in effect and the permit-
holder had complied with the conditions of its permit (Act Now 2014e). 
The forest clearing authority that had been granted to Albright Ltd in 
2009 does seem to have lapsed when the National Court subsequently 
nullified the SABL that had been issued to the landowner company, 
Mekeo Hinterland Holdings Ltd. But if the government had been 
successful in its defence against Albright’s claim for damages as a result 
of this ruling, that does not mean that it could have defended the breach 
of a contract in which it did have an ‘actionable statutory duty’ towards 
the other party, so if the lease had not been nullified, and the sublease was 
therefore still valid, then cancellation of the clearance permit would have 
been a risky move.
A second example of false hope is contained in the demand for Task 
Force Sweep or other organs of the state to prosecute those individuals 
whose corrupt and illegal behaviour was documented by the COI. 
The COI’s terms of reference did not really allow for an investigation 
of the chains of influence or command by which politicians got public 
servants to evade or ignore the procedures that should have established 
the consent of customary landowners to the alienation of their land. 
The commissioners found little evidence of bribery, and they made no 
specific recommendations for the prosecution of the various lands officers 
and other public servants whose negligence or incompetence was the 
focus of their investigation. Furthermore, as they often pointed out in the 
conduct of their hearings, evidence presented to a commission of inquiry 
cannot later be used as the basis for a criminal conviction, so prosecutions 
would have to be based on fresh detective work by the police. And finally, 
the sort of evidence that might be used to convict someone of ‘stealing 
14  Musa Century Ltd v Peter O’Neill and Others [2013]. PNG National Court judgement N5334, 
23 August. An ‘unidentified source’ has been cited as the basis for a claim that the Board granted 
a new forest clearing authority over 105,000 hectares of land held under an SABL in West Sepik 
Province in April 2014 (Global Witness 2014: 3). This would appear to be the Wammy project, from 
which a substantial quantity of logs was exported in 2015 (see Table 7.2, Chapter 7, this volume).
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customary land’ is actually much harder to assemble than the sort of 
evidence that Task Force Sweep or the Public Prosecutor has used to 
convict people of stealing public money.
If it is also unreasonable to expect the government to rapidly concoct some 
new piece of legislation that would instantly nullify an entire collection of 
leases and licences without risking a new round of litigation on the part of 
their current owners, it is certainly not unreasonable to ask the question 
posed by Gary Juffa, which is why government ministers, provincial 
governors, or other members of parliament have not been helping specific 
groups of landowners to take legal action in defence of their own property 
rights. There are now several cases in which the National Court has 
nullified an SABL on the grounds that some landowners did not consent 
to it, and none of these judgements has so far been overruled on appeal to 
the Supreme Court. If the COI and the media campaign have served to 
enlarge the population of landowners who have just cause for complaint 
about the loss of their property, why would their elected political leaders 
not seek to enhance their chances of re-election by helping to retrieve it?
Many members of the anti-dependency group, or the anti-corruption 
group, think the answer lies in the subordination of these political leaders 
to foreign business interests. From this assumption it follows that their 
complacency about the land grab is an affront to nationalist sentiment, 
as well as to the ‘ideology of landownership’ that counts every indigenous 
citizen as a customary landowner who should be rightly jealous of his or 
her property. But this argument barely makes sense of a political system 
in which most members of parliament represent electorates in which most 
of the voters are customary landowners living on their own land, unless it 
is also assumed that the foreign companies supply the money with which 
the politicians buy the votes of the people whose land they have conspired 
to steal.
An alternative explanation can be found in the testimonies that the 
COI itself collected from the landowners who had an interest in each 
of the areas covered by its hearings. The majority of the witnesses who 
objected to the grant of an SABL said that they were not motivated by 
opposition to whatever form of large-scale resource development had 
supposedly justified the creation of this new property right, but rather by 
their exclusion from the decision-making process by which a landowner 
company had been formed or a foreign investor had been found. In many 
cases, different landowner companies, or different factions represented 
on the board of one landowner company, had formed partnerships with 
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different investors, each one with a view to convincing their partners that 
they alone were the genuine representatives of all the customary owners 
of the land to be developed. Members of the anti-dependency group 
have construed this form competition as evidence that foreign investors 
‘use local intermediaries who often mislead people and use payments in 
cash or presents to secure consent’, while some of these intermediaries 
‘made deals with foreign companies on land that was not theirs and was 
actually used by other communities’ (Mousseau 2013:  25). However, 
those investors who appeared before the COI often appeared to be truly 
confused by the politics of landowner representation, and there is other 
evidence to indicate that many potential investors have given up and gone 
home when they could not see a way to manage this sort of political risk.15
Regardless of the power dynamics of this form of partnership and 
competition, what matters here is that politicians who aspire to be elected 
or re-elected as members of the national parliament or as presidents of local-
level governments may rationally calculate that there are more votes to be 
gained from promising some form of large-scale resource development 
than from opposing any form of large-scale resource development on the 
customary land of their constituents. This certainly seems to be the case 
in some of the provinces where large areas of customary land have been 
alienated through the lease-leaseback scheme. When the COI had just 
started to conduct its hearings, Leo Dion declared that there was no need 
for any inquiry to be conducted in East New Britain Province, of which 
he was then the Governor,16 because agro-forestry projects initiated under 
the lease-leaseback scheme had broad popular support and exemplified 
the ‘public-private partnerships’ that were an integral component of the 
provincial government’s development strategy (Anon. 2011). All of the 
elected political leaders of that province have consistently toed the same 
line, so it is not surprising that they have failed to back any legal action 
taken by groups of dissident landowners who want to get their land back. 
Indeed, the Prime Minister may have cause to be relieved that East New 
Britain was one of the three provinces covered in the hearings conducted 
by Alois Jerewai, so its agro-forestry projects have been saved from any 
immediate threat to the integrity of their land titles.
15  This is a classic example of what economists call the principal-agent problem. The landowners 
end up with developers who cannot be trusted to produce ‘real development’ because the landowner 
representatives cannot be trusted to represent the ‘true landowners’.
16  He was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Inter-Governmental Relations after 
the national elections of 2012.
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Most members of PNG’s national parliament would claim to be 
customary owners of land in their own electorates. Most of the voters in 
most electorates reside on what they think is still their customary land, 
even if the law says that it has been alienated. Only a minority of these 
electorates contain large areas of customary land that have been legally 
alienated through the lease-leaseback scheme. But most of the members 
who represent these electorates believe that their own political fortunes 
are tied to the promise that these areas will be ‘developed’, and most of the 
members who represent other electorates, where this form of alienation 
has not taken place, appear to share the same belief. But all members 
would still profess to share Gary Juffa’s concern for the rights and interests 
of customary landowners, since these are the people who constitute 
the nation.
A grand narrative of bribery and corruption does not really serve to explain 
this combination of phenomena. If it is unrealistic to portray the land grab 
policy network as a single community of interest with a common policy 
objective, it may also be unrealistic to portray the state as an overbearing, 
monolithic, corrupt and incompetent vehicle for the implementation 
of a neoliberal policy agenda (Lattas 2011). We need to bear in mind 
that national government ministers who previously pronounced their 
public support for the alienation of so many large areas of customary 
land commonly justified this process by reference to a ‘developmental’ 
agenda conceived as a nationalist alternative to the ‘neoliberal’ policy 
prescriptions of the World Bank. And in the aftermath of the COI, 
members of the anti-dependency group have quite correctly asked why 
a government that is still committed to the same agenda could possibly 
be expected to halt or reverse the process of expropriation by which it 
has been implemented. Politicians still talk up the prospects of ‘economic 
corridors’, ‘special economic zones’, ‘impact projects’ and ‘public-private 
partnerships’ in their electorates, but the neoliberal connotations of such 
terms are given another meaning in the networks of patronage through 
which they harvest the votes of customary landowners who expect their 
own leaders to deliver developers to their land. So what seems to be at 
work here is a contradiction between the ideology of landownership and 
an ideology of rural or national development that cannot be resolved at 
any level of political organisation, yet still constitutes a quite distinctive 
form of political behaviour.
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Conclusion
As noted in Chapter 6, the original reason for allowing customary 
landowners to lease their land to the state and have it leased back to a 
corporate body of their own choice was the absence of a legal mechanism 
for the direct registration of customary land titles. That hole in the 
policy framework has since been plugged with amendments to the Land 
Registration Act and the Land Groups Incorporation Act. What seems 
to have bothered John Numapo (and a number of other people) is that 
these laws may prove to be unworkable, or may only serve to ‘mobilise’ 
relatively small areas of customary land. When John said that SABLs 
should still be the mechanism of choice for what he called ‘high-impact’ 
projects needing large amounts of rural land, he had not forgotten the 
ambitious land mobilisation targets set by the Somare government in 
a number of policy and planning documents between 2002 and 2011. 
Richard Maru’s solution to this problem, which is to use a large block 
of public land to form the core of a new rural development project, 
resembles the policy adopted by the Australian colonial administration 
when it established the first big oil palm scheme in the 1960s. However, 
this solution has only limited scope for replication today, not only because 
of the concentration of such blocks in a narrow coastal belt where they 
were previously alienated for the development of copra plantations during 
the colonial period, but also because these blocks are subject to multiple 
claims of customary ownership that have only grown stronger with the 
passage of time (Filer 2014).
In the first two years after the new legislation was certified and gazetted, 
about 15,000 hectares of land had apparently been registered in the names 
of incorporated land groups, but one of the 11 titles whose registration 
was advertised in the National Gazette accounted for more than two thirds 
of this land area. More disturbing was a notice published in August 2014, 
which said that the Lands Department was intending to accept a land 
investigation report that would establish the ownership of the whole of 
one local-level government area (more than 470,000 hectares of land) by 
three incorporated land groups. This example suggests that the problem 
of consent is not simply solved by insisting that properly constituted 
land groups be the only legal entities allowed to sublease customary land 
to private investors, especially if the Lands Department is the arbiter of 
what constitutes a proper constitution. In this respect, it should be noted 
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that 10 SABLs over areas larger than 10,000  hectares were granted to 
incorporated land groups before the Commission was established, none 
of these covered an area larger than 50,000 hectares, all of them look quite 
suspicious, but only two came to the attention of the Commission.
The size of a block of land is not the only consideration here. One of 
the SABLs that was investigated by the Commission, and was included 
in the list of 29 leases that the Lands Department tried to recall in July 
2014, covered an area of roughly 25 hectares in the national capital, Port 
Moresby. Within a month of the publication of the notice of revocation, 
representatives of one local clan were complaining that officers of the 
Lands Department had certified the reincorporation of the clan that was 
implicated in the SABL without providing the legally required opportunity 
for objections to be made to its original claim to customary ownership 
of the land in question (Anon. 2014).17 This is one of several cases in 
the national capital which suggest that the capacity of some people to 
appropriate customary land claimed by other people is not so much a 
function of the land area in question as of the value of the economic 
benefits to be obtained from its development.
The recommendations of the Commission left open the possibility that 
land groups already involved in the grant of an SABL could reincorporate 
themselves under the terms of the amended legislation, register titles to 
their land, and then grant fresh subleases to investors of their choice. 
However, the operators of PNG’s existing oil palm schemes, who hold 
a number of subleases under SABLs previously granted to incorporated 
land groups, have already discovered that this is likely to be a painfully 
slow process unless the participants, including officers of the Lands 
Department, are willing and able to bend or break the law. That is why 
John Numapo, as a member of the land development group in the land 
grab policy network, doubts the capacity of the new legislation to solve 
the problem of development, and that is why members of the anti-
dependency group consider the new legislation as a mask for the real 
problem of corruption (Act Now 2014f ). The events that have followed 
the public release of the Commission’s findings suggest an additional 
conclusion: that appeals to the ‘rule of law’, whether in the form of 
legislation, litigation or adjudication, will not suffice to settle the contest 
17  This is one of the SABLs in which Rimbunan Hijau has an economic interest, but it has nothing 
to do with the practice of agro-forestry.
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between the ideologies of landownership and development that is still 
being played out at every level of political organisation, from the level 
of the nation-state to the level of the rural or urban council ward.
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Urban Land Grabbing by 
Political Elites: Exploring the 
Political Economy of Land and 
the Challenges of Regulation
Siobhan McDonnell
Introduction
Internationally there is a large and growing body of scholarly literature 
that describes problems of ‘land grabs’ whereby local actors, including 
indigenous people, lose access to land. This international land grab 
literature overwhelmingly focuses on large-scale land transformation—
on a new scale and with a new intensity—resulting from processes of 
globalisation, the liberalisation of land markets, and increases in foreign 
direct investment in land (Deininger 2003; Sikor and Müller 2009; 
Borras and Franco 2010; Zoomers 2010: 130; Li 2014). In this literature, 
land is grabbed not only by high-wealth individuals but also by foreign 
governments demanding a supply of cheap food crops or arable land on 
which to grow biofuels and non-food agricultural crops (Cotula et al. 
2008, 2009; Borras and Franco 2010; Zoomers 2010). Development 
of nature reserves and conversation areas form another basis for large-
scale land transformation (Peluso and Lund 2011; Peluso  2012). 
The suggested overall trend from land grabbing is a shift in landownership 
from indigenous people to foreigners (Zoomers 2010: 440). In the work 
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of Derek Hall, Philip Hirsch and Tania Murray Li (2011), this land 
grabbing is described in terms of the processes of exclusion of people from 
landscapes.
In contrast with much of this global literature, this chapter seeks to focus 
on the way in which political elites across Melanesia are instrumentally 
involved in land transformations, and particularly in the leasing of 
commercially valuable urban state land. In Vanuatu, state land is defined 
in Section 9 of the Land Reform Act as public land belonging to the 
colonial state powers that was vested in the Republic of Vanuatu on the 
day of national independence.1 Urban state land is an important site for 
illustrating the exercise of state power, and in particular for considering 
in whose interests state actors transact public land. This chapter uses 
the term ‘land grab’ in an instrumental way to describe the agency of 
state actors who lease urban state land without regard to the public 
interest. Here the act is one of political elites seizing land and leasing it 
in their own self-interest in defiance of the rule of law or administrative 
requirements. Hall,  Hirsch and Li describe these processes as ‘licensed 
exclusion’, whereby governments award legal titles to some people rather 
than others (Hall et al. 2011: 27). This chapter will explore the idea of 
licensed exclusion and the broader processes of regulation with reference 
to a case study of ministerial leasing of urban state land in Vanuatu.
Hall, Hirsch and Li view regulation as a set of rule-backed claims over a 
particular area of land, where rules over land establish boundaries, types of 
land use, ownership and zoning requirements (Hall et al. 2011: 15–16). 
While processes of exclusion are informed in significant ways by particular 
legal contexts, the importance of formal rules can be exaggerated. In this 
chapter, I argue that the exercise of state power over land is guided 
by: (1)  the operation of the shadow state; (2) the behavioural norms 
established by political elites in transacting state land; (3) the operation 
1  According to Section 9 of the Act:
(1) On the Day of Independence all state land shall vest in the Government and be public land and 
be held by it for the benefit of the Republic of Vanuatu.
(2) The Minister, on the advice of the Council of Ministers, may by Order declare that any land 
described in the Order ceases to be public land.
(3) In accordance with Article 81 of the Constitution the Minister may, on the advice of the Council 
of Ministers, by Order vest any public land in indigenous citizens or communities referred to in the 
Order for such payment by them and on such terms and conditions as may be referred to in the Order.
(4) When an Order is made under subsection (3) it shall provide for payment of compensation to the 
custom owners by the Government and the amount of such compensation shall be set out in the Order.
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of property law; and (4) the organisational ‘culture of complicity’ in 
land administration agencies. Rather than enhancing formal rules, these 
processes can work to establish behavioural norms that often defy the 
legal frameworks established with respect to land dealings.
Land Transformation in Melanesia
In discussing land transformations in Melanesia, important distinctions 
need to be made about the scope of customary landholdings and the 
ambit of states in Southeast Asia—the context that informs the work 
of Hall, Hirsch and Li—when compared with Melanesia. In Melanesia, 
the overwhelming majority of land is held under customary tenure 
arrangements, although both Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Vanuatu 
have experienced ‘land grabs’ over customary land in recent years. Written 
to engage with the broader international debate around land grabbing, 
Colin Filer’s work details the large-scale leasing of customary land in 
PNG through the grant of ‘special agricultural and business leases’. Filer 
meticulously details the more than five million hectares of customary land 
(11  per cent of PNG’s total land area) ‘grabbed’ by private companies 
between 2003 and 2011, while at the same time challenging much of the 
central ‘land grab’ narrative in the process (Filer 2011, 2012; also Chapter 
6, this volume). In a similar vein, my work documents the processes by 
which, over the last 15 years, Vanuatu has experienced a dramatic land 
grab, with more than 10  per cent of all customary land now leased 
(McDonnell 2016). On Efate Island alone, 56.5  per cent of what was 
previously held as customary land along the coastline is now leased (Scott 
et al. 2012: 4; see Figure 9.1). This has the effect of limiting Ni-Vanuatu 
access to both the most arable land and much of the coastal estate.
In Melanesia, the geographical scope of state authority is more constrained 
than in Southeast Asia. While formal state law guides the market in 
land in Melanesia, many local disputes are managed through customary 
institutions. Land use access and exclusion is often dictated by customary 
rules enforced by local male leaders in what is described in the introduction 
to this volume as ‘the neo-traditional social order’. Across Melanesia, male 
leaders, increasingly termed ‘chiefs’, engage in acts of ‘intimate exclusion’, 
validating their own claims of authority over land to the exclusion of the 
broader landowning group, especially women and young people (Hall et 
al. 2011: 145; see also Chapter 1, this volume). I call these men ‘masters 
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of modernity’, rather than ‘masters of tradition’ (Rodman 1987), because 
of the way that they have used the power of the state, as well as their claims 
to customary authority, in attempts to legitimate their dealings with foreign 
or non-indigenous real estate developers (McDonnell 2013, 2016).
Figure 9.1 Leases on Efate Island as at 2015.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University, based on data provided by the 
Vanuatu Ministry of Lands .
Note: National lease data indicate that 46 per cent of the Efate land mass is leased, but 
this statistic was compiled before the leasing of two large areas of customary land in north 
Efate (titles 12/0543/032 and 12/0542/001) .
In spite of some constitutional similarities, the regulatory arrangements 
over land vary substantially across Melanesia. However, while the rules 
differ, there are commonalities across the region in how political elites and 
government officials work to facilitate land transactions, as well as logging 
deals and mining arrangements, for their own benefit or for the benefit 
of corporate or individual investor interests.
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Hall, Hirsch and Li use the term ‘licensed exclusion’ to refer to the 
process by which the state licenses access to land, through a legal title, 
to some people, while at the same time excluding others (Hall et al. 
2011: 27). Licensed exclusion is described through an exploration of land 
formalisation and land titling projects in Southeast Asia whereby the state 
makes land ‘legible’ through surveying, creating categories of ownership, 
allocating land titles, ultimately allowing for the commodification of 
land (Scott 1998; Hall et al. 2011: 27–9). The Australian company that 
has been at the forefront of land registration in several South East Asian 
countries, Land Equity International (LEI), also operated the Australian 
government’s land program in Vanuatu. Land titling programs based 
on Torrens Title registration were rolled out through Thailand, Laos, 
Indonesia and the Philippines (Hall et al. 2011:  35). More recently, 
LEI has played a lead role in Vanuatu’s five-year Land Program, at a cost of 
AU$23 million, which has been focused on improving the administration 
of land by government agencies and on the registration of all outstanding 
leasehold titles. However, these efforts at improving land administration 
have done little to address what I shall call the ‘culture of complicity’, which 
involved the Minister for Lands gifting state land to government officers.2
The Impact of the Shadow State 
on Regulation
Melanesian states are embedded in political economies largely dominated 
by the exploitation of natural resources associated with mining, forestry, 
and land itself. These political economies mean that Melanesian states 
are situated in webs of patronage—global and local—such that political 
alliances with investors representing transnational institutions inform the 
exercise of state power. These shifting political networks form the shadow 
state that operates behind the façade of the formal state, beyond the ambit 
of written laws and institutional processes (Reno 2000: 434). It is these 
networks of the shadow state that often guide the operation of state power 
over customary and state land in Melanesia. Shadow state networks also 
2  The Australian government and other donors must be cautious of a programmatic approach 
that creates silos of expertise in which some staff become essential to the land administration process. 
Where this occurs, it tends to create an opportunity for staff to broker their own individual payments 
as part of the government land administration process. For example, if only a single staff member 
can operate a system designed to create maps, then this staff member may demand additional direct 
compensation for this skill set.
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dominate ministerial leasing of urban state land, and across Melanesia, 
development, planning and environmental regulation is regularly 
subverted through the alliances of investors with politicians.
Political elites do not always perform land transactions in accordance 
with the rules written in national constitutions, laws and regulations. 
Licensed exclusion does not describe the processes by which specific state 
actors are included in this type of performance. The dominance of the 
shadow state means that, across Melanesia, state actors offer concessional 
access to land to their investor partners or close business and political 
associates. Politicians also routinely allocate valuable urban state land to 
members of their immediate family or wider kinship networks. These acts 
of licensed inclusion affect the access for other rights holders and override 
public interest or rule of law requirements. In Vanuatu, successive lands 
ministers have repeatedly acted in contravention of the law by leasing 
urban state and customary land for their own benefit, or in the interests 
of investors. Court and Ombudsman decisions detail numerous acts of 
licensed inclusion: ministers granting land to themselves, close family 
members, kin, or ‘wantoks’, as well as political associates and close 
business associates.3 For example, the Ombudsman’s decision in relation 
to former Minister for Lands Paul Telukluk found that ‘15 land titles were 
improperly allocated by the Former Minister for Lands  …  to himself, 
Members of his Family and wantoks (people of his island community)’.4 
These judgements demonstrate that successive lands ministers have 
regularly leased urban state land in acts of intimate inclusion to immediate 
family members and kin.
3  Public Report on the Conduct of Messrs Vohor, Dope and Boulekone Regarding an Attempt 
to Contract with Volani International Ltd [1998] VUOM  4; Public Report on the Improper Sale of 
Government Houses by the Office of the Prime Minister under the former Prime Minister Maxime Carlot 
Korman [1998] VUOM 7; Public Report on the Improper Granting of Land Lease Title 11/0E22/016 
by the Former Minister Paul Telukluk and Former Director of Lands Roger Tary. [1998] VUOM 10; 
Public Report on the Granting of Leases by the Former Minister for Lands Mr Paul Barthelemy Telukluk 
to Himself, Family Members and Wantoks. [1999] VUOM 6; Public Report on the Mismanagement 
of the Tender Sale of the Ten (10) Deportees’ Properties by the Former Minister of Lands, Mr Paul 
Telukluk. [1999] VUOM 9; Public Report on the Improper Conduct by Public Officials in Dealing with 
Mondragon’s Proposed Free Trade Zone in Big Bay, Santo [2001] VUOM 3. See also Ifira Trustees Ltd 
v Kalsakau [2007] VUSC 119.
4  Public Report on the Mismanagement of the Tender Sale of the Ten (10) Deportees’ Properties by the 
Former Minister of Lands, Mr Paul Telukluk. [1999] VUOM 9.
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Legitimation of State Power over Land
According to Hall, Hirsch and Li, legitimation of state power is the 
cornerstone of regulation. Legitimation as a process of exclusion 
‘establishes the moral basis for exclusive claims, and indeed for entrenching 
regulation  …  as politically and socially acceptable bases for exclusion’ 
(Hall  et al. 2011:  5,  19). Rather than a moral or acceptable basis, 
legitimation must be understood as central to establishing regulatory 
authority. Nancy Peluso and Christian Lund describe regulatory processes 
through the lens of ‘legalisation’—the process of defining ownership 
through claims to property rights. Through legalisation and the associated 
‘legal titles’, certain claims are legitimised, and when enforced, turn 
previous rights holders into ‘poachers and squatters’ (Peluso and Lund 
2011: 674). Formal rules retain significance because they are the means of 
‘laundering power’ by claiming legitimate authority over land.
Across Melanesia, formal rules are often used erroneously to justify the 
exercise of state power over land, even where these acts of power are 
beyond the actual text of the rules. However, establishing legitimate 
state authority over land can occur almost regardless of the formal rules. 
In Vanuatu, there are two specific processes that have resulted in the state 
retaining authority over urban and customary land, even where the land 
was leased in dubious legal circumstances: (1) the establishment of new 
behavioural norms, and (2) the tenets of property law.
The behaviour of state actors influences the informal rules that govern 
land dealings. Governmentality is the ‘conduct of conduct’—the attempt 
to shape the behaviour of citizens by distinctive means so as to create 
a ‘governmental rationality’ (Foucault 1991: 93–5). Acts of leasing state 
land work to establish the governmentality of land by the state, even 
where this is beyond the formal rules. Where regulatory processes are 
undertaken by key state actors, they become the embodied practices 
of governmentality.
In Vanuatu, lands ministers have repeatedly leased state land in breach of the 
criminal code and the leadership code.5 The leadership code enshrined in 
the national constitution specifically requires that members of parliament 
and government officials do not use their office for ‘personal gain or enter 
5  PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu all have leadership codes in their constitutions that 
mandate codes of behaviour for politicians and public servants.
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into any transaction or engage in any enterprise or activity that might be 
expected to give rise to doubt in the public mind’.6 Ministerial leasing of 
customary and urban state land is legitimated by the failure to prosecute 
any illegal acts. This failure to prosecute lends an obdurate legitimacy to 
acts of state power over land.
A minister transacting land with the authority of the state changes the way 
that the processes of legitimation occur. The behaviour of key actors can 
comply with, or circumvent, the law (Lund 2009: 139). This is because 
the legitimation of state power over land involves more than rules:
what is perceived as legal or illegal may change over time without any 
change to legislation. Government policies, statements and practices can 
effectively outlaw certain legal practices and nullify certain established 
rights (Sikor and Lund 2009: 7; see also Lund 2009).
The Vanuatu example demonstrates that acts of successive lands ministers 
in leasing state land have operated to nullify established public rights over 
land without substantial changes to the law as written.
The Register is Everything
The legitimation of state power over land is also established by property 
law. The effect of property law operates to override the circumstances 
by which state land transactions occur. The legal foundation of formal 
property rights in Melanesia is Torrens Title indefeasibility: once a lease 
is registered it is unable to be broken. The grounds for challenging the 
registration of a lease are very limited, ensuring the stability of the titling 
process. By giving effect to registration, the power of the state over land 
is made legitimate. Property rights in natural resources are ‘intimately 
bound up with the exercise of power and authority’ (Sikor and Lund 
2009: 1). The acts of lands ministers in Vanuatu provide an illustration 
6  According to Article 66 of the Constitution:
(1) Any person defined as a leader in Article 67 has a duty to conduct himself in such a way, both in 
his public and private life, so as not to – (a) place himself in a position in which he has or could have 
a conflict of interests or in which the fair exercise of his public or official duties might be compromised; 
(b) demean his office or position; (c) allow his integrity to be called into question; or (d) endanger or 
diminish respect for and confidence in the integrity of the Government of the Republic of Vanuatu.
(2) In particular, a leader shall not use his office for personal gain or enter into any transaction or 
engage in any enterprise or activity that might be expected to give rise to doubt in the public mind as 
to whether he is carrying out or has carried out the duty imposed by subarticle (1).
291
9 . URBAN LAND GRABBING By POLITICAL ELITES
of the argument that recognition of property works to legitimise the 
authority of the institution making the determination. Leases allocated 
by the Minister, even where this is beyond his legal powers, have been 
legitimated by the operation of the tenets of property law. Once leased by 
a minister and registered, a lease title over state land becomes indefeasible.
The power of the Minister to create property rights has been repeatedly 
upheld by the courts in Vanuatu, based on their interpretation of the 
legislation that governs lease making. Courts in Vanuatu have repeatedly 
stated that:
The essential feature of any Torrens System is the indefeasibility of the title 
of the registered proprietor … the effect of all these provisions is that the 
register is everything. The title of the registered proprietor … is protected 
against any adverse claims or interests not entered in the register except as 
provided in the Act. 7
Property interests are detailed in the register, and the register is everything. 
Once the technical requirements of the property transaction and 
registration are met, the transaction is likely to be held to be indefeasible. 
Torrens Title registration creates a repository of interests in land so as 
to ‘protect persons dealing in registered interests in land’ regardless of 
‘the  circumstances in or the consideration for which such proprietor 
or any previous proprietor was registered’.8 The property rights of the 
titleholder of the registered instrument are backed by the implicit force 
of the state, thereby excluding prior claims of other groups. The position 
of the lands minister is legitimated by the power to create property rights, 
which has been upheld by the courts and backed by the authority of the 
state. This in turn legitimates the authority of the minister as the state 
actor who transacts land.
The Organisational Culture of Complicity
Land administration agencies across Melanesia demonstrate a widespread 
culture of complicity whereby many government officers either support 
political elites who engage in illicit acts, or themselves facilitate property 
transactions on the basis of illicit payments. This culture may operate in 
part because government officers fear for their jobs or face persecution 
7  Toro v Kiri [2013] VUSC 210. Paragraph 8 (emphasis added).
8  See Section 23 of the Land Leases Act.
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if they do not comply with directions from their political masters. But it 
is also clear that some government officers promote illegal acts by key state 
actors for their own personal gain.
A number of systemic problems with land administration have been 
identified across the Melanesian region, namely that land administration 
officials may collude with outside investors to: tamper with or destroy 
land records; lower valuations of state land so that they do not reflect 
the market value and to reduce taxes payable; lower land prices or give 
preferential access to state land to certain investors or politicians; and 
regularly circumvent planning and environmental processes. However, 
this does not mean that all officers involved in land administration are 
inveigled by an organisational culture of complicity.
Minister Kalsakau’s Grabbing of Urban State Land
The laundering of state power over land by political elites and the culture 
of complicity in place in land administration are best understood with 
reference to a case study from Vanuatu. In 2012, at least 190 leases 
over state land were approved by the former Minister for Lands Steven 
Kalsakau to individuals in three general categories: (1) government officers 
comprising staff from the Department of Lands, the Ministry of Lands, 
and other related government agencies (including those responsible for 
agriculture, environment, planning and valuation); (2) Kalsakau’s personal 
business and political associates, comprising his close circle of political 
advisers and personal staff; and (3) close family members, including his 
son Periaso Kalsakau, who as a child should not legally have been able to 
hold a lease interest (GoV 2014: 39).9 Minister Kalsakau’s grants of urban 
state land leases to his business and political associates, and to close family 
members, illustrate the processes of regulatory inclusion. For example, the 
Minister’s political associates included his close circle of political advisers 
and staff members, including his personal driver.
In an illustration of the widespread culture of complicity, leases over 
valuable urban state land were granted to all 40 staff in the Department 
of  Lands and Ministry of Lands, from senior management to office 
cleaners. In some instances staff received single leases, but particularly 
well-connected staff received four or five parcels of state land, 
9  For this reason, when Ralph Regenvanu became Minister for Lands, he was able to cancel this lease.
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or arranged for their wives, sons or close relatives to also be granted leases 
(GoV 2014: 21). Significantly, 11 staff who were granted leases did not 
subsequently register their leases over state land (ibid.: 9).
A Public Service Commission investigation into the Kalsakau leases 
describes the challenges faced by the investigation team as all senior 
staff, and around ‘80  per cent’ of all other Lands Department staff, 
were implicated in the granting of state land leases (GoV 2014:  41).10 
The entrenched, widespread culture meant that senior government officers 
felt confident in requesting that the Minister offer them concessional 
leases over state land. This request was responded to on 3 August 2012 
when Minister Kalsakau issued a letter to the Acting Director of Lands:
A lot of staff members have approached me and sincerely requested that 
they wish to acquire and obtain leaseholds either in Vila or Luganville 
state lands.
Please find out available plots and allocate each of those staff that has 
sufficient funds to pay relative fees for the land on the following negotiable 
arrangement:
1. Pay only 50% of the premium, deposit 10% of the said amount and 
register the lease and let them organize settlement with the Banks.
2. Must pay full value of all administration fees
3. The lease term to run for fifty (50) years
4. The registered lease would be a non-transferable instrument until the 
premium balance is fully paid.
5. Type of lease should be classed according to the appropriate zoning 
and location.
I would expect that you organise this as a priority and forward all 
certificates and leases to me for approval (Kalsakau 2012).
10  A key recommendation of the team’s report was that the Public Service Commission: ‘formally 
question the former DG [Director General] of MOLNR [Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources] 
and the Acting Director at that time, Mr. Peter Pata, as to why they didn’t ensure that the officer[s] 
of the MOLNR and the DOL [Director of Lands] have followed the … [proper] processes … After 
all, it is the view of the [investigating team] that if the former DG and the Acting Director have 
properly monitored the processes of lease application and registration done by their officers, they 
(i.e. the former DG and Acting Director) would have detected the flaws in the process and would 
have addressed them appropriately’ (GoV 2014: 38–9).
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Following from this letter, on 4 October 2012, the Land Management 
Planning Committee (LMPC), staffed by senior Lands Department 
staff and representatives of other government agencies, approved the 
registration of the leases.11 The 10-member committee approved the 
allocation of leases to themselves and to other staff, thereby breaching 
the leadership code and requirements under the Public Service Act that 
government staff do not personally benefit from their positions.12
The Kalsakau leases were issued without any regard to existing planning 
and environmental regulations for the Port Vila and Luganville areas. 
Leases were issued over many of the remaining public spaces and areas 
of natural parkland in Port Vila and Luganville. A number of leased areas 
contain cultural sites such as old nasara (dancing) grounds, and trees 
registered as sites of national heritage by the Vanuatu National Cultural 
Council.13
The Kalsakau leases included numerous leases over commercially valuable 
real estate with high market value. In Port Vila, leases were issued in 
Tassariki—the wealthiest residential area—and over part of a luxury 
resort. Leases were also issued over the site of the former Joint Court 
House, prime real estate with views across the harbour. Together, the 
Kalsakau leases involved significant grants of valuable commercial urban 





respectively. The total 
value of state land leased in Port Vila was approximately VT781,818,000 
(approximately AU$8 million) and that of the leases in Luganville was 
VT181,054,000 (AU$2  million). In numerous instances, the leases 
also included existing government properties, roads and infrastructure, 
including existing police housing. In a complete abrogation of government 
11  The staff in the LMPC meeting who allocated themselves land were Peta Pata (Acting Director of 
Lands and chair of the LMPC), Joe Keilson (Lands Department Planning Section and secretary of the 
LMPC), Phillip Koroka (Lands Department Survey Section), Benuel Tabi (Lands Department Land 
Lease Section), Gwen Wells (Lands Department Registration Enforcement Officer), Prosper Buletare 
and Anaclet Philip (Sanma Province representative), Harry Tete (from Luganville Municipality), Philip 
Banban (from the Department of Agriculture), and Dick Tomker (from the Forestry Department) 
(GoV 2014: 13).
12  The recipients were mainly located within the Ministry of Lands and Department of Lands but 
also included representatives from the Environment Office, municipal agencies, and the Department 
of Geology and Mining (GoV 2012).
13  Preservation of Sites and Artefacts (Amendment) Act 2008.
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processes, leases were offered to staff without any consideration of their 
market value or the value of the state properties and assets located on 
many of them.14
Examples of the leases in Port Vila are shown in Figures  9.2, 9.3 and 
9.4. The first example, near Independence Park (Figure 9.2), is a lease 
that was granted to Masoi John Alexine, an associate of Steven Kalsakau. 
The  property was subsequently valued at VT19,500,000. The second 
example (Figure 9.3) comprises leases issued behind the Malvatumauri 
chief ’s nakamal in an area adjacent to Seaside.  The third example 
(Figure 9.4) is a lease that the Minister issued to his own son, covering 
commercially valuable land located in Tassariki, next to the New Zealand 
High Commissioner’s residence.
Figure 9.2 Lease titles allocated to staff over state land leased 
near Independence Park, including two houses.
Source: Author’s rendition of Google Earth imagery, overlaid by data obtained from 
the Vanuatu Ministry of Lands .
14  The public interest requirement associated with the leasing of state land and state assets should 
have at least ensured that the process involved the competitive tendering for land and assets greater 
than VT5 million, in accordance with the legal requirements of the Financial Services Act.
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Figure 9.3 Lease titles allocated to staff over parkland, existing Nasara 
areas and cultural sites adjacent to Seaside show ground.
Source: Author’s rendition of Google Earth imagery, overlaid by data obtained from 
the Vanuatu Ministry of Lands .
Figure 9.4 Lease title issued by Minister Steven Kalsakau to his son 
Periaso Kalsakau.
Source: Author’s rendition of Google Earth imagery, overlaid by data obtained from 
the Vanuatu Ministry of Lands .
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Like many other ministerial leases over state land, the Kalsakau leases 
resulted in a loss of substantial revenue to the state. Most government 
officers paid premiums of less than 1 per cent of the value of the land, with 
at least four staff making no payments at all for their leases.15 For example, 
government surveyor Harold Moli registered a lease title over part of the 
grounds of a luxury hotel without paying any premium for the lease or any 
administrative fees. While Moli paid nothing, the land was subsequently 
independently valued at VT8,340,000 (just under AU$100,000) 
(GoV 2014: 34). These amounts suggest the scale of the illicit financial 
gains made by government officers who support lands ministers in their 
gifting of urban land, and who maintain an organisational culture of 
complicity.
In Defence of the Culture of Complicity
Minister Kalsakau’s issuing of leases involved him in an orchestrated 
bypassing of proper legal and administrative processes that was supported 
by government officers.16 In March 2013, Ralph Regenvanu became 
Minister for Lands and I was appointed as his legal adviser. The new 
Ministry of Lands team convened a meeting of all government officers 
involved in Kalsakau’s scheme to request that that those who had obtained 
15  A report prepared by the Valuer-General for the Public Service Commission suggests that all titles 
were undervalued, premiums were assessed incorrectly based on this undervaluation, some premiums 
were assessed on a 50-year lease term when the term of the lease was 75 years, and some leases had no 
valuations done at all (GoV 2014: 35). The grant of leases to staff as gifts is inconsistent with Section 
100 of the Land Leases Act, which requires that land be leased for a ‘valuable consideration’. It is 
arguable that this requirement could be used as a basis to cancel the lease instruments where no actual 
payment was received or—as in the overwhelming majority of leases—where the payment received 
amounted to less than 1 per cent of the independent valuation of the land. It is likely that similar 
or greater concessions were offered to the business and political associates of Minister Kalsakau, but 
statistics related to these land grants are not currently available.
16  Proper administrative process was not followed in the allocation of leases to staff: very few 
staff actually complied with the ministerial instruction in terms of the amount to be paid; no staff 
applied for leases over state land following the usual application process; many staff did not pay all of 
the administrative and registration fees prior to registration—something that in usual circumstances 
would mean that the lease could not be registered. Administratively, each lease instrument that is 
submitted for registration should include a ‘checklist’ to ensure legal and administrative compliance 
with the requirements of various agencies (State Law Office, Planning Department, Environment 
Department, and Lands Department). In practice, like the Kalsakau leases, leases are routinely 
registered in Vanuatu without any reference to this checklist, and with little more than the consenting 
signature of the minister.
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leases ‘through flawed processes’ surrender them.17 This request was made 
in the context of pending court cases and investigations by the Public 
Service Commission and the Ombudsman.
Standing before a room full of staff in a meeting convened in the 
Malvatumauri Nakamal (see Figure 9.3), the Minister, lawyers from the 
State Law Office, members of the Public Service Commission investigation 
team and I all asked the government officers to surrender their leases. 
Senior government staff who had orchestrated the arrangement responded 
with indignation to this request. In the days following the meeting, only 
one staff member took action to surrender their lease. During the initial 
meeting and in subsequent discussions, the government officers repeatedly 
defended the leases on the grounds that the authority of the Minister 
to consent to the transactions is legitimated by the state, and that this 
overrides any other legal or process requirements.18 These arguments were 
repeated by staff during Public Service Commission interviews where they 
stated that ‘the Minister as Lessor had an agreement with them as Lessee. 
Thus, according to them [the staff interviewed] when the Lessor gave them 
the authority to proceed in registering the land, it is a legal instruction’ 
(GoV 2014: 21). Using their expert knowledge of the law, government 
officers argued that the leases had been consented to by the Minister and 
subsequently registered, and were now ‘indefeasible’ property rights that 
could only be challenged through the courts.19
17  The meeting was chaired by the Acting Director-General of the Ministry of Lands and was 
attended by the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the Public Service Commission 
investigating team, staff of the Office of the Ombudsman, legal representatives from the Office of the 
Attorney-General, and the legal adviser to the Minister for Lands. Each staff member was individually 
handed a letter signed by the Minister that stated, in part: ‘I write to you in my capacity as the 
Minister for Lands requesting that you surrender the lease or leases issued to you over state land by the 
former Minister for Lands Steven Kalsakau. As you are aware there is currently a court case and two 
internal investigations being undertaken to identify the current and previous staff of the Department 
of Lands and Ministry of Lands who have obtained leases in the last 12 months … The powers of 
these Public Service Commission and Ombudsman investigations are broad and far reaching. While 
I await the findings of the inquiries it is highly likely that staff who have been involved in obtaining 
leases through this process may be subject to disciplinary proceedings and/or prosecution under the 
Penal Code [CAP 135] and under the provisions of the Leadership Code [CAP 240]. Accordingly 
I wish to provide staff with an opportunity to surrender the leases that they have obtained over state 
land through these flawed processes.’
18  The Public Services Act makes clear the duties of all government employees which include: to 
disclose and take reasonable steps to avoid any conflict of interest (real or apparent) in connection 
with his or her employment; to use resources and public money in a lawful and proper manner; and 
not to make improper use of information or use his or her duty, status, power or authority in order to 
gain or seek to gain a benefit or advantage for himself or herself or for any other person.
19  The usual legal grounds for challenging existing leases are contained in Section 100 of the Land 
Leases Act.
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Government officers also repeatedly referenced previous staff-facilitated 
leasing of urban state land by other former lands ministers, including 
Paul Telukluk and Maxime Carlot Korman. In 1994, the Council of 
Ministers headed by Prime Minister Korman passed a resolution to sell 
all of the government houses and land that had previously belonged to 
the former Condominium government. These house and land sales were 
funded through preferential access to loans from the Vanuatu National 
Provident Fund.20
In interviews with the Public Service Commission investigation team, 
[land] officers pointed out that the decision made by the Hon. Kalsakau 
was not a new decision. Such [a] decision has already been made in the 
past by the former Minister for Lands namely Hon. Paul Telukluk and 
the Former Prime Minister, Maxime Carlot Korman (GoV 2014: 32).
Government officers who administratively supported the Korman 
government in the illegal registration of state land leases personally 
benefited. Each of the officers involved was granted a lease over an 
existing parcel of state land including a government house. While the 
Ombudsman found that the Korman government leases were illegal 
in terms of the Constitution and other laws, and involved significant 
breaches of the leadership code, no members of parliament or government 
officers were ever prosecuted in relation to these matters.21 When asked 
about their actions in relation to the Kalsakau leases, government officers 
repeatedly referenced the actions of former government officers who 
received Korman state land leases, who remain unprosecuted, and who 
now occupy senior positions in land administration. These references 
suggest a long-established organisational culture such that government 
officers have repeatedly supported successive lands ministers in leasing 
state land and assets.
20  See Public Report on the Improper Sale of Government Houses by the Office of the Prime Minister 
under the former Prime Minister Maxime Carlot Korman [1998] VUOM 7: 10–11. There are a number 
of similarities between these Korman government leases and the Kalsakau state land leases. First, the 
Korman government leases were illegal as they failed to follow proper processes and involved 
a substantial conflict of interest in which key decision makers personally benefitted from the allocation 
of public assets. This was confirmed at the time by legal advice provided by the Attorney-General to 
the Council of Ministers which stated that the sale of land and houses to politicians and their political 
secretaries without competitive tendering was not in accordance with the leadership code or the law. 
Second, like the Kalsakau leases, the properties and land were seriously undervalued, and third, while 
the houses were allocated mainly to politicians and political advisers, key government staff located in 
the Department of Lands who assisted with the scheme were also allocated houses and state land leases.
21  Public Report on the Improper Sale of Government Houses by the Office of the Prime Minister under 
the former Prime Minister Maxime Carlot Korman [1998] VUOM 7: 28–33.
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The fragility of governments in Melanesia, and their associated shadow 
state networks of patronage, also have important implications for the 
accountability of the bureaucracy. Meeting to respond to Minister 
Regenvanu’s request that they surrender their leases, senior government 
staff argued in an incendiary fashion that the political cycle was short, that 
a vote of no confidence would presumably be progressed before any legal 
action could proceed against them, and that a new government would 
likely decide not to prosecute staff. These arguments were based on the 
assumption that a new minister would gain office, supported by investor 
interests, and would halt any legal action taken against staff. This prediction 
proved to be correct. On 25  June 2015, newly appointed Minister for 
Lands Paul Telukluk, well known for previously granting state land to 
himself, family members and kin, issued an internal memorandum to all 
Ministry of Lands staff which stated:
My first priority is to deal with the sale of urban land to staff in the 
Department of Lands. Last Monday, 15 June I asked the DG [Director-
General] and CEO to prepare a COM [Council of Ministers] paper to 
strike out the court case that the outgoing Minister [Ralph Regenvanu] 
started against you. My first PA [Principal Advisor] will look over the 
COM paper to make sure that the government ‘cleans the face’ of all staff 
(Telukluk 2015).22 
This reference to wanting to ‘clean the face’ of all staff suggests the deep 
compact that can exist between government officers and their ministers, 
such that staff and ministers together engage in leasing state and customary 
land at heavily discounted rates, rather than acting in the interest of the 
public.23
22  This is a translation of the Bislama version, which reads: ‘1) Fes priority, hem I sale blo urban 
land lo staf blo department blo land. Mi askem finis lo DG mo CEO sins las Mandei 15 June 2015 
blo preparem wan COM pepa blo strikem kot kase we outgoing minista I mekem agens yufala. 1PA 
tu bae I lukluk lo COM pepa ia blo mekem soa se bae gavman I klinim fes.’
23  Minister Telukluk also began a media campaign defending the issuing of leases over state land to 
government officers by his colleague Minister Kalsakau, and attacking the actions of former Minister 
Regenvanu in challenging the leases and attempting to prosecute staff (Ligo 2015). See also Makin 
(2015) for Ralph Regenvanu’s response to these statements.
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Conclusion: Changing the Rules of the Game
Questions of legality become confused when land dealings are performed 
by key state actors and upheld by courts as indefeasible lease titles. 
Understanding the operation of state power over land in Melanesia 
involves mapping the terrain of politics, the networks of the shadow state: 
‘who defines the laws, who implements them, who contests them and 
why?’(Sundar 2009). Political elites and senior government officers act 
with the imprimatur of the state, such that their actions are the acts of 
the state. This is the regulatory basis of the political economy of land 
dealings in Vanuatu, and elsewhere in Melanesia. Lands ministers and 
senior government officers should be made accountable for illegal acts by 
the legal institutions of the state, but their actions are the actions of the 
state. Who then is able to prosecute the illegal acts?
And how does regulation influence the operation of state power over land? 
Regulation remains an important element in understanding the way in 
which state power can be laundered to give effect to land transformations. 
By carefully studying the processes through which state power is laundered, 
effective regulation can be designed to alter the capacity of state actors to 
enact state power through property transactions. In this way, effective land 
reforms can alter the influence of shadow state networks and change the 
established norms of behaviour of political elites and government officers.
Recent land reforms in Vanuatu will provide an important case study 
on whether changing the regulatory rules creates substantial, long-term 
changes to the exercise of state power over urban and customary land. 
Led by Minister Regenvanu, and drafted by the author of this chapter, 
radical land reforms have been enacted that remove the powers of the 
Minister to act unilaterally in leasing urban and customary land.24 Under 
the new arrangements, the Minister can only lease urban state land on 
the advice of a committee made up of representatives from government 
24  Constitutional amendments and new land laws were debated at length in parliament before being 
supported by an overwhelming majority of members in December 2013, with the laws coming into 
effect on 30 February 2014. The land reform package is contained mainly in two pieces of legislation: 
a new Customary Land Management Act to replace the operation of the existing Customary Land 
Tribunal Act; and significant amendments to the existing Land Reform Act. As Minister Regenvanu’s 
legal adviser, I was the principal drafter of the land reform package.
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agencies under the authority of an independent chair.25 Predictably, 
the implementation of the new rules has not received the full support of 
land administration staff.
Vanuatu’s land reforms are designed to ensure that state land transactions 
are in the interests of the public and follow proper legal and administrative 
processes. These land reforms substantially change the rules of the game 
relating to land transformations. For instance, if they had been in place at 
the time that Minister Kalsakau held office, he would not have been able 
to unilaterally grant urban state land to either government officers or his 
close family and business associates.
Regulatory reform can influence the political economy of land by changing 
the rules of the game. Vanuatu’s land reforms represent an attempt to 
wrestle government from the influence of the shadow state. For this reason 
they remain vulnerable to the haunting presence of the shadow state and 
its influence over politics. Already Vanuatu’s parliamentary opposition is 
calling for the removal of these reforms. The question that must be asked 
is: in whose interests do they act?
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Making the Invisible Seen: Putting 
Women’s Rights on Vanuatu’s 
Land Reform Agenda
Anna Naupa
Women in Vanuatu are at a cross road: they live in a society that is 
both traditional and modern … The gendered roles imposed by society 
on women has [sic] seen them keep the traditions necessary for the 
continuation of the culture of their society (Piau-Lynch 2007: 4).
Kastom has dictated that men are the decision makers and women play 
a supportive or submissive role. This is often cited as the reason why women 
are not only involved in decision-making but also do not have a significant 
voice in the governance of their society. (Tor and Toka 2004: 9).
Introduction
Advocates of Melanesian women’s rights have often struggled to find 
sympathetic audiences among the region’s male-dominated societies. 
Resistance has been rationalised as preservation of cultural values and 
traditional notions of gendered behaviour, where gender equality advocates 
have been accused of undermining social cohesion and upsetting the 
delicate cultural ecosystem (Tor and Toka 2004). Women’s traditional 
gendered roles as mothers and housewives has meant that few women 
enter positions of seniority in both public and private sectors, resulting 
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in only a handful of champions for women’s rights at the national level 
(Piau-Lynch 2007: 4). While Vanuatu can claim gender equality successes 
in areas most relevant to women’s childcare roles (for example, health and 
education), there is still a long way to go in other areas (VNGOC 2007).
While land reform was a key political driver of Vanuatu’s Independence 
in 1980, land policy reform only recently returned to the political arena 
in the mid-2000s. Finding the space to raise awareness about women’s 
land rights in a Vanuatu land reform context is challenged by competing 
reform priorities, such as redress mechanisms for unscrupulous deals, 
customary conflict resolution, and anti-corruption measures that had 
been overlooked for a couple of decades. Predominantly viewed as a male 
domain, the absence of women is notable in land discussions. Women 
have been largely invisible in state-managed land decisions, not least 
due to exclusionary practices by the males who control access to land in 
the traditional arena. Compounded by the primacy of customary land 
practice enshrined by Vanuatu’s Constitution and state reinforcement of 
such gender bias, advocating for women’s land rights—and women’s rights 
in general—has required culturally and politically strategic approaches to 
finding a place in the land reform agenda.
This paper analyses the different strategies used to raise awareness and 
advocate for the recognition of women’s rights to land in Vanuatu’s 
policy reform context. Given the cultural context in Vanuatu, it has 
been necessary to adopt an advocacy model that goes beyond framing 
the language of rights within accepted socio-cultural constructs, to also 
address the political-economic dimensions of gendered access to land 
through identifying male champions, and to combine both upstream 
(awareness-raising) and downstream (coalition-building) advocacy paths. 
Future advocacy efforts must include greater engagement by women 
themselves, not just their advocates, for reform efforts to be sustainable.
Country Context
The Republic of Vanuatu comprises 83 islands in a Y-shaped archipelago, 
lying south of Solomon Islands and west of Fiji, with a population 
currently  estimated to be about 290,000, of which 48  per cent are 
women. It is considered to be a lower middle-income country, where the 
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gross national income per capita was US$3,000 in 2012. According to 
the World Bank’s ‘country policy and institutional assessment’ ranking, 
Vanuatu scored 3.1 out of 6 for ‘social inclusion/equity’ in 2012.1
The majority of Ni-Vanuatu depend on what are described in Chapter 
1 as ‘land-based livelihoods’, given that roughly three quarters of the 
population lives in rural areas, and 71 per cent of rural household incomes 
in 2010 were derived from subsistence production (39 per cent) or the sale 
of agricultural and other ‘home made products’ (GoV 2012a:  113–4). 
For countless generations, the land provided for all members of society, 
regardless of gender, sustained relationships between groups, and still 
underpins the identity and self-worth of most Ni-Vanuatu. Most 
Ni-Vanuatu have access to land through customary systems, and this, 
combined with the richness of natural resources and social capital, has 
tended to buffer rural communities from some of the more extreme effects 
of poverty (AusAID 2009: 5).
The sacred value Ni-Vanuatu place on land, and the central role land plays 
in cultural identity, are enshrined in Chapter 12 of the Constitution, 
which articulates the underlying cultural principle of the inalienability 
of land and universal indigenous access to land for basic livelihoods.2 
Consequently, all of Vanuatu’s land legislation recognises the limitations 
of state governance of customary land. Formalised state protection 
of traditional land rights, until recently, was only possible in the case 
of land that was legally titled. Customary landholders governed non-titled 
land according to the rules of their kastom.
A number of development indicators illustrate that women in Vanuatu 
are disproportionately disadvantaged in society. There is limited access 
to education, with only 49 per cent of girls completing primary school 
and just 24  per cent commencing secondary school. In over 30  years 
of independence, Vanuatu has never had more than one or two female 
representatives, and currently has none at all, in a national parliament 
with 52 members. Vanuatu has one of the highest rates of gender-based 
violence in the world, with over 60  per cent of women experiencing 
violence (VWC 2011). Women’s fertility remains high, with an average 
1  See: data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.SOCI.XQ/countries.
2  Chapter 12 of the Constitution is devoted to land matters. Article 73 states that ‘[a]ll land in the 
Republic of Vanuatu belongs to the indigenous custom owners and their descendants’, while Article 
74 states that ‘[t]he rules of custom shall form the basis of ownership and use of land in the Republic 
of Vanuatu’.
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of 4.8 children per mother. While 61 per cent of working-age women 
participate in the workforce, a significant proportion work in the 
undocumented informal sector. Women typically access land and 
property through inheritance and marriage, but very few have recorded 
a formal claim to land.3 Nationally, only one in five households is headed 
by a  woman (GoV 2009). The limited cash economy and poor access 
to credit in rural Vanuatu mean that there are few opportunities for 
women to earn cash or improve the standards of living of their families. 
The absence of women from representation in government and in the 
formal sector, and their limited access to services, point to women being 
particularly vulnerable in Vanuatu.
As a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) since 1995, the Vanuatu 
government has been committed to advancing gender equality across 
several sectors, including that of land governance. However, gender 
equality has been largely viewed as a foreign import by the representatives 
of traditional societal structures. Existing land legislation is, at best, 
gender-neutral, with administrators typically adopting a (cultural) male 
bias in formal land titling and leasing (Scott et al. 2012). Women face 
several cultural barriers in exercising their rights to land, as exemplified by 
Merilyn Tahi’s testimony to a Pacific regional meeting on women’s access 
to adequate housing and land:
I was forced to marry a boy. I had one son and forced to care for three 
children adopted by my husband, and one son from another woman. 
I was married to him for 26 years … he died in 1997 … all my things 
were thrown out of my matrimonial house … I have since found another 
partner … [but] according to custom, because of the bride price, I should 
have remarried my husband’s brother, uncle or nephews. So the uncle 
has vowed revenge if I re-marry someone else … I still go to the island 
regularly with my son, but I do not go to my matrimonial home or my 
husband’s family. My husband’s sisters no longer speak to me. I have lost 
everything there (Tahi 2004: 137).
Women’s rights to land are not independent of male relatives, and are an 
extension of their socially constructed gendered roles as daughters, sisters, 
wives or mothers (AusAID 2008: 82).
3  The Department of Lands does not disaggregate land leasing records by gender, but the author’s 
own research has found that rural leases typically do not record Ni-Vanuatu women as lessors (except 
on Efate Island). In urban areas, the state is the lessor, and Ni-Vanuatu women may be included as 
joint lessees, but this is rare.
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This increases women’s economic dependence on men, discouraging 
them from investing in land as a productive resource beyond subsistence 
farming, and denies women decision-making rights based on informed 
consent over land usage, investments and formal agreements on land 
rights (UNESCAP 2013: 149).
Advocates for women’s rights in a male-dominated communitarian 
context must seek out an accepted cultural space to introduce women’s 
matters into land discourse, overcoming exclusionary practices.
Central to this advocacy is a deep understanding of the nuances between 
access to land, in terms of rights-based advocacy, and the authority to 
decide on access to land, which focuses on the political dimensions of 
exclusion. Various studies have shown that most of Vanuatu’s women have 
access to land in some form (Naupa and Simo 2008; GoV 2012b), but the 
ability to exert authority over this access is influenced by cultural norms 
and practice, both in the customary and formal domains. Hall, Hirsch 
and Li’s (2011) framing of exclusion as a political process for determining 
access—including access to benefits—provides an appropriate lens for 
unpacking the advocacy approach taken in Vanuatu to elevate women’s 
rights in the land reform agenda.
Land Dualism
As noted earlier, the Constitution of Vanuatu formally recognises the 
dual system of state and customary governance, particularly in relation to 
land matters. This dualism has led some (AusAID 2008; Naupa and Simo 
2008; Naupa 2009; Stefanova et al. 2012; McDonnell 2013) to question 
which norms and practices take precedence, particularly where customary 
practices may conflict with state-condoned international best practice in 
matters such as women’s rights.
Administratively, both the overlaps and differences between the two land 
governance systems often lead to conflict and confusion. As Rodman 
(1995) notes, uncertainty about who defines ‘custom’ lends itself to 
the emergence of ‘masters of tradition’ or political elites who direct or 
manipulate the modern interpretation of custom, and in so doing control 
it. In such a situation, the foundation of customary land tenure systems 
becomes challenged and further complicated by the overarching state land 
administration system that is limited in its ability to verify customary 
land claims. Siobhan McDonnell introduces the concept of ‘masters of 
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modernity’—men who are adept at negotiating the financial, cultural 
and, to a more limited degree, legal arrangements relating to land matters 
(see Chapter 9, this volume). This ‘mastery’ of the processes of the two 
systems affords certain men additional authority and privileges them as 
knowledge brokers or gatekeepers.
Where the two systems interact, such as when customary land parcels are 
formalised through the creation of a land title, a ‘hybrid system’ emerges 
that can embed the marginalisation of women in land matters, if rights 
are defined by the ‘masters of modernity’. On many islands in Vanuatu, 
women do not have a formal role in traditional (or state) land matters, and 
where they do, this is becoming increasingly marginal (Naupa and Simo 
2008). Competing interests in land further compound the ambiguous 
definition of kastom practice in a hybrid system. Whatever minimal 
protections for women’s access to land may exist in traditional customs, 
which the state has lacked the capacity and the mechanism to enforce, 
become more threatened in the context of a land grab.
The Global Land Grab Context
Globally, land grabs have accounted for mass marginalisation of local 
populations, disenfranchised them of their land rights, and have occurred 
in contexts where the state imposes strict regulations over indigenous or 
customary land and retains the right to override the social institutions 
associated with it (Cotula et al. 2009). The displacement of settlements in 
the name of commerce, whether for large-scale agribusiness or extractive 
industries such as mining, has been viewed as a necessary price to pay for 
the greater economic benefit of states and multinational companies, but 
has also led to greater poverty in many cases, threatening the food security 
of the poor in particular (Daniel and Mittal 2009).
The global land grab literature and global campaigns to date have primarily 
addressed the ethics of land grabs or large-scale land investments, 
with some observers proposing a ‘code of conduct’ to regulate such 
land dealings (FAO et al. 2010). For example, Oxfam International’s 
(2012) ‘Behind the Brands’ campaign has succeeded in getting major 
multinational brands (such as Coca-Cola) to commit to zero tolerance 
for land grabs by appealing to their corporate social responsibility.4 
4  www.oxfam.org/en/grow/campaigns/behind-brands.
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The  focus on transnational commercial land transactions is centred on 
the production and export of food, biofuel, timber and minerals, where 
there is a perception of foreign-induced land grabbing (Borras and Franco 
2012). The emphasis on the role of external actors in the process has 
limited the attention paid to the role of domestic facilitators, national 
elites, and state institutions that enable large-scale access to land, both at 
a commercial and individual scale (Cotula et al. 2009; Borras and Franco 
2010). In Vanuatu, the framing of land issues in terms of foreign-driven 
investments and deals, enabled by a weak government administration, has 
tended to overlook the role that traditional institutions and the ‘masters 
of modernity’ have played in facilitating these deals.
Verma (2014: 55) has observed that most of the land grab literature has 
been gender blind (but see Mackenzie 2010). Verma encourages closer 
scrutiny of the framing of land grab debates, which have tended to
focus on technocratic and productive values of land, stripping it of the 
multiple sociocultural, political, historical, and gendered meanings. 
This  affects the processes by which women’s and men’s differential 
relationship, access, control, ownership, and security over land are 
negotiated (Verma 2014: 54).
This chapter explores the role of socially dominant groups and state 
bureaucrats in consolidating and expanding landholdings and selling 
or leasing them out to new investors, building on Borras and Franco’s 
(2012) distinction between the de jure and de facto management of private 
property in land. It specifically looks at how this experience shaped 
particular gender advocacy strategies during Vanuatu’s land reform process 
of the mid to late 2000s.
Land Grabs and Vanuatu
Vanuatu’s ‘land grab’ experience is one of weakly enforced land legislation, 
unlike cases in the African region, and more recently in Papua New 
Guinea, where the government has strongly exerted its authority in 
facilitating large-scale land transactions for extractive industries. Vanuatu’s 
‘zone of abandonment’ in land governance, exemplified by the limited 
state oversight of land lease transactions negotiated between customary 
landowners and interested lessees—both foreign and domestic—is a direct 
product of Vanuatu’s dual land governance system. The enshrining of 
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customary land governance in the Constitution, combined with weak 
state legislation and regulation, has done little to protect traditional 
groups from the removal of their access to large tracts of land.
During the late 1990s through to the early 2000s, limited state monitoring 
enabled exponential growth in land transactions, mostly for speculative 
purposes. While almost 10 per cent of Vanuatu’s land is under leasehold, 
this is primarily for residential purposes, reflective of the unique real 
estate emphasis of the ‘land rush’ during the early 2000s (Scott et al. 
2012). The rising tensions between customary land groups and within 
families, as people—most often women—found themselves suddenly 
prevented from accessing garden lands, were the subject of much media 
coverage throughout the 2000s (see Kaloris 2009). Recognising the 
escalation of land conflict, the Vanuatu Cultural Centre convened a 
National Self-Reliance Summit in 2005, which led to a National Land 
Summit in 2006, hosted jointly with the Vanuatu government and the 
Malvatumauri (National Council of Chiefs). The National Land Summit 
passed 20 resolutions, committing the country to a long-term land reform 
process (Regenvanu 2008).
I was drawn into the land reform policy dialogue for both personal and 
intellectual reasons. As a mixed-race Ni-Vanuatu woman, I was aware 
that land had always been something that my male relatives talked 
about, not me. But in 2001, I became involved in researching traditional 
resource management for the Vanuatu Cultural Centre, which sparked an 
interest in researching the practical adaptations that occur when various 
pressures on community land management are prevalent. In the course 
of conducting research in the peri-urban village of Mele (for a Masters 
in Geography), it became apparent that I could not ignore the nexus 
between traditional and state land governance systems. By the time of 
the 2006 National Land Summit, I was one of only a small handful of 
women engaged in high-level discourse on this subject. This privilege was 
in part due to my previous employment at the Vanuatu Cultural Centre, 
my personal contacts within the Ministry of Lands from conducting my 
research, and my new job in the Australian government’s Pacific Land 
Initiative.5
5  This latter role drew both personal persecution from certain land rights activists who were 
suspicious of donors’ interest in land reform, but also great opportunities to influence the land reform 
process to address gender issues and women’s rights. Cox (2014) has pointed to the role of Melanesia’s 
urban middle class in influencing politics and policy. Though not myself resident in town, I may have 
fallen into this category.
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While the ‘land grab’ in Vanuatu has largely been facilitated by 
internal—primarily indigenous—actors (the ‘masters of modernity’), 
certain stakeholders were still focused on the popular framing of land 
reform to address the threat of foreign-induced land grabs. Framing 
the land reform process as a battle of ‘us versus them’, or ‘Ni-Vanuatu 
versus foreigners’, failed to recognise the role of indigenous middlemen, 
and did not allow for the heterogeneity of customary groups, nor the 
local political dynamics that shape land governance. This demarcation 
conceals women’s rights behind a wholesale image of customary land 
tenure, and diverts public attention from the more pervasive challenge 
of local elite capture of custom and formal land governance processes. 
As a Ni-Vanuatu woman familiar with what Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011) 
call the ‘intimate exclusions’ that occur within customary land practice, 
I regularly advocated for a focus on indigenous facilitation of land grabs, 
but popular media rhetoric continually presented Ni-Vanuatu as victims 
of land decisions, belying the active role that Ni-Vanuatu men played in 
creating situations of land alienation. This framing challenge continues to 
the present day (Simo 2013).
Gender and Land Context
Eight years ago, my colleague Ketty Napwatt and I stood before an 
audience of 3,000 men in the national meeting hall of the traditional 
leaders who had gathered for the 2006 National Land Summit. This was 
my first public moment advocating for the protection of women’s land 
rights—to speak about the unspoken. Until then, I had been working as 
a ‘behind-the-scenes’ policy maker, gathering evidence and applying it 
to Vanuatu’s long-term land reform process. In Vanuatu culture, women 
do not speak before traditional chiefs; we certainly do not speak publicly 
in traditional meeting spaces, and we are invisible in land decisions. 
How then can we get women’s perspectives included in the national land 
reform agenda when the space is typically male-dominated?
Introducing gender rights into the public discourse around land was not 
only made difficult by cultural attitudes and gendered roles, but also by 
the modalities of communication. A 2012 survey of citizens’ information 
needs (InterMedia 2013) highlighted that the most preferred method 
of sharing information about land issues was in person (81  per cent), 
while radio was the second preferred method (68 per cent). If a trusted 
source is someone you know, the potential for distortion or influence in 
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information flows is large. Any attempt to help increase women’s awareness 
of their rights to land has to consider how to utilise these communication 
preferences. Addressing men, as the gatekeepers of knowledge and land 
decisions, is a prudent way to start to tackle the complex issue of land 
rights protection for Vanuatu’s women.
A Boost for Women’s Land Rights: Passage 
of the Land Reform Act Amendments
The recent amendments to the Land Reform Act signal an important 
step towards enhanced gender inclusion in the state and customary 
administration of land. The legislation6 is the culmination of a seven-year 
multi-stakeholder effort to formally protect women’s land rights, although 
there is still much work to be done. Careful strategising enabled the 
attainment of this historic first step towards formalised social inclusion in 
a country struggling to balance the tension between the traditional and 
the modern, and between political elites and those without voice.
Advocating for Women’s Land Rights
Globally, land rights advocacy typically adopts a cyclical approach 
of employing a highly visible ‘upstream advocacy’ that publicises the 
issue, and the less visible ‘downstream advocacy’ that involves building 
consensus, forging alliances, and lobbying. Land rights advocacy efforts 
have also involved a cyclical approach in which awareness raising and 
consensus building are followed by: building the capacity of women’s 
organisations; the use of research to educate and mobilise support; various 
forms of public engagement; and the application of lessons learned to the 
next stage in the process (ANGOC 2010).7
In Vanuatu, advocacy for women’s land rights has adopted similar 
approaches, but adapted to existing power dynamics and the cultural 
context. While the issue of focus was the protection of women’s access 
to land, the emphasis was on mobilising men rather than women’s 
organisations. This ‘downstream’ approach was essential to empowering 
6  Land Reform (Amendment) Act no. 31 of 2013 and Land Lease (Amendment) Act no. 32 of 2013.
7  Some examples of global programs include Terrewode (Uganda), Landesa’s Center for Women’s 
Land Rights, and the International Land Coalition’s program on Women’s Land Rights (see also 
OHCHR and UN Women 2013).
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traditional male leaders to recognise, advocate and protect women’s access 
to land resources. Efforts that began with an overtly public, ‘upstream’ 
gender advocacy effort would have hampered subsequent ability to engage 
male decision makers. Focusing efforts on those in power, rather than 
mobilising women’s organisations, was equally important to ensuring that 
women’s land rights became visible through formal state mechanisms. 
Commencing with research on traditional rights helped inform 
stakeholder engagement and mobilisation of men at all levels—from the 
grassroots to the national parliament. Women’s mobilisation had to be the 
final step in order to ensure initial buy-in from the predominantly male 
decision makers (see Table 10.1).
The following account of this policy process is largely drawn from a paper 
presented at meeting on ‘Good Practices in Realizing Women’s Rights to 
Land’ that was held in Switzerland, not Vanuatu (Naupa 2012).
Table 10.1 Timeline for gender advocacy efforts, 2006–13.
Year Milestone
2006 National Land Summit Resolutions recognise women’s role in land matters 
(‘group ownership’) .
2007 Research conducted on women’s access to land in matrilineal societies 
(Naupa and Simo 2008) .
2008 Vanuatu Cultural Centre’s Women Fieldworkers Workshop discusses 
‘Women’s Place on the Land’ .
2009 Land Sector Framework 2009–2018 highlights inclusive decision‑making 
processes .
2010 Justice for the Poor Program (World Bank/AusAID) conducts research on 
group decision making about land on Epi Island (Porter and Nixon 2010) .
2011–13 Malvatumauri and Department of Lands build chiefs’ awareness, and 
integrate social inclusion into institutional policy and practice .
2013 Land Reform Act amendments foster inclusive decision making for lease‑
based land transactions .
Source: Author’s summary .
Gathering Evidence for Advocacy Efforts
Cultural resistance to gender equality in land matters can be addressed 
by sharing evidence of the negative impacts of women’s exclusion from 
land decisions. In 2007 research was conducted on women’s traditional 
roles in land decisions to gather evidence on cultural precedence for 
women’s proactive roles in traditional land matters, led by the Vanuatu 
Cultural Centre with support from the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
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(Naupa and Simo 2008). This was followed by a 2008 Vanuatu Cultural 
Centre workshop focusing on women’s voice in land matters. By gathering 
overwhelming evidence that refuted the received notion that decision 
making about land in Vanuatu was exclusively the realm of men, advocacy 
efforts could be tailored to make the land reform process more inclusive. 
Sustaining public attention on the issue required strategic use of the 
media in accentuating the challenges for women in the ‘land for sale’ 
environment on the main island of Efate.
In May 2009, the Cultural Centre’s Land Desk gained the support of 
100 chiefs to declare opposition to the government’s initial land reform 
efforts through a ‘Lamap Declaration’ (MILDA 2009).8 Despite high-
level support from the Malvatumauri (the National Council of Chiefs), 
and its partnership with the Vanuatu government, there was still 
much suspicion surrounding any land reform efforts. According to the 
‘traditional guardians’ camp, no land reform effort would be genuine 
without addressing the more fundamental problem of ministerial powers 
over customary land. However, procedurally, the inclusion of women and 
youth, as well as chiefs, in the Lamap Declaration was a good example of 
how to engage the broader community in land matters.
In 2010, the World Bank’s Justice for the Poor program (called Jastis blong 
Evriwan in Bislama) collaborated with communities on the island of Epi to 
research the ways in which customary groups engage in the lease creation 
process and the subsequent impacts of this process on communities 
(Porter and Nixon 2010). Community theatre was used to communicate 
research findings and generate action at the local level. In 2011, the 
program conducted an assessment of the community dissemination of 
land leasing research, which found that communities most remembered:
the importance of land and its protection for future generations in 
the context of a growing population; the need for greater consultation 
and inclusive group decision-making regarding the leasing of land; 
the importance of transparent processes for customary landholder 
identification; the need to understand the social and environmental impact 
of leasing and obtain specialist advice to make informed decisions … and 
the need for benefit-sharing within the group (World Bank n.d.).
8  In 2009, opposition to land reform efforts were generalised to encompass any effort by the 
Vanuatu government to modify the existing (although widely accepted by government as flawed) land 
administration arrangements. The specific land law reforms mentioned in the bulk of this chapter 
relate to efforts since 2009.
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The value of this localised action research in triggering discussions about 
inclusive group decision making was considerable and timely, building 
on the momentum started by the Vanuatu Cultural Centre.
Framing Gender Within Culture: Social Inclusion
Fiercely nationalistic and supportive of the constitutional mandate of the 
primacy of customary governance systems over land, Vanuatu’s traditional 
leaders have not responded positively in the past to a rights-based 
approach to gender and land. The framing of women’s land rights within 
the context of family and community, and the broader social and cultural 
context, helped to gain a foothold in broader high-level discussions 
about customary land reform, offering a narrative of cultural continuity 
that sought to accommodate incremental advances for women (Naupa 
et al. 2006). Framing the issue as one of social inclusion, rather than 
‘just’ a women’s issue, tied advocacy efforts closer to culturally respected 
and valued principles relating to communal livelihoods. It helped to 
gain credibility for advocacy efforts, and also earned women a seat at the 
negotiating table for land reform.9
The strategic decision to focus on family units, rather than individuals, 
is one that has met with considerable success in other areas of women’s 
rights. The Vanuatu Women’s Centre’s 11-year effort to introduce 
family protection legislation rested on principles of community peace 
and harmony, highlighting the importance of respect for women and 
therefore its importance in social cohesion. Working with nominated 
men and women who deliver community education activities and provide 
counselling and legal services (through Committees Against Violence 
Against Women), and a network of male advocates who conduct men-
to-men awareness on gender rights, the Centre has successfully integrated 
a women’s rights issue into the social fabric of Ni-Vanuatu lives (Ellsberg 
et al. 2008: 173, 179–80). For advocacy efforts relating to women’s land 
rights, targeted integration of women into key stages of decision-making 
processes will be an important next step.
9  The author subsequently served as a gender and land policy expert for the Vanuatu government’s 
land reform agenda, was a member of the Vanuatu Land Governance Committee, and served as the 
Gender Adviser to the 2013 National Land Law Reform Committee. The last two were ministerial 
appointments.
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Tapping into Networks of Power: Male Champions
Advocating for women’s land rights in a male-dominated culture 
necessitated a strategic emphasis on mobilising men rather than women 
to advocate for gender-sensitive land reform. As previously noted, the 
framing of the issue as a social—rather than gender—issue gave men 
a role to legitimately support the issue without undermining their own 
cultural standing. Ni-Vanuatu from both the traditional and state systems 
could ‘buy in’ to gender advocacy.
The Vanuatu government appointed a male gender focal point within the 
Department of Lands, who worked closely with long-time gender equality 
advocates, such as the author and the Department of Women’s Affairs, 
to achieve a consensus from the traditional chiefly body to formally 
recognise and protect women’s land rights in Vanuatu. The use of male 
champions enabled a truncated network influence effect that lobbying 
solely by women’s organisations would have taken longer to achieve.10 
This is a practice that women’s organisations like the Vanuatu Women’s 
Centre have also employed, using male advocates to champion an end to 
violence against women. In 2012, a citizens information survey revealed 
that 70 per cent of those surveyed believed land to be owned by groups, 
not individuals (InterMedia 2013), thus demonstrating growing public 
support for formalised social inclusion.
The gender focal point position within the Ministry of Lands ended in 
late 2013 due to budget constraints, but the importance of using and 
maintaining networks to ensure the sustainability of these advocacy efforts 
will remain central to the future effectiveness of the new Customary Land 
Management Act and the amendments to the Land Reform Act.
In the final quarter of 2013, the Ministry of Lands conducted a nationwide 
consultation and awareness campaign regarding a proposed Customary 
Land Management Act (as well as amendments to the Land Reform Act). 
This would introduce substantial changes to the formalisation process 
for customary land, not least the process of ownership identification 
(GoV 2013). Particular attention was paid to ensuring that, at each of 
the 24 consultation meetings, separate meetings were held with women. 
Two female staff were appointed to the consultation team to specifically 
10  Advocacy by women’s groups for family protection legislation in Vanuatu took 13 years to have 
an effect.
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facilitate these focused consultations with women on the land reform 
package.11 By clearly linking the 2006 National Land Summit resolutions 
to the proposed land law sections, providing informational material in 
Bislama, and adopting a multi-media campaign, the consultation process 
helped to build the momentum that culminated in the passing of the 
bill during the November 2013 parliamentary sitting. Importantly, these 
public consultations highlighted the point that, in determining group 
rights to land, ‘women and youth have the right to participate in land 
decisions’ (GoV 2013: 5), and that ‘if people did not follow the law, any 
member of a custom land owning group (e.g., any woman or youth) 
had the right to make a formal complaint to the newly established Land 
Ombudsman’ (ibid.: 29). The Minister for Lands, Ralph Regenvanu, and 
the President of the Malvatumauri, Chief Tirsupwe, led the consultations, 
demonstrating the political and cultural power that supported the 
inclusion of women’s rights in land matters (Anon. 2013a). A month 
later, the traditional leaders of Vanuatu overwhelmingly supported the 
proposed legislation, which would also formally protect women’s rights 
and roles in land decisions (Anon. 2013b).
Other Factors: Who Frames the Agenda?
Political commitment enabled the several years of groundwork for 
women’s land rights to be realised. As one aspect of a broader—and 
contentious—land reform package, there were several moments when the 
achievement of formal protection of rights was threatened by differing 
views on traditional rights protection, and by competition from other 
land policy interests. The genuine fear of codification of customary law, 
and the potential for diminished flexibility in land rights, as well as a 
general suspicion of major land reform by the government, led some 
factions within the Vanuatu Cultural Centre to actively undermine efforts 
to formally institute protective mechanisms.12
11  Siobhan McDonnell, personal communication, September 2016.
12  For example, the Land Desk at the Vanuatu Cultural Centre (funded by The Christensen Fund) 
remained highly critical of government reform efforts throughout.
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Closing the Circle
Amendments to the Land Reform Act, gazetted in March 2014, elevate 
the role of women in consultation processes regarding custom and 
rights and public awareness of planned land transactions. Section 6(f3) 
states that:
Membership of the custom owner group must be determined according 
to the rules of custom and by customary processes and is to include all 
indigenous citizens (men, women and children) who hold ownership or 
use rights over land in accordance with the rules of custom.
And Section 6(j8) states that:
‘affected groups’ must include, but are not limited to all women and 
young people living in the area concerned, any indigenous citizens who 
are not custom owners and any community in whose locality the land is 
situated.
Explicit reference to women in ownership identification and negotiation 
discussions will be an important guide to land administrators. This is 
a significant gender equality achievement for Vanuatu’s male-dominated 
culture.
However, while the Customary Land Management Act signals an 
important first step towards clarifying ambiguity in a hybrid land 
governance system, it prioritises customary control of land management 
over social inclusion. Its gender-neutral position with regards to defining 
land rights does not allow for clear implementation of its intent for an 
inclusive approach. Women are only mentioned once in the entire Act 
in relation to group affiliation, where Section 2(1) states that ‘members 
of a nakamal include all men, women and children who come under the 
governance jurisdiction of that nakamal’.
There is some irony in advocating social inclusion in land reform 
while inadvertently excluding women’s organisations and networks. 
The advocacy strategy consciously focused on mobilising men, rather than 
women, to advocate for women’s land rights, in an effort to be culturally 
sensitive, and therefore more accessible to powerful male decision 
makers. However, by delaying the focus on the organisational aspects of 
an advocacy model, Vanuatu now faces the problem of implementing 
gender-sensitive land law reform without the supporting organisational 
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structures. There remains a role for the Department of Women’s Affairs, 
which was consulted in the land reform process, women’s organisations 
and networks of power, to maintain a focus on the rights issue, specifically 
through public ‘upstream advocacy’ efforts and to ensure the sustainability 
of law reform efforts to date.
The value of this important step in formalising protection of women’s 
rights to land cannot be overemphasised. However, protecting rights 
to social inclusion in decision making on land-related matters is only 
part of a bigger package of legal reforms that are necessary to ensure 
complete protection. Family law, which will address marital property and 
inheritance concerns, is currently being developed and will demand greater 
participation by women’s organisations and advocates with considerable 
cultural and formal experience in this area, such as the Vanuatu Women’s 
Centre.
Beyond legal reforms, administrative reforms within both the Department 
of Lands and related land management entities (at both the state and 
local levels), as well as reforms within social institutions to incorporate 
women into traditional decision-making processes, have already begun. 
Standard policy implementation practices, such as public service training 
in operationalising legal roles and responsibilities, along with gender 
training, must be complemented by continued social inclusion campaigns 
via the media and chiefs’ networks. Monitoring mechanisms to track 
policy implementation, such as six-monthly and annual agency reporting, 
should include gender-specific indicators to ensure that social inclusion 
remains visible in both practice and performance. Women’s organisations 
should also play a role in monitoring implementation, using provincial 
and national networks to provide an independent assessment that can 
be used to inform improved government practice, through mechanisms 
like the CEDAW ‘shadow reporting’ process. Cross-sectoral resourcing 
of gender equality on land matters is essential for operationalising the 
current legislation.
Vanuatu’s path to emphasise land tenure security for indigenous citizens 
has  its pros and cons. On the one hand, group land rights have the 
potential  to prevent and/or mitigate the negative implications of land 
grabs if private tenure security is guaranteed—a process that the Vanuatu 
government has now strengthened. On the other hand, unless the 
government strengthens its planning regulations and services, the lack of 
appropriate land advisory services to mitigate bad decisions by private 
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group-based landholders may lead to a repeat of the land speculation of 
the early 2000s and women’s continued exclusion from land decisions. 
However, the introduction of a set of formal mechanisms that require the 
involvement of women in the decision-making process goes some way 
towards mitigating against the lack of transparency in land decisions and 
the previous scant attention paid to the wider social implications of these 
land decisions.
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1  Just as the people whose ethnic origin is of Vanuatu are known by the demonym ‘Ni-Vanuatu’, 
so I shall refer to people who identify as originating from Lamen Island as Li-Lamenu, meaning 
‘people of Lamen’ in the vernacular.
From Colonial Intrusions to 
‘Intimate Exclusions’: Contesting 
Legal Title and ‘Chiefly Title’ 
to Land in Epi, Vanuatu
Rachel E . Smith
Introduction
Exclusion from land was evidently a pressing social concern in November 
2011 in Lamen Bay on Epi Island in central Vanuatu. At a community 
council meeting I attended a few days after I arrived in my field site, the 
village chief appealed to the local people to resist registering their land. 
The chief said that the registration of land under state law (loa) would 
make it vulnerable to leasing by outside ‘investors’. He urged people that 
land should be left for chiefs to manage according to kastom. At the time of 
this council meeting, two major land disputes put the majority of Lamen 
Bay land under contention. Senior Li-Lamenu1 men were the principal 
actors behind these conflicts, both of which involved attempts to register 
the land. These men had issued eviction letters to their own kin and 
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neighbours, across several different clans (nasara).2 Later in this chapter, 
I shall discuss these two disputes in order to show how those attempting to 
exclude kin and neighbours from land in processes of ‘intimate exclusion’ 
(Hall et al. 2011: 20), and those trying to prevent these exclusions, deploy 
different discourses of kastom and loa to legitimate their actions.
Beyond Efate and Santo islands, where urbanisation and tourism are 
concentrated, Epi has the next highest degree of land leasing in Vanuatu 
(Howlett 2012). Lamen Bay is located on the northwest coast of Epi 
(see Figure 11.1), and is named after the small offshore Lamen Island, 
whose inhabitants use the bay area for cultivating their gardens. Over the 
past 50 years or so, Li-Lamenu people have begun to move from Lamen 
Island to the Epi mainland more permanently and in increasing numbers. 
Unlike most of the mainland, Lamen Island and Lamen Bay are densely 
populated, and there are growing worries about future land shortages. 
The pressure on land could be a reason why Epi islanders see Lamen Bay 
as a place where land disputes between kin are especially common.
The exclusion of kin and neighbours from land is a process that Derek 
Hall, Philip Hirsch and Tania Murray Li (2011: 145–66) term ‘intimate 
exclusion’. The authors suggest that such processes are frequently 
motivated by a desire for wealth and capital. Likewise, in both the land 
disputes I analyse in this paper, local people saw the attempted exclusions 
as motivated by a desire for income from rent or leases. Like the Lamen 
Bay chiefs, many people also perceive exclusionary processes as being 
facilitated by the creation of formal legal titles to property and state 
regulation of land titles.
2  Nasara is the Bislama term most often used by Li-Lamenu people for their primary kinship 
groups, which I also refer to as clans. Whilst pamerasava, the vernacular term, refers to ideals of 
exogamy, nasara is also the Bislama term for a ritual and dancing ground, and thus has more territorial 
connotations as oral histories relating to such historical sites feature often in land claims. The terms 
nasara and pamerasava usually map on to each other, and are often used interchangeably.
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Figure 11.1 Map of Vanuatu, showing the location of Lamen Bay.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University .
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Conflicts over land and resources are simultaneously struggles over power, 
and the meaning and values that give authority to those claims (Hall et 
al. 2011: 166). As elsewhere in Melanesia (McDougall 2005; Filer 2006), 
political and moral discourses about land are often articulated in terms 
of kastom and loa, or loa blong waetman (‘white people’s law’). Kastom 
denotes knowledge and practices deemed to be indigenous or customary, 
usually in contradistinction to counterparts characterised as ‘foreign’. 
In Vanuatu, people often say that loa—whether relating to land, criminal 
or civil cases—creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Forsyth 2009: 195), whereas 
the principle behind kastom courts is to restore peaceful and ordered social 
relations. Nevertheless, I suggest that senior men stand to benefit more 
than others, as the ideological principle of the restorative power of kastom 
has the effect of reinstating and reinforcing existing hierarchies of power.
As I shall argue in the first part of this chapter, in relation to major 
land claims on Epi, kastom is usually framed in terms of an ‘ideology 
of chieftainship’, and claims to ‘chiefly title’, by which rival claims are 
judged. Like any ideology, powerful actors can manipulate assertions 
of ‘chiefly title’ for personal gain. So, although in Melanesia kastom is 
often conceptually opposed to loa in a way that would seem to express 
an axiomatic distinction between the ‘indigenous’ (or ‘autochthonous’) 
and the ‘Western’, this duality must be understood as contextual and 
contested, articulated according to changing and often contradictory 
political strategies. Furthermore, appeals to kastom conceal the way in 
which local leadership and land tenure systems have been shaped and 
transformed through interactions with missionary, colonial and state 
influences.
Although kastom and chiefs, loa and the state, have a long and complex 
history of entanglement, they can still act as salient conceptual oppositions, 
deployed by Ni-Vanuatu people to represent contrasting and conflicting 
political and moral principles. When local people make the distinction 
in relation to land tenure today, they often contrast the ‘inclusive’ 
principle of kastom, ensuring everyone has some access to some land 
(whilst putting everyone in their rightful place), with the private property 
regimes of state law, which uphold the ‘exclusive’ rights of a recognised 
landholder whilst denying the claims of others altogether (Lea 1997: 12). 
On Epi, the ideology of chieftainship has also evolved in connection with 
social processes that (following Hall et al. 2011) I shall term ‘intimate 
inclusions’, by which displaced allies from outside were incorporated into 
kin structures and the ‘relational economy’ (see Chapter 5, this volume).
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In contrast, people on Epi associate loa with imported and imposed 
European legal definitions and procedures, recalling the historical 
enforcement of processes of exclusion from land by foreign interests. 
From  the late 1890s to Independence in 1980, Epi was one of the 
centres  for European plantations in the archipelago (Bonnemaison 
1994:  46–50), but  throughout this period local people contested the 
legitimacy of colonial land titles. In the second part of this chapter, 
I shall give an account of these political struggles over land, to show how 
loa became a byword for exclusion from land, and kastom came to be 
understood as a compelling political framework for countering these 
‘foreign’ intrusions.
As the phrase loa blong waetman suggests, Ni-Vanuatu people continue 
to  associate state law with imported and imposed European legal 
definitions and the continuation of colonial rule, failing to represent 
indigenous practices and principles in the post-colonial era. Although 
land was returned to ‘custom owners’ following Independence in 1980, the 
boundaries created by colonial powers, and the legal system that encoded 
them, continue to be retraced in land disputes and leasing patterns taking 
place between kin and neighbours. A World Bank survey of leasing on 
Epi found 23 registered leases, of which 17 were created on land that 
had been alienated prior to Independence (Porter  and Nixon 2010: 
ii). A subsequent report argued that ‘pre-independence land alienation 
experience shapes land leasing on Epi today’ (Stefanova et al. 2010: 2).
In the final part of this chapter, I shall present two case studies that 
serve to illustrate the micro-level processes by which local actors, usually 
senior men and self-proclaimed ‘chiefs’, strategically deploy discourses of 
kastom alongside legal claims for political and economic gain. However, 
as the second case demonstrates, alternative discourses of kastom that 
emphasise a more ‘inclusive’ ethic can be deployed as an effective means 
for countering exclusive legal claims.
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Customary Landownership and 
the Ideology of ‘Chiefly Title’
‘When you talk about land, you talk about chiefs.’ So said the Epi 
representative on the National Council of Chiefs (Malvatumauri) in 
a recorded interview.3
Kastom and loa can be seen as shifting and contested categories that can 
each incorporate aspects of their conceptual opposite, according to the 
contexts in which they are applied.4 As the juxtapositions in the terms 
‘customary law’ and ‘custom owner’ imply, in post-colonial Melanesian 
states there is an ambiguity in the relationship between kastom and loa that 
allows their configuration to take on an ideological character, concealing 
changing political and economic relations by presenting a front of time-
honoured tradition. For instance, in Papua New Guinea, Filer (2006: 66) 
argues that the politically salient opposition between custom and law 
has been eclipsed by an emerging post-colonial ideology of customary 
landownership, in which indigenous citizenship is increasingly premised 
on legal status and entitlement within an extractive economy. The new 
‘ideology of landownership’ in this context reflects the desire for resource 
compensation from mineral extraction and other lucrative development 
projects, in which claims are structured through the legal framework 
of membership of incorporated landowning groups.
In Vanuatu, where land leasing and rents rather than resource extraction 
dominate land transactions, it was the figure of the chief that stepped into 
the post-colonial space between kastom and loa to dominate the definition 
of ‘custom ownership’. Following Filer, we might term this an ‘ideology 
of chieftainship’, in which the hereditary chief is the personification of 
kastom and rightful guardian of a traditional social order in which he 
represents the legitimate authority (White 1992: 75; also Chapter 1, this 
volume). On Epi, major land claims tend to be framed in terms of ‘chiefly 
title’, and these often entail contests over land occupied by people other 
than those of the chief ’s immediate kin group.
3  The chief quoted here is a key claimant in Case Study 2.
4  I am grateful to Keir Martin for helping me to elaborate this argument.
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Unlike achieved rank and warrior status, hereditary chieftainship on Epi 
is traditionally associated with ideals of peace and social order. It is said 
that, if the chief is of the correct ‘bloodline’, everything will be ‘good’ 
or ‘straight’ (Lemaya 1996: 78). Although, in recent decades, the village 
chiefs have instructed each clan to nominate their own ‘chief ’ to help keep 
order, it is socially recognised hereditary chiefs who tend to be seen as the 
appropriate candidates to be village chief, and to represent the villagers on 
the Area and Island Councils of Chiefs.
The role of hereditary chiefs has been transformed, even strengthened, 
since the early colonial period, relative to other forms of traditional 
authority. The literature on pre-colonial leadership systems draws 
a dividing line through Epi between an area of hereditary chiefly titles 
to the Polynesian-influenced south, and the more relational ‘graded 
society’ system to the north (Blackwood 1981; Bonnemaison 1984:  4, 
1996: 201; Bedford and Spriggs 2008: 110).5 However, in practice this 
line was blurred, and both systems operated flexibly together on Lamen 
Island (Lemaya 1996: 77–8). On Lamen and in western Epi, grade-taking 
continued until its demise in the early twentieth century—a period of 
great depopulation and disruption due to labour migration. And, whilst 
Presbyterian missionaries at this time looked favourably on the apparently 
noble institution of hereditary chieftainship, they sought to stamp out the 
‘morally depraved’ grade system (Riddle 1949: 57).
Missionaries appointed Christian men to take on leadership roles as 
‘elders’ and ‘chiefs’, and in some islands appointed ‘paramount chiefs’ 
to oversee the whole island. People today relate how Supabo, an early 
convert from northeastern Epi, was chosen by the missionaries to oversee 
a redistribution of land across northern Epi in the early 1900s, including 
the boundary where Lamen Bay gardens meet those of adjacent villages.
He was the government of Epi. At the same time, he created some of the 
boundaries that exist today … They didn’t call him chief; they called him 
government of Epi. He was chief, but at the same time he was government 
(Village chief of Lamen Island, recorded interview).
From 1911, chiefs were given the role of ‘assessors’, working alongside 
government ‘district agents’ to oversee local disputes. Even after 
Independence, former ‘assessors’ continued to use this position to claim 
5  The ‘graded society’ was a system in which individual men competed to join successively senior 
grades or ranks through the distribution of wealth items to other members of their communities.
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authority and chiefly titles (Lindstrom 1997: 212–3; Rio 2007: 30–1). 
Thus the redefinition of the ‘chief ’, as the occupant of a Presbyterian or 
colonial leadership role, has had a direct impact on the role of ‘chief ’ 
in post-colonial Vanuatu (Bolton 1999: 3–4).
The position of chief as someone who presides over the land access of 
different clans also evolved in response to a remarkable historical series 
of ‘intimate inclusions’, whereby refugees and other incomers were 
incorporated into local kinship and exchange systems. During the 
dramatic depopulation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
depopulated clans, seeking to maintain their population and labour force, 
took in people from different parts of Epi who had been displaced by 
land alienation and tribal warfare. Lamen was known to be a hub for 
returned Queensland labourers (Giles 1968:  63; Docker 1970:  135), 
and like the Epi mainland, many current residents are descended from 
colonial-era plantation labourers and refugees from volcanic eruptions. 
Incomers, especially those from other islands, can be referred to in Bislama 
as mankam—a term which sometimes has derogatory connotations in 
contradistinction to the autochthonous manples. On Lamen today, such 
terms would occasionally arise in the context of land disputes, especially 
if the alleged incomers were seen as claiming the right to exclude other 
people from the land they  occupied. However, due to a peaceful and 
inclusive ethic of respect for kin and neighbours, the word mankam 
is generally suppressed on Lamen.6
In fact, it is not those chiefs who claim that they are autochthonous 
to Lamen Island, but those claiming descent from long-abandoned 
mainland villages in Epi’s interior, who tend to contest control over land 
in Lamen Bay, based on conflicting claims to ‘chiefly titles’ on overlapping 
areas of  land, as we shall see in the two case studies that follow. In the 
past, Li-Lamenu people cultivated land on Lamen Island, and claims 
to garden land in Lamen Bay derive variously from claims to descent 
from the mainland, victories in warfare, and the granting of land rights 
by mainland chiefs.
6  See McDougall (2005: 83) for a similar situation in Ranongga, Solomon Islands.
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Exclusion and Loa: The Historical 
Experience on Epi
In this section, I outline how processes of state formation and the 
development of a legal apparatus served to protect rival territorial claims 
between the two colonial powers. Land law was introduced largely to 
uphold and formalise land alienation, and so loa blong waetman became 
synonymous with exclusion from land for Ni-Vanuatu people. In the 
anti-colonial movements that mobilised to contest land alienation, kastom 
was deployed as a salient symbol of opposition, and it retains undertones 
of resistance to exclusion today. This historical background is crucial 
to understanding the ongoing politics of land on Epi today, because 
these legal and political processes of exclusion, and the boundaries they 
created, continue to be retraced in ‘intimate exclusions’ between kin and 
neighbours.
The Nineteenth Century ‘Land-Grab’
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Epi was at the centre 
of ‘one of the biggest land grabs in the history of the South Pacific’ 
(Van Trease 1987: 26). Unhappy with an 1878 ‘non-annexation agreement’ 
between the rival powers of Britain and France, New Caledonia-based 
businessman John Higginson sought to acquire large amounts of land 
in the archipelago with the ultimate goal of effecting French control. 
He founded the Noumea-based Compagnie Caledonienne des Nouvelles-
Hebrides (CCNH) in 1882, and Epi was a major target for acquisition 
(Sope 1974: 12; Van Trease 1987: 26).
Barthelemy Gaspard was one of Higginson’s two agents in charge of 
procuring land. Many of these transactions took place on board their 
vessel, the Caledonienne, without any land surveys, and islanders were 
told to mark a piece of paper in exchange for trade goods and alcohol. 
Often the purported vendor had no right to the land, or was unaware 
of the nature of the transaction (Riddle 1949: 69; Weisbrot 1989: 70). 
Distances and directions were recorded with a deliberate imprecision 
that allowed them to be stretched far beyond those originally indicated 
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(Scarr  1967:  183, 199–200; Sope 1974:  14; Van Trease 1987:  27–8).7 
‘Needless to say, these transactions were not worth the paper on which 
they were written’ (Van Trease 1987: 27). People on Epi today continue to 
relate such stories of fraud and coercion in colonial land transactions, and 
as Sope (1974: 7–14) argued, it is likely that local landholders would only 
have knowingly conceded temporary use rights to small areas of land, 
as was customarily practised, and not freehold title.
The CCNH became the Société Francaise des Nouvelles-Hebrides (SFNH) 
when the French government took control in 1894, and the French began 
to settle beyond Port Vila in much greater numbers from the late 1890s 
(Bonnemaison 1994: 50). The French concentrated their efforts on Epi, 
where land was split into blocks of 50 hectares to be offered to prospective 
settlers (Scarr 1967: 212–3; Van Trease 1987: 40). With a Joint Naval 
Agreement now in place to protect the ‘lives and property’ of settlers, 
indigenous people had few options for resistance (Van Trease 1987: 42). 
Even so, the Presbyterian missionaries on Epi, who were strongly against 
French annexation, were lending their voices to indigenous protests against 
the rapid land appropriation (Scarr 1967: 213n; Van Trease 1987: 40).
In 1901, a missionary in western Epi, Robert Fraser, recorded regular 
incidents between French planters and local villagers, which were 
published by the Presbyterian Mission Synod to expose France’s ‘secret 
plan’ for a settlement on the island. The missionaries claimed that the 
French were appropriating vast areas, including whole inland villages that 
had never dealt with French agents (Fraser 1900; Paton et al. 1901; Van 
Trease 1987: 40). However, despite having no official authority over land, 
the British naval commander gave tacit support to the French planters. 
‘The forcible occupation of land on the strength of Gaspard’s swollen title-
deeds was thus facilitated by the unofficial intervention of a body which 
was formally debarred from deciding land cases’ (Scarr 1967: 214).
In the same year, ‘675 male adults, including 106 chiefs’ on Epi signed 
a petition organised by Fraser,8 beseeching King Edward VII to annex the 
island for the British, stating:
7  Around the same time, the Australian-owned South Sea Speculation Company was 
purchasing Epi land in ways that were just as questionable (Van Trease 1987: 28; also Scarr 
1967: 202).
8  With support from local missionaries, Epi and Efate chiefs had presented a similar 
petition intended for Queen Victoria in December 1891 (Anon. 1892).
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There are many white men now coming to the New Hebrides, and at 
the hands of some of these—mostly Frenchmen—we have suffered cruel 
wrongs. Some have forcibly possessed themselves of our lands, which 
they have not bought, burnt down houses, shot our pigs, and harassed 
us in other ways. We wish to live in peace, but at present we feel no 
protection from such injuries, but we feel that under the shadow of your 
just Government we would have justice and enjoy peace (Anon. 1901).
With their continued appeals to the British Empire and Commonwealth 
of Australia to intervene (Paton et al. 1901: 4; Scarr 1967: 218–20), the 
missionaries played a part in bringing about the Anglo-French Convention 
of 1906, which led to the formation of the Condominium government 
(Scarr 1967:  218; Sope 1974:  15; Stober 2004:  14). But with French 
insistence, the burden of proof regarding disputed land sales was to fall 
on any challenger. Title deeds relating to the 600,000 hectares purchased 
before 1896 were very difficult to contest, and the half of these lands 
that had been acquired by CCNH agents in the mid-1880s were beyond 
dispute altogether (Scarr 1967: 224–6; Sope 1974: 17).
Resisting the Rule of Loa
Throughout the colonial period, people on Epi continually resisted the 
alienation of their lands, but the balance of ‘justice’ was very much 
weighted in favour of the colonial powers. It was a long time before the 
new government agreed on any legislative measures to deal with disputed 
land, and in its early decades, land alienation continued to proceed on 
what was effectively a lawless frontier. A Joint Court was founded in 
1910, but was widely seen as inept and ineffective: the Court could only 
try ‘infractions’, not major crimes or land disputes (Scarr 1967: 232–3).
In April 1913, two French planters occupied some land in northern Epi 
that was under cultivation by islanders. When one of the planters attacked 
local people who refused to leave the land, they fought him and he was 
killed. The French struck back, and 20 Epi islanders were captured and 
taken to Vila, including Sam Miley, a leader of indigenous resistance 
against land alienation. The French pinned Miley with a range of 
charges, including collecting monies by threat, and attempts to persuade 
plantation workers to leave their employment (Scarr 1967:  234–40). 
Miley was tried in secret on board ship, without a hearing, and sentenced 
to an additional six months’ imprisonment. Edward Jacomb, an English 
lawyer who encouraged indigenous people to resist the appropriation 
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of land by whatever means they could, considered Miley’s treatment 
a  ‘travesty of justice’ (Jacomb 1914:  126), and argued that the French 
were trying to prevent Miley from finding funds for legal proceedings 
against the planters.
Figure 11.2 Registered land and ‘native reserves’ on Epi Island.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University, based on a colonial map 
reproduced in Van Trease (1987: 2) .
In 1914 the British and French agreed to a protocol that allowed 
for the  extension of the Joint Court’s powers to include land 
disputes, but  even  disputed titles would be upheld with a supporting 
survey  and  either  recognised antiquity or three years’ occupation 
(Scarr 1967: 249–51). It was only in 1935 that the Joint Court finally 
turned its attention to the 74 applications pertaining to Epi, most held 
by SFNH, but survey work was halted by hostility from Epi islanders 
(Sope 1974: 17). Twenty-one of Epi’s chiefs had instructed the Court’s 
Native Advocate to counter every one of the SFNH’s applications, insisting 
that the purchases were illegitimate, but without success (Van  Trease 
1987: 86). The formalisation of the Epi claims was only completed in 
the 1950s, by which time 15  ‘native reserves’ had been created on the 
island, including one in the northern part of Lamen Bay (see Figure 11.2). 
However, this was done with little regard to where people were living, the 
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quality of the land, or how much they required (Van Trease 1987: 80–7). 
As Sope (1974: 10–11) argued: ‘In the judgement of many people the 
Joint Court was established to legalise land titles which were illegal by 
European as well as New Hebridean standards.’ So it is hardly surprising 
that people on Epi came to associate loa with illegitimate exclusion 
from land.
Independence and the Rise of Kastom
From the 1960s, anti-colonial movements started to gather momentum, 
which revalorised and propagated kastom as a popular symbol to counter 
land alienation (Weisbrot 1989:  70). Many Li-Lamenu people were 
drawn to Nagriamel, a movement based on Santo Island that mobilised 
against further appropriation of land (Kolig 1987).9 After the New 
Hebrides National Party (NHNP) was formed in 1971, around half of 
Li-Lamenu people, mainly from one of its two main villages, withdrew 
from Nagriamel and joined the new party, encouraged by the Presbyterian 
Church of Vanuatu. The church made an official declaration of support 
for the nationalist cause when a resolution was passed at the 1973 
Presbyterian Assembly in Tanna, when Li-Lamenu pastor Jack Taritonga 
was the moderator (Gardner 2013: 138–9; Van Trease 1987: 210).
In 1974, the NHNP produced a number of radical proposals for land 
reform, stressing the need to return land to customary owners (Van Trease 
1987: 213, 217). But when the French intervened politically to prevent 
the NHNP from achieving the majority required to push through more 
extensive land reforms, the party resorted to advocating direct action, 
including the occupation and seizure of alienated land by its Ni-Vanuatu 
supporters. In 1977 and 1978, supporters of the NHNP, now known as 
the Vanua’aku (‘My Land’) Party (VP), set up roadblocks and occupied 
alienated land. Many VP supporters from Lamen Island and the villages 
of northeastern Epi occupied the large French-owned Walavea10 and 
nearby Ringdove plantations and ousted the plantation owners, seizing 
their cattle and store goods (Van Trease 1987: 226–30).
9  A Nagriamel ‘headquarters’ was built at Merakup in Lamen Bay, site of the second case study 
in this paper. This was later to be the site of a showdown between rival Nagriamel and NHNP 
supporters. When conflict grew between the two movements in the late 1970s, NHNP supporters in 
northern Epi (according to one of those involved) threatened the Nagriamel group, tore down their 
flag and burned their copra plantation.
10  The site of Walavea plantation is part of the second case study.
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Independence was achieved in 1980, after the VP won a strong majority 
in the national elections of 1979. The Constitution of the new nation 
declared that all land belonged to customary owners and their descendants 
(Van Trease 1987: 238), but did not state how ‘custom ownership’ was to 
be resolved.
The proclamation that all land belongs to the custom owners is, in one 
sense, an appeal to kastom in its oppositional role, and a direct denial of 
colonial practices of land alienation and of colonial attempts to legislate 
or police land matters. But the proclamation also created a zone of 
abandonment by government, in the sense that highly variable customs 
and the difficulty of identifying custom owners can be glossed over as 
kastom and left alone, beyond state control (Rodman 1995: 66–7).
Meanwhile, the legal system for registration of land was still based on the 
colonial logic of the ‘Torrens system’, designed to ease land transactions 
by facilitating individualised land titling without any checks on existing 
undocumented claims, and thus difficult to challenge (Rose 1994: 208; 
McDonnell 2013: 9). This process allowed local people to register land 
and engage in legal proceedings in Port Vila, often without any prior 
knowledge or consent from other people using the land, as we shall see in 
the case studies to follow.
Case Study 1: Appeals to Loa and Kastom
I shall now discuss the first of the two attempts at ‘intimate exclusion’ 
in Lamen Bay that I mentioned in the introduction. This case study 
shows the legal mechanisms by which colonial boundaries and processes 
of exclusion continue to be reproduced. Furthermore, it reveals how the 
indeterminacy of the category ‘custom owner’ can be manipulated from 
the angles of both loa and kastom for personal benefit. As mentioned 
in court documents, the boundary of the area in question included an 
airport and—at the time of the original claim—the wharf used by a large 
commercial cruise ship, and thus was a potentially lucrative source of 
rental income. In this case, the self-proclaimed chief at the centre of the 
dispute exploited legal ambiguities to support his highly contested claim 
to ‘chiefly title’.
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An Error of Judgement
This dispute stems back to a 2003 Island Court case between a family 
from nearby Paama Island, and Philip, who acted as a spokesman for 
four different Li-Lamenu clans. The claimant from Paama had produced 
a document relating to an 1886 land sale attributed to the infamous 
French CCNH agent, Barthelemy Gaspard. The claim extended from the 
northwestern point of Epi to the northern side of Lamen Bay, a region 
named as ‘Velague’ and ‘Bourgue’ in the deeds. These names most likely 
referred to the areas known today as Vela and Purke, though the disputed 
boundary extends far from these stretches of shoreline, bearing the 
dubious hallmarks of Gaspard’s hugely exaggerated land claims.
Figure 11.3 Two major land dispute boundaries, Lamen Bay, c. 2012.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University, based on claim documents .
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The judgement from the 2003 Island Court case stated that, although 
the deeds of sale produced by the Paamese claimant appeared to support 
his claim that his ancestor was resident on ‘Velague’ land, this was 
not admissible as evidence for custom ownership, and considered the 
possibility that it might be based on fraudulent claims:
We have reminded ourselves to be mindful and conclude that such 
instrument … is not a decision of a recognized Court that was in existence 
during the European settler’s era in these islands.
Island courts are bound to administer cases according to the ‘customary 
law’ of each island or region, so the criteria by which they adjudge cases are 
open to influence by those who can convince the judges of their superior 
place-based knowledge. The disputed land included the garden lands or 
residences of four different nasara that had cooperated in the 2003 court 
case, supporting Philip’s claim to be the chief representing one of the 
original four nakamal (communal men’s houses) that were historically 
located on the landscape, with their chiefs’ customary ordination stones. 
In this case the judge was convinced that proof of ‘chiefly title’ was 
required:
It is evident that there is a customary obligation for a Paramount Chief 
to allocate land to his assistants together with their boundary limits. As 
a matter of reciprocity a custom lease is normally paid to the Paramount 
Chief. This Chiefly system and the land tenure system are proved to be 
intertwined. Thus, any isolation or absence of these founding aspects to 
land would prove an invalid custom.
Accordingly, the judgement rejected the Paamese claim on the grounds 
that the claimant could not demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the place 
and its ‘custom’, such as knowledge of the chiefly system on Epi.
Furthermore, the Li-Lamenu counter-claims in this case, framed in 
terms of the ‘ideology of chieftainship’, also concealed disagreements 
about claims to ‘chiefly title’ and the way that these were manipulated 
to strengthen their case. Although in court the four nakamal supported 
Philip’s claim to be descended from a particular high-ranked chief, I later 
found out that there was an ongoing dispute between two nasara as to 
which could legitimately claim descent from this chief. One man told me 
that his and the other clans decided to go along with Philip’s claims in 
court, despite the fact that they rejected the truth of these claims, in order 
to give a united and consistent testimony. That is, by concealing internal 
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rifts and tensions, they could strengthen their claim to superior place-
based customary knowledge, which would be difficult for any outsider to 
challenge. The judge was convinced and the judgement concluded:
it is this day adjudged that [Chief Philip] representative of the four (4) 
Nasara of the Lamen Bay community is the rightful owner of the Velague 
and Bourge [sic] land.
Exploiting Legal Ambiguities
Although the Li-Lamenu strategy of concealing their differences to present 
a united front was successful in the short term, it had later repercussions. 
Some years later, when one of Philip’s neighbours went to plant some 
crops near his house, Philip stopped him from doing so and threatened 
to evict him from the land, claiming that it belonged to him in light 
of the concluding statement of that poorly worded 2003 judgement. 
The neighbour told me that he had heard Philip was travelling to Port 
Vila, and suspected that Philip would try to register the land in his own 
name, so he phoned a friend at the Lands Department and advised him 
that the land was under dispute and not to be registered. Nevertheless, 
Philip had issued a number of eviction notices through a solicitor, 
ordering local residents off the land. Philip’s threat to evict his close kin 
and neighbours can thus be seen as an attempt at ‘intimate exclusion’ 
(Hall et al. 2011: 145)—a process in which kinsfolk and social intimates 
may be excluded from land, which is often motivated by a desire for rent 
or resource income.
In 2010, members of the different clans that claimed land within the 
disputed boundary returned to the Island Court to request a ‘judgement 
clarification’ in respect of the 2003 judgement, this time addressing their 
argument to Philip and making it in Bislama, so it was clear to all. It stated 
that the land belonged to all four historic nakamal, and that each had 
equal interests. However, given that Philip’s opponents have withdrawn 
their support for his ‘chiefly title’, and say that he fabricated his genealogy 
and oral history, this means that even this ‘clarified’ judgement is still 
highly contested.
Despite the formal ‘clarification’, the indeterminacy of customary law 
means that it could remain open to future attempts at exclusion, or else 
demands for payments from those occupying the land. The clarification 
said that residents who were ‘non kastom owners’ have the right to continue 
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to occupy the land provided that they make the ‘necessary arrangements 
such as leasing the land following kastom or law’, and ordered Philip not 
to threaten or disturb the people occupying the land unless his notice was 
‘justifiable and follows law’.
Furthermore, this case illustrates the type of mechanism by which land 
exclusions today continue to reflect titles created in the colonial period. 
The boundary claim was originally based on a land purchase document 
from 1886—a claim that is likely to be fraudulent or exaggerated, given 
what is known about Gaspard. This document was later deployed to make 
a post-colonial land claim, despite the fact that colonial titles are supposed 
to have been erased at Independence. An Island Court decision served to 
retrace this colonial boundary, but this time through a claim of exclusive 
ownership by a local man against his own kin.
Case Study 2: Vested Interests
In Vanuatu today, those land disputes that threaten ‘intimate exclusions’ 
and evictions tend to be motivated by expected economic gains (Hall et 
al. 2011: 145) from commercial developments or from leasing the land. 
These are the disputes that would usually involve attempts to register 
and secure title to the land. However, many other disputes on Epi did 
not involve attempts at registration or leasing. Rather, they served as a 
means to settle political conflicts, aimed more at (re-)establishing social 
hierarchies between traditional authorities or groups than expectations of 
economic gain (Epstein 1969: 198; McDougall 2005: 6).
This second case study serves to demonstrate examples of both types 
of logic and motivation. Whilst the case was triggered by the threat of 
exclusion from an attempted registration and lease arranged with an 
expatriate investor, following the logic of exclusive legal title, the same 
tribunal was used to settle a hierarchical dispute between rival chiefs 
through a discourse of kastom. The chief who arranged the tribunal used 
a vision of a more ‘inclusive’ kastom—one opposed to exclusive legal 
principles—to defend his land against the lease. However, this model also 
served to confirm and reinforce his place in a local political hierarchy, 
and to help perpetuate the ‘ideology of chieftainship’ to legitimate chiefly 
authority over land.
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Investors and Leasing
In Vanuatu today, attempts at exclusion are often motivated by the 
expectation of rent or lease payments, which are enabled by registration of 
the land, often through collaboration with expatriate ‘investors’ and with 
the complicity of powerful political figures (see Chapter 9, this volume).
This is illustrated in a case triggered when John P, originally from Lamen 
Island but resident in Port Vila, leased an area of land known as Merakup 
from his own father and brother. John P was a close work associate of 
an  expatriate businessman based in Port Vila who is associated with 
a  number of other land leases in Vanuatu, and it was rumoured that 
family P wished to subdivide the land for tourism in partnership with this 
businessman (Porter and Nixon 2010: 60–1; Farran 2011: 261).11 I was 
also told that John P had used the colonial title number to register the 
land, again showing the types of process by which land boundaries created 
in the colonial era continue to be redrawn.
In 2009, Chief X, and other people in the village of Wenia, close to 
Lamen Bay, received a letter from a lawyer representing John P, which 
stated:
Our client instructs us that you and your immediate family members have 
been living on the land without knowledge and/or consent of our client 
who is the registered legal owner of the land.
As such, you are hereby given Notice to vacate the land within twenty 
eight (28) days upon the date of the receiving of this letter.
This came as news to the Wenia villagers, who were unaware that the 
land had been registered at all.
At the time of the dispute, Chief X was representative for Epi in the 
National Council of Chiefs (Malvatumauri). Thus he was well versed in 
land matters and well connected in terms of legal and political support. 
He was also in a strong position to navigate the complexities of loa and 
kastom to succeed in regaining control over the land. For Lindstrom 
(1997:  222–8), Malvatumauri chiefs represent the incorporation and 
codification of chiefly authority, and operate both inside and outside the 
11  Family P had adopted the investor in a high profile ceremony in 2010, and this allowed him to 
run for election as Member of Parliament for Epi in 2011. His victory seemed to reflect a common 
disappointment with the failure of the post-colonial state to deliver ‘development’.
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state. In their mediatory role, Lindstrom argues, they serve to sanctify 
the state as upholding kastom, but in their role as authorities of kastom, 
they can also wield their power to oppose the legitimacy of state law. 
Chief X took the case to the Supreme Court in 2010, on the grounds 
that the land ‘had been registered by fraud or mistake’. He argued that 
family P had registered the land without the knowledge of other residents, 
ignoring the ruling of a 2007 area court judgement that indicated Chief 
X was in charge of the land. On this basis, the judge ordered that the case 
be transferred to a Customary Land Tribunal.12
The 2007 judgement was in fact the result of a long-running dispute 
over Merakup land between two neighbouring Lamen-based clans from 
Ngalovasoro village—family P and family Q. The 2007 judgement 
indicated that both of these Li-Lamenu families had been granted 
separate areas of land by some chiefly predecessors of Chief X. Family Q 
supported Chief X in court, confirming that the small area of garden 
land they cultivated was granted to them by a historical agreement with 
one of  Chief X’s ancestors. Those who supported Chief X’s claim said 
that family P originated from another part of Epi, and that Chief X’s 
ancestors had granted them garden land, but a much smaller area than the 
115 hectares they had registered (Farran 2011: 261).
Chiefly Rivals
At the same time, Chief X used the opportunity of the Land Tribunal to 
defend his ‘chiefly title’ and claim over an adjacent area of land against 
rival claims by another Li-Lamenu man, James, a member of Y clan from 
Lamen Island. James was claiming chiefly title as a direct descendant 
of a past chief of ‘Madoga’ land, but the boundary of his claim closely 
matched the boundary of the land claimed by Chief X.
The year prior to the tribunal hearing, James had staged an elaborate 
ceremony in which visiting chiefs from the villages of Varsu—a separate 
district in northeastern Epi—conferred a chiefly title on him. Then, 
12  The Customary Land Tribunal process was introduced in 2001 through a recognition that state 
courts were not a legitimate location for the resolution of land disputes, which required local knowledge 
(Rousseau 2004: 76). However, it drew criticisms from chiefs and others who asserted that it contravened 
customary norms, such as the right of chiefs to take charge of decision making (Farran 2008: 97–8; 
Regenvanu, 2008: 65). The World Bank research team (Porter and Nixon 2010: 20n) found that Epi 
chiefs had initially resisted the idea of a Tribunal, but then in 2009 had formally requested one for Epi 
to address major disputes. Their request was initially refused but eventually granted.
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shortly before the hearing, James held another impressive ceremony with 
the same Varsu area chiefs to open a nakamal newly built on the disputed 
land, and even tried to bring the hearing to this new nakamal, rather 
than the one at Wenia, where Chief X resided. These ceremonies were 
provocative political statements because Chief X was then involved in 
land and title disputes with the same Varsu chiefs who were supporting 
James. Chief X and the Varsu chiefs were of the same language group, and 
claimed descent and titles from long-abandoned villages in Epi’s interior. 
James and Chief X told me, at the time of the dispute, that rival chiefs in 
the two districts were planning a series of meetings to try to resolve their 
disputes according to a ‘chiefly structure’.
James and his family had been locked in another dispute with a family 
Z, belonging to another Lamen clan, who were neighbours of his, and 
built a church close to James’s house. In court, the members of family 
Z corroborated Chief X’s statement that he had given them the right to 
work on the smaller area of land that they occupied, and said they had 
made two customary transactions to him in the 1980s. Thus we can see 
volatile relationships between different Li-Lamenu clans (P and Q, Y 
and Z), based on historic alliances and claims relating to ‘chiefly titles’ on 
the mainland.
Despite these conflicts, neither James nor Chief X ever threatened to evict 
the other groups occupying or cultivating the land. In fact, during the 
council meeting I described at the beginning of this chapter, James had 
stood up to speak in agreement with the Lamen Bay chief, to say that 
they were all ‘Christian’ men and should trust each other to resolve the 
dispute locally. This suggests that James and Chief X were more interested 
in asserting rival claims to be the ‘bigger chief ’, higher up in the social 
hierarchy, than to profit from leases or commercial development of 
the land.
Intimate Inclusions and Relative Exclusions
In an interview, Chief X told me that a big chief ’s role is to ‘manage’ the 
land and everything within it. He argued that Epi kastom does not permit 
exclusive legal claims, and it is the chief ’s responsibility to ensure that 
all the clans using the land, and their descendants, have enough land on 
which to subsist.
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Today, many people do not want to do what kastom tells them. They say 
‘The land is mine’, but no, kastom does not say that ground belongs to 
you. Kastom says that land is for all of us, but that you, the chief, must 
make sure that you manage the land well so that my children can eat from 
the land, and when they die their children will still eat from the land. 
It’s simple.
Chief X argued that, when it came to a land dispute, the claimant should 
not only demonstrate knowledge of genealogical connections, and 
customary landmarks and boundaries, but also prove where he is properly 
located in a ‘chiefly structure’. To prove that he is a ‘big chief ’, a claimant 
must prove that he has a set of ‘small chiefs’ as his ‘clients’. Equally, 
if someone arrives from ‘outside’, the chief can allocate land to him, but 
the newcomer must recognise that he is ‘under’ that chief.
For this tribunal hearing, Chief X presented a list of eight points that he 
used as ‘proof ’ that he was the ‘big chief ’ of the land in question, and had 
control over the landholdings of four different Li-Lamenu families (P, Q, 
Y and Z) involved in the dispute:
I am a chief that has other chiefs below me, with all our ‘clients’, following 
the chiefly structure.
Following number 1, they have their own nasara and their stones.
I went through an ordination ceremony to take back my title Chief X, 
and I have a stone.
In 1988, Tarbumamele Council [the Epi Island Council of Chiefs] 
decided that [Z] family that work in Madoga hill must make a kastom 
[transaction] to me, because we gave them the right to work on that land.
Our ancestors gave the right to the [Y] nasara a long time ago, and they 
have already made a kastom [transaction] to us.
In 2007 Varmali Area Council made the decision that Chief X would take 
the [Q] family and show them their boundary.
We also gave the right for Epi High School to work on the land.
My ancestors gave a piece of land to the family [P]. I don’t know if the 
family [P] knows this or not?13
13  These statements have been translated from a document written in Bislama.
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In the 2012 tribunal hearing, it was adjudged that Chief X was the ‘big 
chief ’ in charge of the Wenia land whose boundary encompasses Merakup 
and Madoga (see Figure 11.4). Chief X was implored not to exclude those 
who were occupying the land:
Following this agreement, that you are the big Chief that oversees the 
Wenia boundary, do not endanger those people that stay under your care.
Thus, even though family P were deemed to be immigrants from another 
part of Epi, the judgement sought to protect their right to remain on the 
land, alongside the access rights of the other clans allocated adjacent areas.
Figure 11.4 Model of land boundaries according to tribunal judgement.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University, adapted from 2012 Land Tribunal 
judgement.
This version of the ideology of chieftainship takes the form of a layered 
model of overlapping land rights, where the ‘big chief ’ maintains 
administrative control, alongside an inclusive ethic that all have rights 
to use some land. Gluckman (1963:  90–8) argued that, in areas of 
shifting agriculture, land tenure systems were likely to take the form of 
layers of different rights administered through a status hierarchy, and 
those rights depended on the fulfilment of obligations to others. Epstein 
(1969: 114–6) refined this concept to better fit the kinds of systems found 
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in Melanesia, whereby various overlapping rights and interests in land 
may apply through membership of a descent group, but also through ties 
of kinship with other groups, as well through interpersonal transactions. 
However, changing political and economic circumstances may be leading 
to a greater emphasis on exclusivity, at the expense of wider obligations 
and ‘interlocking reciprocal claims’, as Martin (2013:  35) observed 
amongst the Tolai people whose customs had previously been described 
by Epstein (1969).
The promotion of this layered model of land tenure can also be seen as 
a means for self-proclaimed chiefs to assert their positions in a political 
hierarchy and, in doing so, perpetuate and even strengthen the ‘ideology 
of chieftainship’. Although this may be more ‘inclusive’ in terms of 
allocation of access to land across kin groups, it can be exclusive in terms 
of restricting decisions about land to senior men, and the voices of women 
and younger people are often not heard in land debates (see Chapters 10 
and 13, this volume).
Conclusions
The concepts of kastom and loa dominate the terms of debate about 
land exclusions on Epi today. Kastom and loa came to be conceived as 
oppositional terms articulating a history of mutual entanglement, a 
shifting form of ‘double movement’ (Filer 2014, following Polanyi 
2001:  138), but the way that this is manifested is always contextual 
and contested. Due to Epi’s experience of historical land alienation, and 
the formalisation of land titles by the incipient state, state law often 
invokes bitter memories of the appropriation of land to support foreign 
commercial and political interests. It is little surprise, then, that people 
on Epi came to associate loa with exclusion and domination. Later, in the 
lead-up to Independence, kastom was reshaped and revalued as a potent 
oppositional symbol of resistance against land alienation.
The post-colonial period represents a further shift in the relations between 
kastom and loa, as attention has turned to the identification of ‘custom 
owners’. On Epi, the hereditary chief, as the personification of kastom 
and an arbiter of peace and social order, appeared as the natural figure 
to take control of the articulation between kastom and loa. However, this 
‘ideology of chieftainship’ conceals the way in which the position of chief 
has been transformed, and even strengthened, through missionary and 
colonial influences. Furthermore, like any ideology, powerful actors can 
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manipulate discourses of kastom and claims to ‘chiefly title’ for personal 
gain. So kastom is not a straightforward articulation of autochthony or 
indigeneity against alien loa. Rather, each concept is able to take on aspects 
of the other according to the contexts and purposes of its deployment.
Attempts at ‘intimate exclusions’ of kin from land usually invoke claims 
of ‘chiefly title’ as ‘custom ownership’, but also legal processes of land 
registration and leasing, often motivated by the promise of economic 
benefits. Furthermore, boundaries created around land alienated in the 
colonial era have not been fully erased after more than three decades 
of independence, and can be retraced in ongoing land claims by senior 
men who use old title numbers and colonial documents to support their 
legal claims. Thus loa continues to be understood as a continuation of 
the logic and instruments of colonial rule, facilitating the dispossession 
of customary owners.
However, alternative and more inclusive discourses of kastom can act as 
effective political frameworks for resistance in denying the legitimacy of 
exclusive legal property claims. Popular moral narratives of kastom tend 
to give authenticity to those claims that demonstrate a peaceful and 
inclusive ethic, respecting people’s interlocking claims to access land and 
subsistence security, as opposed to the exclusive land rights associated with 
state law and capitalist engagements (Carrier 1998; also Lea 1997: 12). 
The reassertion by councils of chiefs of a layered model of land tenure, 
which is embedded in social relationships and the ‘relational economy’, 
has remained the most compelling form of resistance against ‘intimate 
exclusions’ by safeguarding access to land by different clans. However, 
this model also serves to reinforce and perpetuate existing hierarchies, in 
which ‘land’ becomes synonymous with ‘chiefs’, and so often women and 
younger people can be excluded from decision-making processes.
Recent (2014) land reforms give good reason to be optimistic that the 
types of exclusionary processes outlined in the above case studies will not 
continue to be enabled by political and legal systems as they have been 
before (McDonnell 2016). Registration and leasing should no longer be 
able to take place without the knowledge and consent of the community. 
Perhaps this means that, in future, kastom and loa can become more 
conceptually aligned in the minds of Ni-Vanuatu people. And given the 
oppositional capacity of kastom to signify inclusive, consensual, peaceful 
and relational ethics against exclusionary or individualising processes 
in shifting political contexts, there may be potential for it to adapt to 
incorporate increasing community participation and strengthen the 
values of consensual decision making in future.
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Across the Pacific, as across much of the post-colonial world, various 
practices of land formalisation—particularly land titling—are posited as 
remedies to the exclusion of peoples and groups from land, as well as from 
the promises of ‘development’ and from participation in the globalising 
market place and in the political and social space of the nation-state. 
This is particularly so in the case of indigenous, poor, women, and 
other marginalised peoples. In Melanesia, land formalisation generally 
involves mechanisms for codifying or translating elements of customary 
land systems in order to make them commensurable with the forms and 
requirements of modern systems of governance and economic production 
and exchange. Invariably, this involves establishing relations of property 
ownership—making land into property and people into ‘landowners’ 
(including ‘customary landowners’).
Drawing on an ethnographic analysis of communities living in the 
vicinity of industrial tuna fishing and processing facilities in Madang 
Province, Papua New Guinea (PNG), this chapter explores and critiques 
some of the claims which are made by proponents of land formalisation in 
PNG. Far from securing people’s access to the promises of development, 
globalisation, and statehood, it argues, mechanisms of land formalisation 
for these communities have, in many cases, facilitated and exacerbated 
experiences of exclusion. The chapter considers two key ways in which 
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this has occurred: first, through the introduction and privileging of 
particular practices of boundary making associated with modernist and 
regulatory approaches to land organisation; and second, through the use 
of incorporated land groups and lease-leaseback schemes which claim to 
reconcile customary and modern land systems. The intention here is not 
to suggest that all forms of legislative response to issues of land organisation 
should be avoided. Indeed, as the Madang communities find themselves 
entangled with the structures of both globalising capital and the nation-
state, forms of institutionalised response can become both necessary and 
desirable. The argument, simply, is that more critical acknowledgement 
be made of the ways in which mechanisms of land formalisation can, 
themselves, function to exclude.
Land Reform in Papua New Guinea
Land reform in PNG has long been a contested affair. The enshrining of 
customary land tenure in the country’s Constitution upon Independence 
in 1975 reflected a broader political commitment to a vision of small-
scale development embedded in Melanesian culture—the ‘Melanesian 
Way’. This was, in many ways, a radical and far-reaching vision for the 
birth of a new nation-state (James et al. 2012). It also, however, reflected 
a continuation of colonial policy grounded in elements of paternalistic 
‘social protection’ (Filer 2014). Indeed, as Colin Filer observes, the 
creation of the Papua New Guinean nation-state rested on something 
of a ‘founding fiction’ (Filer 2014: 82), which overstated the distinction 
between colonial and post-colonial land policies, and which instituted 
a national ‘ideology of landownership’ as a basis for the new state’s self-
imagining and social relations. The national ideology of landownership 
declares all indigenous citizens to be customary landowners, it denies the 
possibility of waste or vacant land, it identifies clans as the foundational 
social unit of the nation, and it establishes rent or resource compensation 
(paid to ‘customary landowners’ whose land or natural resources are 
subject to commercial exploitation) as a principal mode of income and 
the predominant means of accessing ‘development’.
If the ideology of landownership remains a potent political force 40 years 
after Independence, however, a key change in the political landscape 
over that period has been the emergence of neoliberalism as a dominant 
political-economic ideology both on the global stage and within 
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key sections  of the national stage. This has had significant—if  often 
ambiguous—implications for the imaginings both of ‘development’ 
and of  land policy. Globally, organisations such as the World Bank 
began arguing through the 1980s and early 1990s for the introduction 
of individual freehold land titles (see Deininger and Binswanger 1999). 
Drawing on the ideas of influential international economists such 
Hernando de Soto (1989), the argument made was that such reform was a 
necessary precondition for economic growth, and hence ‘development’. In 
PNG, attempts by the state to introduce mechanisms for the registration 
of customary land in 1995 were abandoned amid popular opposition, 
which was sparked by rumours that the World Bank was demanding 
individualised registration of customary land as part of the conditionality 
for receiving its loans. In fact the contentious loan condition was rejected 
by the PNG Department of Finance, but suspicion of land registration, 
and of both the PNG state and international donor organisations as 
actors that stood to gain from such registration, remained powerful. And, 
indeed, the argument for land titling—and for an associated model of 
large-scale resource extractive ‘development’—increasingly took hold 
among much of the country’s political elite, including many individuals 
who two decades before, had been vocal advocates for the Melanesian 
Way. Throughout the early 2000s, a number of Australian policy advisers 
influential in shaping Australian foreign policy in regards to the Pacific 
also argued strongly for land titling and tenure conversion (Curtin 2003; 
Gosarevski et al. 2004a, 2004b; Hughes 2004).1
In the absence of mechanisms for widespread land registration, two 
key legal instruments have been used in the post-Independence period 
to facilitate what is widely described in PNG as the ‘mobilisation’ of 
customary land ‘for development’. Principal among these are the Land 
Groups Incorporation Act 1974 and the lease-leaseback scheme. In the first 
of these, legislation allows for the incorporation of landowning groups as 
legally recognised entities, able to contract with other entities, particularly 
corporations. In the lease-leaseback scheme, land is leased from customary 
owners by the state, which then leases it on to another entity, usually 
a corporate developer (see Chapters 6 and 7, this volume). In 2009, land 
reform legislation—the Land Groups Incorporation (Amendment) Act 
and the Land Registration (Customary Land) (Amendment) Act—was 
passed to entrench the use of land groups, particularly, and also to enable 
these groups to register titles to their land. The passing of this legislation 
1  For critiques of their position, see Fingleton (2005) and Allen (2008).
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reflects, in part, a broader policy shift away from straightforward tenure 
conversion (from customary tenure to a private property regime), towards 
hybrid systems that seek to find a ‘middle way’ between customary land 
tenure and modern, Western legal frameworks (Deininger and Binswanger 
1999; World Bank 2003; AusAID 2008). In part, as well, it reflects what 
is arguably a growing acceptance of a mainstream developmentalist 
paradigm in PNG, which takes cash income, formal sector economy, and 
business-led development as its key criteria of value. It is notable that, 
notwithstanding opposition from some non-governmental organisations, 
and the recent anger over the revelation of the ‘land grab’ facilitated by 
long-term special agricultural and business leases (Filer 2011; Winn 2012; 
also Chapters 6 and 7, this volume), the 2009 legislative amendments 
encountered substantially less popular opposition than did previous 
attempts at land reform.
In their analysis of land exclusion in Southeast Asia, Derek Hall, Philip 
Hirsch and Tania Murray Li (2011) identify regulation—including 
mechanisms for land formalisation and titling—as one of four key forces 
propelling processes of exclusion from access to land, along with the market, 
the use or threat of force, and legitimation. This is in spite of the fact, they 
observe, that proponents of land formalisation efforts most frequently 
describe them not in terms of exclusion, but inclusion. Hall, Hirsch and 
Li’s four ‘powers of exclusion’ do not operate in isolation, but are mutually 
affecting and mutually enforcing. Particularly relevant for this discussion 
is the intertwining of legislation and legitimation, which is the force that 
‘establishes the moral basis for exclusive claims, and indeed for entrenching 
regulation, the market and force as politically and socially acceptable bases 
for exclusion’ (Hall et al. 2011:  5). On Madang’s north coast, we shall 
see that the use of both land groups and land leases has been central to 
the dynamics of the tuna industry, and to the relationships between local 
communities, the PNG state, and corporate and non-corporate outside 
actors. In the development of the tuna industry, as well as of the mission-
operated plantation industry that preceded it in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, regulation has been a basis for exclusion of (some) 
people and communities from key sections of land. Across this history, such 
regulation has been closely bound up with both normative and ideological 
discourses of legitimation. At the same time, local negotiations and strategic 
engagements with both legislation and legitimation have given rise to forms 
of ‘intimate exclusion’ (Hall et al. 2011: 145) within which some people 
are excluded from land, not simply by state or corporate actors, but also 
because of the actions of neighbours and relatives.
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Across PNG, arguments for land formalisation invoke normative and 
ideologically laden ideas of development, citizenship, and progress. 
Literature produced by the National Land Development Taskforce, for 
example, features repeated references to ‘mobilising’, ‘freeing up’, or 
‘making available’ customary land ‘for development’ (GoPNG 2007), 
while elsewhere the aim of the Taskforce is stated as being to ‘make land 
more productive’ (Fairhead et al. 2009: 1). With the ‘security’ of rights, 
titles and codified ownership claims, proponents of land formalisation 
insist, people can use their land as collateral for loans, engage in 
transactions with resource developers and others, and in so doing can 
access ‘development’ and its many promises. The Australian aid agency 
AusAID—influential in guiding land policy in PNG as well as elsewhere in 
the Asia-Pacific region—likewise talked about land formalisation ‘making 
land work’ (AusAID 2008). Such legitimating discourses assume a model 
of development predicated on the extension of capitalist production and 
exchange and, within this context, they assume very particular ideas of 
what it means for land, and people, to ‘work’ (Stead 2014). In the context 
of state-building processes, they form part of the project of making 
citizens, and incorporating people and places within the political space 
of the nation-state (Scott 1998; Lund 2011). Simultaneously, people and 
places are incorporated within the economic space of globalising capital. 
Papua New Guinean civil society organisations, and some landowners 
and communities, have critiqued these legitimations for land registration 
and codification, arguing that they ignore the ways in which land already 
‘works’ within communities, and the ways in which ‘security of tenure’ 
is provided not by land titles but by customary systems of governance, 
kinship and oral tradition (Anon. 2008). In turn, they offer their own 
legitimations, for local small-scale models of ‘development’, for the 
efficacy of customary tenures, and so for other visions of statehood 
and nationhood.
Tuna Fishing in Madang
On most afternoons, the informal fish market near the Madang harbour, 
easy walking distance from the main Madang market, is brimming 
with colours, sounds and smells. Small reef fish—brightly coloured and 
variously shaped—are sold fresh or else cooked up on skewers or wrapped 
in banana leaves and ready to eat. These fish come in close to the shore 
and can be caught in shallow waters from boats, or even with lines thrown 
KASTOM, PROPERTy AND IDEOLOGy
362
into the water from on land. It is women, usually, who fish for these 
small catch, both to feed their own families and to market for cash to 
supplement a predominantly subsistence livelihood. Among the larger 
fish on sale are tuna—skipjack, yellow-fin and big-eye—which can be 
caught out in deeper waters with nets or with lines cast, usually by men, 
from small outboard motor boats or even wooden canoes. Increasingly, 
though, the tuna being caught in the waters off the coast of Madang are 
not being eaten, or sold, by Papua New Guineans, but are caught by 
large industrial tuna fishing vessels that fly the flags of various countries—
Taiwan, Japan, Korea, the United States and the Philippines. Instead 
of lines and small nets, these use purse seines, huge round nets up to 
2,000 metres in diameter, which are dropped from the boats and then 
drawn together (pursed) so that they enclose whole schools of fish. For the 
most part, these vessels pay licence fees to the PNG state for the right to 
fish in PNG waters, and they take their catches—and most of the profits 
associated with them—to third countries where the fish are processed and 
exported for sale. Recent efforts to develop the onshore tuna processing 
industry represent attempts by the PNG state to move from this so-called 
‘first-generation strategy’ to a ‘second-generation’ one, whereby tuna will 
be processed onshore and exported—ideally to the lucrative European 
Union market. This is an attempt, in other words, to move up the global 
tuna commodity chain, one that will ‘bring development’ in the forms 
of increased gross domestic product, employment, and cash income 
(Havice and Reed 2012; Stead 2014).
Currently, there is one tuna canning facility operating in Madang. 
This is run by the Philippines company RD Tuna Canners Ltd (RD Tuna) 
on a piece of land titled Siar Portion 1004, just north of the boundary 
of Madang town. RD Tuna also operates a wharfing facility, the Vidar 
Wharf, approximately twenty kilometres further along the north coast 
highway. The Vidar Wharf, like the cannery, is located on land previously 
alienated in the period of German administration, when Lutheran 
and Catholic missionaries alike arrived in the late nineteenth century 
and began establishing coconut plantations as a lucrative side business to 
the saving of souls. The area surrounding the Vidar Wharf—216 hectares 
in total—now stands to be developed as the Pacific Marine Industrial 
Zone (recently  renamed the Madang Industrial Park, but still widely 
referred to as the PMIZ), a ‘special economic zone’ that is forecast to 
house up to 10 new canning facilities, with additional wharfing and 
berthing facilities as well. Initial funding for the PMIZ was reported to 
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have been secured in 2011 in the form of a 74 million kina concessional 
loan from China (Anon. 2011), but construction has stalled amid disputes 
with landowners, legal challenges, political wrangling, and allegations of 
corruption and mismanagement. Recently, though, more Chinese money 
has been secured, and construction is once again set to commence.
Among the communities negotiating the presence and extension of the 
tuna industry are the Kananam, whose customary land includes the site 
of the present Vidar Wharf, and Rempi, whose people also claim part 
of the land that is now being developed as the PMIZ. Both are largely 
subsistence communities, with some supplementary cash income gained 
through copra production, as well as through the roadside sale of fish in 
Kananam, and buai (betel nut) in Rempi. In both communities, as well, 
much of what is claimed as customary land is in fact alienated freehold. 
The 216 hectares of the PMIZ site is part of a larger 880-hectare block 
previously alienated by the Catholic Church during the colonial period, 
and used for coconut plantations (the Vidar plantation) and for housing 
the Alexishafen mission station. In Rempi, leaders of the Bomase clan tell 
stories about how their ancestors were tricked by missionaries into selling 
their land in exchange for a pot full of trinkets and quantities of salt, signing 
their names on papers they could not read and did not understand. In the 
1990s the land was returned by the Catholic Church, not to its original 
owners, but to the state. It was subsequently sold by the corporate arm of 
the Madang Provincial Government to RD Tuna, which then proceeded 
to build the Vidar Wharf. RD Tuna subsequently sold back to the national 
government that section of the former plantation which has now been 
demarcated as a special economic zone. The making of customary claims 
on formally alienated land speaks to a ‘double movement’ of property 
rights in PNG which has, in the post-Independence period, involved both 
the ‘partial alienation of customary land’ and the ‘partial customisation of 
alienated land’ (Filer 2014: 82, 89). It is a double movement that blurs 
the oft-made distinction between customary and freehold land in the 
country.
Twenty kilometres down the road, at the site of the existing RD Tuna 
cannery, the Siar and Nobnob communities claim customary ownership 
of land from which they are, in practice and in legal fact, excluded. Here 
as well, the access to land enjoyed by global corporate actors today is made 
possible by prior acts of alienation during periods of colonisation and 
missionisation. In this case, 540 hectares of land was alienated to form 
the Siar coconut plantation in the late 1800s, which was administered 
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through the period of German colonialism in close collaboration with 
Lutheran missionaries (Sinclair 2006:  48). Siar Portion 1004—the 
6.5-hectare block on which the cannery stands—forms part of this larger 
plantation area. As with Rempi and Kananam, the original claiming 
and titling of this land provided a basis for the land subsequently being 
claimed by the state, before then being leased to RD Tuna in the mid-
1990s as part of a package—along with a ten-year tax holiday, and cheap 
fishing licences—to incentivise it to establish the cannery.
Both at the PMIZ site and at the RD Tuna cannery, then, large sections of 
the land, which local communities claim as their customary inheritance, 
have been subject to the various titling and codification practices advocated 
by proponents of land formalisation. In differing ways, each community 
has at times contested the ‘mobilisation’ of their land for the development 
of the tuna industry, as they have previously contested its mobilisation by 
missionaries, plantation bosses, and colonial officials. They have done this 
both by challenging the ownership claims of outsiders, and by asserting 
their own claims for recognition as ‘customary landowners’. As an 
oppositional self-referent (Keesing 1989; Kirsch 2006), one that employs 
a modernist terminology to assert a claim in the face of modernist, and 
modernising outsiders, ‘customary landowner’ is one that has been 
learned through harsh experience. In recent years, the primary way in 
which this claim has been leveraged has been through the constitution of 
incorporated land groups as legally recognised bodies capable of entering 
into contractual relationships, lodging and contesting judicial claims, and 
claiming compensation and ‘spin-off benefits’ from developers. In other 
words, the Rempi, Kananam, Nobnob and Siar communities have each 
sought, or else been compelled, to become landowners in a way that is 
‘legible’ (Scott 1998) to the sites and agents of the state and globalising 
capital. Doing so involves not simply a translation, but a transformation 
of the nature of connection to land.
Exclusion 1: Making Landowners/
Boundary Creation
Practices of land formalisation are exercises in boundary making, and 
this is a key way in which they function to exclude. Incorporated land 
groups make landowners, in effect, by drawing boundaries around them. 
They provide a mechanism for determining who is and is not a recognised 
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right-holder, and for grouping them together to form a singular entity 
with which courts, companies, and state agencies can easily transact. Land 
groups and other processes of formalisation similarly draw boundaries 
around land, recording clear and fixed parcels of land that can be 
identified and known independently of the site of the land itself and of 
the memories, bodies and social relations of those who claim connection 
to it. Of course, the making of boundaries is not a uniquely modernist 
preoccupation, but rather a deeply human practice of marking difference, 
including the difference between inside and outside. Exclusion, similarly, 
is not a uniquely modern phenomenon, but a fundamental part of how 
land is accessed and organised in all times and places (Hall et al. 2011). 
The types of boundaries that are drawn, however, and the ways in which 
they are made, maintained, and adjudicated, are not uniform. What is 
significant about the extension of modern, formalised systems of land 
titling and codification is not that they introduce boundaries, but rather 
that they introduce and privilege particular types of boundaries, and in 
doing so, particular types of exclusion. The social implications of this are 
far-reaching.
In Rempi, the power of boundary making as an exclusionary force 
is narrated in the stories through which members of the Bomase clan 
recount the trauma of their ancestors’ dispossession. In the words of the 
leader of the clan, an old man named Peter Gau Sabum:
The mission marked out huge areas of land and put borders around it to 
indicate the boundaries. When they finished, they gave presents to the 
people … The missions then wrote our ancestors names and told them to 
sign. Our ancestors did not know how to write so they just hold the pen 
and did some marks on the agreement paper and the mission said, that 
mark is enough to say that you agree to the sale of the land. That’s how 
the mission took this land (Peter Gau Sabum, personal communication 
May 2010).
Bomase ancestors, the old man stressed, did not know they were selling 
their land. The missionaries did not explain, and they could not read 
the contracts they were asked to sign in return for what they believed 
to be ‘presents’. More fundamentally, though, how could they know that 
they were selling their land? The type of exclusion that the missionaries 
orchestrated was, in an important sense, inconceivable within a customary 
understanding of land and people as mutually constitutive (Stead 2012). 
The types of boundaries that have customarily separated clan groups 
or tribes have, indeed, functioned as exclusionary mechanisms—this is 
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what boundaries do—but they have been embedded in the histories and 
ongoing social relations of the people and land that they both separate 
and join together. Recorded and narrated through oral history, customary 
boundaries have qualities of flux. The oral and relational practices through 
which they are maintained and contested take place on the land to which 
they relate. They are, as many have pointed out in the context of the 
Pacific and elsewhere, ‘fuzzy’ (Rivers 1999; Wainwright and Bryan 2009), 
pertaining to multiple levels and forms of claims, relating to land itself 
as well as the resources found within it.
The boundaries marked out by the mission were not fuzzy. The old Bomase 
leader tells how, after they were marked out and the performance of a sale 
enacted, the mission poured concrete to mark where the boundaries now 
stood. ‘So the mission lived on one side,’ the old man said, ‘and we lived 
on the other side’. The types of boundaries that the mission made were 
not recorded and maintained in oral tradition or through the ongoing 
lived practices of exchange—although the mission and clan did indeed 
become embroiled in one another’s lives—but rather on maps and in 
titles. The mission’s ownership of the land became something that existed 
in the abstract; the land itself became something that could be bought, 
sold or otherwise transacted. It became something from which people 
could be both analytically and physically separated, a fact of which the 
Rempi people and their Kananam neighbours were made painfully aware 
when the land passed back, not into their hands, but into the hands of the 
government, and then of the company. As initial, albeit stunted, phases of 
the PMIZ construction have commenced, fences have been constructed 
around the perimeter of the special economic zone. Tall, metal, the 
opposite of fuzzy, the fences are glaringly conspicuous against the grasses, 
coconut palms and trees which surround them. In 2010, the sons and 
nephews of Peter Gau Sabum took me walking along the perimeter, 
pointing through the bars of the fence as they told stories about the land 
on the other side.
As the Bomase walked the boundaries of the PMIZ, the stories they told 
were not simply about the loss of gardens and land to build houses, but 
about the histories and movements of their ancestors, about recognition, 
and about the humiliation at being made, as one informant described 
it, into ‘beggars on their own land’. It is a stark reminder that questions 
of access to, or exclusion from, land have significance that go beyond 
resource access and the possibilities for livelihood. Connection to land 
speaks to culture and spirituality, to identity, belonging, knowledge, and 
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to structures of governance and authority; in other words, to social life 
in its fullest sense. Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011) suggest that access to land 
is the opposite of exclusion, but it might also be thought of as belonging 
(Trudeau 2006: 423). Practices of boundary making create and transform 
relations of belonging, as well as of access and exclusion. Boundaries 
define what belongs, as well as what does not, with far-reaching social 
implications.
However, if the varied boundary-making practices evident at the PMIZ 
speak to very different ways of being in the world—different forms and 
expressions of belonging—it is not the case that the introduction of 
modernist systems of land titling and ownership represents a definitive 
shift from one way of relating to land to another. The boundary 
between the customary and the modern, as it were, is far from clear-cut. 
Rather, the differing articulations of exclusion, access, and belonging 
are ‘entangled’ in shifting and dynamic configurations (Stead 2013). 
Entanglement offers its own possibilities for creative expressions of agency 
and negotiation, but it can also be destabilising in ways that themselves 
function to exclude local communities both from land and from power. 
The development of the PMIZ is bringing to a head the complexities of 
such entanglement for the Bomase and their neighbours. For the Nobnob 
and Siar communities, this process began more than a decade ago with the 
establishment of the RD Tuna cannery.
Exclusion 2: Land Groups and Land Claims/
Codifying Custom
The RD Tuna cannery stands in the middle of a complex of claims 
made by local people identifying themselves as ‘landowners’. These 
claims are made, first, against the company. Second, to the extent that 
both the national and provincial governments are involved in RD Tuna’s 
operations (having originally invited the company to establish a factory 
as part of its development strategy, and themselves party to negotiations 
and agreements with both the company and local communities), these 
claims are also often made against the state. Third, to the extent that 
many of them are in competition with one another, they are also claims 
made by groups within the Nobnob and Siar communities against other 
groups within those same communities. The primary vehicle for asserting 
these claims has been the codification of various ‘landowning’ groups 
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and clans, including a ‘landowner company’, within legal negotiations, 
documentation, and contractual agreements entered into with the state 
and RD Tuna. These are the types of ‘middle-way’ mechanisms that are so 
often upheld as means of inclusion with market, state and nation. Yet the 
codification of custom is never simply a process of translation (Gewertz 
and Errington 1991; Keesing 1992), and codifications of customary land 
systems can have far-reaching effects (Weiner and Glaskin 2007; Chesters 
2009). Unpacking just some of the experiences of the Nobnob and Siar 
communities reveals the complex ways these land reform mechanisms 
have also functioned to exclude.
In field research conducted in 2010—in the villages of Matupi, Baitabag 
and Nobnob, all within the larger Nobnob area—a total of eight distinct 
Nobnob clan groups were identified. These were: Ditipa, Gidigdi and 
Abdah (these three clans together forming the Mamagtub tribe), Inad, 
Sasagas (with three distinct subclans identified by respondents), Dadolkud, 
Hibutpa, and Badalon (this latter grouping being sometimes identified as 
a clan and other times as a subclan, with allegations also made that it 
is an altogether fictitious or invented clan—a point to which we shall 
return). It should be noted, however, that the exact nature and relation of 
different social groupings within Nobnob is contested. There are claims 
from some community members that some of the groups presenting 
themselves as clans are in fact not original landowners but descendants 
of labourers brought to work on the colonial plantations. Indeed, usage 
and manipulation of terms such as ‘clan’, ‘subclan’ and ‘tribe’ have been 
widely incorporated into the strategies and narratives of many different 
claimants across the area, with accounts of the structuring of social groups 
in relation to one another varying over time as alliances and imperatives 
shift. Added to this is the erosive impact that the intertwined histories 
of corporate, church and colonial presence have had on local customary 
knowledge (Sullivan et al. 2003), which further complicates the task 
of presenting an authoritative picture of social organisation in the area, 
if, indeed, such a thing were ever possible.
The arrival of RD Tuna in Madang marked the beginning of the series of 
protracted legal and extra-legal conflicts within the community, related 
particularly to who was to enjoy recognition as the landowners of Portion 
1004 by the state and the company, and the distribution of benefits 
(primarily, contracts to run ‘spin-off businesses’—cleaning, security, 
transport, etc.) from the project. In July 1995, prior to the commencement 
of the cannery’s operations, a ‘deed of concern’ was reportedly signed 
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between RD Tuna and a man named Bantam Dabid, signing as 
representative of the ‘Badalon clan’. Three months later, a  statement 
was signed by representatives of the Sasagas, Hibutpa (identified here as 
‘Hibutpa No. 2’) and Ditipa (identified as ‘Didipa Kunta’) clans,2 calling 
for the withdrawal of the deed of concern on the basis that Badalon 
were not in fact the landowners of Portion 1004. The following year, the 
Madang Development Corporation issued RD Tuna with its lease, and 
construction on the project began. Another year later, a memorandum 
of agreement was signed between the State of PNG, Madang Provincial 
Government, RD Tuna, and representatives of the identified landowners. 
Here, the three clans identified in the letter of protest—Ditipa Kunta, 
Sasagas, and Hibutpa No. 2—are included, and the representatives signing 
for them are the same men who signed the letter two years prior. A fourth 
man, Salib Pasagai, is also a signatory, signing as the representative of 
‘Badalon subclan’ (emphasis added).
Dan Jorgensen, writing about land claim processes in the area surrounding 
the Nena/Frieda mining project in PNG’s West Sepik Province, describes 
those processes in terms of ‘clan-making’ and ‘clan-finding’. Telefolmin 
claimants in the area around the mine site, he writes, fashioned their 
claims in the language of clans and subclans, despite this being contrary 
to the actual nature of their social organisation: the Telefolmin do not 
have clan-based societies. Explaining the fiction, Jorgensen argues that 
‘the  state’s commitment to customary tenure is framed in terms of the 
state’s own ideas of what customary tenure looks like’ (2007: 66), which 
is to say a model of clans and subclans. The state looks for clans, and 
accordingly the Telefolmin ‘create’ clans that the state can find. A similar, 
if less dramatic, manipulation of the language of clans and subclans is 
evident in the claims surrounding Siar Portion 1004. While the Nobnob 
and Siar communities, like other communities in the Madang area, do 
have a clan-based system of social organisation, the language and processes 
of land group incorporation are creating new opportunities for this system 
to be manipulated.
Such observations fit—to a degree—with the argument that custom is 
elicited by the state and modernity. James Weiner and Katie Glaskin, in 
this vein, have argued that ‘the customary is a product of the expansion of 
2  Throughout the written documentation, as well as in people’s recountings of the land claim 
disputes, a variety of different spellings occur (for example, ‘Didipa’ and ‘Ditipa’), as well as slight 
variations in naming.
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state and capital formations, rather than foreign or external to it’ (2007: 2; 
see also Weiner 2006). To a degree they are incorrect, but it is also possible 
to distinguish between customary forms of sociality, on the one hand, and 
custom—or kastom—as a modernist idea of what that sociality entails, 
on the other. In doing so, we recognise that land groups do not only 
elicit custom, they draw together customary and modern ways of being in 
complex ways. However unwittingly, the argument that custom is elicited 
by the modern accords a problematic ontological priority to the latter. 
Customary forms of connection to land are indeed transformed through 
processes of land group incorporation, but this is not to say that land 
groups are solely modernist phenomena. Indeed, it is their entangled 
character, not simply their modern-ness, that makes them so destabilising 
of the social and political landscape.
The manipulation of clan identities is evident in Nobnob and Siar, 
particularly in allegations that the ‘Badalon clan’—on whose behalf 
Bantam Dabid signed the 1995 deed of concern with RD Tuna—is not 
a clan at all, but rather a group made up of the descendants of plantation 
workers brought to the area during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. After many generations living at Siar, complicated by the 
realities of extensive intermarriages, there are no customary ‘homes’ to 
which the plantation workers’ descendants can return. Their connection 
to the Siar land is not customary, in the sense that it is not land to which 
they claim an ancestral connection, but they have nonetheless been drawn 
into customary forms of community social relations (including social 
relations of conflict) through their residence on that land. In seeking 
a share of the benefits that they hoped the RD Tuna cannery would bring, 
the plantation descendants fashioned themselves in the form that would 
best support their claims. As the ‘Badalon clan’, they were able to present 
themselves as a legitimate, and ‘legible’ (Scott 1998), entity, securing both 
a modern legal and ‘customary’ basis from which to assert themselves in 
negotiations.
In objecting to the deed of concern signed by Bantam Dabid, the 
representatives of the Sasagas, Hibutpa and Ditipa clans rejected the 
Badalons’ claim to be rightful owners of Siar Portion 1004. Nevertheless, 
the Badalon group was included as a signatory in the 1996 memorandum of 
agreement with the company and the state, suggesting some reconciliation 
between the groups. The reasons again point to the manipulation of clan 
identities and the legal process of negotiation. Unpacking the different 
narratives surrounding the signing of the memorandum of agreement, 
371
12 . LANDOWNERSHIP AS ExCLUSION
a picture emerges of shifting alliances between clans and social groups, 
playing out within the new legal-political domain of land groups and 
benefit-sharing agreements. Within this domain, the two contesting 
claims for ownership of Portion 1004 came from Badalon and from the 
Sasagas clan (the latter supported by Hibutpa and Ditipa).
There is, however, another claim made outside of this domain. 
The Dadolkud clan, another of the eight primary clan groups identified 
in the Nobnob area, also claims customary connection to the land on 
which the cannery has now been built. Nongoi, the head of the Dadolkud 
clan, repeats the assertion made by others, that the Badalon ‘clan’ are in 
fact descendants of settlers from the plantation days. All of the eight clans, 
Nongoi and his supporters insist, ‘know’ that Dadolkud is the rightful 
landowning clan. Nonetheless, Dadolkud has been completely excluded 
from all of the legal negotiations related to RD Tuna’s operations. In this 
context, the shifting alliances of the Badalon appear in a different light. 
Their own claim to be customary landowners of the cannery site is widely 
disputed, with no support from any other clans. In contrast, the leaders of 
the Sasagas clan—particularly Kumai Musas Mumum and his son John 
Musas—were able to mobilise support from the Hibutpa and Ditipa clans, 
and in doing so defeat the Badalons’ own claims. Subsequently bringing 
the Badalons into their alliance, the Sasagas clan was able to further 
bolster the support for their own claim, and entrench the exclusion of the 
only other primary claimant, the Dadolkuds. Relegating the Badalon to 
the status of a ‘subclan’ rather than a ‘clan,’ the representatives of Sasagas, 
Hibutpa and Ditipa were able to further manipulate the language and 
relations of clans to give legal effect to the Badalons’ junior position 
within their alliance, and within their negotiations with RD Tuna and 
the PNG state.
The alliance, however, was not long-lasting. Centrally positioned within 
it, the Sasagas leaders were able to establish the Daghan landowner 
company, which became the legal entity contracted by RD Tuna to run 
the ‘spin-off businesses’ that were to be the main source of income for the 
Nobnob and Siar communities. If the national ideology of landownership 
locates the clan as the paramount building block of national society, 
it similarly locates the landowner company as the core unit of the 
national economy. In Nobnob and Siar, the business activities of the 
Daghan landowner company—providing security and cleaning services, 
running a transportation service and canteen for factory workers—were 
operational for a short time, but collapsed in 2000 amid conflicts within 
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the Nobnob communities and between the landowner company and RD 
Tuna. Having positioned themselves as the major powerbrokers within 
Nobnob, the leaders of the Sasagas clan were subsequently accused 
by the other clans of monopolising the landowner company and the 
benefits derived from it. More specifically, John Musas was accused of 
running the company so as to directly benefit his family and members of 
the particular subclan within Sasagas of which he is a part, the Damon 
subclan. Allegations of financial mismanagement were made, and another 
land group, presenting itself as the ‘Sasagas No.  2 clan’ was formed. 
In  September 2010, a violent attack on the Musas family was made 
by other residents of the Siar area, including members of the Hibutpa 
and Ditipa clans. Amid the confusion and conflict, RD Tuna chose to 
terminate their agreement with the Daghan landowner company, giving 
as reasons the mismanagement of the money paid to the company, and 
the fact that it was solely, they alleged, benefiting John Musas and his kin.
Following RD Tuna’s termination of the memorandum of agreement, 
Musas Mumum (as representative of the Sasagas clan) and his son John 
Musas (as representative of the landowner company) initiated legal action 
against RD Tuna, the PNG state and the Madang Provincial Government 
for their breach of the agreement, as well as against the Hibutpa No. 2, 
Ditipa Kunta and Badalon clans. The case ultimately fell apart because 
lawyers could not be organised, and because of internal tensions within 
Sasagas. The result, then, is that John Musas and his father are now 
relatively marginalised. When RD Tuna began talks in 2009 to build 
housing for its employees on a piece of land adjacent to the cannery 
site—Portion 1005—Musas and the Damon subclan were excluded from 
the negotiations, with RD Tuna talking instead to representatives of the 
Ditipa, Inad and Hibutpa clans, as well as the new splinter ‘Sasagas No. 2’ 
grouping. Back in Nobnob, the now isolated John Musas began reaching 
out to Nongoi, the leader of the Dadolkud clan whose own exclusion 
Musas was responsible for engineering more than a decade ago. Meanwhile, 
as the internal lines of alliance and division continue to shift and re-form, 
none of the ‘spin-off benefits’ forecast for the Nobnob communities have 
eventuated (Sullivan et al. 2003; Stead 2014). RD  Tuna’s operations 
continue.
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Shifting the Sites and Centres of Power
What does the conflict in Nobnob reveal about the politics of becoming 
landowners? Where does power sit within this contested landscape, and 
with whom? To an extent, the manipulation of identities, histories and 
representations within the land group system—including the alleged 
‘invention’ of the Badalon clan—is itself consistent with the exercise 
of power within customary sociality. The narration of custom in oral 
traditions, as the French anthropologist Jean Pouillon describes it, 
is never fixed or exact, but rather ‘a structural ensemble which tolerates, 
and even favours, a form of creativity’ (quoted in Rouland 2001:  15). 
Annette Weiner, similarly, has pointed to the central role of memory and 
oral communication in the political domain of customary community, 
including the manipulation of details of land tenure and the deployment 
of ‘fictively arranged’ genealogies (Weiner 1976: 42). The fluidity of land 
claims in Nobnob, and the accommodation of tension and argumentation 
within everyday relations, resonates too with the accounts of other scholars 
describing customary land systems, including in PNG (Sillitoe 1999), 
Samoa (Olson 1997), and Africa (Berry 2002; van Leeuwen 2010). To this 
extent, then, and remembering Hall, Hirsch and Li’s (2011) proposal that 
exclusion and access be seen as conjoined conditions, the entanglement 
of custom and modernity with the land group system can be seen to offer 
new opportunities for creative agency, and hence for claiming access 
to land.
A normative valorising of ‘negotiability’, however, is to be cautioned 
against. Pauline Peters, writing about customary land tenure in Africa, 
argues that, in place of such an uncritical privileging, more emphasis needs 
to be placed by researchers on who benefits and who loses from instances of 
‘negotiability’ in access to land (Peters 2004: 270). Her argument connects 
strongly with Hall, Hirsch and Li’s (2011) critique of the impulse to see 
exclusion from land as innately negative, and their proposal to inquire, 
instead, into its effects and consequences. Peters (2004: 270) calls for a shift 
towards an approach ‘that is able to identify those situations and processes 
(including commodification, structural adjustment, market liberalization 
and globalization) that limit or end negotiation and flexibility for certain 
social groups or categories’. It is by doing so that we illuminate the new 
exclusionary potentials—and implications—inherent within land groups 
and practices of land formalisation.
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The introduction of practices of land formalisation brings into being 
a whole new system and structure of knowing and governing land. 
Abstracted from the intimate and particular relations of belonging—
defined through new practices of boundary making—land is stripped 
of its own agentive capacity and potential, and customary communities’ 
autonomy over their own land similarly diminishes. As the adjudication 
of land claims shifts to the administrative and judicial processes of the 
state, the governance of land shifts from the site of land itself, which is 
the grounding of customary power and authority, to the sites of land 
titles commissions, courtrooms, and government offices. So too is 
knowledge disembedded from the land to which it pertains, recorded in 
titles and registration documents rather than in the embodied, situated 
memories and stories of people who are connected to land. Through these 
abstracted structures of law, regulation and administration—structures 
of boundary maintenance—particular human agents are invested with 
power in relation to land: lawyers, bureaucrats, policy makers, judges, 
cartographers. Collectively, these agents, institutions and structures form 
the foundations of a modernist cartography of power in relation to land, 
and it is these that are privileged over customary agents, institutions, 
and structures as the authoritative basis for adjudicating, recognising, 
or rejecting claims of access. In this way, landownership can function to 
exclude those whose customary claims to access and use land, or whose 
practices of access and use, fall outside the structures of governance and 
organisation to which ‘ownership’ gives rise.
Customary forms of relating to land, though, are not expunged. 
In Nobnob, the dynamic and relational process of claims and counter-
claims continues. Yet as much as this negotiability persists, the danger 
here is that it is against the modernist, definitive statements of ‘fact’ that 
these claims are measured and assessed. Indeed, the final termination 
of the benefit-sharing agreement in Nobnob speaks profoundly to this 
possibility. As much as the Nobnob and Siar communities were able to 
engage with the legal system in such a way that allowed some continuation 
of customary practices of disputation and communication, ultimately it 
was the company, against which all of those communities were positioned, 
which acted unilaterally and, to date, definitively in simply terminating 
the agreement.
On the site of the old Siar plantation, our attention is also drawn to the 
implications of landownership for power relations within communities, 
as well as between communities and external actors. That is to say, we see 
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practices of ‘intimate exclusion’ (Hall et al. 2011: 145) directed by local 
Papua New Guineans at neighbours and kin, as well as processes of 
exclusion attributable to the regulatory or legitimating forces of state or 
corporate actors. What we see, in these local and intimate relations of 
landownership, is that power often goes to those able to translate across 
ontological difference. That is, power goes to those who are best able to 
position themselves within, and across, both modernist and customary 
systems of land use and governance. Peters (2004: 279) comments on the 
theme of negotiability, that ‘not everyone is able to be an interlocutor, 
and many lose in such negotiations and “conversations”’. Her comments 
are made particularly in the context of negotiability within customary 
land systems, but the point is perhaps all the more salient in the context 
of negotiations, or translations, across different systems of boundary 
making and boundary maintenance. Similarly, Benjaminsen and Lund 
(2002) point to the ways in which those who most often benefit from 
land formalisation titles are those, often elites, who are most able to work 
across the spaces of both tradition and the formal institutions of the state.
In the disputes between the Nobnob claimants, the representative of the 
Damon subclan within the Sasagas clan, John Musas, emerges as someone 
who was able to gain and assert power within the intertwined communities 
through his negotiation of both customary and modern forms of land 
systems. Through customary practices of negotiation between different 
clans, he secured support for the Sasagas claim over the land on which the 
RD Tuna cannery was built. Through his familiarity with the mechanisms 
of courts and administrative processes, he was able to assert this claim 
within a modernist framework as well, establishing a landowner company 
to enter into a contract with RD Tuna and the state, while also demoting 
the rival Badalon claim through the letter of challenge and through the 
subsequent designation of Badalon as a ‘subclan’. In contrast, Nongoi, the 
leader of the Dadolkud clan, has been unable to translate his customary 
claims within a modernist legal context, and the effect of this has been the 
clan’s exclusion. Of course, whatever power John Musas was able to garner 
through his negotiation of the customary and the modern needs to be set 
within the context of his ultimate failure to hold on to it. The cancelling 
of the Daghan landowner company’s contract highlights the fact that 
possibilities for agency by local communities are made within the context 
of structures of power that can be weighted against them.
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Conclusion: Dilemmas of Ownership
In each of the Madang communities negotiating the development 
of the PMIZ—Nobnob, Siar, Rempi and Kananam—contemporary 
experiences of exclusion cannot be understood outside of the context 
of prior acts of colonial alienation some 100 years ago. In the claiming 
of land for plantations at the turn of the twentieth century, land itself 
became a commodity—something that could be parcelled, sold, leased, 
‘developed’—and it is as a commodity that it is now being ‘mobilised’ 
for use in the burgeoning tuna industry. The alienation enacted by the 
missionaries and colonial administrators instigated particular practices of 
boundary making that drew lines around parcels of land and so separated 
them, analytically and categorically, from the emplaced, contingent 
relationships of those who claim belonging to them. Land and people 
became ontologically separable, and this process of abstraction was the first 
act of regulatory exclusion. At the same time, however, colonial attempts 
at alienation were never complete. The introduction of modern relations 
of property and landownership does not expunge customary ones, and 
even in places where land formally exists as freehold property, dynamic 
forms of customary practice continue. Processes of land formalisation, 
meanwhile, have themselves given rise to ideas and identities of ‘customary 
landownership’, which are wielded in ongoing relations through which 
exclusion is practised, contested, legitimated or decried. Dramatically 
different forms of connection to land exist, but these are entangled in 
dynamic configurations.
Exclusion from land is not, as Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011) point out, an 
innately negative phenomenon. Relations of exclusion and inclusion are 
inherent to all systems of land use and organisation. As these relations take 
different forms, however, we need to also take account of the consequences 
of the entanglement of these differing forms. These are far-reaching, not 
only for issues of access to resources and livelihood opportunities, but 
also for issues of identity, culture, and belonging. Attention needs to be 
paid, too, to the legitimating discourses through which some forms of 
exclusion/access are privileged, and others devalued.
In PNG, the ‘mobilisation’ of land is heralded as a mechanism for 
securing  access to the promises of ‘development’, by which is meant 
a  contingently modernist vision of formal sector employment, 
cash income, and participation in capitalist systems of production 
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and  exchange.  Drawn  into modernist cartographies of power through 
which land use is governed and adjudicated, these communities who live 
on and around the Siar and Vidar plantations have indeed been drawn 
into the social and political space of the nation-state, and through their 
negotiations with state and corporate actors they find themselves embroiled 
in the relations of capital and the global market. These ‘inclusions’, 
however, have only been made in the most marginal and unequal of ways. 
The entanglement of custom and modernity has offered some space for 
creative negotiation and for the deployment of ‘customary landowner’ 
identities as a basis for making claims against both state and company, but 
ultimately the promises of land mobilisation remain elusive.
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The Politics of Property: 
Gender, Land and Political 
Authority in Solomon Islands
Rebecca Monson
Introduction
In his 2012 New Year’s address to the nation, Solomon Islands’ Governor-
General Sir Frank Kabui warned that land tenure had become the issue 
most likely to spark conflict within the scattered archipelagic nation. 
He went on to outline a number of issues he perceived to be a problem, 
including: the ‘communal’ ownership of land by kin groups and the 
need to register land in order to make it ‘marketable’; the inequitable 
distribution of natural resource rents; and the ‘illegal occupation’ of 
land in the vicinity of the national capital, Honiara, by migrants from 
other islands. He exhorted Solomon Islanders to ‘adjust our mindset’ or 
remain ‘caught between our cultural way of life and the cash economy’ 
(Damosuaia 2012).
The core themes of Sir Frank Kabui’s address—transformations in 
customary tenure, social differentiation, and capitalist development—
occupy a prominent position in politics, not only in Solomon Islands, 
but across Melanesia. Indeed, recent conditions and events in Solomon 
Islands have sometimes been seen as exemplifying regional concerns about 
land, development and conflict in the wider region. From 1998 to 2003, 
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Solomon Islanders experienced a period of civil conflict, popularly known 
as ‘the Tension’, during which hundreds of people died, tens of thousands 
were displaced, and the country’s economy collapsed. Although land 
scarcity is not a major issue in Solomon Islands, Solomon Islanders 
continue to perceive disputes over customary land to be a major source of 
social inequality and conflict.
As is the case elsewhere in Melanesia, the state in Solomon Islands is often 
described as ‘weak’ when it comes to land governance and administration, 
and in any event, most land is formally governed by customary tenure. 
In broad terms, this means that land tenure revolves around the occupation 
and use of a named place, by a named group, whose members trace their 
descent through men, women or both, to an apical ancestor or ancestors. 
Landholding and social ordering vary immensely across the country, but 
people generally lay claim to both land and membership of a kin group by 
invoking histories of their ancestors’ origins and migrations. These stories 
are etched out across the land and sea, punctuated by important sites such 
as abandoned villages, old gardens, and significant trees. Contemporary 
land tenure therefore hinges on received ancestral models of land, 
territory and kinship. However, these models have also been recalibrated 
as people have engaged with Christian ideas and institutions, state laws 
and institutions, and an economy that is highly dependent on extractive 
industries. One of the most striking features of land tenure in Solomon 
Islands—in some parts of the country more than others—is the extent to 
which Solomon Islanders establish, assert, and defend their claims, not 
only by drawing on customary and state-based norms and institutions, 
but also norms and institutions rooted in Christianity. Contemporary 
land tenure is therefore characterised by multiple, overlapping arenas, 
norms and institutions emanating from kastom, Christianity and the state 
as they vary from one community to the next (Monson 2012; see also 
Scott 2007).
This means that land tenure in Solomon Islands is far from static, but 
dynamic and negotiable, with people asserting claims to land by drawing 
on a range of vocabularies, narratives and institutions. These qualities of 
indeterminacy and negotiability have been emphasised in much of the 
recent scholarship on land and natural resource tenure in Melanesia. 
This  literature often draws on ethnographic research in Papua New 
Guinea, and focuses on innovations in landholding and sociality elicited 
by mining and forestry (Brown and Ploeg 1997; Wagner and Evans 
2007; Weiner and Glaskin 2007). While attention has been paid to 
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the ways in which the negotiation of ‘ownership’ is linked to increased 
social and economic differentiation (Rodman 1987; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 
1997; Koczberski and Curry 2004; Bainton 2008), the links between 
‘local’ contests over land and wider processes of state formation remain 
relatively under-explored. This is a theme that has received far greater 
attention in the literature on sub-Saharan Africa, which emphasises that 
the negotiation of land tenure is bound up with the contestation and 
assertion of political authority and leadership, whether by ‘local’ actors 
such as chiefs, or by representatives of the post-colonial nation-state.1
This chapter links questions about social differentiation in land relations 
in Solomon Islands to debates about gender inequality in the exercise 
of formal political authority. I demonstrate that, although land tenure 
is dynamic and contested, different people are differently positioned to 
influence the outcomes of negotiations over land. In particular, once 
contests over land enter the arenas established by the state, it is primarily 
male leaders—often referred to as ‘chiefs’—who perform, endorse and 
reject claims to land as property. While the dominance of senior men in 
these arenas is often perceived by foreign observers as rooted in ‘customary’ 
ideas about ‘who may talk’ about land matters, I suggest that it is also 
linked to long-term processes of colonial intrusion, missionisation, and 
capitalist models of development.
In this chapter, I argue that an individual’s ability to solicit the state’s 
recognition of claims to land is not merely linked to their political authority, 
but that property and authority are in fact mutually constitutive. As is 
the case in neighbouring Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, the Solomon 
Islands’ economy has always been heavily dependent on agricultural 
development and exploitation of natural resources. This means that 
soliciting the state’s recognition of claims to land, trees and other resources 
has become a vital avenue to economic and political power and prestige 
in contemporary Solomon Islands.
The relationship between property and authority also means that land 
disputes have implications that stretch far beyond the local contexts in 
which they initially arise. The recursive constitution of property and 
authority through the state tends to consolidate control over land in 
1  As Sara Berry puts it, ‘contests over land involve contests over authority as well as resources: they 
draw on and reshape relations of power as well as property’ (Berry 2002: 656; see also Lund 2008; 
Sikor and Lund 2009).
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the hands of a small number of men, while reproducing state norms 
and institutions as a masculine domain. Thus contests over land not 
only reflect social differentiation but constitute it; and processes of 
inclusion and exclusion at the national level are intimately entwined with 
the construction and re-inscription of categories of difference through 
contests over the ‘ownership’ of land at the local level.
Property and Emergent Inequality
Land tenure systems in Solomon Islands are dynamic, with multiple 
pathways for making, contesting and sanctioning claims through kastom, 
Christianity and the state. However, not all people are equally well 
positioned to influence the outcomes of negotiations, particularly as they 
occur across different arenas. Indeed, once contests over land enter the 
arenas established by the state, such as land acquisition procedures, it is 
primarily male leaders who perform, endorse and reject claims to land as 
property. Women are rarely listed as land trustees or timber rights holders, 
and they are largely absent from records of public hearings, suggesting 
that their role within the formal legal system is constrained. This is not 
to suggest that women—or indeed many men within communities—are 
unable to exert any influence over land deals and disputes. As I have argued 
elsewhere, women have had highly visible roles in all of the customary 
feasts I have observed, and their strategies for influencing land deals range 
from informal conversations within the household to staging large-scale 
protests (Monson 2011, 2012, 2014). However, across Solomon Islands, 
men and women alike express concern that logging, mining and the sale 
or leasing of land are occurring to the benefit of a small number of men, 
while many men and most women are excluded both from negotiations 
regarding these arrangements and the financial benefits that flow from 
them. Notably, all of these arrangements involve particular claims to 
land (or, in the case of logging, trees) being recognised, legitimated 
and consolidated by state legal and administrative systems. Thus, while 
Solomon Islanders gain and maintain access to resources in a variety of 
ways, it is primarily senior male leaders who are involved in making and 
adjudicating claims to land as property; and it is often senior male leaders 
who stand to gain the most from the legitimation of property by politico-
legal institutions such as chiefs and courts (see Sikor and Lund 2009; 
Hall et al. 2011).
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These inequalities are thrown into sharp relief in struggles over land 
in Kakabona, a series of densely populated settlements built along 
the coastline to the immediate west of the Honiara town boundary.2 
These  villages are occupied by a number of matrilineages, widely 
referred to in Pijin as traeb (‘tribes’) and subtraeb (‘subtribes’). Each of 
these matrilineages is associated with one of two moieties, and there is 
a prohibition on intra-moiety marriage—historically, villages were made 
up of two intermarrying groups.
Land in Kakabona is held under various tenure arrangements. Most of 
the land in the immediate vicinity of the Honiara town boundary has 
been registered and leased under the Land and Titles Act. In formal legal 
terms, this means that it is no longer considered ‘customary land’. These 
parcels are registered in the names of a small number of male leaders 
who, under the terms of the Land and Titles Act, are representatives of 
the landholding group. The extent of registration declines as one moves 
east along the highway and away from Honiara, and customary land 
tenure becomes predominant. Significant tracts of land in this area are 
claimed by the members of one particular matrilineage, who base their 
claim on their descent from those who originally settled and cleared the 
land. However, in the last 30 years there have been a series of transactions 
through which some of this land has been divided up and distributed 
among a number of landholding groups. While these transactions often 
involve cash and are increasingly commercialised, they are also rooted 
in customary practice. Most involve feasting or tsupu, the ceremonial 
exchange of gifts, particularly food and shell money. The maintenance of 
claims to land depends on these feasts and ceremonies being remembered 
through oral histories and emplaced genealogies, known as tutungu 
(Scott 2007; Monson 2012).
Oral histories and government records indicate that social conflict and 
legal disputes regarding land in Kakabona intensified as the urbanisation 
of Honiara gathered pace during the 1970s. Indigenous villages on the 
outskirts of Honiara grew as indigenous Guale people relocated from 
more remote areas. While migrants from other islands initially settled 
on government land inside the town boundary, these settlements quickly 
began to spill out onto customary land. By the 1980s, disputes concerning 
land in Kakabona were regularly coming before the chiefs and courts, 
2  Despite their proximity to the national capital, villages in Kakabona have received only very 
limited scholarly attention.
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often triggered by attempts to register and then lease or sell blocks of 
land under the Land and Titles Act. With just one notable exception, 
all of the disputes I examined involved men coming before the courts to 
make claims on behalf of the landholding group, and in all of the cases, 
the members of dispute resolution forums (whether chiefs or courts) 
were men.
Transcripts of hearings before chiefs and courts reveal that the claims 
made by senior men revolve around: highly complex and non-linear oral 
histories of origin and migration; descriptions of boundaries and sacred 
sites; repeated prestations across several generations; and intermarriage 
between groups and the birth of descendants. These tutungu reveal that 
land tenure on Guadalcanal was historically characterised by a complex web 
of nested and overlapping interests, with particular matrilineages living in 
close proximity to one another and regularly intermarrying. Disentangling 
the history of territorial claims is further complicated by the fact that 
oral histories suggest that the population of this part of Guadalcanal was 
quite mobile well into the twenty-first century. Indeed, it appears that it 
was not until the 1950s that sizeable, permanent settlements began to 
develop in Kakabona (Scott 2007; Monson 2012). However, the process 
of registration under the Land and Titles Act 1996 requires that land 
acquisition officers, chiefs and courts legitimate the claims of some kin 
groups and not others to ‘ownership’ of the land. While exclusive claims 
are rarely (if ever) made, courts often construct a hierarchy of claims, 
describing other groups as ‘living under’ the identified ‘owners’. Under 
Section 195(1) of the Act, the process of registration also requires the 
identification of individuals who may be registered as the ‘duly authorised 
representatives’ of the landholding group, and joint owners on a statutory 
trust. These individuals are, with few exceptions, the individuals who 
appear before land acquisition officers, chiefs and courts, on behalf of 
the successful tribe; and in the vast majority of cases they are senior male 
leaders.
Most of the current trustees were initially nominated by members of the 
landholding group when land registration began to gather pace during 
the 1980s. All are senior men within their landholding groups, and most 
are referred to as ‘chiefs’. The appointment of these men can in some 
respects be traced to long-standing models of masculine leadership: 
historically, a  senior male was usually the spokesperson for the family 
and kin group on all land-related issues. These spokespersons are often 
described, in Pijin, as having the ‘ability to talk’ about land matters. 
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The idea of being ‘able to talk’ about land is important across Guadalcanal, 
and indeed many other parts of Solomon Islands. It depends partly on an 
individual’s level of education and skill in managing land relations within 
the landholding group, as well as with outsiders. Since women often have 
less access to education than do men, they are often less likely to possess 
the skills necessary to negotiate the state legal system and manage land 
transactions. Further, according to some Guadalcanal people, custom 
dictates that women no save tok (‘cannot or should not talk’) about land. 
People in Kakabona often explain that women should ‘stand behind’ 
the men when it comes to speaking about land and dealing with land in 
public arenas. This norm is often explained by reference to the role of men 
as warriors and protectors of women.
It is a principle of both kastom and the state legal system that these trustees 
consult with other members of the landholding group before dealing with 
the land.3 However, there is evidence that trustees have often failed to fulfil 
this obligation. Land in Kakabona has often been sold to migrants from 
other areas, as well as to local landholders who wish to move into new 
areas and establish new hamlets or gardens. Many of these sales have been 
made by trustees, although other members of landholding groups have 
also sold land. These deals are often struck by individuals in exchange for 
cash rather than through the traditional tsupu (feast), without adequate 
consultation of other members of the landholding group, and without 
distributing the proceeds of sale. As a result, land transactions are often 
highly controversial and a significant source of conflict.
This suggests that received ancestral models of leadership are now being 
translated into the state legal system in a manner that turns the customary 
‘ability to speak’ about land into increasingly individuated control over 
land. People often explain that these trustees were nominated at the time 
of registration because they were ‘big men’ and skilled spokespersons who 
were trusted to represent the interests of the group. However, registration 
fixes their control over land and the wealth that flows from it, enhancing 
their authority over land vis-à-vis other members of the landholding 
group even further. Thus, while the dominance of senior men in state 
legal arenas may be partially traced to ‘customary’ ideas about ‘who may 
talk’ about land matters, it also needs to be understood in terms of the 
structural characteristics of the state legal system, which have worked to 
3  See, for example, the then Chief Justice Muria’s comments in Kasa v Biku [2004] SBHC 62.
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facilitate the simplification of the land tenure system and enable certain 
male leaders to consolidate their authority over land, people and kastom. 
Furthermore, I suggest that the dominance of senior men in state legal 
arenas also needs to be understood in terms of long-term processes of 
colonial intrusion, missionisation, and capitalist models of development.
The Recursive Constitution of Property 
and Authority
An individual’s ability to solicit the state’s recognition of claims to land 
is closely entwined with the political authority they enjoy. Indeed, 
following Christian Lund (2008), I suggest that property and authority 
are in fact mutually constitutive. Since the earliest period of colonisation, 
the pursuit of control over natural resources in Solomon Islands has been 
tightly bound up with the assertion, consolidation and dispersal of political 
authority. This has occurred at multiple scales, ranging from localised 
struggles over the territory between adherents to different missions, 
to constitutional debates about federalism and freedom of movement.
With the notable exception of Alice Pollard’s work (2007), the scholarly 
literature on Solomon Islands focuses on male institutions of leadership 
and pays very little attention to the political roles and power of women 
prior to colonisation. Two key characteristics emerge from this literature. 
First, in many societies, male leadership appears to have been characterised 
by a triumvirate of idealised leadership functions involving a leader in 
warfare; an entrepreneurial feast giver; and a religious leader.4 For example, 
on Guadalcanal, these idealised masculine roles were concentrated in the 
taovia (often referred to in Pijin as jif or big man), malaghai (warrior), and 
vele (sorcerer). It is important to note that oral histories in Guadalcanal, as 
in many parts of Solomon Islands, clearly indicate that the idealised roles 
of the chief and warrior often overlapped and found expression in a single 
person (Aswani 2008).
Second, in many parts of Solomon Islands, male leaders gained prestige 
primarily by winning followers and mobilising people and resources in 
warfare, feast giving and ceremonial occasions. The taovia of Guadalcanal 
4  For Malaita, see Hogbin (1939) and Keesing (1978); for Marovo, see Hviding (1996); 
for Guadalcanal, see Kabutaulaka (2002).
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were never assured of their status as leaders, but required to constantly 
compete with others by: making prestations of pigs and shell valuables; 
mobilising dancers and bamboo pan pipers; establishing large gardens; 
and leading warfare (Hogbin 1934, 1937, 1964; Bathgate 1993). 
Hereditary preference played a larger role in some parts of the country, 
but still depended largely on the ability to gain prestige. In the New 
Georgia group, the role of the bangara was generally achieved through 
a combination of male primogeniture, alliance through marriage, and 
leadership ability (Hviding 1996). A man who demonstrated exceptional 
skill as a warrior and leader, and who built up and distributed wealth, 
might become a bangara; and equally, a young man who lacked these 
qualities might be overlooked in favour of a more capable uncle, brother 
or cousin. Political leadership was therefore achieved more than it was 
ascribed, and characterised by a high degree of contestation.
Missionisation, the development of the cash economy, and the 
‘pacification’ policies of the colonial authorities all worked to transform 
these pre-colonial systems of male leadership. The idealised masculine 
role of the warrior receded with the cessation of warfare; and though the 
fear of the power of pre-Christian religious authorities never disappeared 
altogether, it probably abated in the face of the new source of spiritual 
power promoted by Christian missionaries. European missionaries often 
regarded feasts as a waste of resources and actively discouraged them, 
contributing to a decline in an important path to prestige and increasingly 
individuated control over wealth. While wealth had previously been 
distributed throughout the community in order to gain prestige, it was 
increasingly used by the individual who earned it (Hogbin 1934: 252). 
However, many of the old avenues to prestige were in decline just as 
new opportunities to assert and consolidate authority were opening 
up. The ‘big men’ within communities were among the first to engage 
in commercial trade, and the language and commercial skills they 
acquired through trade with Europeans soon enabled them to sell land 
to Europeans and retain the financial benefits of such transactions. Those 
men who could speak English or Pijin were able to further consolidate 
their authority following the implementation of a system of indirect rule 
that involved the identification and appointment of ‘village headmen’ and 
‘constables’.5 Indirect rule, like the new commercial opportunities opened 
5  British colonial regimes in Melanesia, like those elsewhere in the world, sought to establish and 
exercise administrative control through a version of indirect rule (see Berry 1992).
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up by colonisation, provided new avenues for the enactment of political 
authority and territoriality—opportunities that were overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the hands of those men who were able to convince British 
colonial officers and foreign planters to recognise them as leaders, ‘chiefs’, 
and the ‘owners’ of the land.
Processes of rearrangement of customary tenure and leadership therefore 
worked to legitimate and consolidate the authority of some segments 
of customary polities while de-legitimating and undermining others. In 
particular, leadership roles historically associated with women were usually 
overlooked and ignored. While existing scholarly literature pays very little 
attention to the political authority of women prior to colonisation, oral 
histories often attest to its importance. For example, the Bareke people of 
central Marovo Lagoon frequently refer to the fact that they historically 
had three important institutions of leadership: the bangara, siama, and 
vuluvulu. The bangara is often translated in Pijin as jif (chief ), while 
the role of the siama was tied to pre-Christian religious beliefs and pre-
colonial warfare. The term vuluvulu has multiple meanings, one of which 
refers to the people who constitute the blood core of a matrilineage. 
The term is also used to refer to particular women of high standing and, 
in this sense, is often translated as meaning the ‘first born girl’, the ‘oldest 
female’, a ‘princess’ or a ‘queen’. However, European missionaries and 
colonial administrators alike consistently recognised some segments of 
the local polity, notably the idealised masculine role of the bangara, while 
seemingly unaware of the vuluvulu and actively undermining the siama. 
For example, European missionaries incorporated the term bangara into 
Christian liturgies and hymns, and Protectorate officials perceived kastom 
as collapsing political authority and control over land into the single 
figure of the bangara (Monson 2011). This enabled the bangara to convert 
their historical roles as group leaders to those of ‘chiefs’ and ‘landowners’, 
strengthening their political power in a context where customary forms of 
land tenure and leadership were already being renegotiated, and customary 
leaders were struggling to secure their continued relevance.
Perhaps the pre-eminent example of such a leader is Ngatu, a man from 
Marovo Lagoon who successfully negotiated the multitude of changes 
occurring during the early twentieth century. Despite being unable 
to assert his authority as a warrior due to the ‘pacification’ policies of 
the colonial authorities, Ngatu was able to negotiate new paths to 
prestige by attaching himself to the new orders of the church and state. 
He introduced Methodism to Marovo and became a critical leader within 
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the Methodist mission. He was able to use his reputation as a ‘chief ’ or 
‘big man’ to sell land to the government, and to generate cash through the 
establishment of a large-scale cooperative scheme of copra production, 
transport and marketing (Bennett 1987:  116,  224). The introduction 
of indirect rule consolidated Ngatu’s authority even further—he was 
appointed District Headman for Marovo, and held the post until it 
was abolished in the 1940s, at which point he became a member of the 
Native Court instead. Court records, oral histories and written histories 
all indicate that Ngatu was very heavily involved in determining land 
disputes (Carter 1981: 60). His position as bangara and his appointment 
by Protectorate officials must have had a recursive effect, for in the process 
of legitimating some claims to land, and not others, Ngatu’s authority was 
simultaneously reinforced. Put another way, as local claimants sought to 
secure their rights to land by having their claims recognised by Ngatu, 
that process worked to consolidate Ngatu’s authority in the eyes of both 
local people and Protectorate officials. Indeed, Ngatu was so successful in 
consolidating his authority within each of the arenas of kastom, church 
and state that he ultimately became regarded as the ‘chief ’ of a huge area, 
from Nggatokae to Ramata.
Processes of adaptation, contestation and legitimation of claims to both 
natural resources and politico-legal authority have therefore worked to 
benefit some segments of the customary polity more than others, with 
implications for property and authority today. Marovo is well known not 
only as a major tourist destination in Solomon Islands, but as the site of 
some of the most socially and environmentally destructive logging in the 
country. This occurs under the Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act 
1978, which provides (in Section 7) that any person who is interested 
in logging customary land must apply to the Commissioner of Forest 
Resources for consent to negotiate with the relevant government 
authorities and the ‘owners’ of land and timber rights. In theory, under 
Sections 8 and 9, the relevant provincial government then holds a ‘timber 
rights hearing’ at which it determines a range of issues, including who 
holds timber rights; who the customary landowners are; and how profits 
are to be shared.6 This information is then recorded in a ‘certificate of 
customary ownership’, commonly known as a ‘form two’. The individuals 
6  Note also that the courts have interpreted the Act to distinguish between ownership of customary 
land and ownership of trees: Allardyce Lumber Company Limited [1989] SBHC 1; Gandley Simbe 
v East Choiseul Area Council [1997] SBHC 67; Mateni v Hite [2003] SBHC 144. This distinction has 
added to the complex maze of claims, negotiations and contracts associated with logging.
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listed in the ‘form two’ are deemed to be entitled to negotiate with the 
logging company. Under Part III of the Act, there is a right of appeal to 
the Customary Land Appeal Court, the decision of which is final and 
conclusive, subject only to the original jurisdiction of the High Court.
The regulation of forestry in Solomon Islands is notoriously complex, and 
the problems surrounding logging have stimulated a wealth of research 
on collusion between foreign logging companies and local politicians, 
irregularities in the timber rights hearing process, poor monitoring and 
enforcement, and the uneven distribution of royalties (Frazer 1997; 
Dauvergne 1998; Bennett 2000; Kabutaulaka 2000, 2001; Wairiu 2007; 
Wairiu and Nanau 2010; Allen 2011a; McDougall 2011). The Forest 
Resources and Timber Utilisation Act presupposes that it is possible to 
identify and mark boundaries between social groups, as well as delineate 
the ‘land’ and ‘timber’ to which they hold ‘rights’. As a result, debates 
about the ‘ownership’ of land and trees in timber rights hearings and 
before courts often revolve around competing unilineal interpretations 
of customary tenure (Hviding 1993, 2002; Foale and Macintyre 2000). 
The process of making and legitimating claims to land and trees as property 
results in relationships between people bound by generations of shared 
descent and shared use of the land being fractured or ‘cut’ (Strathern 
1996; Blomley 2011). In at least one instance, the process of disentangling 
people and marking off social identities and land claims has precipitated 
protracted litigation between a father and son.7
Women and men are differently positioned to influence the outcomes 
of negotiations with logging companies and contests before provincial 
authorities and courts. In practice, negotiations between logging companies 
and landowners have often been underway for a significant period before 
the issue of a ‘form two’. While forested land is widely regarded as being 
the collective territory of the kin group in Marovo, representatives of 
logging companies often focus their efforts on negotiating with particular 
individuals who are identified as being influential with the landowning 
group and are in favour of logging (Wairiu 2007; Kabutaulaka 2008: 252). 
In many instances, proponents of logging form ‘companies’, a process 
that involves the appointment of particular individuals as company 
directors (see Scales 2003:  105; also Kabutaulaka 2008:  252, 2011:  7, 
7  I have not cited the case here in order to preserve the privacy of the parties. However, the 
ongoing dispute resulted in at least nine determinations in the High Court and the Court of Appeal 
between 2003 and 2010.
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104–5, 185ff). The individuals who are appointed as company directors, 
involved in negotiations, and signatories to agreements are nearly (if not 
always) men—some are recognised as chiefs, and some are younger, 
entrepreneurial individuals who are likely to be recognised as chiefs in the 
future (Hviding and Bayliss-Smith 2000).8 Many of the younger men have 
become powerful due to their relatively high level of formal education and 
literacy, their understanding of regulatory frameworks governing forestry, 
and their ability to persuade elderly—sometimes illiterate—senior men to 
endorse and promote logging.9 As was the case with traders, missionaries 
and colonial administrators before them, loggers and provincial authorities 
today wish to identify and engage with individuals rather than entire 
matrilineages—a process that is facilitated by the requirements of the state 
legal system. This has enabled a small number of individuals to carve out a 
‘big man’ status and strengthen their power base within their matrilineage 
by obtaining and distributing logging revenue (Bennett 1987, 2000; 
Wairiu 2007). These processes have implications that stretch far beyond 
the local contexts in which they initially arise.
Property, Authority and Post-Colonial 
State Formation
Despite the manifest weaknesses of the state in Solomon Islands, it has 
nevertheless constructed and recognised a structure of entitlements for 
some people while diluting the claims of others (Lund 2008: 8–9). This 
has resulted in processes of gendered social differentiation, in which the 
semantic and institutional structures of the state have been reproduced as 
masculine domains. It is generally senior men who mobilise the language 
of state law on behalf of the group before chiefs and courts, men who are 
constructed as the defenders of the land against incursion, senior men 
who are constituted as ‘trustees’, and therefore senior men who control 
the access to revenue so crucial for participation in provincial and national 
politics. These processes have not only ensured that land disputes remain 
a critical arena for the performance of particular models of masculinity, 
but  have produced and reinscribed state institutions as a masculine 
domain.
8  There are also similarities with the practices regarding mining (see Hviding 1993).
9  See also Kabutaulaka (2000, 2001), who emphasised generational differences between men 
in relation to logging on Guadalcanal.
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Since the earliest period of colonisation, economic development in 
Solomon Islands has been based primarily on the extraction of natural 
resources by a relatively small number of large-scale, foreign-owned 
companies. Many of these operations are based on customary land, and 
the state bureaucracy acts as both regulator and intermediary between 
local communities and foreign companies. In this context, soliciting 
the state’s recognition of claims to land and other natural resources 
has become a vital avenue to building economic and political power in 
contemporary Solomon Islands (Hameiri 2007a, 2009). A number of 
scholars have noted that parliamentarians in Solomon Islands invariably 
have substantial logging interests (Bennett 2000; Hviding and Bayliss-
Smith 2000; Allen 2011a), and similarly, many of the men who have been 
successful in establishing themselves as ‘trustees’ of registered land also 
hold significant roles in national and provincial politics.
Securing state recognition of territorial authority has therefore become 
an important means by which to assert authority, not only at the local 
level, but also in provincial and national politics. Provincial and national 
political organisation in Solomon Islands, as in neighbouring Papua 
New Guinea, is extremely unstable and fragmented. For various reasons, 
governing coalitions in Solomon Islands have been characterised by highly 
fluid alliances, in which political cohesion is maintained through highly 
personalised patronage networks, largely involving men (Dinnen 2008a, 
2008b; Allen 2011b). Again like Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands’ 
heavy dependence on primary resources and foreign capital has meant 
that the bulk of cash required to support these patronage networks comes 
from the state, from revenues derived from natural resource extraction 
by foreign-owned corporations, and from foreign donors (Hameiri 
2007a, 2007b; Dinnen 2009; Allen 2011a). As Sinclair Dinnen points 
out, this has worked to maintain social fragmentation and to disperse 
rather than centralise power (Dinnen 2009). The relative fragility of the 
state has contributed to a situation that Edvard Hviding has described as 
‘compressed globalisation’, in which a relatively small number of actors 
engage with a variety of local and global actors, including multinational 
logging, fishing and mining companies, as well as conservationists and 
tourists (Hviding 2003).10 The fragility of government, combined with the 
relatively small and dispersed population, has allowed foreign commercial 
10  Knauft (1999: 242) similarly suggests that Melanesia is notable for the ways in which ‘the local 
intersects the global in axiomatically condensed forms’.
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actors and non-government organisations alike to largely bypass the central 
government and negotiate directly with communities. In some senses, this 
could be praised as contributing to decentralisation and strengthening 
indigenous control over natural resources. Yet in practice, control over 
negotiations is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number 
of people, primarily male leaders. Thus local contests over land and 
leadership are entwined with broader processes of social differentiation 
and state formation that are often extremely condensed in both space and 
time (Hviding 2003).
The implications of these processes of social differentiation must be 
understood in symbolic as much as material terms. Land disputes have 
now become a key arena for the performance of masculine authority and 
prestige, and the ideal spokesperson of the group embodies not only the 
oratorical prowess, but also the aggression and independence, that was 
previously symbolised by the chief and warrior (Scott 2000). Put another 
way, the forms of authority, prestige and solidarity that were previously 
associated with chiefs and warriors now find their coalesced expression 
in the ideal representative of the social group in discussions and disputes 
regarding land. This serves to construct men, rather than women, as 
the ideal spokespersons of the group. Furthermore, the performance of 
authority in state arenas works to entrench the authority of particular 
male leaders over land, so that the roles of ‘spokesperson’ and ‘trustee’ are 
mutually constitutive.
The implications of these processes stretch from local-level struggles over 
land through to participation in the exercise of formal political authority 
at the provincial and national level. Solomon Islands has one of the worst 
records in the world in terms of women’s participation in the national 
parliament.11 I suggest that the dominance of male leaders, and the absence 
of most women and many men from the courts and the parliament, 
are closely entwined. Soliciting the state’s recognition of claims to land 
has become a vital, if not the pre-eminent, route to building masculine 
authority and prestige in contemporary Solomon Islands. The recursive 
constitution of property and political authority through the state therefore 
works to consolidate control over land in the hands of a small number of 
men, while simultaneously producing and reinscribing state norms and 
institutions as a masculine—even hypermasculine—domain.
11  Only two women have so far been elected to it: Hilda Kari held a seat for two terms in the 1980s, 
and in 2012, Vika Lusibaea was elected in a by-election for the seat formerly held by her husband.
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Conclusion
Customary land tenure in Solomon Islands is highly dynamic and 
negotiable, comprised of an ever-shifting mosaic of norms and institutions 
emanating from kastom, church and state. Such flexibility undoubtedly 
opens up multiple pathways for negotiating access to land, but not all 
of these pathways are equally accessible to all people. While members 
of landholding communities have a variety of means by which to claim 
access to land, once contests over land enter the arenas established by 
the state, it is primarily male leaders who perform and adjudicate claims 
to land as property. Indeed, these arenas have become crucial sites for 
the performance of masculine authority and prestige, meaning that 
property and authority are not only recursively constituted, but inscribed 
as masculine. Securing state recognition of control over land is therefore 
intimately intertwined not only with the performance of masculine 
authority and prestige at the local level, but also in provincial and national 
politics. The mutually constitutive relationship between property and 
authority works to consolidate control over land in the hands of a small 
number of male elites while reproducing state norms and institutions 
as a  masculine domain. This means that contests over land cannot be 
dismissed as parochial struggles over economic resources, nor do they 
merely ‘reflect’ social differentiation. Rather, contests over property 
emerge from and are productive of social differentiation in ways that are 
not merely confined to ‘the local,’ but inextricably entwined with contests 
over belonging, citizenship, political authority, and state formation.
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Afterword: Land Transformations 
and Exclusion across Regions
Philip Hirsch
Introduction
The preceding chapters of this book give a central place to the Powers of 
Exclusion framework for understanding transformations in land relations, 
as developed in our 2011 book on Southeast Asia (Hall et al. 2011). 
A couple of the main aspects of the two books make for an interesting 
comparison. The first is that each employs a regional frame of reference to 
explore themes in changing land relations. The second is their respective 
development and application of a common conceptual framework. These 
commonalities beg the twin questions I seek to address in this chapter:
• Are there particular regional characteristics and dynamics that mark 
land relations with reference to exclusionary processes?
• Is the conceptual approach developed in one region applicable or 
adaptable to another?
These questions are explored first by considering what a regional approach 
to land relations might mean. The main part of this Afterword then makes 
a number of comparative observations between Melanesia and Southeast 
Asia, drawing out implications for the ways in which powers of exclusion 
help frame our understanding of commonalities and differences between 
KASTOM, PROPERTy AND IDEOLOGy
406
regional patterns of changing land relations. The essay concludes with 
a recap of tensions between common forces reshaping land relations across 
both regions, on the one hand, and regional specificity on the other.
A Regional Approach to Land Relations
During our several writing retreats as we co-authored Powers of Exclusion, 
Derek Hall, Tania Murray Li and I wondered out loud on a number of 
occasions whether there would be uptake of our approach at a wider 
geographical and interdisciplinary level, with reference to country cases 
beyond our regional area of interest in Southeast Asia, or—and most 
ambitiously—with specific reference to other world regions. Reviews, 
informal discussion, and feedback from colleagues working in the field of 
agrarian studies and land-oriented activism in Africa, Latin America and 
South Asia have been positive in this regard, and they have encouraged us 
with the sense that the Powers of Exclusion framework does indeed have 
wider geographical resonance. However, not until the present volume has 
there been a sustained monograph-length effort to test the framework 
with reference to another world region.
What does a regional approach to understanding changing land relations 
entail? Unlike ‘fugitive’ resources that move across jurisdictions, such 
as water in transboundary river basins, or riverine and ocean migratory 
fisheries, and unlike environmental pollution such as smoke haze or 
greenhouse gas emissions, land is fixed in space and hence is not often 
treated as a transboundary resource. Land is also jealously protected as 
a national asset that is subject to national policy prerogative and ownership, 
or to more locally specific arrangements associated with ethnic identity. 
Yet despite this fixity of land in particular locales and national spaces, land 
is also subject to regional analysis in at least three main respects.
First, regions are often defined by particular characteristics that have 
relevance to land relations. Cultural norms such as patron-clientage, 
reciprocity, structures of political authority, and religious affiliation have 
regional associations, albeit in ways usually much more complex than 
simple stereotyping allows for. Also, regional location has both historically 
and in a more contemporary sense subjected land relations to external 
economic influences in particular ways. Different world regions have 
been subjected to quite specific colonial and post-colonial influences, 
and to Cold War and post-Cold War changes. Agro-ecological patterns 
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of farming characterise regions, with implications for land use, land 
tenure, and rural social relations. Similarly, population dynamics within 
and between regions are location-specific, with implications for pressures 
on land.
Second, regional political-economic dynamics are integral to the defining 
of regions beyond more archaic and static cultural bases for regional 
demarcation. The discursive construction of regions is closely linked to 
these dynamics, so that, for example, Southeast Asia and subregions within 
it have been associated with institutionalised regional arrangements such 
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Greater Mekong 
Subregion. Regions are also naturalised around river basins, shared 
maritime zones, island groups, and so on. The governance of natural 
resources within, and with reference to, these regional constructions 
is in part shaped by institutionalised arrangements, aid programs, and 
other interventions that adopt a regional approach. In Southeast Asia, for 
example, the Greater Mekong Subregion’s neoliberal agenda of facilitating 
private sector-led infrastructure development and transboundary flows of 
goods and investment capital brings with it a suite of policy and legal 
reforms geared to strengthening private property rights in land, enhancing 
wealth creation through markets (not only in mobile goods and services 
but also through mortgageable land), and through other measures. In the 
Pacific, regional arrangements and external interventions through aid 
flows appear to be much more circumspect in the ways in which they 
intervene in customary property arrangements.
Third, intra-regional flows and regional interaction with the global 
economy bind regions, internally and externally, in ways that have 
significant implications for land relations. In particular, concern during 
the past decade over land grabbing plays into regional dynamics. 
But  these dynamics are often quite specific to one region or another. 
In Southeast Asia, transboundary land deals dominate the investment 
in boom crops such as rubber and sugar. In mainland Southeast Asia, 
or the Greater Mekong Subregion, investments by Chinese, Thai and 
Vietnamese companies in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar respectively 
forge a particular regional dynamic, which is matched to a lesser degree 
by Malaysian and Singaporean investments in oil palm in Indonesia. 
In  Melanesia, in  contrast, this intra-regional dynamic is lacking, and 
indeed, much of the investment through land deals is from the region’s 
northern neighbours.
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Some Comparative Reflections Between 
Melanesia and Southeast Asia
Regional patterns of changing land relations in Melanesia and Southeast 
Asia reflect each region’s historical experience of colonisation and state 
formation, as well as innate cultural and agro-ecological specificities. 
We can explore commonalities and contrasts with reference to the four 
key powers of exclusion that we set out (in Hall et al. 2011): markets, 
regulation, force and legitimation. First, however, it is useful to consider 
the respective regional contexts in which the powers operate.
The Politico-Historical Regional Backcloth
Agrarian structures are the basis on which property relations in land 
develop. Southeast Asian and Melanesian societies have quite different 
backgrounds in their pre-colonial and colonial-era structuring of land and 
labour vis-à-vis capital and central authority.
Historically, paddy rice has been the staple crop in lowland parts of both 
mainland, and insular and peninsular, Southeast Asia; and even in upland 
areas dominated by swiddening, rice has provided a main staple. Rice 
is commonly associated with smallholder peasant farming (Bray 1986), 
and historically irrigation systems have associated such cultivation with 
wider patterns of kingship, quasi-feudal land relations, and patronage. 
Of course, smallholder farming varies across the region, and histories of 
colonialism, revolution, land reforms, and other processes are quite diverse 
and country-specific. Nevertheless, land issues were prominent in most of 
Southeast Asia’s anti-colonial grievances, in post-Independence conflicts, 
in the left-right struggles of the Cold War, and in the post-revolutionary 
regimes and subsequent reforms of Indochina.
In Melanesia, on the other hand, swidden cultivation systems and the 
absence of pre-colonial or colonial state involvement in small-scale 
agriculture, which has been mainly swidden-based, provides a very different 
backcloth for land relations. This is related to the absence of large-scale 
kingship, and the tribal, clan and lineage basis for authority, including 
assignation of individual and communal rights over land. Similarly, the 
decolonisation process in Melanesia reinforced the quite different agrarian 
structure and the role of the post-Independence states, which were shaped 
much less by Cold War dynamics than in Southeast Asia.
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Additional to the different colonial and post-colonial histories of the two 
regions, the scale at which society is organised around land influences the 
nature of exclusion in the two regions in question. The intimate exclusions 
discussed in Powers of Exclusion are considered in terms of familial and 
neighbourly relations at the village level. In the smaller scale societies of 
the Pacific, personal ties also operate within the government system to 
a greater degree and in a seemingly more obvious sense, and with greater 
impunity, than in larger bureaucracies. The quasi-feudal arrangements 
around land and labour in Southeast Asia that have shaped revolutionary 
and reform programs alike are more or less absent in Melanesia, and the 
tribal rather than peasant-based nature of society has, as a result, tended 
to show greater persistence than in Southeast Asia.
Land is political everywhere, but in some cases it is more overtly related to 
big-picture political agendas than in others. The politics of exclusionary 
processes around land have had quite different meanings in the two regions 
in question. Rural support for anti-colonial movements in Southeast Asia 
was closely linked to resentment over impositions on land and labour 
(Scott 1976, 1985). Land-to-the-tiller campaigns became embroiled 
in Cold War tensions, both through revolutionary movements and in 
counter-revolutionary pre-emptive reforms. Some socialist experiments 
went beyond land redistribution, with programs of cooperativisation 
and collectivisation, including the extreme example of Khmer Rouge 
elimination of all individual claims to, and family working of, land.
In Melanesia, the politics of decolonisation were nowhere near as closely 
tied up in agrarian grievances as they were in Southeast Asia. Land reform 
has never assumed the redistributive agenda that it has in Southeast Asia 
(Chapter 1, this volume), whether through the vehicle of successful 
communist revolutions or as a pre-emptive measure against revolutionary 
movements. Ironically, because of this absence of socialist land reform, 
Melanesia has also not been subject to exclusions associated with the post-
socialist market-based reforms, which has been one of the strongest forces 
for renewed concentration of land in Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and—
in a different geopolitical and structural context—Myanmar (Hirsch and 
Scurrah 2015).
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Markets: Boom Crops and Land Grabbing
The phenomenon of land grabbing has drawn global attention to injustices 
associated with unequal political-economic power and has revived interest 
in land questions around the world more generally. Driven in particular 
by the 2008 food price spike and concerns over underinvestment in 
agriculture that encouraged or legitimised a spate of ‘land deals’, land 
grabbing has increasingly come under scrutiny at a number of levels, one 
of which is definitional. Land grabbing is not only open to discursive 
interpretation, but it also manifests itself in regionally specific ways.
In mainland Southeast Asia, the so-called land grab takes a number of 
forms. Most often discussed is the rush of transboundary investment 
in agricultural and other land-hungry resource projects by commercial 
interests from the more industrialised and land-scarce countries of China, 
Thailand and Vietnam in the perceived land and natural resource-abundant 
countries of Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. In reality, domestically driven 
land grabbing by the military in Myanmar, and by crony tycoons in 
Cambodia, is equally significant. Large-scale land accumulation has also 
accelerated in Thailand, historically a country of smallholders (Laovakul 
2015). In insular and peninsular Southeast Asia, Malaysian investment in 
oil palm in particular is associated with dispossession of ethnic minorities 
and with forest clearing. Despite the global legitimation of land grabs by 
concern over food shortages, the boom crops behind much of Southeast 
Asia’s land grabbing are mainly industrial, including rubber and crops 
grown for biofuels. The latter are often what have been termed ‘flex crops’ 
(Borras et al. 2014), such as oil palm and cassava, but the driving force 
for their expansion has mainly come from the biofuel sector. While 
market demand has driven expansion, the large-scale concessions granted 
to transnational regional capital have been facilitated by the neoliberal 
notion of underutilised lands whose suboptimal use can be corrected by 
market-based measures. This follows longer standing colonial practices 
that often characterised swidden fallows as ‘wastelands’ (Ferguson 2014).
In Melanesia, the land onto which oil palm and other boom crops 
have expanded has nominally remained in customary hands. However, 
arrangements for alienation of such lands are evident in various forms, 
including the special agricultural and business leases (SABLs) in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG), which provide an institutional means for concentration 
of land in the hands of corporate interests while maintaining nominal 
customary tenure (Chapter 6, this volume).
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Regulation: Land Formalisation Through Titling
In Southeast Asia, marketisation of land often goes hand in hand with 
formalisation through land titling. Whether marketisation creates the 
demand for titling or vice versa remains an open discussion. In Melanesia, 
given that only a very small proportion of land is under freehold or 
state land leases, land exclusions are driven by market pressures through 
informal transactions, for the most part on customary land (Chapter 5, 
this volume). This implies that kastom provides a sound basis for relational 
market transactions that tend to fly in the face of conventional thinking 
about formalisation and individualisation of property rights as a basis 
for market transactions in much of Southeast Asia. Yet at the same time, 
formalisation works within the framework of customary arrangements 
around land to privilege certain groups with respect to boundary making 
and to catalyse innovative exclusionary institutional arrangements that 
exclude even in the absence of fully individualised land title (Chapter 12, 
this volume).
The authors of the introductory chapter to this volume follow Rose 
(1994) in suggesting that social relations embedded in property in the 
Spearhead states of Melanesia are concealed by formalisation through 
registration under Torrens Title. Most of the land titling in Southeast 
Asia has similarly been carried out under programs employing the Torrens 
system of title by registration, that is, without reference to historical 
lineage of possession. Land titling programs have received significant 
technical and financial support from the Australian government and the 
World Bank. Most have been run by the Australian company Land Equity 
International, an offshoot of the surveying arm of the Australian mining 
giant BHP Billiton. Thailand’s land titling program, established in the 
mid-1980s, served as a model that was adopted in Laos, the Philippines, 
and to varying degrees in other Southeast Asian countries. While these 
programs were the target of critique, and have faced significant challenges 
in their importing of particular assumptions about property rights systems 
developed in capitalist economies under mainly liberal democratic 
governance, there has been relatively little resistance to their adoption. 
In part, this may be attributable to the post-socialist economic contexts 
in which market-based institutions are being developed quite aggressively 
by the respective governments of countries such as Laos, Cambodia, 
Myanmar and Vietnam.
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In Melanesia, in contrast, the usurping of customary land tenure by 
individualised property rights has been subject to heated debate (Hughes 
2004; Fingleton 2005). The same company that implemented the main 
Torrens Title-based land titling programs in several Southeast Asian 
countries, Land Equity International, has more recently led Vanuatu’s 
Land Program, but without succeeding in overcoming the nepotistic 
or otherwise corrupt practices of ministers gifting land to government 
officers. Because of the patronage relations in a small-scale society, this 
leasing of state land is referred to as another level of ‘intimate exclusion’ 
(Chapter 9, this volume).
An interesting point of comparison emerges in the formalisation of 
customary land tenure. On the one hand, the restriction of title to 
collectively managed land subject to rights of use by association with 
a  particular community, clan, or other group serves as a protection 
against alienation of individual land title, whether through voluntary 
decision or as a result of distress sale. In parts of Southeast Asia, 
customary rights associated with locale or ethnic distinction continue 
to play a role in negotiating tenure arrangements that push back on the 
neoliberal model of fully alienable property rights in land. In eastern 
Indonesia, for example, farmers appear to give priority to security against 
alienation rather than individually mortgageable and alienable property 
rights following the neoliberal model (Kristiansen and Sulistiawati 
2016). In northeastern Cambodia, the 2001 Land Law has provided the 
basis for community title in indigenous communities, albeit following 
a convoluted and expensive bureaucratic process. But, at the same time, 
formalisation of customary lands also raises the spectre of ‘powerful men’, 
comparable with those mentioned in Chapters 1 and 9 in this volume, 
excluding fellow members of the customary group and even leasing out 
the land in question in a process echoing Powers of Exclusion’s ‘intimate 
exclusions’ (Chapter 6, this volume). Milne (2013) presents an interesting 
such case in northeastern Cambodia, where some farmers have opted for 
individual over community title out of concern that the latter can be 
exploited by unscrupulous leaders. These intimate exclusions also take 
on an important gender dimension in Ni-Vanuatu social relations in the 
process of formalisation (Chapter 10, this volume).
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Force: Scales of Authoritarianism
In Powers of Exclusion, our consideration of force as a power of exclusion 
looks largely at the ways in which violence or threats of violence serve 
to exclude, beyond the enforceable regulatory power of the state and 
often by extra-legal means. In Southeast Asia, state authoritarianism has 
waned and waxed, and it has taken various forms ranging from outright 
military dictatorship to illiberal communist regimes, including regimes 
best characterised as ‘neoliberal authoritarian’ (Springer 2009). Control 
over land and restrictions on land-based activism or right of redress for 
land grabbing and related injustices are a significant part of the extra-
constitutional exercise of authority, such as that exerted in the enforced 
disappearance of community development leader Sombath Somphone 
in Laos in December 2012.1 Elsewhere, notably in Cambodia and the 
Philippines, violence with impunity is carried out or threatened by those 
with direct vested interests in land, often supported by connections in 
high places. As land prices have skyrocketed across the region, so the 
threat of violence has pervaded land disputes.
The association between state power and local violence is not so apparent 
in this volume. Rather, local and highly gendered structures of authority 
appear to wield this power of exclusion more autonomously. This is not 
to suggest that such power is unrelated to wider developments. On the 
contrary, in Vanuatu we see local powerful men acting as ‘masters of 
modernity’ (Chapter 9, this volume), and an interweaving of property and 
authority in Solomon Islands such that ‘land disputes have now become 
a key arena for the performance of masculine authority and prestige’ 
(Chapter 13, this volume). Furthermore, also in Solomon Islands and 
perhaps related to the relatively small-scale society within which violent 
or potentially violent land disputes are played out, conflict is constitutive 
not only of local social relations but also of wider political authority in 
a manner that helps shape state formation (Chapter 13, this volume).
Both Melanesia and Southeast Asia exhibit violence in exclusions based 
on ethno-territorial claims (Hall et al. 2011: 11; Chapter 2, this volume). 
But in Melanesia, such violence extends into peri-urban and even urban 
zones, whereas it tends to be concentrated in peripheral frontier lands 
in Southeast Asia. The centrality of clan, tribe and lineage in social and 
political organisation in Melanesia means that state and kastom co-exist 
1  See the website www.sombath.org/en/.
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within a more singular polity, particularly with reference to land, than in 
the more centralised and much larger states of Southeast Asia. The fact 
that the ruling regimes in the latter are all associated with a numerically 
dominant ethnic majority claiming national patrimony also gives ethno-
territorial land claims a different place and role with respect to the 
distinction between extra-legal force and state-sanctioned violence.
Legitimation: Custom, Conservation 
and Developmentalism
In Melanesia, the status of customary landholder carries a great deal more 
weight in legitimising smallholders, not only to farm and live on the land 
in question, but also to derive resource rents or compensation payments 
when outsiders extract value from the land (Chapter 1, this volume). 
However, the role of kastom is complex. At one level, it is often understood 
as an inclusive basis for counter-movements to keep exclusionary market 
forces at bay. At another level, however, kastom can be a legitimating 
power of ‘intimate’ exclusion in its own right, particularly as it interacts 
with rights of chiefly authority (Chapter 11, this volume).
In both Melanesia and Southeast Asia, conservation has been a legitimating 
pretext for exclusion. In particular, forest carbon schemes (Hall et al. 
2011: 84; Chapter 8, this volume) have facilitated the identification of 
areas to be excised from agricultural use in the name of forest protection. 
It is noteworthy that market principles underlie such schemes, illustrating 
the overlaps in powers of exclusion in both cases.
In both regions also, large-scale land acquisition has been legitimated by the 
investment that large plantation schemes attract for relatively high value 
‘boom crops’, which we described as cases of ‘volatile exclusion’. In PNG, 
oil palm dominates this kind of investment (Chapter 7, this volume), 
and SABLs are the key vehicle for investors to gain access to customary 
land. They do so through a process facilitated but not brokered by state 
authorities. This valorisation of land potential in pursuit of productivity 
and profits is a response to market forces, but more immediately it is 
legitimised by the promises of modernity contained in the land use itself 
and the associated infrastructure that it attracts. These developments 
are typically carried out as ‘agro-forestry’ projects, although it should be 
noted that this term denotes a peculiar set of practices in Melanesia—
logging followed by plantation or agricultural development—whereas 
in Southeast Asia, it refers to integrated land uses mixing annual and 
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perennial crops, or sometimes—as in the colonial-era taungya system in 
Burma—a progressive succession of swidden systems into silvicultural 
systems as shifting cultivation is phased out in favour of long-term teak 
rotations.
There are commonalities between upland Southeast Asia and Melanesia in 
the legitimation of possession in shifting cultivation systems through the 
act of cultivating the land. In both regions, such possession is traditionally 
a temporary right of exclusion (Chapter 1, this volume), albeit one whose 
form and relative impermanence varies greatly from one agro-ecological 
and ethnic context to another. Similarly, in both regions, there are 
many cases where exclusive tree ownership may not coincide with the 
recognition of landownership of the plot on which the trees are growing 
(Peluso 1995).
A key contrast in the legitimation of exclusion through colonial or post-
colonial state-assigned property rights occurs in the realm of customary 
tenure. Whereas land alienated by titling in most Southeast Asian countries 
is more or less off-limits for customary claims, Torrens Title continues 
to be contested in all of the Spearhead states discussed in the current 
volume, and Vanuatu even went to the extent of abolishing freehold land 
after Independence (Chapter 1, this volume). Powers of Exclusion tends 
to focus on state lands, notably the untitled ‘political forest’, as sites of 
contestation in Southeast Asia that are subject to legitimacy-based claims, 
with more emphasis on market-based exclusions in the case of titled 
lands. The situation in Melanesia appears to be considerably more open, 
fluid and contestable, presumably because of the continuing debate on 
the suitability, necessity, or otherwise of alienable property rights in the 
development context of Melanesian societies (Fingleton 2005).
These tensions over property rights find their way into public discourse 
and debates in different ways in each region. In both Melanesia and 
Southeast Asia, the neoliberal argument that legitimates exclusion through 
individualised, alienable land title has considerable traction (Chapter 1, 
this volume), but more so in the latter than in the former. The argument 
tends to be rolled out in Melanesia by certain neoliberal economists as an 
explanation for continuing underdevelopment (Hughes 2004), a notion 
hotly contested by others (Fingleton 2005), whereas in Southeast Asia 
the post-facto neoliberal economic discussion on land titling has long 
sought to measure its effect on productivity (Feder 1987)—a discourse 
that is less challenged, but that raises conundrums on the extent to which 
KASTOM, PROPERTy AND IDEOLOGy
416
public cultivated land in particular should be fully titled (Hirsch 2011). 
In Melanesia, the experience of land tenure reform that violates the moral 
basis of customary land principles through excessive individualisation 
has been one of failure. This does not necessarily exclude outsiders from 
access rights to land, but it requires that such rights are contingent on 
establishing place-based social relationships and enduring goodwill 
between in-migrants and existing customary landowners (Chapter 5, 
this volume). Nonetheless, neoliberal ideology holds increasing sway, 
even in the absence of a Torrens Title system, legitimating exclusionary 
arrangements such as SABLs (Chapter 7, this volume) and ‘special 
economic zones’ (Chapter 12, this volume).
In one respect, the requirement to formalise at the level of customary 
land, rather than by individualisation of titles, has provided a partial 
protection against land alienation in Melanesia. However, it has by no 
means pre-empted land grabbing. The lease-leaseback system in PNG 
allows wholesale alienation and abuse of authority by those in positions 
of power at the community level, who are thereby empowered to do 
documented land deals with external investors (Chapter 6, this volume). 
While the form of such exclusions may be different from state-brokered 
deals in Laos and Cambodia, for example, the effect is not altogether 
different. Nevertheless, land tenure reform in favour of customary group 
title registration in Melanesia might afford greater protection against such 
land grabbing.
The Melanesian ideology of landownership described in this volume 
(Chapter 1, this volume), based in membership of tribes or clans or 
lineages, is quite different from much of what we encounter and describe 
for Southeast Asia in Powers of Exclusion. The formalisation of these 
links as a key process of state formation is similarly difficult to recognise 
in the historical experience of Southeast Asia. The role of land titles 
in identification with the state as a form of urban and even national 
citizenship appears particularly strong in the urban context of Port 
Moresby (Chapter 4, this volume)—a phenomenon that remains under-
explored in Southeast Asia, although a recent study in Bangkok suggests 
important links between land security and a sense of urban belonging in 




What do the foregoing comparative comments reveal about regional 
processes and conceptual applicability of the Powers of Exclusion framework 
across regions? We see a number of common external forces pertinent to 
land relations in both regions: both have been shaped by colonial and 
post-colonial histories that incorporate land as a site of contestation at 
the state-society nexus. Both regions have gone through processes of 
marketisation and formalisation of bounded property arrangements. 
Both are subject to transnational investment and policy reform inspired 
by neoliberal development agendas. Both have seen the emergence and 
problematising of land grabbing. Corruption and violence enters the field 
of land relations in both regions, and in both there have been challenges 
to full commodification of land.
Yet we have also seen regionally specific dynamics. History and culture 
are of paramount importance, but there is also a need for caution in 
explaining regional dynamics in overly simplified historico-cultural terms, 
particularly in a region such as Southeast Asia, which is often considered 
to be an imagined or constructed entity rather than having an innate 
geographical logic (Acharya 2013). The political economy of land grabs 
differs fundamentally between the two regions. In part this may be an 
issue of scale. In the introduction to this volume, the authors raise the 
question of whether the quantum difference in population size of the 
countries in Melanesia and Southeast Asia makes a difference to the 
conceptual framework’s application across regions. For example, we have 
seen that the more ‘intimate’ nature of the political systems in Melanesia 
raises questions of exclusions based on personalised aspects of the political 
process. But beyond scale, the nature of state authority, the very different 
experiences of the Cold War and subsequent reforms, and the difference 
in the drivers and shape of land reform initiatives, also set the regions 
apart.
A final key difference between land struggles in Southeast Asia and 
Melanesia is the significance of urban land conflicts in the latter 
(Chapters 2–4, this volume). This is not to suggest that urban land issues 
are insignificant in Southeast Asia, but there are three reasons for the 
relative absence of urban considerations in Powers of Exclusion. The first 
is simply that we wrote the book as part of a project concerned with the 
agrarian transition in Southeast Asia, and scoped it mainly as a rural-based 
KASTOM, PROPERTy AND IDEOLOGy
418
analysis. The second is that much of the literature and public discussion 
on land issues in Southeast Asia is based on rural land conflicts, which 
have a history of political salience in the region. And the third is that 
most—although far from all—urban land in Southeast Asia is registered 
with private land title, and exclusions are therefore largely market-based, 
so that conflict tends to be less overt in urban than in rural areas. This is 
in direct contrast to the situation in Melanesia. With this in mind, there 
is  still much to learn from this volume in re-addressing urban land 
questions in Southeast Asia through the lens of exclusion.
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